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PETITIONER: BIHARI LAL BATRA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER & ORS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/03/1964

BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M.

CITATION:  1965 AIR  134            1964 SCR  (7) 192

ACT: Evacuee  property-Land allotted to a refugee in urban  area- Allotment  is  invalid  under  the  rules-Displaced  Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955, Rule 2(h).

HEADNOTE: The father of the appellant owned considerable  agricultural property  in Pakistan and he with the members of his  family moved  over to India on partition.  The  appellant’s  father had some unsatisfied claim for allotment and on December 29. 1955  he  was  allotted some plots in Urban  area  within  a certain  municipality.  The appellant’s father died in  1952 and the allotment made was actually to the appellant in lieu of the claim of his father.  On the allotment being made,  a sanad  was issued to the appellant by the Managing  Officer. When the appellant tried to take possession of these  lands, disputes  were  raised by respondents Nos. 4  and  5.  These respondents moved the Assistant Settlement Commissioner  for cancellation  of  the  allotment on the  ground  that  these disputed  plots  were  within an  "urban  area"  within  the meaning  of r. 2(h) of the Displaced  Persons,  Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955 and, therefore, the allotment to  the  appellant  was  contrary  to  law.   The  Assistant Settlement Commissioner accepted the contention of the  res- pondents and allowed the appeal and cancelled the allotment. The  appellant  then applied to the  Chief  Settlement  Com- missioner in revision.  He rejected the petition.  Then  the appellant  moved a petition under Arts. 226 and 227  of  the Constitution before the High Court.  This petition was  also dismissed.  the  High Court granted certificate  of  fitness under Art. 133 of the Constitution and hence the appeal. Held:(i) Where an order making an allotment was set aside by the  Assistant Commissioner or Settlement  Commissioner  the title which was obtained on the basis of the continuance  of that sanad or order also fell with it. Shri Mithoo Shahani v. Union of India, [1964] 7 S.C.R.  103, relied on. (ii)The  contention  of the appellant that r.  2(h)  of  the Displaced  Persons  Compensation and  Rehabilitation  Rules,

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1955,  was unconstitutional as contravening Art. 14  of  the Constitution  must  fail.  This contention is based  on  the basis  of  the proviso to Rule 2(h).  Rule 2(h)  was  framed under  s. 40 of the Act.  This rule along with  other  rules came into force on May 21, 1955.  The allotment was made  to the appellant on December 29, 1955 and the Sanad was  issued two  days later.  In other words the allotment in favour  of the appellant was after the rule came into force and was not one  "already  made" as stated in the proviso  to  r.  2(h). Therefore,  if on the date of the allotment the land was  in an  urban area, the allotment would be governed by the  main para of the definition and the proviso, had no application. 193 The  discrimination  is said to consist in the  rule  having drawn  a dividing line at the date when it came into  force, for  determining  whether the allotment was  valid  or  not. Such a contention is patently self-contradictory.  Every law must have a beginning or time from which it operates, and no rule  which seeks to change the law can be held invalid  for the  mere reason that it effects an alternation in the  law. It is sometimes possible to plead injustice in a rule  which is  made  to operate with retrospective effect, but  to  say that a rule which operates prospectively is invalid  because thereby  a  difference  is made between  the  past  and  the future, is one which cannot be accepted.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 543 of  1962. Appeal from the judgement and order dated November 26,  1959 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 678 1957. Bishan Narain and N. N. Keswani, for the appellant. B.   K.  Khanna and B. R.  G. K. Achar, for respondent  Nos. 1 to 3. D.   N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 4. R.   V. S. Mani and T. R. V. Sastri, for respondent No. 5. March 12, 1964.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- AYYANGAR,  J.-This is an appeal on a certificate of  fitness granted  under Art. 133 by the High Court of Punjab  against the order of that Court dismissing the appellant’s  petition to it under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The  point in controversy lies within a narrow  compass  and hence  of  the voluminous facts we propose to set  out  only those  which are relevant for appreciating  the  contentions urged  before  us.  The father of the appellant  owned  con- siderable agricultural property in Pakistan and he with  the members of his family moved over to India on partition.  The appellant’s  father  was allotted a considerable  extent  of land  in  village Kharar, District Ambala, but  we  are  not concerned  with that.  He had still some  unsatisfied  claim for  allotment and on December 29, 1955 he was  allotted  by the  Managing Officer on quasi-permanent tenure Khasra  Nos. 880,  881  and 882 which were within the municipal  area  of Kharar  with  the regularity of which allotment  alone  this appeal   is  concerned.   It  may  be  mentioned  that   the appellant’s  father had died in 1952 and the allotment  made was  actually to the appellant in lieu of the claim  of  his father.  On the allotment being made, a sanad was issued  to the appellant on December 31, 1955 by the Managing  Officer. When the appellant tried to take possession of these  lands, disputes were raised by respondent& L/P (D) ISCI-7 ..... 194

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Nos.  4  and  5. They were not displaced  persons  but  they claimed  that they had been in possession of  this  property from  a  long  anterior date from which they  could  not  be disturbed  and  also  that the property  could  not  be  the subject  of a valid allotment.  These respondents moved  the Assistant  Settlement Commissioner for cancellation  of  the allotment  and  this appeal was allowed by the  officer  who found that the land comprised in these three khasra  numbers were within an "    urban  area"  within the meaning  of  r. 2(h)    of   the   Displaced   Persons   Compensation    and Rehabilitation   Rules,  1955  and  consequently  that   the allotment  to  the  appellant  was  contrary  to  law.   He, therefore,   cancelled   the   allotment.    The   appellant thereafter  applied to the Chief Settlement Commissioner  in revision and not being successful there moved the High Court by a, petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution.. As stated earlier, this petition was dismissed and it is the correctness  of  this dismissal that is  challenged  in  the appeal before us. Mr.  Bishan Narain, learned Counsel for the appellant  urged in  the main two contentions in support of the appeal.   The first  was  (1) that after the Managing  Officer  granted  a sanad  on December 31, 1955 in the name of the President  of India,  the appellant obtained an indefeasible title to  the property  and that this title could not be displaced  except on  grounds contained in the sanad itself even in the  event of  the  order  of allotment being set aside  on  appeal  or revision.   We  have considered this point  in  Shri  Mithoo Shahani and Ors. v. The Union of India and Ors.(1) which was pronounced  on  March  10, 1964 and for  the  reasons  there stated this submission has to be rejected. The second point that he urged was, and this was in fact the main contention raised before the High Court, that rule 2(h) of  the  Displaced Persons Compensation  and  Rehabilitation Rules, 1955 was unconstitutional as contravening Art. 14  of the  Constitution  and  so the  original  allotment  to  the appellant must be held to be lawful.  We consider that there is no substance in this argument.  In fact, we are unable to appreciate  the  ground  on which the  contention  is  being urged.   Section 40 of the Displaced  Persons  (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 enables the Central Government by  Notification  in the Official Gazette to make  rules  to carry  out the purposes of the Act, and in particular on  an elaborately   enumerated  list  of  matters.   It  was   not suggested  that the rules of 1955 were not competently  made under  s.  40.  These rules were published on May  21,  1955 when they came into force.  Rule 2(h) the validity of  which is  impugned in these proceedings is a rule  containing  the definitions.  Rule 2(h) reads, to extract what is material: (1)  [1964] 7 S.C.R. 103. 195               "2.   In  these  rules,  unless  the   context               otherwise requires-               (a) to (g)..................................               (h)   ’Urban  area’ means any area within  the               limits   of   a   corporation,   a   municipal                             committee,  a notified area committee,   a  town               area  committee,  a small  town  committee,  a               cantonment or any other area notified as  such               by the Central Government from time to time;               Provided that in the case of the  quasi-perma-               nent  allotment  of rural  agricultural  lands               already  made  in  the States  of  Punjab  and               Patiala  and  East Punjab  States  Union,  the

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             limits  of  an  urban area shall  be  as  they               existed on the 15th August, 1947." The  words  ’of rural agricultural lands’ occurring  in  the proviso to this rule were replaced by an amending  Notifica- tion  of  1957  by  the words  ’in  rural  area’,  but  this amendment is obviously of no significance.  "Rural area"  is defined by rule 2(f) to mean ’any area which is not an urban area’. Pausing here, it would be useful to state two matters  which are not in dispute: (1) that the allotment to the  appellant was  made on December 29, 1955, the sanad being  issued  two days  later.  It was therefore an allotment which  was  made after  May 21, 1955 when the rules came into force; (2)  the other  matter  is  that Khasra Nos. 880, 881  and  882  were included  in  urban  limits  on February  10,  1951  by  the municipal  area  of  Kharar being extended  to  cover  these plots.   It  would, therefore, be obvious that on  the  date when  the  allotment was made, the allotted land was  in  an "urban  area" and therefore it could not have  been  validly allotted. We  must confess our inability to comprehend what  precisely was the discrimination which the rule enacted which rendered it  unconstitutional as violative of Art. 14.  So far as  we could  understand the submission, the  unreasonable  discri- mination  was said to exist because of the operation of  the proviso.   Under  the proviso in  regard  to  quasipermanent allotments  ’already made, i.e. made before May 21, 1955  in the  States of Punjab and PEPSU, the test of what was to  be considered an "urban area" was to be determined on the basis of the state of circumstances which obtained on 15th August, 1947.   The allotment in favour of the appellant  was  after the  rules came into force and was not one  "already  made". Therefore if on the date of the allotment the land was in an urban area, the allotment would be governed by the main para of  the definition and so could not have been  validly  made and that was the reason why it was set L, P(D) 1 SCI-, (a).. 196 aside.  The  discrimination is said to consist in  the  rule having  drawn a dividing line at the date when it came  into force,  or  determining whether the allotment was  valid  or not.   It is the discrimination that is said to be  involved in  this prospective operation of the rule that we  find  it difficult  to  appreciate.  It is possible that  before  the rules  were framed the land now in dispute could  have  been allotted, but because of this it is not possible to  suggest that  the  rule altering the law in this  respect  which  ex concessis is within the rule-making power under the Act,  is invalid.  Such a contention is patently  self-contradictory. Every  law  must  have a beginning or  time  from  which  it operates,  and no rule which seeks to change the law can  be held  invalid  for  the  mere  reason  that  it  effects  an alteration  An the law.  It is sometimes possible  to  plead injustice  it’,  a  rule  which  is  made  to  operate  with retrospective effect, but to say that a rule which  operates prospectively  is  invalid because thereby a  difference  is made  between the past and the future, is one which  we  are unable to follow. There  are no merits in this appeal which fails and is  dis- missed with costs. Appeal dismissed. 197