Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF  INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  7108 of 2003

Bharatha Matha & Anr.        …….Appellants  

Versus

R. Vijaya Renganathan & Ors.        ……...Respondents

O R D E R    

Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J

1. This  appeal  has  been  preferred  against  the  Judgment  

and Order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated  

10th July,  2001 allowing the appeal  filed by the respondent  

No.1  against  the  judgment  and  decree  of  the  Ist  Appellate  

Court dated 17.9.1986 affirming the judgment and decree of  

the Trial Court dated 7.3.1977 in O.S. No.269/1975 instituted

by the predecessor-in-interest  of  the  present appellants for  

claiming the property in dispute and denying the share to the  

respondent Nos. 2 to 5 or their predecessor-in-interest.   

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to the present  

case  are  that  the  predecessor-in-interest  of  the  present  

appellants, Peria Mariammal  instituted a suit, being O.S. No.  

269 of 1975 against the respondents and their predecessor-in-

interest claiming the share of her  brother Muthu Reddiar, on  

the  ground  that  he  died  unmarried  and  intestate  and  that  

Smt. Rengammal, the defendant No. 1 in the suit was a legally  

wedded wife of one Alagarsami Reddiar,  who was still  alive,  

therefore,  her  claim  that  she  had  live-in-relationship  with  

plaintiff’s brother Muthu Reddiar and had two children from  

him,  had  to  be  ignored.   The  defendants/respondents  

contested  the  suit  denying  the  marriage  between defendant  

No.  1  and  the  said  Alagarsami  Reddiar.   The  Trial  Court  

decreed the suit vide Judgment and decree dated 7th March,  

1977 recording the finding that Rengammal, defendant No.1 in  

the suit was wife of Alagarsami Reddiar who was alive at the  

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time of  filing the suit.   There had been no legal  separation  

between them.  Therefore, the question of live-in-relationship  

of Smt. Rengammal with Muthu Reddiar could not arise.   

3. Being  aggrieved,  the  defendants  therein  filed  the  First  

Appeal.    The respondent No. 1 herein, Vijaya Renganathan,  

purchased the suit property in 1978 i.e. during the pendency  

of the First Appeal for a sum of about Rs. 10,000/- and got  

himself impleaded in the appeal as a party.  The First Appeal  

was  dismissed  by  the  Appellate  Court  vide  judgment  and  

decree  dated  17th September,  1986.    The  said  purchaser,  

respondent No.1, alone filed the Second Appeal under Section  

100  of  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908  (hereinafter  called  as  

‘CPC’)  before the High Court  which has been allowed.  Hence,  

this appeal.   

4. Learned counsel  for  the  appellants  has submitted that  

Smt. Rengammal, original defendant No.1 was legally wedded  

wife  of  Alagarsami  and  he  was  still  alive.   Therefore,  the  

question  of  presumption  of  marriage  for  having  live-in-

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relationship  with  Muthu  Reddiar  could  not  arise.  In  such  

eventuality,  Muthu  Reddiar  could  be  liable  for  offence  of  

Adultery  under  Section  497  of  Indian  Penal  Code,  1860  

(hereinafter called as ‘IPC’). More so, even if live-in-relationship  

is admitted and it is further admitted that the two children  

were born due to that live-in-relationship,  the said children  

could not inherit the coparcenery property and in absence of  

any finding recorded by any Court below that the suit land  

was self-acquired property of Muthu Reddiar, the judgment of  

the  High Court  is  liable  to  be  set  aside.   At  the  most,  the  

respondent  No.  1  herein  can  claim  recovery  of  the  sale  

consideration from his vendors as the possession is still with  

the present appellants.   

5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent No.1  

has  vehemently  opposed  the  submission  of  the  learned  

counsel  for  the  appellants,  contending  that  the  High  Court  

after  re-appreciating  the  evidence  on  record  came  to  the  

conclusion that the factum of  marriage of  Smt.  Rengammal  

with Alagarsami Reddiar could not be proved by the appellants  

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herein and because of their live-in-relationship, a presumption  

of  marriage  between  Muthu  Reddiar  and  Smt.  Rengammal  

could  be  drawn and,  therefore,  in  view of  the  provisions  of  

Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter called  

as,  “the  Act”),  the  two  children  born  out  of  that  live-in-

relationship  were  entitled  to  inherit  the  property  of  Muthu  

Reddiar and thus, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.   

6. We have considered the rival submissions of the learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.

7. The Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have  

recorded a categorical  finding of fact that Smt. Rengammal,  

defendant No.1 had been married to Alagarsami Reddiar who  

was alive on the date of institution of the suit and, therefore,  

the  question  of  marriage  by  presumption  between  Smt.  

Rengammal  and  Muthu  Reddiar  would  not  arise  and  for  

determining  the  same  all  the  material  on  record  had  been  

taken  into  consideration  including  the  statement  of  

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Seethammal, DW1 along with all other defence witnesses and  

the documents, particularly, Exts.B14, B18, B19 and B2.   

8. However,  the  High  Court  framed  two  substantial  

questions of law, namely:  

(a) Whether on the admitted long cohabitation of the  

First  defendant  and  Muthu  Reddiar,  a  legal  

presumption of a lawful wedlock is not established;  

and  

(b) Whether  the  specific  case  of  prior  and  

subsisting  marriage  between  defendant  and  

Alagarsami Reddiar set up by Plaintiff is established  

as required by law and she could have a preferential  

claim over defendants 1 to 3?  

9. While determining the substantial question (b) the High  

Court only considered the statement of Seethammal, DW1, the  

step  mother  of  Muthu  Reddiar  and  did  not  take  into  

consideration the evidence of plaintiff’s witnesses which had  

been  relied  upon  by  the  courts  below,  particularly,  

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Kumarasamy PW2 and Kandasamy PW5 and re-appreciated  

the documentary evidence. Therefore, the question does arise  

as to whether such a course is permissible while deciding the  

Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC.

10. In Sheel Chand Vs. Prakash Chand, AIR 1998 SC 3063,  

this  Court  held that  question  of  re-appreciation of  evidence  

and  framing  the  substantial  question  as  to  whether  the  

findings relating to factual  matrix by the court below could  

vitiate  due  to  irrelevant  consideration  and  not  under  law,  

being question of fact cannot be framed.   

11. In  Rajappa  Hanamantha  Ranoji Vs.  Mahadev  

Channabasappa & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 2108,  this Court held  

that  it  is  not  permissible  for  the  High  Court  to  decide  the  

Second  Appeal  by  re-appreciating  the  evidence  as  if  it  was  

deciding the First  Appeal  unless it  comes to the conclusion  

that the findings recorded by the court below were perverse.

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12. In Kulwant Kaur & Ors. Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead)  

by L.Rs. AIR 2001 SC 1273, this Court held that the question  

whether Lower Court’s finding is perverse may come within the  

ambit of substantial question of law.  However, there must be  

a  clear  finding  in  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  as  to  

perversity  in  order  to  show  compliance  with  provisions  of  

Section 100 CPC.  Thus, this Court rejected the proposition  

that  scrutiny  of  evidence  is  totally  prohibited  in  Second  

Appeal.   

13. Thus, it is evident that High Court can interfere with the  

finding of fact while deciding the Second Appeal provided the  

findings  recorded by the Courts below are perverse.         

14. In  H.B.  Gandhi,  Excise  &  Taxation  Officer-cum-

Assessing Authority, Karnal & Ors. Vs.  M/s. Gopi Nath &  

Sons & Ors.  1992 Supp.(2) SCC 312, this Court held that if a  

finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant  

material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or  

if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the  

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vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then  

the finding is rendered infirm in law. In M/s. Triveni Rubber  

& Plastics Vs. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin AIR 1994  

SC 1341, this Court held that the order suffers from perversity  

in  case  some relevant  evidence  has not  been considered or  

that  certain  inadmissible  material  has  been  taken  into  

consideration or where it can be said that the findings of the  

authorities  are  based  on  no  evidence  or  that  they  are  so  

perverse  that  no  reasonable  person  would  have  arrived  at  

those findings. In Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police  

& Ors. (1999) 2 SCC 10, this Court held that if a decision is  

arrived  at  on  no  evidence  or  evidence  which  is  thoroughly  

unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it,  the  

order  would  be  perverse.  But  if  there  is  some  evidence  on  

record which is acceptable and which cannot be relied upon,  

howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not  

be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered  

with.   In  Gaya Din  (dead)  thr.  Lrs.  & Ors.  Vs.  Hanuman  

Prasad (dead) thr. Lrs. & Ors. AIR 2001 SC 386, it has been  

held that order of an authority is perverse in the sense that  

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the order is not supported by the evidence brought on record  

or it is against the law or it suffers from the vice of procedural  

irregularity.  In  Rajinder Kumar  Kindra Vs.  Delhi  

Administration, thr. Secretary (Labour) & Ors.   AIR 1984  

SC 1805, this Court while dealing with a case of disciplinary  

proceedings  against  an  employee  considered  the  issue  and  

held as under:

“17. It  is  equally  well-settled that  where  a  quasi- judicial  tribunal  or   arbitrator  records  findings  based  on  no  legal  evidence  and  the  findings  are  either  his  ipse  dixit  or  based  on  conjectures  and  surmises,  the  enquiry  suffers  from the  additional  infirmity  of  non-application  of  mind  and  stands  vitiated.  ….The  High  Court,  in  our  opinion,  was  clearly  in  error  in  declining  to  examine  the  contention that  the  findings were perverse on the  short,  specious and wholly untenable ground that  the matter depends on appraisal of evidence.”  

15. In the instant case, the Courts below had appreciated the  

entire   evidence  and  came  to  the  conclusion  that  Smt.  

Rengammal,  defendant  no.1  was  legally  wedded  wife  of  

Alagarsami Reddiar and thus did not presume her marriage  

with  Muthu Reddiar.   The  High Court  without  making  any  

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reference  to  the  evidence  of  the  plaintiff’s  witnesses,  

particularly,  Kumarasamy-P.W.2  and  Kandasamy-PW.5  

reversed the finding of fact and reached the conclusion that  

merely live-in-relationship between the said two parties would  

lead  the presumption of marriage between them.  The High  

Court  erred  in  not  appreciating  that  the  judgments  of  the  

Courts below could be based on another presumption provided  

under  Section  112  of  the  Evidence  Act,  1872  (hereinafter  

called as the ‘Evidence Act’).  

16. Section  112  of  the  Evidence  Act  provides  for  a  

presumption  of  a  child  being  legitimate  and  such  a  

presumption can only be displaced by a strong preponderance  

of evidence and not merely by a balance of probabilities as the  

law  has  to  live  in  favour  of  innocent  child  from  being  

bastardised.  In the instant case, as the proof of non-access  

between Rengammal and Alagarsami had never been pleaded  

what  to  talk  of  proving the  same,  the  matter  has not  been  

examined  by  the  High  Court  in  correct  perspective.   It  is  

settled legal proposition that proof of non-access between the  

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parties to marriage during the relevant period is the only way  

to  rebut  that  presumption.   [vide Mohabbat  Ali  Khan  Vs.  

Muhammad  Ibrahim  Khan  &  Ors.  AIR  1929  PC  135;  

Chilukuri  Venkateswarlu  Vs.  Chilukuri  Venkatanarayana  

AIR 1954 SC 176;  Mahendra Manilal Nanavati  Vs. Sushila  

Mahendra Nanavati AIR 1965 SC 364; Perumal Nadar (Dead)  

by Lrs.  Vs. Ponnuswami  Nadar (minor)  AIR 1971 SC 2352;  

Amarjit Kaur Vs. Harbhajan Singh and Anr. (2003) 10 SCC  

228;  Sobha Hymavathi Devi  Vs. Setti Gangadhara Swamy  

and  Ors. AIR  2005  SC  800;   and  Shri  Banarsi  Dass  Vs.  

Teeku Dutta (Mrs.) and Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 449]     

17. The  High  Court  has  decided  the  issue  regarding  the  

factum of marriage between Alagarsami and Rengammal only  

placing  reliance  upon  the  statement  of  Smt.  Seethammal,  

DW1, step mother of Muthu Reddiar who had been disbelieved  

by the Courts below by giving cogent reasons and taking note  

of the fact that she had arranged their marriage spending a  

sum of Rs.10 only.  The High Court has also reappreciated the  

documentary evidence and took a view contrary to the view  

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taken by the court’s below.  It was not appropriate for the High  

Court to re-appreciate the evidence in Second Appeal as no  

substantial question of law involved therein.  Both the Courts  

below  found  that  Rengammal  was  legally  wedded  wife  of  

Alagarsami.  The Courts below had placed very heavy reliance  

upon  the  witnesses  examined  by  the  appellant/plaintiff  

particularly, Kumarasamy- PW 2 and Kandasamy- PW 5.  

18. In view of the fact that the High Court did not even take  

note  of  the  deposition  of  the  plaintiff’s  witnesses,  findings  

recorded by the High Court itself become perverse and thus  

liable to be set aside.

19. Be that  as  it  may,   Section  5(1)  of  the  Act  lays  down  

conditions for  a Hindu marriage.   It  provides that  marriage  

may be solemnized between any two Hindus if neither of them  

is a spouse living at the time of marriage.  Section 11 provides  

that any marriage which is in contravention of Section 5(1) of  

the Act, would be void.  Section 16 of the Act stood amended  

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vide Amendment Act of 1976 and the amended provisions read  

as under:-

“Legitimacy  of  children  of  void  and  voidable  marriages – (1) Notwithstanding that a marriage is  null  and  void  under  section  11,  any  child  of  such  marriage  who  would  have  been  legitimate  if  the   marriage had been valid, shall be legitimate……..    (2) Where a decree of nullity is granted in respect of a  voidable  marriage  under  section  12,  any  child  begotten or conceived before the decree is made, who  would have been the legitimate child of the parties to   the marriage if at the date of the decree it had been  dissolved instead of being annulled, shall be deemed  to  be  their  legitimate  child  notwithstanding  the  decree of nullity.

(3)  Nothing contained in sub-section (1) or sub- section (2) shall be construed as conferring upon  any child of  a marriage  which  is  null  and  void or  which  is  annulled  by  a  decree  of  nullity  under   section  12,  any rights in or to the property of  any person, other than the parents, in any case  where,  but  for  the  passing  of  this  Act,  such  child  would  have  been  incapable  of  possessing  or  acquiring any such rights by reason of his not being  the  legitimate  child  of  his  parents.” (Emphasis  added)   

20. Thus, it is evident that Section 16 of the Act intends to  

bring  about  social  reforms,  conferment  of  social  status  of  

legitimacy  on  a  group  of  children,  otherwise  treated  as  

illegitimate, as its prime object.          

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21. In  S.P.S. Balasubramanyam  Vs. Suruttayan @ Andali  

Padayachi & Ors.  AIR 1992 SC 756, this Court held that if  

man and woman are living under the same roof and cohabiting  

for  a  number  of  years,  there  will  be  a  presumption  under  

Section 114 of the Evidence Act that they live as husband and  

wife and the children born to them will not be illegitimate.    

22. In S. Khushboo Vs. Kanniammal & Anr. JT 2010 (4) SC  

478, this Court, placing reliance upon its earlier decision in  

Lata Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr. AIR 2006 SC 2522, held  

that  live-in-relationship  is  permissible  only  in  unmarried  

major persons of heterogeneous sex.  In case, one of the said  

persons is married, man may be guilty of offence of adultery  

and it would amount to an offence under Section 497 IPC.    

23. In  Smt. P.E.K. Kalliani Amma & Ors.  Vs. K. Devi &  

Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1963, this Court held that Section 16 of the  

Act is not ultra vires of the Constitution of India.  In view of  

the  legal  fiction  contained  in  Section  16,  the  illegitimate  

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children, for all practical purposes, including succession to the  

properties of their  parents, have to be treated as legitimate.  

They cannot, however, succeed to the properties of any other  

relation on the basis of this rule,  which in its operation,  is  

limited to the properties of the parents.   

24. In Rameshwari Devi Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. AIR 2000  

SC 735, this Court dealt with a case wherein after the death of  

a  Government  employee,  children  born  illegitimately  by  the  

woman, who had been living with the said employee, claimed  

the  share  in  pension/gratuity  and  other  death-cum-retiral  

benefits along with children born out of a legal wedlock.  This  

Court held that under Section 16 of the Act, children of void  

marriage  are  legitimate.  As  the  employee,  a  Hindu,  died  

intestate, the children of the deceased employee born out of  

void  marriage  were  entitled  to  share  in  the  family  pension,  

death-cum-retiral benefits and gratuity.     

25. In  Jinia Keotin & Ors.  Vs. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi &  

Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 730, this Court held that while engrafting a  

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rule of fiction in Section 16 of the Act, the illegitimate children  

have  become  entitled  to  get  share  only  in  self-acquired  

properties of their parents.  The Court held as under :-

“4………..Under the ordinary law,  a child for  being  treated  as  legitimate  must  be  born  in  lawful wedlock.  If  the marriage  itself  is  void  on  account  of  contravention  of  the  statutory   prescriptions, any child born of such marriage  would have the effect, per se, or on being so  declared or annulled, as the case may be, of  bastardising the children born of the parties to  such  marriage.  Polygamy,  which  was   permissible  and widely  prevalent among the  Hindus in the past and considered to have evil   effects on society, came to be put an end to by  the mandate of the Parliament in enacting the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955.  The  legitimate   status  of  the  children  which  depended  very  much  upon  the  marriage  between  their   parents being valid or void, thus turned on the   act  of  parents  over which  the  innocent child  had no hold or control.  But for no fault of it,   the innocent baby had to suffer a permanent  set back in life and in the eyes of society by  being treated as illegitimate.  A laudable and  noble act of the legislature indeed in enacting   Section 16 to put an end to a great social evil.   At the same time, Section 16 of the Act, while   engrafting  a  rule  of  fiction  in  ordaining  the   children, though illegitimate,  to be treated as  legitimate,  notwithstanding that the marriage   was void or voidable chose also to confine its   application,  so  far  as  succession  or  

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26. This view has been approved and followed by this Court  

in Neelamma and others Vs. Sarojamma and others (2006)  

9 SCC 612.    

27. Thus, it is evident that in such a fact-situation, a child  

born  of  void  or  voidable  marriage  is  not  entitled  to  claim  

inheritance in ancestral  coparcenery property but is entitled  

only to claim share in self acquired properties, if any.      

28. In the instant case, respondents had not pleaded at any  

stage that the Suit land  was a self acquired property of Muthu  

Reddiar.  It is evident from the record that Muthu Reddiar did  

not partition his joint family properties and died issueless and  

intestate in 1974.  Therefore,  the question of  inheritance of  

coparcenery  property  by  the  illegitimate  children,  who  were  

born out of the live-in-relationship, could not arise.  Thus, the  

judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside only on  

this sole ground.   

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29. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.  

The judgment and order of the High Court  dated 10th July,  

2001 is hereby set aside.  No order as to cost.   

30. However,  it  shall  be  open  to  R.5  to  resort  to  legal  

proceedings,  permissible  in  law  for  recovery  of  the  sale  

consideration  from  his  vendors  as  he  has  purchased  the  

property in lis pendis and the appellants are still in possession  

of the suit property.  

…………………………………..J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

…………………………………..J. (SWATANTER KUMAR)

New Delhi, May  17, 2010

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF  INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

JUDGMENT TO BE   PRONOUNCED   

BY

HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE B.S. CHAUHAN

ON

25.5.2010 (TUESDAY)

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF  INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 7108 of 2003

Bharatha Matha & Anr.        …….Appellants  

Versus

R. Vijaya Renganathan & Ors.        ……...Respondents

Dear brother

A  draft  judgment  in  the  above  mentioned  matter  is  being  sent  

herewith for your kind perusal and favourable consideration.

With regards,

   Yours sincerely,

(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)  19.5.2010

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SWATANTER KUMAR

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF  INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  7108 of 2003

Bharatha Matha & Anr.        …….Appellants  

Versus

R. Vijaya Renganathan & Ors.        ……...Respondents

      ORDER DICTATED BY  

HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE B.S. CHAUHAN

ON  

  17.5.2010

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