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PETITIONER: BHUT NATH METE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT08/02/1974

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1974 AIR  806            1974 SCR  (3) 315  1974 SCC  (1) 645  CITATOR INFO :  R          1974 SC 816  (3)  R          1974 SC 832  (3)  F          1974 SC 895  (3)  F          1974 SC1739  (4)  F          1974 SC2120  (5)  RF         1974 SC2240  (1)  D          1974 SC2337  (15)  F          1975 SC 255  (1)  E          1975 SC 550  (8)  RF         1975 SC 602  (7)  R          1975 SC 638  (11)  E          1975 SC 775  (4)  R          1975 SC 919  (4)  R          1976 SC1207  (207)  RF         1976 SC1508  (13)  E          1979 SC1945  (3,8)  RF         1980 SC 326  (21)  RF         1980 SC1789  (106)  RF         1989 SC1933  (28)  F          1990 SC1361  (13)

ACT: Maintenance    of    Internal   Security    Act,    1971--s. 3--Continuance  of emergency not a justiciable  issue--Order of detention if bad because criminal prosecutions failed--If Government  should pass a speaking  order--Communication  of facts  cornerstone of right of  representation--Poverty  and illiteracy if relevant to S. 3.

HEADNOTE: The petitioner was detained under s.3 of the Maintenance  of Internal Security Act, 1971 on the ground that he broke open wagons and looted wheat and tea.  The report which was  sent by  the Police to the District Magistrate was  forwarded  to the Government and the Board.  It contained information that the  petitioner was poor and illiterate, had  associates  in notorious  wagon-breakers  and  anti-social  elements,   had developed  the spirit of lawlessness and aptitude for  anti- social  activities  and  that  many  of  the  reported   and unreported  cases of recent and criminal activities  existed to  his  credit besides the instances  communicated  to  the detenu.

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It  was contended that (1) there was no real  emergency  and yet the proclamation of emergency remained unretracted  with consequential peril to fundamental rights; (2) that sections 3(3)  and  10 of the Maintenance of  Internal  Security  Act violated art. 22(5) of the Constitution; (3) that the  order was  male fide because it was made after and on  account  of the  discharge  of the petitioner in the  relative  criminal cases;  (4)  that a speaking order should be passed  by  the government  or  by  the Advisory Board  while  approving  or advising   continuance  of  detention  and  (5)  that   some irrelevant  and  uncommunicated charges had  influenced  the authority, vitiating the order of detention. Allowing the petition, HELD:(1) Academic exercise in constitutional law are not for courts  but jurists and it is not possible to hold that  the continuance  of emergency was void. it is outside the  orbit of  judicial control and wandering into  the  para-political sector.  The argument is political, not a justiciable  issue and the appeal should be to the polls and not to the courts. [321 H] Rex  v. Governor of Wormwood Scrubbs Prison, [1920]  2  K.B. 305, The King v. Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260, 270 and  Ringkan v.  Government  of  Malaysia, [1970]  A.C.  379;  390;  391; referred to. (2)  There  is  no  inconsistency with  or  erosion  of  the opportunity of making a representation against the order The soul  of  art.  22 is the fair chance to  be  heard  on  all particulars  relied on to condemn the detenu  to  preventive confinement.   But sec. 3(3) does not and  cannot  transcend this  trammel and never states that particulars conveyed  to government  and  eventually to the Board may be  behind  the back of the detenu.  Reading the provisions liberally and as owing allegiance to Art. 22(5), it is right to say that  all particulars  transmitted under s.3(3) beyond the grounds  of detention  must in no way detract from the effectiveness  of the  detenu’s  right  of  representation  about  them.   The guarantee  of Art. 22(5) colours the construction of  s.  3. [324 A-C] (3)  It  is not correct to say that the order  of  detention was bad because the criminal prosecutions have failed. it is well-settled  that  even  unsuccessful  judicial  trial   or proceeding  would not operate as a bar to a detention  order or render it mala fide. [324 E-G] Subrati v. State of West Bengal, [1973] 3 S.C.C. 250, M.  S. Khan  v. C. C. Roze, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1670 and Rameswar  Lal v. State of Bihar, [1968] 2 S.C.R. 505;511, followed. 316 (4)  There  is no substance in the argument that a  speaking order  should  be passed by government or  by  the  Advisory Board  while approving or advising continuance of  detention although  a  brief expression of the  principal  reasons  is desirable.  The communication of grounds, the right to  make representation and the consideration thereof by the Advisory Board  made up of men with judicial experience, the  subject matter  being the deprivation of freedom, clearly implies  a quasi-judicial approach.  The bare bones of natural  Justice in this context need not be clothed with the ample flesh  of detailed hearing and elaborate reasoning. A speaking  order, like  a regular judicial performance, is  neither  necessary nor  feasible.   A  harmonious  reconciliation  between  the claims  of  security of the nation and the  liberty  of  the citizen  through   the process of  effective  representation before  deprivation and fair consideration by the  executive and  the  Advisory  Board are the  necessary  components  of natural justice, no more. [326 F]

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(5)  The detention was illegal for denial of opportunity  to make  effective  representation.  Sec. 3(3) read  with  Art. 22(5) stands contravened and the right to represent rendered barren.   Particulars prejudicial to the detenu played  over the  judgment  of the authorities but the  petitioner  never knew  of  such injurious information, and could  not  answer back.   Communication  of facts is the  cornerstone  of  the right of representation and orders passed on  uncommunicated materials  are unfair and illegal.  Poverty  and  illiteracy arc  irrelevant  to  S. 3. The  spirit  of  lawlessness  and aptitude  for  antisocial activities are  neither  here  nor there   vis-a-vis   s.3.  Other  reported   and   unreported instances,   though  relevant,  are  kept  back   from   the petitioner. [328 B]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 1456 of 1973. Under Article 32 of the Constitution for issue of a writ  in the nature of  habeas corpus. S.   J. S. Fernandez, for the petitioner. P.   K. Chakravarty, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA  IYER, J.-The petitioner, undergoing inhibitive  in- carceration  in West Bengal, seeks this Court’s writ  to  be liberated on grounds of substantive innocence and  processor injustice.   Judicial vigilance is the price of liberty  and freedom  of the person is a founding faith of our  Republic. So  it behaves us to examine the legal circumstances of  the detention  in  the light of the  constitutional  constraints under art. 22 and the procedural safeguards of the Act  (the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971). A brief calendar bearing on the landmark events, giving  the core  facts  relevant to the legality of the  detention,  is necessary right at the beginning.  The order of the District Magistrate,  Burdwan,  which cast the petitioner  into  jail recited  that  he  was  ’satisfied’  that  with  a  view  to preventing  the  petitioner  ’from  acting  in  any   manner prejudicial  to  the maintenance of  supplies  and  services essential  to  the community’ the  direction  for  detention under S. 3 of the Act was being made, impeccably adhering to the  mantra  of  the law.  The, grounds  which  induced  the authority’s  satisfaction  were concomitantly  furnished  as required  by S. 6(1), read with s. 3(2), of the  Act.   "You are  being  detained"  runs the communication  ....  on  the grounds that you have been acting in a manner prejudicial to the  supplies  and services essential to  the  community  as evidenced by the particulars given below :--" Three specific instances  were set out of November 21, 1971,  November  24, 1971 and 317 January  13,  1972-all  over  seven  months  prior  to   the detention  order  alleging  that  the  petitioner  and   his associates (not named) broke open wagons and ’looted’  wheat and tea.  There is also a statement that ’the said  activity of yours thus attracts Sec. 3 (1) (a) (iii) of the ... Act." It is a trifle mystifying that the detention order is passed many months after the three criminal break-ins, and  equally strange it is that the prisoner is arrested only on February 22,  1973,  many  months after the order  of  detention  was passed,  there being no justification of  absconders.   Long before  the grounds of detention were served on  the  detenu (February  22, 1973) the State Government had  approved  the District  Magistrate’s  order which it did on  September  2,

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1972.   Shortly thereafter, the State Government placed  the case of the detenu before the Advisory Board under s. 10  of the Act, although the actual detention was effected only  in 1973.   The affidavit-in-opposition by the Deputy  Secretary to  Government does not explain these time lags between  the prejudicial  acts  and the preventive detention  order,  and between  the  order  and the  detention.   The  petitioner’s averment  in this context becomes  disturbingly  meaningful, for, according to him, the instances were false and when  he was prosecuted in Court, the cases ended in his favour.   He has stated in his representation to the Advisory, Board that "over  the  grounds No. 1, 2 and 3 Burdwan P.  S.  Case  No. G.R.P.S. No. 10(1)71, 9(11)71, and 6(1)72 was started.   The petitioner  was arrested in connection with aforesaid  case. But  as  the charges are false, so no prima facie  case  was established  against  the petitioner was discharged  by  the learned  S.D.J.M., Burdwan.  But soon as the petitioner  was discharged from the case, the petitioner again arrested  and arbitrarily detained under MIS Act." We  will  consider these aspects in a little  detail  later. Suffice  it  to say that the Advisory Board  considered  the representation of the detenu and the material placed  before it by the State, and concluded on April 28, 1973 that  there was  sufficient cause for the detention of tile  petitioner. Thereafter, by order dated May 7, 1973, the State Government continued  the  detention "until the  expiration  of  twelve months from the date of his detention or until the expiry of D.I. Act, 1971, whichever is later." Both the State Government and the Advisory Board had  before them, while deciding on the propriety of the detention,  the criminal  biography of the petitioner, and, indeed,  counsel for the State fairly stated that the opinion and the  advice were  based  upon the specific instances  furnished  to  the petitioner  in  the grounds of detention as well as  on  the dossier furnished by the Superintendent of Police, a copy of which has been produced in Court.  It looks as if this is  a routine  procedure and there is a proforma for  the  history sheet.   Column 7 thereof, apart from setting out the  three instances  communicated to the detenu also mentions  certain relevant   and  injurious  circumstances  relating  to   the petitioner, which may be extracted here :               "The subject Bhut Nath Mete s/o L. Sambhu Nath               Mete of Belari, P.S. Ausgram, Dist.   Burdwan,               was born in a poor               8-L954SupCI/74               318               family.  He got no education in his childhood.               He worked is a day labour.  He used to mix  up               with  the notorious wagon breakers  and  anti-               social  elements.   This inspired in  him  the               criminal propensities which shaped his  future               career.   But  to  his  association  with  the               railway  criminals and antisocial elements  he               developed   the  spirit  of  lawlessness   and               acquired  special  aptitude  for   anti-social               activities   and  acts  prejudicial   to   the               maintenance of supplies and services essential               to  +the community.  For fear of  assault  and               manhandling  one of the local people  dare  to               say anything against him and his associates to               the Police or to any authority as a result  of               many cases remain unreported to the Police.               Besides  many of the reported  and  unreported               cases  some  of the instances  of  his  recent               anti-social   and  criminal  act   wish   were

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             prejudicial to the maintenance of the supplies               and  services essential to the  community  are               mentioned below. . . . " It is apparent,-and indeed it is not denied,-that the  total impact  of these materials on the District  Magistrate,  the State  Government  and the Advisory Board, resulted  in  the initial    detention   and   subsequent   continuation    in incarceration. We have now to see what the grounds of challenge are and the sustainability  thereof  in  the  eye of  the  law  and  the Constitution. Before getting to grips with the contentions we may indicate the  constitutional dimensions of the freedom of  which  the judges  are,  in  part, sentinels on the  qui  vive.   Civil liberty, a constitutional guarantee, is a strange bed-fellow with detention without trial, a British bequest.  Begun from the  days of the East India Company, our  freedom  fighters, including  the  Father  of  the  Nation,  have  endured  its repressive  impact  and so when the somber,  colonial  story came  to a close, our founding fathers enshrined freedom  of the  person  as a fundamental right.  But as  realists  they know that we became free amidst blood bath and chaos and the environs  oil belligerency.  The, delicate  balance  between security and liberty had to be kept, conscious that, in  the contemporary  world, war is to peace near allied  and  ’this partition  do  their bounds divide’ and the  defenses  of  a nation can be destroyed and the morale of its people  broken not  only  by  external  aggression  but  also  by  internal disruption.   The sensitive underside of the nation  can  be wounded  by  those who break up public order,  breach  State security,  blow up essential supplies and services; and  so, as  an unhappy necessity, preventive detention,  apart  from punitive  prison  term,  was recognised  and  provided  for. Being  committed  to  the rule of law,  primary  article  of faith,   the   framers  of   the   Constitution   mistrusted uncanalised  power  in  the Executive  and  wrote  into  the paramount law provisions regulating preventive detention and proclamations  of  emergencies.   After  all,  Lord  Anton’s dictum that absolute power corrupts absolutely was for  them no new knowledge, and Lord Atkin’s great words in Liversidge V. Anderson(1) that amid the clash of arms the laws are  not silent, that (1)  [1942] A. C. 205 319 they may be changed, but they speak same language in war and peace, reverberated in their ears.  Therefore, where freedom is  in  peril and justice is threatened  the  citizen  shall receive  the  fullest protection from the Court  within  the four  corners  of art. 22, benignantly  stretched,  and  the safeguards   of   the   Act   liberally   interpreted-within legitimate  limits.   The  worth of the human  person  is  a cherished  value carefully watched over by the Court.   Such is the judicial perspective in the application of art. 22 to the MISA, which it contains, controls and animates. Indeed,  this Court. by a series of creative  pronouncements has  built into vast powers vested in the Administration  by the  MISA and its predecessors legal  bulwarks,  breakraters and   blinkers  which  have  largely  humanised  the   harsh authority  over  individual  liberty  otherwise  exercisable arbitrarily  by  executive  fiat.  In  this  case,  we,  are concerned  with  a  limited canvass, for, in  a  sense,  the court’s control through review is peripheral,. processor and yet  crucial.   The  area of  judicial  ‘embudsmania’  which obtrudes  into our attention in the present case relates  to the  observance-  of  natural justice  to  the  partial  but

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compulsory  extent the law of the Constitution and  the  law under  the  Constitution,  obligate.   There  is  a  limited ’judicialisation’  of  administrative  acts  that  art.   22 insists  on,  which is express, explicit and  mandatory  and admits of no exceptions. Article 22(5) is principled and pragmatic, flexible but firm and  enforces the right to be heard without overloading  the administrative process with judicial trappings.  It reads               "(5) When any person is detained in  pursuance               of  an order made under any law providing  for               preventive detention, the authority making the               order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to               such person the grounds on which the order has               been  made and shall afford him  the  earliest               opportunity of making a representation against               the order." The   fundamental  constitutional  mandates  are  that   the authority (a) shall communicate to the detainee ’the grounds on  which the order has been made-nothing less than all  the material  grounds  which operate to create  that  subjective satisfaction in the authority which spells suspension of the citizen’s  liberty-and  (b) shall afford  him  the  earliest opportunity of making a representation against the  order-no avoidable  delay, no shortfall in the material  communicated shall   disable   the   prisoner  making   an   early,   yet comprehensive  say  on every particular or  fact  which  has influenced  the detainer or other body to order, approve  or advice the deprivation of an individual’s freedom.  Such  is the  fairness and justice ’untouchably’ entrenched  in  art. 22(5)  when  administrative  action  preventively  drowns  a sacred human right in the name of public good and  organised society.    The   power   and   its   limits   co-exist   in constitutional amity and the MISA has effectuated this great policy  in S. 3(1) and (3) read with ss. 5(1) 10  and  11(i) and  (ii).   The humanist restraint so woven  into  the  law against  executive  extravagance  or  indifference  must  be strictly applied since casual and careless and 320 uninformed  disposal  of other’s freedom is to  break  faith with the constitutional tryst.  The admonition of  Patanjali Sastri, C.J., is inspirational :               "  Preventive detention is a serious  invasion               of personal liberty and such meager safeguards                             as  the Constitution has provided  aga inst  the               improper   exercise  of  the  power  must   be               jealously  watched and enforced by the  Court.               In  this cast;, the petitioner has the  right,               under  article 12(5), as interpreted  by  this               Court  by  a majority, to  be  furnished  with               particulars  of the grounds of  his  detention               "sufficient   to   enable  him   to   make   a               representation  which on being considered  may               give  relief to him.  We are of  opinion  that               this   constitutional  requirement   must   be               satisfied with respect to each of the  grounds               communicated  to the person detained,  subject               of course to a claim of privilege under clause               (6) of article 22."(1).               The strict construction of the statute setting               the court’s face sternly against  encroachment               on  individual liberty, keeping  the  delicate               balance between social security and  citizens’               freedom,   is  perfectly  warranted  by   this               Court’s  observation in Kishori Mohan Bera  v.

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             State of West Bengal(2)               "The  Act confers extraordinary power  on  the               executive to detain a person without  recourse               to the ordinary laws of the land and to  trial               by courts.  Obviously, such a power places the               personal  liberty of such a person in  extreme               peril  against  which he is  provided  with  a               limited  right of challenge only.  There  can,               therefore, be no doubt that such a law has  to               be  strictly  construed.  Equally,  also,  the               power  conferred  by  such a  law  has  to  be               exercised  with extreme care and  scrupulously               within the bounds laid down in such a law."               In   a   sense  this  approach  is   only   an               application of the insistence of fairness when               power  is exercised to effect other’s  rights,               particularly the most sensitive of all rights-               personal  freedom.   Natural  justice  is  the               index  of fairness, although as  Sachs,  L.J.,               indicated  in In re-Pargemon Press  Ltd.(3)  :               "In  the  application of the concept  of  fair               play  there must be real flexibility  so  that               very  different situations may be met  without               producing procedures unsuitable to the  object               in hand".  In A.     K,  Krapak  v.  Union  of               India(4) this Court qualified :               "The  concept  of rule of law would  lose  its               validity if the instrumentalities of the State               are  not charged with the duty of  discharging               their functions in a fair and just manner. The               requirement of acting judicially in essence is               nothing  but a requirement to act  justly  and               fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously."               After all, one could never be too just or  too               fair when dealing with civil liberty.               (1)   Dr.  Ram  Krishan Bhardwaj  v  State  of               Delhi [1953] S. C. R. 708.               (2) A. 1. R. 1972 S. C. 1749.               (3) [1971] 1 Ch.  D. 368.               (4)   A. 1. R. 1970 SC 150,               321               With   these  background   observations,   the               statutory  ’musts’  of  the MISA  may  now  be               delineated.               We are concerned, as earlier stated, only with               some  aspects  of  the  preventive   detention               jurisprudence,  in  the present case,  and  we               confine  ourselves  to  them.   The   District               Magistrate should be bona fide satisfied about               the  prejudicial activities of  the  detainee.               Absence of bona fides in this context does not               mean  proof  of malice, for an  order  can  be               malafide  although  the officer  is  innocent.               The  important point is that the  satisfaction               of the public functionary, though  subjective,               must  be  real and rational,  not  colourable,               fanciful,  mechanical  or  unrelated  to   the               objects  enumerated  in s. 3(1)  of  the  Act.               Viscount   Haldane,   L.C.,  in   Shearer   v.               Shields(1) drew the, line neatly thus :               "Between  malice  in fact and malice,  in  law               there  is  a broad distinction  which  is  not               peculiar   to,   any  particular   system   of               jurisprudence.   A  person  who  inflicts   an               injury upon another person in contravention of

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             the  law is not allowed to say that he did  so               with an innocent mind; he is taken to know the               law, and he must act within the law.  He  may,               therefore,   be  guilty  of  malice  in   law,               although,  so far as the state of his mind  is               concerned,  he  acts ignorantly, and  in  that               sense innocently." The  attack on the order of detention has been delivered  on the following grounds : (1) that the grounds are ambivalent, vague  and  void;  (2)  that  the  particulars  suffer  from insufficient communication thus crippling the constitutional right of representation; (3) that the detention is mala fide having  been  made with ulterior and extraneous  purpose  of making  up  for  the discharge of  the  petitioner  in  the, criminal cases; (4) that a few acts of theft, not  proximate in  time to the detention order after  judicial  proceedings had   failed,  have  no  rational  relation   to   potential prejudicial activities to stanch which it professes to  have been  made; (5) that the materials impelling  the  detention order  and  supplied to the Government and  the,  Board  add substantially  to  the facts disclosed to  the  detenu  thus hitting  him  below  the belt and denying  him  the  plenary opportunity  to  answer  the  uncommunicated  but   damaging charges with a futuristic import; (6) that the MISA violates art.  22(5)  and  is  unconstitutional;  and  (7)  that  the detention  has been arbitrary and may continue  indefinitely if the Proclamation of Emergency becomes a constant fact  of constitutional  life  and  must  therefore  be  regarded  as unconstitutional.  The last two were urged in another habeas corpus  application  heard shortly before this one  and  are dealt with in a way here also. We  have to reject summarily the last Submission as  falling outside the orbit of judicial control and wandering into the para-political sector.  It was argued that there was no real emergency and yet the Proclamation remained unretracted with consequential  peril  to fundamental rights.  In  our  view, this  is a political, not justiciable issue and  the  appeal should  be  to  the  polls  and  not  to  the  courts.   The traditional (1)  [1914] A. C. 808. 322 view,  sanctified largely by some American  decisions,  that political  questions  fall  outside  the  area  of  judicial review,  is  not  a constitutional. taboo  but  a  pragmatic response  of the court to the reality of its  inadequacy  to decide  such  issues and to the scheme of  the  constitution which  has  assigned  to each branch of  government  in  the larger  sense  a certain jurisdiction.  of  course,  when  a problem-which  is essentially and basically  constitutional- although   dressed   up   as  a   political   question,   is appropriately raised before court, it is within the power of the judges to adjudicate.  The rule is one of self-restraint and of subject-matter, practical sense and respect for other branches   of  government  like  the  Legislature  and   the Executive.  Even so, we see no force in the plea.  True,  an emergency  puts a broad, blanket blindfolding of  the  seven liberties  of  art.  19 and its  baseless  prolongation  may devalue democracy.  That is a political matter do hours  our ken,  for  the  validity of the proclamation  turns  on  the subjective  satisfaction  of  the  President  that  a  grave emergency,  of  the  kind mentioned in Part  XVIII,  or  its imminent  danger,  exists.  In Rex v. Governor  of  Wormwood Scrubbs Prison(1) the Earl of Reading observed, on a similar contention               ".  .  even  if it  is  material  to  consider

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             whether the military emergency has come to  an               end,  it is not a matter which this Court  can               consider;  whether the emergency continues  to               exist or not it is for the executive alone  to               determine.. . . . "               The  argument of abuse of power was  urged  in               England   but   repelled.  In  The   King   v.               Halliday(2) Lord Dunnedin met it thus :               "That is true.  But the fault, if fault  there               be,   lies  in  the  fact  that  the   British               Constitution  has entrusted to the two  Houses               of  Parliament, subject to the assent  of  the               King,  an  absolute power untrammeled  by  any               written  instrument obedience to which may  be               compelled  by some judicial body.  The  danger               of   abuse   in   theoretically   present    :               practically,  as  things exist, it  is  in  my               opinion absent."               And  Lord Wright in Liversidge v.  Anderson(3)               added effect to the point in these words :               "The  safeguard of British liberty is  in  the               good sense of the people and in the system  of               representative   and  responsible   government               which  has evolved.  If  extraordinary  powers               are  here  given, they are given  because  the               emergency is extraordinary and are limited  to               the period of the emergency."               of   course,  the  British  have  no   written               constitution but the argument remains.               In  the recent ruling of the Privy Council  in               Hinakan  v.  Government  of  Malaysia(4),  the               vires  of a proclamation of emergency was  put               in  issue as unconstitutional and a  fraud  on               power.   The  Judicial  Committee  made  short               shrift of the submission in these words :               (1)   [1920] 2 K. B. 305.               (2)   [1917] A. C. 260, 270.               (3)   [1942] A. C. 206.               (4)   [1970] A. C. 379; 390; 391.               323               "Although  an  "emergency" to  be  within  the               article must be not only grave but such as  to               threaten the security or economic life of  the               Federation  or  any part of  it,  the  natural               meaning  of  the  word itself  is  capable  of               covering  a very wide range of situations  and               occurrences,  epidemics  and the  collapse  of               civil government."               "It is not for their Lordships to criticise or               comment  upon the wisdom or expediency of  the               steps  taken by the Government of Malaysia  in               dealing  with  the  constitutional   situation               which  had occurred in Sarawak, or to  inquire               whether that situation could itself have  been               avoided by a different approach."               "These   were  essentially  matters   to-   be               determined  according to the judgment  of  the               responsible  Ministers in the lights of  their               knowledge  and experience.  And  although  the               Indonesian  Confrontation had then ceased,  it               was  open  to the    Federal  Government,  and               indeed  its  duty, to  consider  the  possible               consequences   of   a   period   of   unstable               government  in  a  State  that,  not  so  long               before,  had  been  facing  the  tensions   of

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             Confrontation  and the  subversive  activities                             associated with it. That the appellant  regarded               the, Federal Government’s actions as aimed  at               himself is obvious and perhaps natural; but he               has failed to satisfy the Board that the steps               taken   by  the  Government,   including   the               proclamation  and  the impugned Act,  were  in               fraudum legis or otherwise unauthorised by the               relevant legislation." Justifiability was left open is that case, but the limits of judicial  propriety  were clearly drawn.  The  U.S.  Supreme Court  has  frowned on forensic examination of  subjects  of politics  and policy which belong to the other  branches  of government  although in Baker v. Carr(1) a  landmark  ruling and  Gray  v.  Senders(2),  constitutional  questions   with considerable  political  consequences were  boldly  handled. Even  the Viet Nam war came for judicial consideration.  But this  large  and sensitive debate about  the  court’s  power hardly  arises here because basically it is a  matter  least fit for adjudication by judicial methods and materials,  and clearly  the  onus  of establishing  the  effective  end  of emergency  and  absence  of any  grounds  whatever  for  the subjective  satisfaction of the President, heavy as  it  is, has   hardly   been  discharged.   Academic   exercises   in constitutional  law  are not for courts but jurists  and  we decline  to hold the continuance of emergency void. Nor  are we  impressed  with  the argument that S. 3 (3)  and  S.  10 violate art. 22(5) of the Constitution. The vice,  according to  counsel,  is that the detaining  authority  forwards  to Government  not  merely the grounds of detention  but  "such other particulars as in his opinion have (1) 369 U. S. 186 (1962) (2) 372 U. S. 363 (1963) 324 a bearing on the matter"--which matter may be beyond what is communicated   to   the  detenu.   If  so,   the   effective opportunity  to  make  representations  against  such  extra material  is  absent  and the right under  art.  22  (5)  is stultified.   No  doubt,  the soul of art. 22  is  the  fair chance  to be heard on all particulars relied on to  condemn the detenu to preventive confinement.  But s. 3(3) does not- cannot-transcend   this  trammel  and  never   states   that particulars  conveyed  to Government and eventually  to  the Board  may  be behind the back of the detenu.   Reading  the provisions literally and as owing allegiance to art.  22(5), it is right to say that all particulars transmitted under s. 3(3)  beyond the grounds of detention must, if they  have  a bearing  on the determination to detain, in no  way  detract from   the   effectiveness   of  the   detenu’s   right   of representation  about  them.  The guarantee  of  art.  22(5) colours  the  construction of s. 3. So viewed, there  is  no inconsistency with or erosion of the ’opportunity of  making a representation against the order.  Whether, in this  case, any  unconstitutional  deficiency in communication  of  such material has occurred: will be tested later. Is  there any substance in the grievance that order is  mala fide,  made  after and on account of the  discharge  of  the relative criminal cases ? The detention is not punitive  but preventive  and the District Magistrate’s order  recites  to that effect.  In this case, the petitioner’s  representation mentions  the  cases  challenge and  the  discharge  of  the accused by the court in regard to the very incidents pressed into  service  to  found  the  detention  order.   The  long interval   between  the  incidents  and  the  orders   lends

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probability  to the petitioner’s plea that there were  cases which  ended in his favour, particularly because  no  denial nor  explanation  is  forthcoming on these  aspects  in  the return.   The  question  is  whether  for  the  reason  that criminal  prosecutions  have failed the detention  order  is bad.   We  think  not, and there is  authority  for  it.  in Subrace  v. State of, West Bengal(1) this Court rejected  an identical  argument, the, purposes of  preventive  detention being   different   from  conviction  and   punishment   and subjective  satisfaction  being enough in the  former  while proof beyond reasonable doubt being necessary in the latter. "The  Act  creates  in  the  authorities  concerned  a   new jurisdiction  to  make orders for  preventive  detention  on their  subjective  satisfaction on grounds of  suspicion  of commission in future of acts prejudicial to the community in general.   This  jurisdiction  is  different  from  that  of judicial trial in courts for offences and of judicial orders for  prevention  of offences.   Even  unsuccessful  judicial trial  or proceeding would, therefore, not operate as a  bar to a detention order, or render it male fide.  The matter is also  not  res integra." In M. S. Khan V. C.  C.  Bose(2)  a similar  view was expressed and now a host of decisions  had made the legal position unchallengeable.  A note of caution, however, needs to be struck since absolute scrupulousness is expected  of authorities exercising this exceptional  power. This is not a power to put behind bars anyone you regard  as dangerous or rowdyish or irrepressible or difficult of being got  rid  of  by  proof  of guilt  in  court.   This  is  an instrument for protecting the community against specially (1) (1973) 3 SCC 250.      (2) A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 1670. 325 injurious   types   of  anti-social   activity   statutorily enunciated.     If extraneous motives adulterate the use  of power, the court must nullify it.  Observations in Rameshwar Lal v. State of Bihar(1) serve as a warning :               "The  appellant was tried for the offence  and               acquitted as far back as February 1967.   This               ground   discloses   carelessness   which   is               extremely  disturbing.   That  the   detaining               authority does not know that the appellant was               tried   and  acquitted  months   before,   and               considers the pendency of the case against him               as one of the grounds of detention shows  that               due  care and attention is not being  paid  to               such  serious  matters  as  detention  without               trial.    If  the  appellant  was  tried   and               acquitted,  Government was required  to  study               the judgment of acquittal to discover  whether               all these allegations had any basis in fact or               not.   One can understand the use of the  case               if  the acquittal was technical but  not  when               the case was held to be false." After all, however well-meaning Government may be, detention power  cannot  be quietly used to subvert,  supplant  or  to substitute  the punitive law of the Penal Code.  The  immune expedient  of  throwing  into a prison  cell  one  whom  the ordinary law would take of, merely because it is irksome  to undertake  the  inconvenience of proving guilt in  court  is unfair abuse.  To detain a person after a court has held the charge  false  is  to expose oneself  to  the  criticism  of absence of due care and of rational material for  subjective satisfaction.  After all, the responsible officer, aware  of the  value  of civil liberty even for  undesirable  persons, must   make  a  credible  prediction  of  the   species   of prejudicial activity in s. 3(1) before shutting up a person.

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It  may perilously hover around illegality, if a single  act of theft or threat, for which a prosecution was launched but failed,  is  seized  upon  after, say, a  year  or  so,  for detaining the accused out of pique, The potential  executive tendency  to  shy  at courts  for  prosecution  of  ordinary offences  and to rely generously on the easier  strategy  of subjective satisfaction is a danger to the democratic way of life.   The large number of habeas corpus petitions and  the more  or less stereotyped grounds of detention and  inaction by  way  of  prosecution, induce us  to  voice  this  deeper concern.   Moreover, a criminal should not get away with  it as an unconvicted detenu if the rule of law is a live force. The  ritualistic  recital of one or two thefts  followed  by incantatory statutory phrases in the order, unsupported even by  the  affidavit of the detaining authority  may  in  some circumstances  lead  to an inference that the  order  is  in fraudum  legis.   In the present case such an  argument  has been  made  but  we are not satisfied that  there  was  foul exercise of power merely because the courts have  discharged the  accused  or a competent affidavit has not  been  filed. True,  we  should  have  expected  an  affidavit  from   the detaining  authority but even that is felt too  inconvenient and  a Deputy Secretary who merely peruses the  records  and swears an affidavit in every case is the poor proxy.  Why is (1)  [1968] 2 S. C. R. 505; 511. 326 an  affidavit  than needed at all?  The fact  of  subjective satisfaction,  solemnly  reached  considering  relevant  and excluding  irrelevant facts, sufficient in degree of  danger and certainty to warrant preemptive casting into prison,  is best made out by the detaining District Magistrate, not  one who professionally reads records and makes out a precise  in the  form of an affidavit.  The purpose is missed, going  by the  seriousness  of the matter, the  proof  is,  deficient, going by ordinary rules of evidence, and the Court is denied the benefit of the word of one who takes responsibility  for the  action, if action has to be taken against the  detainer later  for misuse.  We are aware that in the  exigencies  of administration,  an  officer  may  be  held  up  far   away, engrossed in other important work, thus being unavailable to swear an affidavit.  The next bust would then be the oath of one in the Secretariat Who officially is cognisant of or has participated  in the process of approval by  Government--not one  who, long later, reads old files and gives its gist  to the  court.  Mechanical means are easy but  not  legitimate. We  emphasize  this infirmity because routine  summaries  of files, marked as affidavits, appear in the returns to  rules nisi,  showing scant courtesy to the constitutional  gravity of  deprivation  of civil liberty.  In some  cases  where  a valid  reason  for the District  Magistrate’s  inability  to swear affidavits directly has been furnished, this Court has accepted  the concerned Deputy Secretary’s affidavit.   This should,  however,  be the exception, not the rule.   We  may refer in this context to the rulings in Ranjit Dam v.  State of West Bengal, (1), J. N.  Roy v. State of West Bengal, (2) and Shaik Hanif and others v. State of West Bengal.(3) We  need  not  proceed further with  this  aspects,  in  the ultimate view we take on this writ petition. We are not persuaded that a speaking order should be  passed by  Government or- by the Advisory Board while approving  or advising   continuance   of  detention  although   a   brief expression  of  the  principal reasons  is  desirable.   The communication  of grounds, the right to make  representation and  the consideration thereof by the Advisory body made  up of men with judicial experience the subject-matter being the

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deprivation  of  freedom, clearly implies  a  quasi-judicial approach.  Indeed. where citizen’s rights are affected by an authority, the question is not so much the mould into  which the nature of the act should be fitted but the nature of the consequence    which   obligates   impartiality,    judicial evaluation   and   reasoned   conclusion   on   facts.    as distinguished  from  policy formulation and  zealous  imple- mentation regardless of two sides and weighing of  evidence. Thebare bones of natural justice in this context need not be clothed  with  the  ample  flesh  of  detailed  hearing  and elaborate reasoning.  It must be self-evident from the order that the substance of the charge and the essential answer in the representation have been impartially considered.  We  do not  think  that a speaking order like  a  regular  Judicial performance is either necessary or feasible.  Article 22(5) (1) A. I. R. (1972) SC 1753. (2) A. I. R. (1972) SC 2143. (3)  Writ Petitions Nos. 1679 etc; judgment on  February  1, 1974. 327 also  does  not compel us to reach a  different  conclusion. After   all,.   we   must   remember   that   a   harmonious reconciliation between the claims of security of the  nation and  the  liberty  of the citizen  through  the  process  of effective   representation  before  deprivation   and   fair consideration  by the Executive and the Advisory  Board  are the necessary components of natural justice.  Not more.   In times  of  emergency, security of the  State  and  essential supplies   and  services  of  the  community  assume   great importance and demand quicker action.  At the same time,  we cannot underrate the right of the citizen and cannot  forget the words of Justice Jackson in Knaff v. Shaughnassy : (1)               "Security is like liberty in that many are the               crimes  committed in its name.  The menace  to               the security of this country be it great as it               may,  from     this  girl’s  admission  is  as               nothing   compared  to  the  menace  to   free               institutions  inherent in procedures  on  this               pattern....  The plan that evidence  of  guilt               must  be  secret  is abhorrent  to  free  men,                             because it provides a cloak for the ma levolent,               the   misinformed,  the  meddlesome  and   the               corrupt   to   play  the  role   of   informer               undetected and uncorrected." What  has  to be underscored is the obligation   to  make  a fair  communication  of  the  grounds  and  the  particulars sufficient to enable the detainee to explain his  innocence. Faceless  informers flourish where confrontation  by  cross- examination is absent, and orders with the inscrutable  face of  a sphinx are not uncommon where subjective  satisfaction is  sufficient.  All the more reason why there should  be  a meaningfull    comprehensive   furnishing    of    essential particulars so that the executive agencies may be rigorously held  to the standards implied by the courts in art.  22(5). Otherwise,  in  the language of Justice Frank  further,  "he that  takes  the  procedural sword shall  perish  with  that sword."  Administrative absolution is incongruous  with  our constitutional   scheme.  If  control  of  liberty   in   an emergency-Barbed-wire   entanglements  of  freedom  by   the executive--is  necessary.  control  of control  is  in  some measure  healthy because power in the minions of  government can be ’of an encroaching nature’. Reference was made at the bar  in  this  context  to Allen’s  "Law  and  Orders",  and Markose’s "Judicial Control of Administrative Action"- In  the petitioner’s case the gravamen of his ’grievance  is

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that   some  irrelevant  and  uncommunicated  charges   have influenced the authority, vitiating the order. We would  not view with unconcern violation on this score, if made out. It is  common ground that the police have sent to the  District Magistrate (who in turn has forwarded to the Government  and the  Board) a blistering bio-data. It states that (a) he  is poor  and illiterate, (b) has associates in notorious  wagon breakers  and anti-social element, (c) has developed  spirit of lawlessness and aptitude for anti-social activities,  (d) many of the (1)  338 U. S. 537. 328 reported  and  unreported cases of  recent  anti-social  and criminal   activities  exist  to  his  credit  besides   the instances  communicated to the detenu.   Fairly  considered, this report has been present to the minds of the authorities but withheld from the affected party, Poverty and illiteracy are  outrageously  irrelevant to S. 3. The  spirit  of  law- lessness and aptitude for anti-social activities are neither here   nor  there  vis-a-vis  s.  3.  Other   reported   and unreported’ instances though relevant are kept back from the petitioner.   If such be the case. s. 3(3)., read with  art. 22(5),  stands  contravened  and  the  right  to   represent rendered  barren.   And yet particulars prejudicial  to  the detenu  played over the judgment of the authorities but  the petitioner  never  knew of such injurious  information,  and could   not  answer  back.   This  Court  in  many   weighty pronouncements over two decades has stressed that art. 22(5) vests  a  real, not illusory right,  that  communication  of facts is the cornerstone of the right of representation  and orders  based  on uncommunicated materials  are  unfair  and illegal. Before  parting  with  this case,( we wish  to  express  our disquiet  that  more theft even of copper  wire,  unless  in association  with  other  facts  may not  give  rise  to  an inference  of proclivities of the type mentioned in  s.3(1). Some proximity in time between the acts and the order. sonic indications  of activities disrupting supplies and  services to the community and more ’trendy’ behaviour warranting pre- ventive measures. must be available before the extreme  step of  detention  without  trial  is  clamped  down.   A  sober prognosis  by  the  District Magistrate  of  the  detainee’s dangerous behaviour must be wellgrounded, even if impervious to judicial probe.  We cannot dismiss as accidental that  in this  area  of the law, in two leading  cases,  two  judges, Bose.   J.,  and  Bhagwathy.   J.,  have  referred  to  the, Bestille  not  that we express our approbation of  its  use. Executive  care  and  Advisory  Board’s  vigilance  are  the hopeful  sentinels  checking on the  misapplication  of  the MISA. unwittingly to rob the people of the Republic of civil liberties. We may emphasise that to minimise processor justice to  mere communication and consequent representation is not to reduce that prescription to a rove of sand, and to make  subjective satisfaction  a sufficient prerequisite to detention is  not to reduce judicial review to a brutum fulmen. We  hold  that  the detention in this case  is  illegal  for denial  of opportunity to make effective representation  and direct that the petitioner be set free. P. B. R. 329