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PETITIONER: BIHAR STATE BOARD RELIGIOUS TRUST, PATNA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MAHANT SRI BISESHWAR DAS

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/02/1971

BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1971 AIR 2057

ACT: Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act (1 of 1951), s.  2(1)-Mutt- Property  gifted  personally  to  first  mahant-Passing   in succession from Guru to Chela-Whether public religious trust within meaning of section-Tests.

HEADNOTE: Gaibi  Ramdasji was the recipient of certain lands from  the the Maharaja of Darbhanga and other zamindars.  From out  of the  income of these lands a temple and certain  residential buildings were constructed.  The estate came to be known  as Kamlabari  asthal.   Gaibi Ramdasji, was  succeeded  in  the office of Mahant by his chela, and thereafter succession  lo the  Mahantship was from Guru to Chela.  The respondent  who was  the reigning Mahant at the relevant time  resisted  the demand of the appellant ,,for the production of accounts and other  particulars under the provisions of the  Bihar  Hindu Religious  Trusts  Act,  1  of 1951.   The  Board  took  out criminal  proceedings against the respondent, who  thereupon filed  a  suit  in  which he  claimed  the  asthal  and  its properties   to  be  his  personal  property   outside   the definition  of religious trust in s. 2(1) of the  Act.   The trial ,court decided in favour of the appellant but the High Court took a contrary view.  In appeal to this Court. HELD : (1) Properties of the temple being admittedly in  the possession,of  the  Mahant  ever since  the  time  of  Gaibi Ramjidas  the onus of proof that the respondent mahant  held them  on  trust  for  public  purposes  of  a  religious  or charitable character was clearly on the appellant Board  who alleged  that  it was so.  The trial Judge  was,  therefore, clearly in error in holding that the respondent mahant ought to have produced sanads and ,that on his failure to do so in adverse  inference could be drawn viz., that had  they  been produced  they  would have shown that the  grants  to  Gaibi Ramjidasji   were  for  public  purposes  of  religious   or charitable character. [686 F-G] (2)The  mere fact that Mahants of a particular  order  did not marry and properties held by them is descended from Guru to  Chela  was  not  ;indicative of  and  did  not  raise  a presumption  of such properties being religious  properties. If originally the property was acquired by a Mahant the fact of its descent subsequently from guru to chela did not  also lead  to  the  conclusion  that  it  had  lost  its  secular

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character. [687 E] (3)Evidence  that  Sadhus and other persons  visiting  the temple  were  given  food  and shelter  was  not  by  itself indicative  of  the  temple being a  public  temple  or  its properties being subject to a public trust. [688 A] (4)The mere fact of the public having been freely admitted to  the temple cannot mean that courts should readily  infer therefrom  dedication  to  the public.  The  value  of  such public  user  as  evidence of  dedication  ,depends  on  the circumstances which give strength to the inference that  the user  was  as of right-.  No such evidence of  any  reliable kind  was avail-able to the appellant Board in  the  instant case. [689 D] 681 (5)A  religious mutt in northern India is generally  known as   asthal,   a  monastic  institution  founded   for   the maintenance  and spread of a particular sampradaya or  cult. The distinction between dedication to a temple and a mutt is that  in the former case it is to a particular deity,  while in the later case it is to a superior or a mahant.  But just as  in  the case of the debutter endowment,  there  is  both private  and public endowment, so too there can be the  same distinction  between a private and public mutt.  A mutt  can be  dedicated for the use of ascetics generally or  for  the ascetics  of a particular section or cult, in which case  it would be a public institution.  But it is not impossible  to have  a private mutt where the endowment is not intended  to confer  benefit upon the public generally or even  upon  the members of a particular order.  Examples do occur where  the founder  may grant property to his spiritual  preceptor  and his  disciples in succession with a view to maintaining  one particular spiritual family and for perpetuation of  certain rites and ceremonies which are deemed to be conducive to the spiritual  welfare of the founder and his family.   In  such cases  it would be the grantor and his descendents  who  are the  only persons interested in seeing that the  institution is  kept up for their benefit.  Even if a few  ascetics  are fed and given shelter, such a purpose is not to be deemed an independent  charity in which the public or a section of  it is  interested.   Such  charities  appertain  to  a  private debutter also. [690 D-R] The  existence of a private mutt in which the  property  was given to the head of the mutt for his personal benefit  only has in the past been recognised.  In such cases there is no- intention  on the part of the grantor to fetter the  grantee with  any obligation in dealing with the  property  granted. In each case the court has to come to its conclusion  either from. the grant itself or from the circumstances of the case whether  the  grant was for the benefit of the public  or  a section of it i.e. annas curtained class, or for the benefit of  the  grantee  himself  or for  a  class  of  ascertained individuals.  An inference can also be drawn from the  usage and  custom  of the institution or from the  mode  in  which properties  had  been dealt with as also  other  established circumstances. [691 B-C] (6)The  fact  that idols were installed permanently  on  a pedestal and the temple was constructed on grounds  separate from  the residential quarters of the mahant could  not,lead to  inference  of dedication to the public.   In  the  first place  such  factors are also found in private  temples  and mutts and therefore are not conclusive.  In the second place there was the evidence that the mahants residential quarters were in fact, not separate from the temple premises. [691 G- H] (7)The  expression  ’appertaining to the  asthal’  in  the

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deeds  of  gifts made by the reigning mahants in  favour  of their  nominees  as  successor$  meant  things  which   were appurtenant  to and forming part of the  principal  property which  was  the  subject  matter  of  the  instrument.   The expression  would  at best mean that the  properties  formed part of the asthal and were not the properties of the mahant as distinct from those of the asthal.  But unless the asthal itself  was a public trust for the religious  or  charitable purposes,  the properties appertaining thereto would not  be properties  of  a public trust for religious  or  charitable purposes.   The use of the expression ’appertaining  to  the asthal’,  therefore, could not lead to the  conclusion  that the property in question was stamped with a trust for public purposes. [692 C] The appeal must accordingly be dismissed. 682 Mahant  Ramsaroop  Das Ji v. S. P. Sahi, 1955  B.L.J.R.  88, Mahant  Ramsaroop Das Ji v. S. P. Sahi, 1959 Supp. 2  S.C.R. 583 & Deoki Nandan v.    Murlidhar,  [1956]  S.C.R.  756  at 761, referred to. Permanand v. Nihal Chand [1938] I.L.R., 65 I.A. 252 Ramsaran Das v. Jai Ram Das, A.I.R. 1943 Pat 135, Babu Bhagwan Din v. Gir  Har  Saroop,  67 I.A. 1, Matam  Nadipudi  v.  Board  of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 810, Missir v. Das, [1949] I.L.R. 28 Pat. 890  and Sri  Thakurji Ramji v. Mathura Prasad, A.I.R. 1941 Pat.  254 at  358 and Mahant Puran Atal v. Darshan Das, [1942]  I.L.R. 34 All 468, distinguished.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 407 of 1967. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 13, 1962  of the  Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No..  3 30 of 1958. D.   Goburdhun and R. Goburdhun, for the appellant. B.   P. Jha, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat  J.-This  appeal arises from a  dispute  between  the appellant-Board  and the respondent which occurred when  the Board  tried  to enforce the provisions of the  Bihar  Hindu Religious  Trusts Act, 1 of 1951, in respect of  the  estate known as Kamlabari asthal consisting of a temple,  buildings and  lands.  The respondent is the current  mahant  claiming direct  descent from the founding mahant Gaibi  Ramdasji  in the  line of succession from Guru to Chela.  Gaibi  Ramdasji was the recipient of certain lands from the then Maharaja of Darbhanga  and other zamindars.  From out of the  income  of these  lands, a temple with Shri Ram, janki and Laxmanji  as the  presiding  deities  thereof,  and  certain  residential buildings  were constructed.  Later mahants added  to  these properties  by  acquisition from out of the  income  of  the existing  properties.   The respondent mahant  resisted  the Board’s  demand  for  production  of  ’accounts  and   other particulars  and in consequence the Board took out  criminal proceedings   against   the  respondent.    The   respondent thereupon filed a suit of which this appeal is the outcome. In the suit, the respondent claimed that the said asthal and its  properties were his personal properties, the  gifts  of lands having originally been made personally to the founding mahant,  and thereafter, to the mahants succeeding him,  and that therefore, the properties were not religious trusts  as defined  by S. 2(1) of the Act.  That sub-section defines  a ’religious trust’ to mean any express or constructive  trust

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created or existing for any pur-                             683 pose  recognised  by  Hindu Law to be  religious,  pious  or charitable  but shall not include a trust created  according to  Sikh  religion  or purely for the benefit  of  the  Sikh community and a private endowment created for the worship of the  family  idol in which the public are  not  interested". The Board took the stand that the  asthal and the properties belonging  to  it were not the personal  properties  of  the manant or his predecessors, that the, gifts to them were not personal gifts but to the asthal  that the fact that members of the public had, without any let or hindrance, been  using the temple for darshan and worship, the fact that  festivals were  celebrated  at  which  members  of  the  public   gave offerings,  the practice of feeding of sadhus and  pilgrims, all  went to indicate that the asthal was a public trust  in which the members of the public had an interest. Both  sides led considerable amount of evidence,  both  oral and  documentary.   The  oral  evidence  consisted  of   the testimony  of  witnesses, some of whom deposed, on  the  one hand,  that the members of the , public had been  coming  to the  temple  without  any obstruction on  the  part  of  the mahant, and some others, on the other hand, that on  certain occasions  some  of the members of the public  had  actually been turned away from the temple.  Witnesses also deposed to the fact of festivals having been celebrated when members of the public were allowed and placed offerings, of sadhus  and pilgrims having been fed and given shelter, thus showing the user  of  the  temple by the public and  the  asthal  having disbursed the income of its properties towards religious and charitable purposes.  Some of the witnesses examined by  the Board were even prepared to depose that on occasions certain members  of the public had exercised some sort  of  ’control over the mahant’s management of these properties.  The  oral evidence,  however,  was  not  of  much  assistance,  partly because  it  was interested and partly because none  of  the witnesses  had  any personal knowledge of the  things  which they sought to depose. As  regards the documentary evidence, the respondent  mahant did  not produce the sanads under which the founding  mahant had  acquired  properties.   These, he said,  could  not  be traced.  The Board also did not make any attempt to  produce the record of the Darbhanga Estate which, on merger there-of with the State of Bihar presumably must be in the custody of the  State  Government.  The record, which  presumably  must contain  copies  of these sanads, if  produced,  would  have thrown considerable light on the nature of the gifts and the manner  in which they were made.  The  documentary  evidence produced  at the trial, therefore, consisted mainly  of  (1) deeds  of  gift or nomination made by a reigning  mahant  in favour  of his chela as his successor, (2) deeds  of  Sales, purchases;  mortgage  deeds etc. made and  executed  by  the mahants in the 14-918 Sup.  C.I./71 684 course of their administration of the asthal properties, and (3) certain revenue records. The  issue which the Trial Judge considered to be, the  most crucial one was framed by him as follows :               "Whether the temple and the properties in suit               are  the personal properties of the  plaintiff               or  are trust properties under the  provisions               of Act 1 of 1951 ?" The  issue was framed by him in these terms  partly  because the respondent had claimed these properties as his  personal

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properties,  and  partly because the Trial Judge  was  under ’the  impression,  because of the High Court’s  decision  in Mahant Ramsaroop Das Ji v.    S.    P.  Sahi(1)   that   the definition  in  s.  2(1) of the  Act  also  covered  private religious  trusts.  That decision was however,  reversed  on appeal to this Court and as reported in Mahant Ramsaroop Das ji  v. S. P. Sahi(2) the correct position is that ’  private trusts  do  not fall within the ambit of the  definition  in that section.  It was because the Trial Judge was under  the belief  that private religious trusts also fell  within  the definition  that’  he also placed before  himself  only  two alternatives,  namely, whether the properties were  personal properties  of  the respondent or whether  they  were  trust properties.   On the evidence before him he ultimately  hold that the asthal and the properties appertaining thereto were public religious trust and dismissed the respondent’s suit. In  coming  to  this conclusion the Trial  Judge  took  into account the following circumstances :               (1)   that  the mahants were  bairagis,  i.e.,               celibates,  which fact raised the  presumption               that  they  held properties on behalf  of  the               asthal  to  which their  lives  were  entirely               devoted;               (2)   that Mahant Gaibi Railidasji had set  up               a   sampradaya   which   attracted   a   large               following, that therefore, the temple built by               him  was for the benefit of his followers  and               for spreading and propagating the doctrines of               that sampradaya,               (3)   that  from these facts the  presumption’               arose that he had dedicated the temple and the               properties to the public or a section thereof;               (4)   that  the evidence showed  that  sadhus,               fakirs  and abhyagats were entertained at  the               temple, that the income of the properties  was               spent. on puja               (1) 1955 B.L.J.R. 88.               (2) [1959] Supp.  2 S.C.R. 583.               68 5               and   other  religious  activities’  and   for               festivals;  consequently, the presumption  was               that the properties were subject to  religious               and charitable purposes;               (5)   that at the time of the installation  of               the deities in the temple Pran Pratishtha  and               other  ceremonies  must  have  been  performed               which meant that the temple and the properties               were  declared to have been dedicated  to  the               public;               (6)   that   the   deeds   of   appointed   of               successors  executed by the mahants  described               the mahants as asthaldharis and the properties               as appertaining to the asthal, and               (7)   that though revenue records descried the               mahants  as proprietors of  these  properties,               they had to be read in the light of the  facts               aforestated. On these premises he upheld the Board’s contention that "the temple and the properties were trust properties of a  public nature for religious and charitable purposes". On  a appeal by the respondent-mahant, the High Court  first observed that the evidence on record had to be viewed in the light of the definition section as constructed by this Court in Mahant Ramsaroopdasji v. Sahi(1) that is to say, that the trust, as defined in that section, meant only public  trusts

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and  did  not include private trusts.  The High  Court  then appraised  the entire evidence ’and came to  the  conclusion that  even if the mahant had not been able to show that  the temple and the other properties were the private  properties of the mahants, all the factors from which the Trial  Judge, raised the presumption of a public trust were constent  with the  properties constituting a private religious trust.   On this view the High Court reversed the judgment of the  Trial Judge  and decreed the respondent’s suit, holding  that  the Act  did not apply to the properties in suit.   Counsel  for the appellant-Board challenged before us the correctness  of the  High Court’s judgment and supported the  Trial  Court’s judgment. It  is true that the respondent-mahant did not  produce  the original sanads whereunder certain lands had been gifted  to the founding mahant by the various zamindars.  They were not produced because, as the respondent deposed, they could  not be traced, but, as stated earlier it was not impossible  for the Board also, if it wanted to rely on them, to produce the record,  such  as  that  of  Dharbhanga  Estate,  and   show therefrom  the  nature and the terms of  those  gifts.   The Trial Court, however, was not entitled, (1)  [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 583. 686 as  we shall presently. show, from the mere failure  of  the mahant  to  produce the original sanads to draw  an  adverse inference which it did against him. From  the  rest  of  the evidence  the  following  facts  as summarised by the High Court, emerged 1.that  the temple was constructed by Gaibi Ramdasji  and it was he who installed the deities therein; 2.that  he was succeeded to the mahantship by his  chela, and  thereafter succession to the mahantship had  been  from guru to chela, 3.that  the  appointment  of a  successor  has  been  all throughout   from  guru  to  chela,  the   reigning   mahant appointing  or  nominating his successor  from  amongst  his chelas and the members of the public have had at no time any voice in the selection or nomination; 4.that  the properties have always, been recorded in  the names  of the mahants as proprietors and not in the name  of the deities in the D registers, khewats and khatians; 5.that the mahants have been in possession and management of the, asthal and the properties all throughout; 6.that the mahants acquired properties from time to time  in their own names as proprietors and-never in the names of the deities  6r the asthal, without, any objection at  any  time from  any one and dealt with, some of them through deeds  of sales, mortgages, leases etc. Properties  of  the  temple being  thus  admittedly  in  the possession  of  the  mahants ever since the  time  of  Gaibi Ramdasji, the onus of proof that the respondent-mahant  held them  on  trust  for  public  purposes  of  a  religious  or charitable character was clearly on the appellant-Board  who alleged  that  it was so.  The Trial Judge  was,  therefore, clearly in error in holding that the respondent-mahant ought to have produced the sanads and that on his failure to do so an  adverse inference could be drawn, namely, that had  they been produced they would have shown that the grants to Gaibi Ramdasji  were  for  public  purposes  of  a  religious   or charitable character. (see Parmanand v. Nihal Chand(1) The  sanads not having been available,  the  appellant-Board tried  to  establish  through  the  oral  evidence  of   six witnesses  (D.Ws. 1 to 6), that the temple was  founded  and the properties in question were acquired for the benefit  of

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the public or a section thereof (1)  [1938] I.L.R. 65 I.A.252, 687 The  testimony of these witnesses, however, did not  possess much credibility, because although these witnesses  declared that  the  temple  was established for the  benefit  of  the public,  none of them deposed that Gaibi Ramdasji or any  of the succeeding mahants, had at any time dedicated the temple or  the  properties to the public or to those  who  used  to attend  the  temple  for  worship  and  darshan.   In  these circumstances,  the  appellant-Board had to fall  back  upon certain  circumstances  and the conduct of  the  mahants  to establish that these properties were properties of a  public trust.The circumstances and the conduct relied on were : (1) the  fact that the mahants were vaishnav bairagis  who  were life  long celibates; (2) that sadhus and others were  given food  and  shelter when they visited the  temple;  (3)  that festivals  and  other  important  Hindu  dates  used  to  be celebrated;  (4) that the members of the public came to  the temple  for darshan without any hindrance and as  of  right; (5)  that in the deeds and wills, whereby  reigning  mahants appointed or nominated their successors, the properties were described as appertaining to the asthal, and that the temple being the dominant part of the asthal and maintained for the worship and puja of the presiding deities installed therein, the  properties belonged to the temple, and therefore,  they were  properties  of a trust for  religious  and  charitable character. In Parmanand vs.  Nihal Chand(1) the Privy Council held that the  mere  fact that mahants of a particular order  did  not marry  and  properties held by them descended from  guru  to chela was not indicative of and, did not raise a presumption of   such  properties,  being  religious   properties.    If originally  the property was acquired by a mahant, the  fact of its descent subsequently from guru to chela did not  lead to  the conclusion that it had lost its  secular  character. Where,  however, a property is dedicated to an idol for  the object of performing its puja and other necessary ceremonies the  person managing such property is only a she  bait,  the idol being a juristic person in Hindu law capable of holding such  property.   If it is alleged that such property  is  a trust property held for public purposes to which Acts,  such as  the  Charitable and Religious Trusts Act,  1920  or  the present  Act, applies, it has to be shown that the trust  is not  a  private trust but is one  substantially  for  public purposes  of  a religious and charitable  nature.   In  such cases  provision for the service of the  sadhus,  occasional guests  and  wayfarers does not render a trust for  an  idol into a trust for public purposes.  This is because where the main  purpose of the trust is making provision for  the  due worship  of an idol and performance of, its seva  puja  ’and other   ceremonies,  the  feeding  of  sadhus   and   giving hospitality to wayfarers are inevitable.  These are regarded as duties forming part (1)  [1938] I.L.R. 65 I.A. 252, 688 of  the due worship of the particular deity.  (see  Ramsaran Das  A vs.  Jai Ram Das(1) Therefore, evidence  that  sadhus and  other  persons visiting the temple are given  food  and shelter  is not by itself indicative of the temple  being  a public  temple or its properties being subject to  a  public trust. Evidence that the mahants used to celebrate Hindu  festivals when  members  of the public used to attend the  temple  and give  offerings  and that the public were  admitted  to  the

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temple for darshan and worship is also not indicative of the temple  being  one  for  the benefit  of  the  public.   The celebration of festivals is, according to Hindu belief, part and  parcel  of the puja of the deity.  Such  festivals  are celebrated  in family and other private temper  also.   The, fact  that members of the public used to come to the  temple without  any hindrance also does not necessarily  mean  that the temple is a public temple, for members of the public  do attend  private temples.  It is against Hindu sentiments  to turn  away persons who come to do worship and darshan.   The mere  fact,  therefore, that no instance had  occurred  when persons from the public were asked to go away or the absence of proof that they were allowed on permission or  invitation only  cannot be conclusive of the temple being one in  which the public have by user acquired interest. The case in point is of Babu Bhagwan Din vs.  Gir Har Saroop (2) . The original grant there was to the respondent  ances- tor,  one  Daryao  Gir,  by the then  Nawab  of  Oudh.   The property  in question comprised of land on which  stood  the temple, the presiding deity of which was Bhaironji,  certain houses  and shops. ,The respondents, who claimed to  be  the descendants of the original grantee, were grahastha  fakirs, i.e.,  both goshains and house holders.  There was no  proof that there had been any interference with the management  of the  properties.  The revenue records showed the  properties in  the names of the descendants of Daryao Gir.   The  shops were let out and in the leases concerning them the  goshains were referred to sometimes as owners and sometimes as owners of the "asthan Sri Bhaironif’.  There was evidence, however, of members of the Hindu public having resorted to the temple for worship and darshan without any obstruction.  An  annual mela used to be held for many years with public subscription on the grounds of the temple.  The evidence showed that  the temple  and the gushains profited from the increased  resort to the temple by the public the mela period.  Yet, the Privy Council  held  that the general effect of the  evidence  was that  the family had treated the temple as  family  property and  the mere fact of the members of the public having  come to the temple and having (1) A.I.R. 1943 Pat, 135, (2) 67 I.A. 1 689 made  offerings  and the mela having been  held  which  gave popularity  to  the temple and increased its esteem  in  the eyes of the public and the fact that they were never  turned away  were not enough to hold the temple and the  properties as a public trust.  At page 10 of the report their Lordships observed               Dedication to the public is not to be  readily               inferred  when  it is known  that  the  temple               property   was   acquired  by  grant   to   an               individual  or family.  Such an inference,  if               made  from the fact of user by the public,  is               hazardous,  since it would not in  general  be               consonant  with Hindu sentiments  or  practice               that  worshippers should be turned away;  and,               as worship generally implies offerings of some               kind,  it  is  not to  be  expected  that  the               managers  of  a private temple should  in  all               circumstances     desire     to     discourage               popularity." Thus,  the  mere  fact of the public having  been  freely  ’ admitted  to  that  temple cannot mean  that  courts  should readily infer therefrom dedication to the public.  The value of such public user as evidence of dedication depends on the

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circumstances which give strength to the inference that  the user was as of right.  No such evidence of any reliable kind was  available, to the appellant-Board in the instant  case. True  it is that a charitable trust might either be  created by  a  grant for an express purpose or a grant  having  been made  in favour of an individual or a class of  individuals, that  individual or that class of individuals  might,  after obtaining the grant, create a charitable trust on behalf  of the  Board  reliance  was placed on the deeds  of  gifts  or nominations   by,  reigning  mahants  in  favour  of   their nominees,  marked in Ex. 7 series., where, the mahants  have stated that they appointed such chelas mahants of  Kamlabari asthal   and   described  the   properties   as   properties appertaining to the asthal.  Relying on these words  counsel argued   that  what  the  founding  mahant  Gaibi   Ramdasji established was the asthal of Kamlabari for the  propagation of  Sri  Sampradaya  where  his  disciples  and  the   other adherents of Sri Sampradaya could receive instruction in the doctrines of that Sampradaya at the hands of the mahant  and that the temple was only part of the asthal as its  adjunct. The  argument was that the asthal was to support the  sadhus and other followers of Sri Sampradaya, the temple being only an  instrument  for propagating and teaching  the  doctrines held  by  the  Sampradava.   In  support  of  the  argument, reliance was placed on Mahant Puran Atal v. Darshan  Das(1). There  was  in that case also no evidence  of  any  original grant  for a charitable purpose from a donor, nor was  there in evidence (1)[1912] I.L.R. 34 All. 468. 690 any  instrument expressly creating a charitable trust.   The High Court of Allahabad, however, held that the mahant  held the properties in trust for"a charitable purpose relying  on the  mode of the user of the property and declarations  made from  time to time by the mahants.  Those declarations  were to the effect that the properties were held for the  purpose only  of  supporting  and  maintaining  Manakshahi   fakirs, entertaining   visitors  and  for  giving  of   alms.    The properties  were  held  muafi, i.e.,  free  from  Government revenue,  on  the strength of such declarations.   Also,  in litigations  for succession to the gaddi, it had  all  along been  assumed  that the properties belonged  to  the  gaddi, managed  by the gaddinashin for the time being and held  for charitable purposes.  On this evidence, the High Court  held that  it  could  presume  that there  was  a  charitable  or religious’.  trust,  and further observed that even  if  the main purpose of the trust was to support Nanakshahi  fakir’s and to spread the religion founded by Guru Nanak, the  trust would  still be one for a public purpose within the  meaning of s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A  religious  mutt  in northern India is  usually  known  as asthal,  a monastic institution founded for the  maintenance and  spread  of  a  particular  Sampradaya  or  cult.    The distinction  between  dedication to a temple and a  mutt  is that  in the former case it is to a particular deity,  while in the latter, it is to a superior or a mahant.  But just as in  the  case  of the debutter endowment, there  is  both  a private and a public endowment, so too there can be the same distinction between a private and a public mutt.  A mutt can be  dedicated for the use of ascetics generally or  for  the ascetics  of  a particular sect or cult, in  which  case  it would  be  a  public  institution.   Mutts  have   generally sadavrats, i.e., arrangements for giving food and shelter to wayfarers  and  ascetics attached to them.   They  may  have temples  to  which  the  public  is  allowed  access.   Such

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circumstances  might  indicate the public character  of  the institution.   But  it is not impossible to have  a  private mutt  where the endowment is not intended to confer  benefit upon  the  public generally or even upon the  members  of  a particular religious sect or order.  Examples do occur where the  founder may grant property to his  spiritual  preceptor and his disciples in succession with a view to maintain  one particular spiritual family and for perpetuation of  certain rights  and ceremonies which are deemed to be  conducive  to the  spiritual  welfare of the founder and his  family.   In such  cases it would be the grantor and his descendants  who are   the  only  persons  interested  in  seeing  that   the institution  is  kept up for their benefit.  Even if  a  few ascetics are fed and given shelter, such a purpose is not to be  deemed an independent charity in which the public  or  a section  of it has an interest.  Such charities, as  already stated earlier, appertain to a private debutter 691 also. (see B. K. Mukherjea, Hindu Law of Religious &  Chari- table Trusts. (3rd /ed.), 303, 304). The  existence  of a private mutt, where  the  property  was given to the head of the mutt for his personal benefit only, has in the past recoginised. (see Matam Nadipudi v. Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras(1)  and Missirv. Ras(1).  In such cases there is no intention on the part  of  the  grantor  to  fetter  the  grantee  with   any obligation  in dealing with the property granted.   In  each case the court- has to come to its, conclusion either  from- the  grant  itself ’or from the circumstances  of  the  case whether  the  grant was for the benefit of the public  or  a section  of  it, i.e., an unascertained class,  or  for  the benefit of the grantee himself or for a class of ascertained individuals.  An inference can also be drawn from the  usage and custom of the institution or from the mode in which  its properties.  have been dealt with as also other  established circumstances. Puran Atal’s case(,’) has no application in the present case because there is no evidence such as there was regarding the user  of the properties for the maintenance of a  particular far  class of ascetics, nor are here declarations made  from time  to  time by the mahants which led the Court  there  to pronounce  that the trust was for a charitable purpose,  and on  the strength of which the proper-ties were held  revenue free. An attempt appears to have been made in’ the Trial Court  to establish   that  certain  ceremonies,  such  as   Sankalpa, Pratistha and Utsarga, were performed at the time when idols were  installed  in  the temple.  In  the  case  of  temples Pratistha,  and not Utsarga, if established, would  indicate dedication   to   the  public.  (see   Kane’s   History   of Dharmasastras, Vol. 2, part If, 892 to 893, and Deoki Nandan v.  Murlidhar (4 ). Unfortunately for the appellant  Board,. there  was  no clear evidence of the  particular  ceremonies performed  at  the time when Gaibi  Ramdasji  installed  the idols  except a general ’statement from the respondent  that when  idols  are  installed in  temples  Pran  Pratistha  is generally performed.  Support for a dedication to the public was also sought from the fact that the idols were  installed permanently  on  a pedestal (Sinhasun) and  the  temple  was constructed  on  ground.-,  separate  from  the  residential quarters  of the mahant.  In the first place,  such  factors are also found in private temples and mutts, and  therefore, are  not  conclusive.  In the second place,  there  was  the evidence  that the mahants residential quarters are in  fact not separate from the temple premises.

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(1)  A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 810. (3) [1942] I.L.R, 34 All. 468. (2)[1949] I.L.R. 28 Pit. 890 (4)   [1956] S.C.R. 756 at 761. 918 Sup. C.I./71 692 Lastly,  reference  was made to some of the deeds  of  gifts made  by the reigning mahant is favour of their nominees  as successors   where   the  properties   were   described   as appertaining  to the asthal.  Assuming that the  scribes  of these  documents  used the expression  appertaining  to  the asthal’  in the sense in which such expression is  sometimes used in the deeds of conveyance, the expression means things which  are appurtenant to and forming part of the  principal property which is the subject matter of the instrument. (see Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, (3rd Ed.), Vol.  1. 177).  The expression  ’appertaining  to the asthal’  in  these  deeds, therefore,  would  at best mean that the  properties  formed part of the asthal and are not the properties of the  mahant as  distinct  from those ,of the asthal. (see  Sri  Thakurji Ramji v. Mathura Prasad(1) But unless the asthal itself is a public  trust  for  religious or  charitable  purposes,  the properties appertaining thereto would not be properties of a public trust for religious or charitable purposes.  The  use of  the expression ’appertaining to the asthal’,  therefore, cannot  lead  to  the conclusion  that.  the  properties  in question were stamped with a trust for public purposes. These  were  all the contentions urged before  us.   In  our view,  the  appellant-Board  failed to  establish  that  the proportion in suit, fell within the ambit of the Act and  he respondent-mahant  was subject to its provisions.  The  High Court  accordingly was right in reversing the Trial  Court’s judgment and decreeing the respondent’s suit.  Consequently, the appeal is dismissed with costs. G.C.                      Appeal dismissed. (1) A.I.R. 1941 Pat. 354, at 358. 693