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PETITIONER: BHIMAJI SHANKER KULKARNI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DUNDAPPA VITHAPPA UDAPUDI AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/05/1965

BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. SUBBARAO, K. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:  1966 AIR  166            1966 SCR  (1) 145  CITATOR INFO :  D          1978 SC1217  (2,5,34,35)  E&R        1979 SC 653  (13,15,16,17,17A)  R          1989 SC2240  (9,12)

ACT: Bombay  Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bom.   Act LXVII of 1948), s. 85(1)Civil Court’s jurisdiction barred in respect  of matters to be dealt with by mamlatdar--Claim  of being a ’protected tenant’ under the Act-To be decided under s.  70(b)  by  mamlatdar-Suit where such  a  claim  made  in defendant’s written statement whether barred under s. 85(1).

HEADNOTE: The plaintiff-appellant instituted a suit in the civil court for  the  possession of suit properties on redemption  of  a mortgage  and the taking of accounts on the allegation  that defendant  No.  1  was the usufructuary  mortgagee  under  a mortgage deed.  The defendants pleaded that the  transaction in question was an advance lease and not a mortgage and that they  were  "protected" tenants within the  meaning  of  the Bombay  Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948.  Under  s. 70(b)  of the Act it was one of the duties of the  Mamlatdar to decide whether a person was a ’protected’ tenant.   Under s. 85(1) of the Act the jurisdiction of the civil court %-as barred in respect of matters which fell to be decided by the mamlatdar.   The  trial  court held  that  the  document  in question  was a composite document comprising of a  mortgage and  a  lease, that the mortgage debt having been  paid  the mortgage  stood  redeemed,  and that the  plaintiff  was  at liberty  to  seek his remedy of possession  in  the  revenue court-.  The first appellate court held that the civil court had no jurisdiction to determine whether defendant No. 1 was a  mortgagee  in possession or a tenant, but  confirmed  the trial courts finding that the mortgage debt stood  redeemed. The  High  Court in plaintiffs second appeal held  that  the lower  appellate court having correctly held that the  civil court had no jurisdiction to interpret the document executed between  the  parties ought not to have taken  the  accounts treating  the  document as a mortgage.  It asked  the  trial court to refer the issue as to the nature of the transaction to  the  mamlatdar.  The plaintiff filed  a  Letters  Patent

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Appeal  and  that  also having failed, he  appealed  to  the Supreme Court, by special It  was  contended  on  behalf of  the  appellant  that  the jurisdiction  of  a civil court depends on  the  allegations made  in  the plaint and the plea in the  written  statement that  the defend-ants were ’protected’ tenants did not  oust jurisdiction of the civil court. HELD  : (i) The Mamlatdar has exclusive  jurisdiction  under the  Act  to  entertain an application  by  a  landlord  for possession  of agricultural lands against a tenant, and  the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try a  suit by   a   landlord  against  a  tenant  for   possession   of agricultural  lands.  The Mamlatdar has no  jurisdiction  to try  a suit by a landowner for recovering of  possession  of agricultural lands from a trespasser or from a mortgagee  on -redemption  of  a  mortgage, and the  civil  court  has  no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit; but if the  defendant to  the suit pleads that he is a tenant and an issue  arises whether he is such a tenant, the Court must refer the  issue to  the Mamlatdar for determination and must stay  the  suit pending  such  determination, and after  the  Mamlatdar  has decided the issue, the court may dispose of the suit in  the light of the decision of the Mamlatdar. [149 E-H] 146 Dhondi Tukaram v. Hari Dadu, I.L.R. 1953 Bom. 969, approved. Mudugere  Rangaiah v. M. Rangaiah, I.L.R. 1959 Mysore,  420, distinguished. (ii) The  High  Court  had jurisdiction  to  set  aside  the finding  of  the  trial court that nothing was  due  by  the plaintiff to the defendants.  The first appellate court  had given inconsistent findings.  The High Court had ample power to correct the error arising therefrom. [152 D-E]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 270 of 1963. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated December 7, 1959 of the Mysore High Court in Second Appeal (B)  No. 184 of 1956. S.   G. Patwardhan, S. N. Prasad, J. B. Dadachanji, for  the appellant. R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat,  J.  On April 19,  1951,  the  plaintiff-appellant instituted  a  suit in the Court of the Second  Joint  Civil Judge,  Junior Division at Bagalkot, for possession  of  the suit  properties on redemption of a mortgage and the  taking of  accounts on the allegation that defendant No. 1 was  the usufructuary mortgagee under a mortgage deed dated June  28, 1945 (Ex. 43).  The defendants pleaded that the  transaction of  June 28, 1945 was an advance lease and not  a  mortgage, and they were ’protected’ tenants within the meaning of  the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bombay  Act LXVII of 1948) hereinafter referred to as the Act.  On March 4, 1953, the trial Court passed the following decree:               "  10. (A) The deed Exhibit 43 is a  composite               document comprising of a mortgage and a lease.               On taking accounts of the mortgage debt, it is               found  that  plaintiff  owed  nothing  to  the               defendants on the date of suit.  The  mortgage               stands fully redeemed.               (B)   The plaintiff is at  liberty to seek his               remedy for possession of the suit lands in the               Revenue Courts.

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             (C)   The  plaintiff  shall recover  half  the               costs of the suit from the defendants and  the               defendants shall bear their own." On  April  15, 1953, the plaintiff filed an  appeal  in  the Court of the Assistant Judge at Bijapur, and the  defendants filed crossobjections.  On July 5, 1955, the first appellate Court  held  that  the Civil Court had  no  jurisdiction  to determine whether defendant 147 No.  1 was a mortgagee in possession or a tenant, and passed the following decree:               "The appeal is partly allowed.  The decree  of               the learned trial Judge that nothing is due by               the  plaintiff  to the  defendants  under  the               transaction  (Exhibit 43) at the date  of               the  suit and the plaintiff is at  liberty  to               seek  his  remedy for possession of  the  suit               land in Revenue Court is confirmed.  The  rest               of   the  decree  namely  that  the   document               (Exhibit 43) is a composite document showing a               mortgage  and a lease and about costs  is  set               aside.  Instead it is directed that the record               and  proceedings should go back to  the  Trial               Court  who should give three months’  time  to               the  plaintiff  after record  and  proceedings               reach it for filing proper proceedings in  the               Tenancy  Court for determining as  to  whether               defendant  I  is a tenant.  If  the  plaintiff               does  not institute those  proceedings  within               the time allowed by the Trial Court, then  the               suit  of  the plaintiff for  possession  etc.,               should  be dismissed ordering the  parties  to               bear their own costs.  If the proceedings  are               instituted  by  the plaintiff in  the  Tenancy               Court,  then the Trial Court should await  the               final decision of the said Tribunal.  In  case               it  is  held  by the Tenancy  Court  that  the               defendant  I is not a tenant, then  the  Trial               Court should proceed to pass a decree for pos-               session of the suit lands from the  defendants               to the plaintiff and should order inquiry into               mesne  profits,  from the date of  suit  until               delivery  of possession and should  reconsider               the  question of costs between the parties  to               the suit." On  October 1, 1955, the plaintiff filed a second appeal  in the  High  Court of Mysore.  On December 7, 1959,  the  High Court dismissed the second appeal.  The High Court held :               "The lower Appellate Court having come to  the               conclusion that it has got no jurisdiction  to               interpret this document, should not have taken               the  accounts,  treating  the  document  as  a               mortgage.  Therefore, I set aside that finding               of the Assistant Judge.  I confirm the finding               of  the Assistant Judge that the  Civil  Court               has  got  no  jurisdiction  to  interpret  the               document,  Ex.  43  as  to  whether  it  is  a               mortgage  or  a  lease.   It  is,   therefore,               directed that the record should go back to the               Trial Court who should refer the issue to  the               Mamlatdar  as  to whether the defendant  is  a               lessee under Exhibit 43, dated 28th 148 June 1945 and in case it is held that the defendant is not a tenant, then the Trial Court will proceed to decide the suit

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on merits. If it is held that the defendant is a lessee  and therefore,  a  tenant,  then the  suit  will  be  dismissed. Consequently, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Subsequent  petitions  by the plaintiff for review  of  this decree  and for leave to file a Letters Patent  Appeal  were dismissed  on April 14, 1960. The plaintiff now  appeals  to this Court by special leave.     On  behalf  of the appellant, Mr.  Patwardhan  contended that  the  jurisdiction of a Civil Court  depends  upon  the allegations  made  in the plaint, the Civil Court  has  full jurisdiction  to  try a suit for recovery of  possession  of agricultural  lands  on  redemption of a  mortgage  and  the Mamlatdar  has no jurisdiction to try such a suit, the  plea in the written statement that the defendants were  protected tenants did not oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. to try  the  suit  and the Civil Court should  have  tried  and decided  the  incidental issue whether the  defendants  were mortgagees  or protected tenants, instead of  referring  the issue  to the Mamlatdar. On behalf of the  respondents,  Mr. Gopalakrishnan  disputed  these contentions,  and  contended that  the  High  Court rightly referred the  issue  for  the decision of the Mamlatdar.     The suit lands are agricultural lands within the meaning of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948.  The Act  was  passed with a view to amend the  law  relating  to tenancies  of agricultural lands and to make  certain  other provisions  in regard to those lands.  ’Land’ as defined  in s.  2(8)  of  the  Act covers  land  used  for  agricultural purposes  including the site of dwelling houses occupied  by agriculturists   for  the  purposes inter  alia  of  s.  29. Sections  2(1 O) (A), 4 and 4-A define "permanent  tenants", "tenants"  and  "protected tenants"  respectively.   Section 29(2)  provides that no landlord shall obtain possession  of any land or dwelling house held by a tenant except under  an order  of  the Mamlatdar, and for obtaining such  order,  he must  make an application in the. prescribed form  within  a certain  time.  By s. 29(4), the landlord taking  possession of any land or dwelling house except in accordance with  the provisions  of sub-s(2), is liable to forfeiture  of  crops, penalties  and costs.  Section 70(b) provides that  for  the purposes  of the Act, one of the duties and functions to  be performed by the Mamlatdar is "to decide whether a person is a  tenant  or  a protected tenant or  a  permanent  tenant." Section  85(1)  provides  that no  Civil  Court  shall  have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any 149 question which is by the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar.  Section 85A reads :               "85A (1).  If any suit instituted in any Civil               Court  involves any issues which are  required               to  be settled, decided or dealt with  by  any               authority competent to settle, decide or  deal               with  such issues under this Act  (hereinafter               referred to as the ’competent authority’)  the               Civil,’  Court shall stay the suit  and  refer               such  issues to such competent  authority  for               determination.               (2)   On  receipt of such reference  from  the               Civil  Court,  the competent  authority  shall               deal with and decide such issues in accordance               with  the  provisions of this  Act  and  shall               communicate  its decision to the  Civil  Court               and such Court shall thereupon dispose of  the               suit   in   accordance  with   the   procedure               applicable thereto.

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             Explanation.-For the purpose of this section a               Civil Court shall include a Mamlatdar’s  Court               constituted under the Mamlatdars’ Courts  Act,               1906." With regard to suits and proceedings by a landowner for pos- session  of agricultural lands, the combined effect  of  ss. 29,  70, 85 and 85A of the Act is as follows: The  Mamlatdar has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain an application by  a landlord  for  possession of agricultural  lands  against  a tenant,  and  the  Civil  Court  has  no,  jurisdiction   to entertain and try a suit by a landlord against a tenant  for possession  of  agricultural lands.  The  Mamlatdar  has  no jurisdiction  to try a suit by a landowner for  recovery  of possession of agricultural lands from a trespasser or from a mortgagee  on redemption of a mortgage, and the Civil  Court has  jurisdiction  to  entertain such a  suit;  but  if  the defendant  to  the  suit pleads that he is  a  tenant  or  a protected  tenant or a permanent tenant and an issue  arises whether he is such a tenant, the Court must refer the  issue to  the Mamlatdar for determination, and must stay the  suit pending  such  determination, and after  the  Mamlatdar  has decided the issue, the Court may dispose of the suit in  the light of the decision of the Mamlatdar. Section 85A was introduced by Bombay Act XIII of 1956, which came  into force on March 23, 1956 during the  pendency  of’ the second appeal in this case.  The suit out of which  this appeal arises was governed by the law as it stood before the introduction  of  s. 85A.  But independently of s.  85A  and before it came into 150 force,  the  Bombay High Court in Dhondi  Tukarain  v.  Hari Dadu(1) held that the effect of ss. 70(b) and 85 read in the light  of the other provisions of the Act was that if  in  a suit filed against the defendant on the footing that he is a trespasser  he  raises  the plea that he is a  tenant  or  a protected tenant the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to deal with  the  plea, and the proper procedure was to  refer  the issue to the Mamlatdar for his decision and not to ,,dismiss the suit straightaway.  The Court observed :               "Therefore,  we  hold  that in  a  suit  filed               against  the defendant on the footing that  he               is a trespasser if he raises the plea that  he               is  a tenant or a protected tenant, the  Civil               Court would have no jurisdiction to deal  with               that  plea. ..... We would, however,  like  to               add  that  in all such cases where  the  Civil               Court  cannot entertain the plea  and  accepts               the  objection that it has no jurisdiction  to               try it should not proceed to dismiss the  suit               straightaway.    We  think  that  the   proper               procedure  to adopt in such cases would be  to               direct  the  party who raises such a  plea  to               obtain a decision from the Mamlatdar within  a               reasonable time.  If the decision of the  Mam-               latdar  is in favour of the party raising  the               plea, the suit for possession would have to be               dismissed, because it would not be open to the               Civil Court to give any relief to the landlord               by way of possession of the agricultural land.               If,  on the other hand, the Mamlatdar  rejects               the  plea  raised under the Tenancy  Act,  the               Civil Court would be entitled to deal with the               dispute on the footing that the defendant is a               trespasser." In  Dhondi Tukaram’s case1’), the Court expressed  the  hope

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that  the legislature would make suitable amendments in  the Act.   The Bombay Legislature approved of the decision,  and gave  effect  to it by introducing s. 85A  by  the  amending Bombay  Act  XIII of 1956.  Section 85A  proceeds  upon  the assumption  that  though  the  Civil  Court  has   otherwise jurisdiction to try a suit, it will have no jurisdiction  to try  an issue arising in the suit, if the issue is  required to  be  settled, decided or dealt with by the  Mamlatdar  or other competent authority under the Act, and on that assump- tion,  s. 85A provides for suitable machinery for  reference of  the issue to the Mamlatdar for his decision.   Now,  the Mamlatdar has jurisdiction under s. 70 to decide the several issues specified therein "for the purposes of this Act", and before the introduction of (1)  I.L.R. [1953] Dom. 969.                             151 s.   85A,  it was a debatable point whether  the  expression "for the, purposes of this Act" meant that the Mamlatdar had jurisdiction to decide those issues only in some  proceeding before  him  under some specific provision of  the  Act,  or whether  he  had jurisdiction to decide  those  issues  even though they arose for decision in a suit properly cognisable by  a  Civil Court, so that the jurisdiction  of  the  Civil Court  to try those issues in the suit was taken away by  s. 85  read  with s. 70, Dhondi Tukaram’s case(1)  settled  the point,   and   held  that  the   Mamlatdar   had   exclusive jurisdiction  to decide those issues even though they  arose for decision in a suit properly cognisable by a Civil Court. The  result was somewhat startling, for normally  the  Civil Court  has jurisdiction to try all the issues arising  in  a suit  properly cognisable by it.  But having regard  to  the fact   that  the  Bombay  Legislature  approved  of   Dhondi Tukaram’s  case(1) and gave effect to it by  introducing  s. 85A,  we must hold that the decision  correctly  interpreted the  law  as it stood before the enactment of  s.  85A.   It follows that independently of s. 85A and under the law as it stood  before s. 85A came into force, the Courts below  were bound  to refer to the Mamlatdar the decision of  the  issue whether the defendant is a tenant. In  Mudugere Rangaiah v. M. Rangaiah(2), the plaintiff  sued for  a declaration that he is the kadim tenant in  the  suit land  and prayed for a permanent injunction restraining  the defendant  from interfering with his possession.   Both  the plaintiff and the defendant claimed to be tenants under  the same  landlord.  The defendant contended that the  suit  was not  maintainable in a Civil Court in view of s. 46  of  the Mysore  Tenancy  Act (Mysore Act.  No. XIII of  1952).   The Mysore High Court held that the jurisdiction of the  Amildar is  limited to cases arising by or under the Mysore  Tenancy Act, and the decisions that he is required to give under  s. 32  of  the Act were "for the purposes of the Act"  and  the aforesaid suit did not arise under any of the provisions  of the Act and the Civil Court had, therefore, the jurisdiction to  decide all the points in dispute in the  suit  including the  question  of tenancy and no provision in the  Act  laid down  that  a  Civil Court was not  entitled  to  try  civil proceedings  involving  the determination  of  any  question falling within s. 32 of the Act, though the Amildar was  the competent  authority to settle, decide and deal  with  those questions,  had  they arisen in proceedings under  the  Act. Sections  32 and 46 of the Mysore Act are similar to ss.  70 and  85  of  the Bombay Act, but there are  many  points  of distinction  between the scheme and legislative  history  of the Mysore Act and those of the (2)  I.L.R. [1959] Mysore 420.

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(1) I.L.R. [1953] Bom. 969. 152 Bombay  Act.  The Mysore High Court considered Dhondi  Tuka- rams  case(1),  and  also  noted  some  of  the  points   of distinction ,between the two Acts.  In the instant case, the question   of  interpretation  of  ss.  32,  46  and   other provisions of the Mysore Act does not arise, and we  express no  opinion  on  it.  We must not be taken  to  express  any opinion one way or the other on the correctness or otherwise of the decision in Mudugere Rangaiah’s case(2). Mr. Patwardhan also contended that in the second appeal pre- ferred  by the plaintiff the High Court had no  jurisdiction to set aside the finding of the first appellate Court  given in favour of the appellant namely, the finding that "nothing is  due  by  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendants  under  the transaction,  Exhibit  43." There is no .substance  in  this contention.  The first appellate Court recorded inconsistent findings.    Having  held  that  the  Civil  Court  had   no jurisdiction  to  determine whether defendant No.  1  was  a mortgagee  in  possession or a tenant, the  lower  appellate Court  should have stayed the suit pending decision of  that question  by  the Mamlatdar, and until such a  decision  was given,  the Court could not proceed on the footing that  the transaction  evidenced  by  Ex. 43 was a  mortgage  and  the defendant  No. 1 was a mortgagee and hold that  nothing  was due  by the plaintiff to the defendants under  the  transac- tion.  The High Court had ample power to correct this  error and  to  set aside this inconsistent finding  in  an  appeal filed  by the plaintiff, though the defendants had filed  no appeal or crossobjections. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. (1) I.L.R. [1953] Bom. 969. (2) I.L.R. [1959] Mysore 420 153