04 December 1990
Supreme Court
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BHOOP ALLEGED SON OF SHEO Vs MATADIN BHARDWAJ SON OF LAKMI CHAND

Bench: AHMADI,A.M. (J)
Case number: Appeal Civil 1172 of 1986


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PETITIONER: BHOOP ALLEGED SON OF SHEO

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MATADIN BHARDWAJ SON OF LAKMI CHAND

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/12/1990

BENCH: AHMADI, A.M. (J) BENCH: AHMADI, A.M. (J) SHETTY, K.J. (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR  373            1990 SCR  Supl. (3) 410  1991 SCC  (2) 128        JT 1990 (4)   594  1990 SCALE  (2)1204

ACT:     Code  of Civil Procedure--Section 146 and order 20  Rule 14,  Order 21 Rule 16--Preemption decree--Whether  could  be transferred to entitled purchaser to execute the same.

HEADNOTE:     Sub-Judge, 1st Class, Mahendergarh, in a suit, granted a preemption decree in respect of agricultural land in  favour of  one Shanti Devi and against the appellant  and  directed Shanti Devi to deposit the sale price by November 17,  1968. The  respondent  Matadin obtained a Deed  of  Assignment  in respect  of the said decree and thereby acquired the  rights of Shanti Devi therein. On the strength of the said  Assign- ment deed, he put the decree to execution by getting himself substituted  as  a  decree-holder on October  15,  1980.  He claimed  actual possession of the land from  the  appellant. The appellant contested the execution proceedings contending that  the  pre-emption decree was not  transferable  and  no right passed to the respondent under the deed of assignment. It  was also contended that since Shanti Devi had failed  to make  the deposit, the suit stood dismissed and Shanti  Devi had  no subsisting right in the decree which she could  pass under the assignment deed. The Sub-Judge, 1st Class,  Mahen- dergarh  held that since the amount was not deposited on  or before November 18, 1968, the suit stood dismissed and  thus Shanti  Devi  had no interest which she could  transfer.  He accordingly dismissed the execution application.  Respondent Mata Din, being aggrieved by the said order filed a revision application  in  the High Court. The High Court  found  that Shanti Devi took timely steps to deposit the sale price  but due  to administrative difficulties, she could  deposit  the amount  only on November 19, 1968. The High Court  therefore held  that  there was no delay on the part  of  the  decree- holder  to deposit the amount and hence the amount  must  be taken to have been deposited within the time allowed by  the decree  and so the decreeholder was competent to  assign  it and  the  assignee  was entitled to execute  the  same.  The revision  application  was  allowed and  the  execution  was directed  to  proceed. The appellant has filed  this  appeal against the said order after obtaining special leave and the main  contention amongst others advanced on his  behalf  re-

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lates to the transferability of the decree and the maintain- ability of the execution proceedings. 411 Dismissing the appeal, this Court,     HELD: The right of pre-emption is generally conferred on a  cosharer in the property or on a person who  claims  some right  over the property e.g., a right of way, etc.,  or  on the ground of vicinage i.e. being an owner of the  adjoining property. This right may be rounded in statute or custom  or personal  law  by which the parties are governed.  The  sole object  of conferring this right on a co-sharer or owner  of an adjacent immovable property is to exclude strangers  from acquiring  interest in an immovable property as a  co-sharer or to keep objectionable strangers away from the  neighbour- hood.  This  right is purely personal and cannot  be  trans- ferred to a third party for the obvious reason that it would defeat the very purpose of its conferment. [416G-H]     The  parties  in the instant case, clearly  intended  to transfer Shanti Devi’s interest in the pre-emptional land to Matadin.  This is, therefore, not a case of a transfer of  a mere  decree with the property remaining vested in title  in the pre-emptor. [418A]     The  document clearly shows that Matadin had to  implead himself  in  place of the decree-holder as a  party  to  the pending  execution proceedings and then seek  possession  of the pre-emptional property. Matadin was substituted in place of the decree-holder after notice to the judgment-debtor. He was therefore, entitled to execute the decree. [418D]     Matadin was entitled in law to execute the decree trans- ferred  to  him and obtain possession of be  land  from  the judgment-debtor. [418E]     Mehr Khan v. Gulam Rasul, AIR 1922 Lahore 300; Negeshwar v.  Taluk  Singh, AIR 1930 Oudh 195; Wajid  Ali  v.  Salian, [1909]  ILR  31 An 623; Zila Singh v. Hazari, [1979]  3  SCR 222;  Chandrup  Singh v. Data Ram, AIR 1983 P & H  1;  Sarju Prasad v. Jamna Prasad, (unreported) S.A. from order No.  45 of 1983 decided on November 21, 1983 and Jugal Kishore Saraj v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., [1955] SCR 1369, referred to.

JUDGMENT: