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PETITIONER: BHARAT SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MANAGEMENT OF NEW DELHI TUBERCULOSIS CENTRE, JAWAHARLALNEHRU

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/04/1986

BENCH: KHALID, V. (J) BENCH: KHALID, V. (J) OZA, G.L. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR  842            1986 SCR  (2) 169  1986 SCC  (2) 614        1986 SCALE  (1)637  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1988 SC 587  (12)

ACT:      Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947  - S.  17-B -  Statutory interpretation of  - Applicability of to awards passed prior to August 21, 1984.      Statutory interpretation  - Duty  of Court - Evolve the concept of purposive interpretation.

HEADNOTE:      Section 17-B  of the  Industrial Disputes Act 1947 came into force  with effect  from August  21, 1984.  It provided that where in any case, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of a workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the Supreme Court the employer shall be liable to pay  such workman during the pendency of such proceedings in the  High Court  or the  Supreme Court,  full wages  last drawn by  him, if  the workman  had not been employed in any establishment during such period.      The Labour  Court in its award dated September 28, 1983 held that  the termination of services of the appellant, was wrongful  and  illegal  and  that  he  was  entitled  to  be reinstated with  continuity of service. It directed that the appellant would  be entitled  to back  wages at  the rate at which he was drawing them when his services were terminated.      The management challenged the award on January 31, 1984 by filing a writ petition before the High Court. On December 12, 1984 the appellant moved an application under s. 17-B of the Act  for a  direction to  the management to pay him full wages last  drawn by  him during  the pendency  of the  writ petition.  The   High  Court   held  that  the  section  was applicable only  to cases where the awards were passed after its commencement,  and since  the award  in  this  case  was passed  prior   to  August  21,  1984  the  section  had  no application. 170      In this  appeal by  special leave  it was  contended on behalf of  the management  that a  section which  imposes an obligation for  the first time cannot be made retrospective. Such sections should always be considered prospective.      Allowing the appeal, the Court,

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^      HELD :  1. Section  17-B applies  even to awards passed prior to  August 21,  1984 if they have not become final. It gives a  mandate to  the courts  to award  wages  where  the following three  ingredients are  present:  (i)  the  Labour Court has  directed reinstatement  of the  workman, (ii) the employer has preferred proceedings against such award in the High Court  or the  Supreme Court, (iii) the workman has not been employed  in any  establishment during such period.[181 E; 176 A; 174 E]      2. Section  17-B is  a  progressive  social  beneficial legislation.  It  codifies  in  a  statutory  form  a  right available to the workmen to get wages. There are no words in the section  to compel  the court  to hold  that  it  cannot operate retrospectively.  The section  on its terms does not say that  it would bind awards passed prior to the date when it came  into force. Before s. 17-B was introduced there was no bar on courts for awarding wages. The workmen, of course, had no  right to  claim it.  The section  recognises such  a right.[176 D; 181 C-D; 176 C; 181 D]      3.(i)  The   objects  and  reasons  of  the  Industrial Disputes (Amendment)  Act, 1982  clearly spell  out that the delay in implementation of awards was due to the contests by employers which consequently caused hardship to workmen. The enactment  intended   to  do  away  with  this  hardship  by providing for  the payment  of wages to the workman from the date of  the award  till the  final disposal of the case. If that be  the object  then it  would be inconsistent with the progressive social  philosophy of  our laws  to deny  to the workman the benefits of s. 17-B simply because the award was passed, for  example, just  a day or two before it came into force. It  would be  not only  defeating the  rights of  the workmen  but   also  going   against  the   spirit  of   the enactment.[175 F; 176 G; 175 D-E, F-G]      (ii) The  Court has  to evolve the concept of purposive interpretation. Though  objects and  reasons cannot  be  the ultimate guide in interpretation of statutes, it often times aids in finding out what really persuaded the legislature to 171 enact a  particular provision.  The Court  should give  such construction to  a statute  as would  promote the purpose or object of the Act. [176 D; 175 E-F; 176 F]      (iii) Where  the words  of  a  statute  are  plain  and unambiguous, effect  must be  given to  them, but  where the intention of  the legislature is not clear from the words or where two constructions are possible, it is the court’s duty to discern the intention in the context of the background in which  a   particular  section  is  enacted.  Once  such  an intention is  ascertained, the  Courts have  necessarily  to give   the    statute   a   purposeful   or   a   functional interpretation. [176 E-F]      4. Section  11-A confers  a jurisdiction  on the Labour Court, Tribunal  or National Tribunal to act in a particular manner which  jurisdiction it  did not  have  prior  to  the coming into  force of  s. 11-A.  The  conferment  of  a  new Jurisdiction can  take effect only prospectively except when a contrary  intention appears  on the  face of  the statute. That is  not the case with s. 17-B. It does not confer a new jurisdiction. [181 A-C]      Workmen of  Firestone Tyre  & Rubber  Co. of India Pvt. Ltd. v.  The Management  & Ors.,  [1973] 3  S.C.R.  587  and Gujarat Mineral  Development Corporation v. P.H. Brahmbhatt, [1974] 2 S.C.R. 128 distinguished.      Rustom &  Hornsby (I)  Ltd. v.  T.B.  Kadam,  [1976]  1 S.C.R. 119 referred to.

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JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1251 of 1986.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated 18th April, 1985 of the Delhi High Court in C.M. No. 4006 of 1984.      M.K. Ramamurthi,  M.A. Krishnamurthy  and Mrs.  Chandan for the Appellant.      G.B. Pai,  Vineet Kumar,  Rakesh Sahni, N.D.B. Raju and Ms. Arshi Singh for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 172      KHALID, J. Special leave granted.      Section 17-B  was inserted  in the  Industrial Disputes Act by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Act 46 of 1982).  This Act  received the assent of the President on August 31,  1982. It  was directed  that the commencement of the Act would be on such date as the Central Government may, by a  Notification in  the Official  Gazette,  appoint.  The Central Government  appointed the  21st day of August, 1984, as the  date on  which the  Act would  come into  force. The question that  falls to be decided in this appeal by special leave by  the workman  is, whether  Section 17-B  applies to awards passed  prior to  21st day of August, 1984. The Delhi High Court  held, in  the Judgment  under appeal,  that  the Section applied  only to  awards that were passed subsequent to the  coming into  force  of  this  Section,  namely  21st August, 1984.      The  appellant  joined  the  Management  of  New  Delhi Tuberculosis Centre,  Jawaharlal Nehru Marg, New Delhi, as a Peon against  a permanent  regular post.  He was  thereafter promoted as  a Daftry.  By a  Memorandum dated September 13, 1975,  the   Management  informed  the  appellant  that  his services were  not required  with effect  from September 13, 1975 afternoon and his services were thus terminated. He was paid one  month’s salary  in lieu  of notice.  The appellant kept quite for three years, obviously because the Management Hospital, as  per the  law as  it then  stood,  was  not  an industry. It  was in the year 1978, that this Court gave the Judgment in  Bangalore Water Supply case. Subsequent to that the  appellant  raised  an  industrial  dispute.  The  Delhi Administration, as  per  its  Order  dated  August  6,  1979 referred the following dispute for adjudication :           "Whether  termination   of  the  services  of  the           workman Shri  Bharat  Singh  is  justified  and/or           illegal and if so to what relief is he entitled?" |The Presiding  Officer of  the Labour  Court, in  his award dated September  28, 1983,  held that the termination of the services of  the appellant was wrongful and illegal and that he was entitled to be reinstated with continuity of service. The Labour  Court  directed  that  the  appellant  would  be entitled to back wages with effect from 19th May, 1979 only, at the rate 173 |at which  he  was  drawing  them  when  his  services  were terminated. The  award  was  published  in  the  Gazette  by Notification dated November 2, 1983.      On January  31, 1984,  the Management  moved the  Delhi High Court,  under Article  226 of the Constitution of India challenging the  award and applied for stay of the operation of the  award. The High Court directed stay of the operation of the  award, during  the pendency  of the writ petition on condition that  the Management  deposited 25 per cent of the

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amount as  determined by the Labour Court, Delhi, in respect of the back wages. The High Court permitted the appellant to withdraw the  amount on  furnishing security;  (we are  told that the  amount was not withdrawn by the appellant since he could not  furnish security).  On  December  12,  1984,  the appellant moved an application under Section 17-B of the Act read with  Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for a direction to the Management to pay him full wages last drawn by him,  during the  pendency of the writ petition. His case was that Section 17-B mandated the Court to award full wages if the  conditions in  that Section were satisfied. This was opposed by  the Management. The High Court after considering the rival  contentions came  to the  conclusion that Section 17-B had  application only  to cases  where the  awards were passed after  the commencement  of Section  17-B;  in  other words, after  August 21,  1984, and  that since the award in this  case   was  prior  to  August  21,  1984,  it  had  no application.  Accordingly,  the  High  Court  dismissed  the petition filed  by the workman. Hence this appeal by special leave at the instance of the workman.      We are  here concerned  only with the interpretation of Section 17-B.  The appellant’s learned counsel relied upon a decision of  this Court in Rustom & Hornsby (I) Ltd. v. T.B. Kadam, [1976]  1 S.C.R.  119 where  this Court construed the language of  Section 2-A  of  the  Act;  while  the  learned counsel  for   the  Management   strongly  relied  upon  two decisions of  this Court  which construed  the  language  of Section 11-A and which according to him, was in pari materia with Section 17-B. The cases are Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co.  of India Pvt. Ltd. v. The Management and Others, [1973]  3   S.C.R.  587   and  Gujarat  Mineral  Development Corporation v. Shri P.H. Brahmbhatt, [1974] 2 S.C.R. 128. 174      Before we  deal with the rival contentions, it would be useful to read Section 17-B with which we are concerned.           "17B. Where  in any case, a Labour Court, Tribunal           or  National   Tribunal  by   its  award   directs           reinstatement of  workman and the employer prefers           any proceedings against such award in a High Court           or the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable           to pay such workman, during the period of pendency           of such  proceedings in  the  High  Court  or  the           Supreme Court,  full  wages  last  drawn  by  him,           inclusive of  any maintenance allowance admissible           to him  under any rule if the workman had not been           employed in  any establishment  during such period           and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to           that effect in such Court :           Provided  that   where  it   is  proved   to   the           satisfaction of  the High  Court  or  the  Supreme           Court that  such workman had been employed and had           been receiving  adequate remuneration  during  any           such period or part thereof, the Court shall order           that no  wages shall be payable under this section           for such period or part, as the case may be." The three  necessary ingredients for the application of this Section are  (i)  the  Labour  Court  should  have  directed reinstatement of  the workman, (ii) the employer should have preferred proceedings  against such  award in the High Court or in  the Supreme  Court, (iii) that the workman should not have been employed in any establishment during such period.      The question  now before  us is whether a workman would be denied the benefit of this Section, even if all the above three conditions  are satisfied,  if the  award  was  passed prior to  August 21,  1984? We  may, even at this stage, say

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that in  cases where  the award  had become  final prior  to August 21, 1984, Section 17-B cannot be pressed into service to reopen  the same. It is only when the award is challenged and the  challenge is  pending,  that  the  Section  becomes operative.      It is  common knowledge  that even  before Section 17-B was enacted,  Courts were,  in  their  discretion,  awarding wages to 175 workmen when  they felt  such a  direction was necessary but that was only a discretionary remedy depending upon Court to Court. Instances  are legion where workmen have been dragged by the  employers in  endless  litigation  with  preliminary objections and  other technical  pleas to  tire them  out. A fight between  a workman  and his employer is often times an unequal fight.  The legislature  was thus aware that because of the long pendency of disputes in Tribunals and Courts, on account of  the dilatory  tactics adopted  by the  employer, workmen had suffered. It is against this background that the introduction of  this Section  has  to  be  viewed  and  its effects considered.      The objects  and reasons for enacting the Section is as follows :           "When Labour  Courts pass  award of reinstatement,           these are  often contested  by an  employer in the           Supreme Court  and High  Courts. It  was felt that           the delay  in  the  implementation  of  the  award           causes hardship  to the workman concerned. It was,           therefore, proposed  to  provide  the  payment  of           wages last  drawn by  the workman concerned, under           certain conditions,  from the  date of  the  award           till the  case is  finally decided  in the Supreme           Court or High Courts."      The objects  and  reasons  give  an  insight  into  the background why  this Section  was introduced. Though objects and reasons  cannot be  the ultimate guide in interpretation of statutes,  it often times aids in finding out what really persuaded the  legislature to  enact a particular provision. The objects and reasons here clearly spell out that delay in the implementation  of the  awards is due to the contests by the  employer  which  consequently  cause  hardship  to  the workmen. If  this is the object, then would it be in keeping with this  object and consistent with the progressive social philosophy of  our laws  to deny to the workmen the benefits of this  Section simply  because the  award was  passed, for example just  a day  before the  Section came into force? In our view  it would  be not  only defeating the rights of the workman but  going against  the spirit  of the  enactment. A rigid interpretation  of this Section as is attempted by the learned counsel  for the  respondents would be rendering the workman worse off after the 176 coming into  force of  this Section.  This  section  has  in effect only  codified the rights of the workmen to get their wages which  they could  not get in time because of the long drawn out  process caused  by the  methods employed  by  the Management. This Section, in other words, gives a mandate to the Courts  to award  wages if the conditions in the Section are satisfied.      In interpretation  of  statutes,  Courts  have  steered clear of  the rigid  stand of  looking into the words of the Section alone  but have  attempted to make the object of the enactment effective  and to  render its  benefits  unto  the person in  whose favour  it is  made.  The  legislators  are entrusted with  the task of only making laws. Interpretation

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has to  come from the Courts. Section 17-B on its terms does not say  that it  would bind  awards passed  before the date when it came into force. The respondents’ contention is that a Section  which imposes  an obligation  for the first time, cannot be made retrospective. Such sections should always be considered prospective.  In our  view, if this submission is accepted, we  will be  defeating the  very purpose for which this Section has been enacted. It is here that the Court has to evolve  the concept of purposive interpretation which has found acceptance  whenever a  progressive social  beneficial legislation is  under review.  We share  the view that where the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous effect must be given  to them.  Plain words  have to be accepted as such but where the intention of the legislature is not clear from the words or where two constructions are possible, it is the Court’s duty  to discern the intention in the context of the background in  which a  particular Section  is enacted. Once such an intention is ascertained the Courts have necessarily to  give   the  statute   a  purposeful   or  a   functional interpretation. Now,  it is  trite to say that acts aimed at social amelioration  giving benefits for the havenots should receive liberal  construction. It  is always the duty of the Court to  give such  a construction  to a  statute as  would promote the  purpose or  object of  the Act.  A construction that promotes  the purpose  of  the  legislation  should  be preferred to  a literal  construction. A  construction which would defeat the rights of the havenots and the underdog and which would lead to injustice should always be avoided. This Section was  intended to  benefit  the  workmen  in  certain cases. It would be doing injustice to the Section if we were to say that it would not apply to awards passed a day or two before it came into force. 177      The learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  invited  our attention to  a decision  of this  Court in Rustom & Hornsby (I) Ltd. v. T.B. Kadam, where this Court was considering the scope of Section 2-A of the Act. Section 2-A provides thus :           "where   any   employer   discharges,   dismisses,           retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of           an individual  workman, any  dispute or difference           between that  workman and  his employer  connected           with,  or   arising  out   of,   such   discharge,           dismissal, retrenchment  or termination  shall  be           deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding           that no  other workman nor any union of workmen is           a party to the dispute." Before this  section  was  enacted,  there  was  a  bar  for individual workman  to raise  an industrial  dispute. It was this bar that the management put forward in that case.      It was  contended that  the reference was bad since the dismissal took  place before December 1, 1965, on which date the Section  came into force. This Court did not accept this plea. The  appellant’s counsel  submits that Section 2-A and Section 17-B  are more  or less similar in their phraseology and  when  this  Court  gave  Section  2-A  retrospectivity, Section 17-B should also be treated alike. This is what this Court said while dealing with Section 2-A:           "When  the  Section  uses  the  words  ’where  any           employer  discharges,   dismisses,  retrenches  or           otherwise terminates the services of an individual           workman’ it  does not deal with the question as to           when that  was done; it refers to a situation or a           state of  affairs. In other words where there is a           discharge, dismissal,  retrenchment or termination           of service  otherwise the dispute relating to such

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         discharge, dismissal,  retrenchment or termination           of service becomes an industrial dispute. It is no           objection to  this to say that this interpretation           would lead to a situation where the disputes would           be reopened  after the  lapse of  many  years  and           referred for  adjudication under  Section 10.  The           question of creation of new right by Section 2A is 178           also  not   very   relevant.   Even   before   the           introduction of  Section 2A  a dispute relating to           an individual  workman could  become an industrial           dispute by  its being  sponsored by a labour union           or a group of workmen. Any reference under Section           10 would  be made  only sometime after the dispute           itself has  arisen. The  only relevant  factor for           consideration in  making a reference under Section           10 is  whether an  industrial dispute exists or is           apprehended. There cannot be any doubt that on the           day the reference was made in the present case, an           industrial dispute as defined under Section 2A did           exist."      The  appellant’s   counsel  relied   upon   the   above observation and  contended that  even though  the words used are in  the future  tense, denoting  something to  happen in future, the Section was held to operate retrospectively also and that  similar is the case with Section 17-B. The learned counsel for  the respondents met this argument with the plea that Section  2-A was  only  a  definition  Section  and  no support could  be drawn  from the  above  Judgment  for  the purpose of  this case.  In our view the principle, laid down in the  above decision,  cannot  be  dismissed  so  lightly, because this Court extended the benefit of this Section to a dispute that  existed before  the Section  came into  force, notwithstanding the  fact that the Section used future tense regarding the  dispute. We  agree  that  Section  2-A  is  a definition Section. Still this Court gave it a retrospective construction. We  feel, some  support is  available  to  the appellant from this decision.      The  respondents’   counsel  relied  heavily  upon  two decisions  of  this  Court,  referred  above,  dealing  with Section 11-A of the Act. Section 11-A reads as follows :           "Where  an  industrial  dispute  relating  to  the           discharge or  dismissal  of  a  workman  has  been           referred to  a Labour  Court, Tribunal or National           Tribunal for adjudication and in the course of the           adjudication  proceedings,   the   Labour   Court,           Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be,           is  satisfied  that  the  order  of  dsicharge  or           dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, 179           set aside  the order of discharge or dismissal and           direct reinstatement  of the workman on such terms           and conditions,  if any, as it thinks fit, or give           such other  relief to  the workman  including  the           award  of   any  lesser   punishment  in  lieu  of           discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the           case may require :           Provided that in any proceeding under this section           the Labour  Court, Tribunal  or National Tribunal,           as the  case  may  be,  shall  rely  only  on  the           meterials on  record and  shall not take any fresh           evidence in relation to the matter." By  this  Section,  Tribunals  were  conferred  with  a  new jurisdiction. The  question arose  whether this jurisdiction conferred for  the first  time by  Section  11-A,  could  be

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extended retrospectively.  While dealing  with Section 11-A, this Court  stated as follows in Workmen of Messrs Firestone Tyre &  Rubber Co.  of India Pvt. Ltd. v. The Management and Others.           "...We have pointed out that this position has now           been changed  by Section  11A. The section has the           effect of altering the law by abridging the rights           of the  employer inasmuch as it gives power to the           Tribunal for  the first  time to  differ both on a           finding of misconduct arrived at by an employer as           well as  the punishment  imposed by  him. Hence in           order to  make  the  section  applicable  even  to           disputes, which  had been  referred prior  to  the           coming into  force of the section, there should be           such a  clear express  and manifest  indication in           the section.  There is no such express indication.           An  inference   that  the   section   applies   to           proceedings, which  are already  pending, can also           be gathered  by necessary  intendment. In the case           on hand,  no such  inference can  be drawn  as the           indications are  to the  contrary. We have already           referred to  the  proviso  to  section  11A  which           states ’in  any proceeding  under this section’. A           proceeding under the section can only be after the           section has  come into  force. Further the section           itself was brought 180           into force  some time  after the Amendment Act was           passed. These  circumstances as well as the scheme           of the section and particularly the wording of the           proviso indicate  that section 11-A does not apply           to disputes  which had  been referred prior to 15-           12-1971. The  section  applies  only  to  disputes           which are  referred for  adjudication on  or after           15-12-1971. To  conclude, in  our opinion, section           11A has  no application to disputes referred prior           to 15-12-1971. Such disputes have to be dealt with           according to  the decisions  of this Court already           referred to........" This Court  approved  this  conclusion  in  Gujarat  Mineral Development Corporation v. Shri P.H. Brahmbhatt thus :           "....The next  question is  whether Section 11A of           the Act  is applicable  to this case. That section           provides that where an industrial dispute relating           to the  discharge or  dismissal of  a workman  has           been referred  to  a  Labour  Court,  Tribunal  or           National Tribunal  for  adjudication  and  in  the           course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour           Court, Tribunal  or National  Tribunal as the case           may be,  is satisfied  that the order of discharge           or dismissal  was not  justified, it  may, by  its           award,  set   aside  the  order  of  discharge  or           dismissal and  direct reinstatement of the workman           on such  terms and conditions, if any as it thinks           fit, or  give such  other relief  to  the  workman           including the  award of  any lesser  punishment in           lieu   of    discharge   of   dismissal   as   the           circumstances of  the case  may require.  We  are,           however, not  concerned with the several questions           which may  arise thereunder,  because the  section           itself will  not apply  to an  industrial  dispute           referred prior  to December 15, 1971, when section           11A was  brought into  operation. It  was held  by           this Court in the Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre &           Rubber Co.  of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Management

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         and Others, (1973 - 1 - LLJ 278) that this section           has no  retrospective  operation  on  the  pending           references......" 181      According  to   the  respondents’  counsel,  these  two decisions clearly cover the question involved in this appeal also. We  feel that  this submission  cannot be accepted for more than  one reason.  Section 11-A, confers a jurisdiction on the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to act in a particular manner which jurisdiction it did not have prior to the coming into force of Section 11-A. This is the reason why this  Court held  that  Section  11-A  cannot  apply  to proceedings before  it came  into force. The conferment of a new jurisdiction  can take  effect only prospectively except when a  contrary  intention  appears  on  the  face  of  the statute. Section  11-A  plainly  indicates  its  prospective operation. This  is made clear in the proviso to the section when it  says "provided  that in  any proceeding  under this Section". This  can only mean something relatable to a stage after the Section came into being. That is not the case with Section 17-B.  Here it  is  not  the  conferment  of  a  new jurisdiction but  the codification  in statutory  form of  a right available  to  the  workmen  to  get  back-wages  when certain given  conditions are  satisfied. There are no words in the  Section to  compel the  Court to hold that it cannot operate retrospectively.  Before Section 17-B was introduced there was  no bar  for Courts  for awarding wages. Of course the  workmen   had  no  right  to  claim  it.  This  Section recognizes  such  a  right.  To  construe  it  in  a  manner detrimental to workmen would be to defeat its object.      In our  considered view,  therefore, the High Court was in error  in holding  that the legislature did not intend to give retrospective  effect to  Section 17-B.  We  hold  that Section 17-B  applies even  to awards passed prior to August 21, 1984,  if they  have not  become final. We set aside the Judgment of the High Court and allow this appeal with costs, quantified at Rs. 3,000. P.S.S.                                       Appeal allowed. 182