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PETITIONER: BHANWAR SINGH & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF RAJASTHAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/12/1967

BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. HIDAYATULLAH, M.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  709            1968 SCR  (2) 528  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1973 SC2204  (12)  D          1977 SC2433  (7)

ACT: Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898) ss. 233 and  196- A(2)-Joint trial of charges-- Offence under s. 120 B. I.P.C. read  with  ss. 467 and 471 I.P.C.  requiring  sanction  for prosecution-Sanction  not obtained-- Offence under s. 120  B read with s. 420 I.P.C. not requiring sanction--Joint  trial not illegal if main object of conspiracy is to commit latter offence.

HEADNOTE: The  appellants  along  with two others  were  charged  with having  entered into a criminal conspiracy in  pursuance  of which postal orders and cheques in the course of transit  by post were pilfered and after various alterations being  made therein  were  encashed  at post  offices  and  banks.   The charges inter alia were under ss. 467/471 read with s. 120-B and a. 420 read with s. 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.  The Sessions  Judge convicted all the four accused but the  High Court maintained the conviction only of the two  appellants. In  appeal  before  this Court  the  appellants  urged  that inasmuch  as the accused were prosecuted for  non-cognizable offences  under  ss. 467/471 read with s. 120-B  I.P.C.  the trial  was illegal and void as the necessary sanction  under s.  196-A(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure had not  been obtained.  It was further urged that the mere fact that  the accused  were also tried for the offence of cheating,  under s. 420 I.P.C. for which no sanction was required, would  not make  the  trial valid.  Under these  circumstances  it  was contended  that  the  joint trial for  cognizable  and  non- cognizable offences was illegal and void. HELD  :  It  is necessary to keep  in  mind  the  difference between the object of a conspiracy and the means adopted for realising  that object.  No sanction is necessary  under  s. 196-A(2)  Cr.  P.C. when the object of the conspiracy is  to commit  the offence of cheating (420 I.P.C.) but forgery  of documents  (467 I.P.C.) and similar non-cognizable  offences are  also committed, as merely steps taken, by one or  other of the a for the purpose of effecting the main object of the conspiracy. [533 F-H]

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The object of the conspiracy has to be determined, not  only by  reference  to  the  sections  of  the  penal  enactment, referred  to in the charge but on a reading of  the  charges themselves.  The charges against the appellants showed  that the only object of the conspiracy was to cheat the banks  or the  post offices, referred to in the charges, which  is  an offence under s. 420 read with s. 120-B I.P.C. for which  no sanction  is  necessary.  The forging of the  documents  and usuing such forged documents were only means adopted by  the accused  for realising the aforesaid object.  Therefore  the trial of the accused in the present case for offences  under ss.  120-B  read with ss. 467/471 and 420 I.P.C.  and  other allied offences, cannot be held to be illegal on the  ground that  sanction under s. 196-A(2) of the  Criminal  Procedure Code had not been obtained. [534 B-E] State  of  Andhra Pradesh v. Kandimala  Subbaiah,  [1962]  1 S.C.R.  194. Ramchandra Rango v. Emperor, A.I.R.  1939  Bom. 129, Durgadas Tulsiram v. State, A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 82,  Abdul Kadar  v.  State,  A.I.R.  1964 Bom.  133,  Paresh  Nath  v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1947 Cal. 32, Golam Rahman 528 529 Notes p. 52 Vadlamudi v. State of A.P. A.I.R. 1961 A.P. 448, referred to. Subbaiah, In re : I.L.R. 1958 A.P. 791, Jadeda Meramanji  v. State of Gujarat, (1963)2 Cr.  L.J. 713, Nibaran Chandra  v. Emperor,  A.I.R.  1929 Cal. 754 and Madan Lal  v.  State  of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1590, distinguished.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 137  of 1967. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated May  9, 1967 of the Rajasthan High Court in S.  B.  Criminal Appeal No. 254 of 1966. Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellants. H. R. Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam,  J.  The two appellants, in  this  appeal,  by special leave, challenge their conviction, by the Additional Sessions  Judge, No. 1, Jaipur City, for offences under  ss. 120B, 420, 420 read with 511, and 467 read with 471, I.P.C., as  confirmed  by the High Court of Rajasthan,  at  Jodhpur. Bhanwar Singh has also been convicted, for an offence  under S.  380, I.P.C. Both of them have been sentenced to  various terms of imprisonment and fine, for these offences, and  the sentences   of  imprisonment  have  been  directed  to   run concurrently. The  two appellants, along with two others, who  have  since been  acquitted, were tried by the learned  Sessions  Judge, for  various  offences,  as indicated below.   There  was  a common charge of criminal conspiracy, under S. 120B, IPC, to do,  or  cause to be done, illegal acts, viz.,  offences  of theft,  cheating,  forgeries,  etc., against  all  the  four accused.  Under this head, the allegation was that the  four accused  agreed,  among  themselves,  to  commit  theft  and pilferage,  of  Indian and British postal  orders  and  bank cheques,  belonging  to  different persons,  which  were  in transmission,  by post and that, after such  pilfering,  the names  of  the original payees and the names of  the  paying post  offices  were  erased and  forgery  was  committed  by writing  the  names of fictitious persons, or the  names  of some  of  the accused, and of different post  offices.   The

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further  allegation was that the accused agreed to  use,  as genuine,  all  such pilfered and forged  postal  orders  and cheques, which the accused knew, or had reasons to  believe, were  forged documents.  There was also an  allegation  that all  the accused had also agreed to present,  such  pilfered and forged postal orders and cheques, for encashment at  the post offices and banks at Ajmer and Jaipur, through the  two appellants  and Yasoda Devi, 4th accused, pretending  to  be either  the original payees or the substituted  payees.   It was further alleged that the accused had agreed to cheat, or attempt to cheat, the postal  L2Sup.  CI/68-3 530 authorities  and banks, at Ajmer and Jaipur, by  dishonestly inducing  them to make payment to the appellants and  Yasoda Devi,  in respect of the pilfered and forged  postal  orders and cheques.  It Was also stated that the accused  committed the  various acts, in pursuance of the agreement,  regarding the  postal orders and cheques, details of which were  given under that charge.  Appellant Bhanwar Singh was also further charged that, in pursuance of the conspiracy, during October 1956 and December 1957, he committed theft of various postal orders and cheques, belonging to various persons and that he also  forged  certain  postal orders,  which  were  valuable securities, by removing the names of the original payees and inserting  his  own  name and that he  thereby  cheated  the postal  authorities at Jaipur, by dishonestly inducing  them to deliver certain amounts against such postal orders, which were  really  payable  to  a third  party,  and  thereby  he committed offences of theft, forgery and cheating, under ss. 380,  467  and 420, I.P.C. There were also  certain  further charges,  for  offences punishable under S. 471; and  of  an attempt   to  commit  cheating  in  respect  of  a   cheque, punishable under S. 420 read with S. 51 1, IPC. Similarly, against Kishanlal, the 2nd appellant, there  were additional charges, framed under ss. 467, 420, 420 read with 511  and 471, I.P.C. Kapoorchand was also charged under  ss. 380 and 467 I.P.C., and Yasoda Devi, under ss. 467, 471, 420 and 419 I.P.C. The  case  of  the prosecution, in brief,  was  as  follows. Bhanwar Singh and Kapoorchand were constables in the C.I.D., Ajmer  Zone, during 1956-57.  In the course of their  duties of censoring postal mail, these two constables, after having opened  the  mail, for the purpose  of  censoring,  pilfered certain  Indian postal orders and British postal orders  and cheques and, after erasing the names of the original payees, as  also  the  names of the post  offices  or  banks,  where payment  was  to be made, inserted their own names  or  some fictitious  names  and  got the  postal  orders  or  cheques encashed at different post officers and banks.  According to the  prosecution, Bhanwar Singh and Kapoorchand had  entered into  a conspiracy, with Kishanlal and Yashoda  Devi,  whose services  were  utilised  for getting the  moneys  from  the Banks.   The  matter came to light when the payees  did  not receive  the cheques or the postal orders intended for  them and  lodged complaints with the post offices and banks.   On investigation,  the four accused were charged,  as  detailed above. The  accused denied the charges levelled against them.   The learned  Sessions  Judge  came to the  conclusion  that  the charge  of criminal conspiracy was established, against  all the  four  accused The first appellant was found to  be  the main accused and he was 531 convicted under ss. 380, 467/471, 420/511 read with S.  120B

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I.P.C. The second appellant and Yashoda Devi were  convicted under  ss.  467,  471  and  420  read  with  S.  120B   IPC. Kapoorchand  was however convicted only for  offences  under ss. 380 and 467 read with 120-B, IPC.  The learned  Sessions Judge   sentenced   all  of  them  to   various   terms   of imprisonment,  and  fine,  for the  different  offences,  as stated already. All  the four accused challenged their conviction for  these offences and the sentence passed against them, be before the High Court of Rajasthan.  Two contentions were raised by the accused;  (i) that the trial held by the Sessions Judge  was illegal  and  void,  inasmuch as the  prosecution  had  been conducted,  without obtaining the necessary sanction,  under S.  196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1 in  respect  of the charge under ss. 467 and 471 read with S. 120B IPC; (ii) that  the  evidence  adduced by  the  prosecution,  did  not establish the guilt of the accused.  Both these  contentions have  been  negatived  by  the High Court,  so  far  as  the appellants  herein are concerned.  The High Court,  however, acquitted   Yashoda  Devi,  holding  that  the   prosecution evidence  id  not  establish her  guilt,  beyond  reasonable doubt.   The High Court also acquitted  Kapoorchand  holding that  the trial against him was void, because the  necessary sanction had not been obtained, under S. 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On  behalf  of the appellants, Mr.  Jain,  learned  counsel, raised  the same two contentions before us.   Counsel  urged that  inasmuch  as  the accused  were  prosecuted  for  non- cognizable  offences  under ss. 467/471 read with  S.  120B, IPC.,  the  trial  was illegal and  void,  inasmuch  as  the necessary  sanction, under S. 196A of the Code had not  been obtained.  Learned counsel further urged that the mere  fact that  the accused were also tried for the offence of  cheat- ing,  under  S. 420 IPC, which is cognizable and  for  which punishment by way of imprisonment extending to 7 years could be  imposed, and for which no sanction was necessary,  would not  make  the trial valid.  Under such  circumstances,  the joint  trial for cognizable and non-cognizable offences  was illegal and void. Mr. Khanna, learned counsel for the State, met this  conten- tion,  on behalf of the appellant, by pointing out that  the main object of the conspiracy was to cheat the banks and the post  offices, by obtaining money from them;  the  forgeries committed  by the accused on the cheques and  postal  orders were  only  incidental  to achieve the main  object  of  the conspiracy,  viz., to commit the offence under S.  420  IPC. Under  those circumstances, Mr. Khanna pointed out,  it  was not  necessary to obtain sanction under S. 196A of the  Code and therefore there was no illegality,. which would  vitiate the trial, held by the Sessions Judge. 532 We  have  already  indicated  the  offences  for  which  the appellants  and the other two accused, who have  since  been acquitted, were tried.  It is enough to note that there  was a  charge under S. 120B, read with s. 467/471 and  420  IPC. The  offences under s. 467 and 471 are  non-cognizable,  but the  offence under s. 420 is a cognizable one for which  the punishment  could  be  imprisonment extending  to  7  years. Therefore,  if the object of the conspiracy, under s.  120B, was to commit a non-cognizable offence, under s. 467 or  471 I.P.C.,  the  obtaining of sanction,  from  the  authorities mentioned   in  sub-s.  (2)  of  s.  196A,  was   absolutely necessary,  and the absence of such sanction  would  vitiate the  trial, for such offences.  Similarly, if the object  of the  conspiracy, under S. 120B, was to commit  a  cognizable

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offence   under  s.  420  IPC,  which  is  punishable   with imprisonment  for  a  term above 2  years,  no  sanction  is necessary, under s. 196A.  The question is, whether sanction was necessary in the case before us, when there was a  trial for  offences  under s. 467/471 and 420 IPC,  read  with  S. 120B. In the instant case, it is admitted that no sanction was ob- tained. In The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kandimalla Subbaiah(1) the question arose, before this Court, whether sanction under s. 196A  of the Code was necessary when there was a  trial  for offences under s. 120B, read with ss. 466, 467 and 420, IPC. It was argued, on behalf of the State, that since the object of  the  conspiracy  was to cheat the  Government  i.e.,  to commit  an  offence under s. 420 IPC, and  as  the  offences under ss. 466 and 467 were only means to that end, the trial was not vitiated simply because no sanction was obtained for prosecuting the accused, for offences of criminal conspiracy to  commit  non-cognizable offences, under ss. 466  and  467 IPC.  But, in that decision, this Court did not express  any opinion  on this point, as the matter was sent back  to  the trial  Court, for framing fresh charges and proceeding  with the trial, after observing that it was for the Government to consider  whether it should accord sanction for  prosecution of non-cognizable offences, assuming that such sanction  was necessary.   The question, that was thus left open, in  that decision, arises for consideration, now, in the instant case before us. On  behalf  of the appellant, reliance has  been  placed  on three  decisions,  in support of the contention  that  under such  circumstances, the trial is illegal and  void.   Those decisions  are: Subbaiah, In re:(2), of the  Andhra  Pradesh High Court; Jadeda Meramanji v. State of Gujarat(3), of  the Gujarat  High Court; and Nibaran Chandra v.  Emperor(4),  of the Calcutta High Court. (1)  [1962] 1 S.C.R. 194. (3)  [1963] 2 Cr.L.J. 713. (2)  I.L.R. 1958 A.P. 791. (4)  A.I.R. 1929 Cal. 754.                             533 The decision of the Calcutta High Court does not assist  the appellant,  because  the  charge  that  was  framed  was  of criminal  conspiracy,  under s. 120B read with s.  384  IPC. The  object  of  the conspiracy having  been  to  commit  an offence,  under  s.  384  IPC,  which  is  a  non-cognizable offence,  it  was held by the Calcutta High Court  that  the Magistrate could not take cognizance of the offence, without the necessary sanction, under s.   196A;   and,   on    this ground, the High Court held that the trial was    void. In  the  decisions of the Andhra Pradesh  and  Gujarat  High Courts, referred to above, it has been held that in  respect of  a prosecution, for criminal conspiracy, under  s.  120B, read  with  es. 466 and 467 IPC., under which  sections  the offences are non-cognizable, the consent, contemplated under s.  196  (A)  (2) is a pre-requisite  to  any  Court  taking cognizance  of  that  offence; it has also  been  held  that sanction  is not necessary to prosecute a case  of  criminal conspiracy to commit an offence under s. 420 IPC.  The legal proposition, stated as such, is unexceptionable.  But it  is not  clear from the discussion, contained in the  two  judg- ments,  as to what was the object of the conspiracy.  It  is also  to  be  stated  that the said  two  decisions  had  no occasion to consider the question whether sanction, under s. 196  (A)  (2), Cr.P.C., is still necessary when a  trial  is held  for offences under s. 120B read with s. 466,  467  and

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420  IPC., and when the case of the prosecution is that  the object  of  the  conspiracy  is to  commit  the  offence  of cheating,  and non-cognizable offences have  been  committed for the purpose of effecting the object of the conspiracy. We  may also point out that our attention has been drawn  to the  decision of this Court in Madan Lal v. State of  Punjab (1).  We have gone through that decision and it does not, in our opinion, assist the appellant. The view of the various High Courts, to which we will  refer presently, and with which view we agree, is that no sanction is  necessary, under s. 196A(2) Cr.P.C., when the object  of the  conspiracy  is to commit the offence of  cheating  (420 IPC),  but, forgery of documents (467 IPC) and similar  non- cognizable  offences  are also committed,  as  merely  steps taken,  by one or other of the accused, for the  purpose  of effecting the main object of the conspiracy.  A trial, under such circumstances, for offences under s. 120B, read with s. 467/471 and 420 IPC., without obtaining sanction, is neither illegal, nor void. It  is necessary to keep in mind the difference between  the object  of a conspiracy and the means adopted for  realising that object.  Even if the object of the conspiracy, viz., of cheating, is (1)  A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1590. 534 sought to be attained by resort to non-cognizable  offences, as in the case before us, sanction under s. 196A of the Code is not necessary.  This principle emerges from the following decisions:   Ramaohandra  Rango  v.   Emperor(1);   Durgadas Tulsiram  v. State(2); Abdul Kadar v. State(3); Paresh  Nath v.  Emperor(4);  Golam  Rahman v. The  King(6);  Kannan,  In re(6); and Vadlamudi v. State of A.P. (7). The object of the conspiracy has to be determined, not  only by  reference  to  the  sections  of  the  penal  enactment, referred  to in the charge, but on a reading of the  charges themselves.  On a perusal of the charges, framed against the appellants,  we  are satisfied that the only object  of  the conspiracy  was  to  cheat the banks or  the  post  offices, referred  to  in the charges, which is an offence  under  S. 420,  read  with  s. 120B, IPC, for  which  no  sanction  is necessary.   No doubt there are also charges  of  committing forgery   Of  valuable  security  and  using   such   forged documents,  which are ,offences under ss.. 467 and 471  IPC, and  non-cognizable.   But a reading of the  charges,  as  a whole,  makes  it  clear  that it is not  the  case  of  the prosecution  that  committing  forgery  of  the  Indian  and British  postal orders or the cheques, or using such  forged documents,  was the object of the conspiracy.   The  accused would not he satisfied by merely entering into a  conspiracy to  forge the postal orders or the cheques, or even  to  use such  forged  documents.  The forging of the  documents  and using such forged documents, were only means adopted by  the accused  for realising the object, of the conspiracy,  which was to cheat -the postal and bank authorities, at the places mentioned  in  the charge, by dishonestly inducing  them  to part with money.  Therefore the trial of these accused,  for offences under ss. 120B read with S. 467/ 471 and 420  IPC., and other allied offences, cannot be held to be illegal,  on the  ground that sanction under S. 196A(2) of the Code,  had not been obtained. Before  closing  the  discussion,  on  this  point,  it   is necessary  to refer to the reliance placed, by the,  counsel for the appellants, on the acquittal, by the High Court,  of Kapoorchand, on the ground that the trial was void,  because the necessary sanction had not been obtained, under S. 196A,

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of the Code.  It will be seen that the said accused also was tried for an offence under S. 120B read with S. 420 IPC., as also  on  certain other charges.  As will be seen  from  the judgment  of the High Court, it has taken the view that  the said accused has not been convicted, by the trial Court, for an  offence, under S. 120B read with S. 420 IPC., and  hence the trial is vitiated, for lack of sanction. (1)A.I.R. 1939 Bom.129.  (2) A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 82. (2)A.I.R. 1964 Rom.133.  (4) A.I.R. 1947 Cal. 32. (5)A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 66.  (6) (1949) 2 M.L.J. Short Notes (7)A.I.R. 1961 A.P. 448.    p. 52 (Crl. M.P. 2686/1949) 535 Mr. Khanna, learned counsel for the respondent, has  pointed out that the said accused was also tried for the offence  of cheating,  but  he  was convicted  only  for  certain  other offences;  and,  in this connection, he referred us  to  the finding of the trial Court that all the accused were  guilty of  the  offence of cheating also.  It is not  necessary  to pursuematter further, because, it Will be seen from  the judgment  of the trial Court that the said accused was  also prosecuted for anoffence under S. 120-B read with S.  420 IPC. In view of what is stated above, the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, has to be rejected. So  far as the second contention is concerned,  that  really relates to merits.  Both the learned Sessions Judge, as well as  the  High ,Court, have very elaborately  gone  into  the evidence  regarding  the  appellants, and  have  found  them guilty of the offences, for which they were punished.  We do not  see  any  error, committed by the High  Court,  or  the Sessions Judge, in the appreciation of the evidence, in  the case, and there is no justification for any interference, by this Court. The result is that the appeal fails, and is dismissed.  G.C.                              Appeal dismissed. 536