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PETITIONER: BHOOP SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/04/1992

BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) SHARMA, L.M. (J) ANAND, A.S. (J)

CITATION:  1992 AIR 1414            1992 SCR  (2) 969  1992 SCC  (3) 136        JT 1992 (3)   322  1992 SCALE  (1)954

ACT:     Constitution of India, 1950:-      Articles   14  and  311-Police  agitation-Services   of several  police constables terminated-Many constables  filed writ  petitions  and  were  reinstated-Petitioner  one  such dismissed  constable-Challenged his termination order  after 22  years-No explanation offered for delay-Not  entitled  to relief merely because others have been reinstated-Refusal of relief-Held not discriminatory-Relief of reinstatement-To be granted to one who is diligent.

HEADNOTE:      A  large number of police constables participated in  a mass  agitation  on  April 14, 1967.  The  services  of  the agitating police constables were terminated on that  account without  specifying that reason for the  termination.  Apart from termination, many of these police constables were  also prosecuted.  As  a result of the demand by some  Members  of Parliament, many of the dismissed constables were taken back in   service  as fresh entrants and the Home  Minister  also directed withdrawal of the prosecution against them.      Some  of these dismissed constables who were not  taken back in service even as fresh entrants filed writ  petitions in the High Court in 1969 and 1970 which were allowed by the High Court on October 1, 1975, quashing the orders of  their termination.  Subsequently,  some  other  constables   whose services were similarly terminated also filed writ petitions in the High Court in 1978, which too were allowed, rejecting the objection raised on the ground of delay and laches.      Another  set  of similarly  dismissed  constables  then filed  writ  petitions  in the High  Court  challenging  the termination  of their services contending that  their  claim was  identical  with  that of the petitioners  in  the  writ petitions filed in 1978. These petitions were transferred to the  Central  Administrative Tribunal which held  that  they were entitled to the same                                                        970 relief  as  was granted in the writ petitions field  in  the High  Court  in  1978. Appeals to this Court  by  the  Delhi Administration against this decision were dismissed.

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    Lt.  Governor  of  Delhi and others  v.  Dharampal  and others, [1990] 4 SCC 13.      The petitioner in the Special Leave petition claimed to be  a  similarly  dismissed police  constable  and  filed  a petition before the Central Administrative Tribunal for  re- instatement  in  service and consequential benefits  on  the ground  that his case and claim was similar to that  of  the police constables who had succeeded in the earlier rounds of litigation.      The  Tribunal  rejected the application on  the  ground that  it  was  highly  belated  and  there  was  no   cogent explanation  for the inordinate delay of 22 years in  filing the application on 13th March, 1989 after termination of the service in 1967.      In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that  the petitioner was entitled to the relief of  reinstatement like the  others dismissed with him and then reinstated  and  the question  of  delay or laches does not arise, and  that  the Delhi  Administration was dutybound to reinstate  him  along with others and in not doing so, it has discriminated him.      Dismissing the special leave petition, this Court,      HELD  : 1. It is expected of a Government  servant  who has a legitimate claim to approach the Court for the  relief he  seeks  within  a reasonable period,  assuming  no  fixed period  of  limitation applies. This is necessary  to  avoid dislocating  the  administrative set-up after  it  has  been functioning  on  a  certain  basis  for  years.  During  the interregnum those who have been working gain more experience and  acquire  rights which cannot be  defeated  casually  by lateral  entry  of a person at a higher  point  without  the benefit  of  actual  experience during  the  period  of  his absence  when  he chose to remain silent  for  years  before making  the claim. Apart from the consequential benefits  of reinstatement  without actually working, the impact  on  the administrative  set-up  and on other employees is  a  strong reason to decline consideration of a stale claim unless  the delay is satisfactorily explained and is not attributable to the claimant. This is a                                                        971 material  fact to be given due weight while considering  the argument   of  discrimination  for  deciding   whether   the petitioner  is  in the same class as  those  who  challenged their dismissal several years earlier and were  consequently granted the relief of reinstatement. [974 G-975 B]      In  the instant case, the petitioner was  appointed  in 1964  and his service terminated after about three years  in 1967.  It is in 1989, after a lapse of about 22  years  from the  date of termination of his service that the  petitioner chose to assail his dismissal, notwithstanding the fact that some of the dismissed constables challenged their  dismissal as  early  as in 1969 and 1970, within a period  of  two  to three  years and others too did so after the success of  the first batch in getting reinstated. No. attempt has been made by  the petitioner to explain why he chose to be  silent  so long  if he too was interested in  being reinstated and  had not abandoned his claim, if any. [974 D, E]      2.  The  lapse  of such a long  unexplained  period  of several  years  in the case of the petitioner  is  a  strong reason  to  not  classify  him  with  the  other   dismissed constables   who  approached  the  Court  earlier  and   got reinstatement. It was clear to the petitioner latest in 1978 when  the  second  batch of petitions were  filed  that  the petitioner  also  will have to file a petition  for  getting reinstatement.  Even  then  he  chose  to  wait  till  1989, Dharmpal’s  case also being decided in 1987. The argument of

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discrimination   is,   therefore,  not  available   to   the petitioner. [975 C, D]      3.  Inordinate  and unexplained delay or  lapse  is  by itself   a  ground  to  refuse  relief  to  the   petitioner irrespective  of  the  merits  of his  claim.  If  a  person entitled  to a relief chooses to remain silent for long,  he thereby  gives rise to a reasonable belief in the  minds  of others  that he is not interested in claiming  that  relief. Others  are then justified in acting on that belief.  It  is more  so in service matters where vacancies are required  to be filled promptly. [975 E]      4.  A  person  cannot be  permitted  to  challenge  the termination  of  his  service after a period  of  22  years, without  any  cogent explanation for the  inordinate  delay, merely   because   others  similarly  dismissed   had   been reinstated  as  a result of their  earlier  petitions  being allowed. [975 F]      5. Article 14 or the principle of non-discrimination is an equitable principle and, therefore any relief claimed  on that basis must itself be                                                        972 founded on equity and not be alien to that concept, [975 G]      In  the  instant  case,  grant of  the  relief  to  the petitioner would be inequitable instead of its refusal being discriminatory as asserted on behalf of the petitioner. [975 H-976 a]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave  petition (C) No. 1485 of 1992.      From  the  Order and Judgment dated  30.9.1991  of  the Central  Administrative Tribunal, Delhi in R.A. No.  162  of 1991 in O.A. No. 753 of 1989.      Govind  Mukhoty,  A.P.  Singh  and  K.N.  Rai  for  the Petitioner.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      VERMA,  J. The petitioner was appointed a constable  in the  Delhi  Armed Police in 1964. A large number  of  police constables  participated  in a mass agitation on  April  14, 1967.  The services of the agitating police constables  were terminated  on that account without specifying  that  reason for the termination. The petitioner claims that his  service was   similarly    terminated  on  3.8.1967   due   to   his participation in the agitation with other police constables. Apart from terminating their services, many of those  police constables were also prosecuted. It appears that as a result of  the  demand by some Members of Parliament, many  of  the dismissed  constables  were taken back in service  as  fresh entrants  and the Home Minister also directed withdrawal  of prosecution  against them. Some of the dismissed  constables who  were  not taken back in service even as  fresh  entrant field  writ  petitions in the Delhi High Court in  1969  and 1970 which were allowed by the High Court on October 1, 1975 quashing  the  orders of termination  of  those  petitioner. Subsequently,  some  other constables  whose  services  were similarly terminated also filed writ petitions in the  Delhi High  Court  in 1978 which too were  allowed  rejecting  the objection raised on the ground of delay and laches.  Another set  of  similarly  dismissed  constables  then  filed  writ petitions   in   the  Delhi  High  Court   challenging   the termination  of their services contending that  their  claim was  identical  with  that of the petitioners  in  the  writ petitions   filed  in  1978.  These  writ   petitions   were

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transferred  to  the Central Administrative  Tribunal  which held that the                                                        973 petitioners therein were entitled to the same relief as  was granted  to the petitioners in the writ petitions  filed  in the  High Court in 1978. The Delhi Administration  preferred appeals  in this Court against that decision. Those  appeals were dismissed by the judgment in Lt. Governor of Delhi  and v. Dharampal and others, [1990] 4 SCC 13.      petitioner,   Bhoop Singh, claiming to be  a  similarly dismissed police constable filed O.A. No. 753 of 1989 in the Central Administrative Tribunal praying for reinstatement in service  and all consequential benefits on the  ground  that his  case  and  claim  is similar  to  that  of  the  police constables  who  had  succeeded in  the  earlier  rounds  of litigation.  The  Tribunal  has  rejected  the  petitioner’s application  on  the ground that it is  highly  belated  and there  is no cogent explanation for the inordinate delay  of twenty-two  years  in filing the  application  on  13.3.1989 after termination of the petitioner’s service in 1967.      Shri   Gobinda   Mukhoty,  learned  counsel   for   the petitioner strenuously urged that the petitioner is entitled to  the  relief of reinstatement like the  others  dismissed with  him and then reinstated and the question of  delay  or laches  does not arise. Learned counsel contended  that  the Delhi  Administration  was  duty  bound  to  reinstate   the petitioner also with the others and in not doing so, it  has discriminated  the petitioner. On this basis, it was  urged, the question of laches or delay does not arise. Shri Mukhoty places strong reliance on the decision in Dharampal  (supra) to support his submission.      The  real  question is : whether, the  mere  fact  that termination of petitioner’s service as a police constable in 1967  is alleged to be similar to that of the  other  police constables  so dismissed in 1967 and then reinstated in  the above  manner  is  sufficient to grant  him  the  relief  of reinstatement ignoring the fact that he made the claim after the lapse of twenty-two years in 1989? It has, therefore, to be seen whether this fact alone is sufficient to classify to petitioner with the earlier reinstated police constables for granting the relief reinstatement claimed in 1989 when those reinstated had made their claim several years earlier.      In  Dharampal  (supra)  there is  no  consideration  or discussion of this question and in that case this Court  had refused to interfere with the relief                                                        974 granted by the Tribunal. The question here is of interfering with  the  Tribunal’s order since the Tribunal  has  refused relief  on this ground. Unless it can be held that delay  of several  years in claiming the relief of reinstatement  must be ignored simply because some other similarly dismissed had been  reinstated  as  a  result  of  their  success  in  the petitions  filed  many years earlier, the  Tribunal’s  order cannot  be reversed in the present case. Dharampal is of  no assistance  for this purpose. Whether, the delay  in  making the claim has been explained satisfactorily to negative  the objection  of laches is a question of fact in each case.  In Dharampal  the Tribunal had apparently been  satisfied  with the  explanation  for  the delay  and  this  Court  declined interference with the Tribunal’s view. In the present  case, there  has  been a much longer delay and  the  Tribunal  has stated that the same has not been explained. Dharampal  does not,  therefore,  help  the petitioner  to  circumvent  this obstacle.      The  petitioner was appointed in 1964 and  his  service

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terminated  after about three years in 1967. It is  in  1989 after  a  lapse of about twenty-two years from the  date  of termination  of  his service that the  petitioner  chose  to assail  his dismissal, not with standing the fact that  some of  the dismissed constables challenged their  dismissal  as early as 1969 and 1970, with a period of two to three years, and  others  too did so soon after to success of  the  first batch in getting reinstated. No attempt has been made by the petitioner to explain why he chose to be silent for so long, if  he  too was interested in being reinstated and  had  not abandoned his claim, if any. If the petitioner’s  contention is  upheld  that  lapse  of any length of  time  is  of   no consequence in the present case, it would mean that any such police constable can choose to wait even till he attains the age of superannuation and then assail the termination of his service and claim monetary benefits for the entire period on the  same ground. That would be a startling proposition.  In our opinion, this cannot be the true import of Article 14 or the  requirement  of  the  principle  of  non-discrimination embodied  therein, which is the foundation  of  petitioner’s case.      It  is  expected  of a government  servant  who  has  a legitimate  claim  to approach the Court for the  relief  he seek within a reasonable period, assuming no fixed period of limitation  applies. This is necessary to avoid  dislocating the administrative set-up after it has been functioning on a certain  basis for years. During the interregnum  those  who have been                                                        975 working gain more experience and acquire rights which cannot be  defeated  casually  by lateral entry of a  person  at  a higher point without the benefit of actual experience during the period of his absence when he chose to remain silent for years before making the claim. Apart from the  consequential benefits  of  reinstatement without  actually  working,  the impact  on the administrative set-up and on other  employees is a strong reason to decline consideration of a stale claim unless  the  delay is satisfactorily explained  and  is  not attributable to the claimant. This is a material fact to  be given   due  weight  while  considering  the   argument   of discrimination in the present case for deciding whether  the petitioner  is  in the same class as  those  who  challenged their dismissal several years earlier and were  consequently granted  the  relief of reinstatement. In our  opinion,  the lapse  of a much longer unexplained period of several  years in  the  case of the petitioner is a strong  reason  to  not classify  him  with  the  other  dismissed  constables   who approached  the Court earlier and got reinstatement. It  was clear to the petitioner latest in 1978 when the second batch of  petitions were filed that the petitioner also will  have to  file a petition for getting reinstatement. Even then  he chose to wait till 1989, Dharampal’s case also being decided in  1987. The argument of discrimination is, therefore,  not available to the petitioner.      There  is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate  and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to  refuse relief  to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of  his claim.  If a person entitled to a relief chooses  to  remain silent  for  long,  he thereby gives rise  to  a  reasonable belief  in the mind of others that he is not  interested  in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that  belief.  This  is more so  in  service  matters  where vacancies  are  required  to be filled  promptly.  A  person cannot  be  permitted to challenge the  termination  of  his service  after  a period of twenty-two  years,  without  any

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cogent explanation for the inordinate delay, merely  because others  similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a  result of  their  earlier petitions being  allowed.  Accepting  the petitioner’s  contention  would  upset  the  entire  service jurisprudence and we are unable to construe Dharampal in the manner  suggested  by  the petitioner.  Article  14  or  the principle  of non-discrimination is an  equitable  principle and, therefore, any relief claimed on that basis must itself be  founded on equity and not be alien to that  concept.  In our opinion, grant of the relief to the                                                        976 petitioner,  in  the  present  case,  would  be  inequitable instead of its refusal being  discriminatory as asserted  by learned  counsel for the petitioner. We are further  of  the view  that these circumstances also justify refusal  of  the relief claimed under Article 136 of the Constitution.      Special Leave Petition is dismissed. N.V.K.                                  Petition dismissed.                                                        977