SHRI BHAJANLAL, CHIEF MINISTER, HARYANA A  v.  

MIS JINDAL STRIPS LTD. AND ORS.  

AUGUST 8, 1994  

[M.N. VENKATACHALAIAH 0. AND S. MOHAN, JJ.] B  

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 25-Transfer Petition-Bias-Ap- prehension of-Case admitted by a Judge who later became acting Chief Jus- tice-Case listed before another Bench-Direction for de/isling from other  Bench and listing before the said Judge-Application for transfer->4.fter ad- C  vance stage of arguments-field: Mere Transfer of the case from one Bench  to another is not justified ground for allegation of bias.  

Administrative Law-Natural Justice-Bias-The decision maker  should have no interest direct or indirect-Non-pecuniary bias-Nature and  extent of interest to be seen. D  

Practice and Procedure-rlffidavit relating the events and conversation  among the judges-Litigant cannot seek information about what transpired  between the Judges of the Cowt regarding his case.  

Judicial Propriety-Case directed to be delisted from one Bench for  listing before another Bench-Another judge of the Cowt wrote letter enquir- ing about de/isling-Held : enquiries and letters not consistent with the  restraint expected of the high offices.  

E  

In a writ petition filed by the Respondent No.l, allegations or F  malafide were levelled against the Petitioner. Petition was admitted by  Judge 's' who later became acting Chief Justice and the matter was listed  before another Tax Bench, Judge 'S' directed the matter to be delisted from  the other Bench and Hsted before him. Judge 'M' gave letters to Registrar  seeking his explanation regarding the delistlng. Judge ~S' delisted the  matter from his Bench and the petition was listed before Tax Bench. After G  appointment of Chief Justice, Jndge 'S' became senior most Judge presid- ing over the tax bench and the petition was again listed before him. At the  advance stage or hearing, appellant filed application for transfer or the  petition on the gronnd or bias. During the hearing Judge 'M' had written  to the Chief Justice requesting tO know the reasons for transfer or the case H  

445

446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.  

A to the bench comprising of Judge 'S'.  

Appellant filed affidavit stating the events and communication be·  tween the Judges of the High Court regardi.ng the listing and delisting of  the petition without stating the source of the information. In the rejoinder  affidavit he stated that before filing of the petition the information was  

B confirmed by the then Chief Justice, but his name was not mentioned in  the petition since he had refused.  

Contention of the appellant was that transfer of single case is  

sufficient to establish the interestedness of Judge 'S'. The contention of  C Respondent No. 1 was that it was the normal practice, if date was fixed for  

final bearing by a particular Bench, it should come before the same Bench.  Therefore, delisting from Tax Bench and listing it before his Bench was  not the sign of bias.  

D  Dismissing the appeal, this court  

HELD: 1. On the ground of allegation of malafides It cannot be said,  a particular Bench cannot bear the case. To make the transfer of the writ  petition from one Bench to another, a ground for allegation of bias Is  unjustified. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, there Is nothing  to indicate that the then Acting Chief Justice evinced and interest in  

E hearing this matter, or that he was biased. (454-F, GI  

2. In the case of non-pecuniary bias, regard is to be bad to the extent  and nature of interest. Then alone the Judge wDl be disqualified. Bias is  the second limb of natural justice. Prima facie no one should be a judge in  

F what is to be regarded as 'Sua Causa' Whether or not he is named as a  party. The decision maker should have no interest by way of gain or  detriment in the outcome of a proceeding. Interest may take many forms.  It may be direct, it may be indirect, It may arise from personal relationship  or from a relationship with the subject matter, from a close relationship  

G  

H  

or from a tenuous one. (455-B, 454-H, 455·A]  

R v. Sussex Justices, Ex. P Mc Carthy, (1924) 1 KB 256 and R v.  Bransley Lisensing Justices, Ex 0 Bransley and District Licensed Victuallers'  Association, (1960) 2 QB 167, Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd.  Lannon, (1969) 1 QB 577, referred to.  

3. It Is deprecating that the appellants sought Information as to what  

!

BHAJANLAL v. JINDALSTRIPSLTD.[MOHAN,J.) 447  

transpired within 'the judicial fortress' among the judicial brethren. A  Judges should not be dragged in and their names mentioned in the  matters. (457-B)  

4. The conduct of Judge 'M' might incur the criticism of transgress-

ing the proprieties of the high office. The enquiries and letters by the  Judge are not consistent with the restraint expected of the High offices. B  Courts are a storm centre facing the panoply of human problems, crowded  dockets an unrelating work schedules. The Judges must remain unrumed  and calm in the midst of contending forces. [ 457 ·E·F ·G, 458-A)  

Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia v. Franklin S C  Palla~ 3.43 US 451, referred to.  

Et palte American Steel Barret Co. 57 Law Ed. U.S. 1379 Bell v.  Chandler, 569, Federal Report 2nd Series 556, United States v. Scuito, 531  Fedral Report, 842; Metropolitan Properties Company v. Lannon, (1969) 1  QBD 577, Ranjit Thakur v. U. O.L, (1988) 1SCR512; Lalita v. State of Bihar, D  AIR (1957) SC 198; M.Y. Shareefv. The Hon'bleludges of the High Court  of Nagpur, (1955) 1 SCR 756; Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sun- gamal Poshni, (1989) 2 SCR 357; The Barium Chemicals Ltd v. The  Company Law Board, (1969) Suppl. SCR 311; Sukhwinder Pal Bipin Kumar  v. State of Punjab, (1989) 2 SCR 31 and Smt. Savithramma v. CECI I E  Naronha, (1988) Suppl; 2 SCR 561, cited.  

CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5525 of  1994.  

From the Judgment and Order dated 6.10.1993 of the High Court F  of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in C.M. 9909/93 in C.W.P. 1898/92.  

With  

T.P. (C) 880/93.  G  

Kapil Sibal, R. Karanjawala and Mrs. Manik Karanjawa for the·  Appellants.  

Shanti Bhushan and Jayant Bhushan for the Respondents.  

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H

448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.  

A MOHAN, J. Leave granted.  

The appellant is the Chief Minister of Haryana. The first respondent  filed a Writ Petition C.W.P. No.1898 of 1992 challenging the assessment  order passed by the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner-cum-As- sessing Authority, Hissar, Haryana confirming a demand for sales tax of  

B Rs. 2,04,13,895. Similar writ petitions have been filed against separate  assessment orders by the first respondent for a total amount of payment  aggregating to a liability of Rs.20 crores. In these writ petitions allegations  of personal mala fide have been levelled against the appellant.  

C The writ petition came up for preliminary hearing on 7.2.92 before a  Division Bench consisting of S.S. Sodhi and K.C. Garg JJ. The writ petition  was admitted and ex parte ad-interim stay was granted. After notice, when  the matter came up for hearing before a Bench consisting of S.S. Sodhi  and R.S. Mongia, JJ, it was directed to be listed for final hearing on 3.8.92.  The then Chief Justice Mr. Rama Jois Proceeded on leave on 1.8.92.  

D Thereupon, S.S. Sodhi, J, became the Acting Chief Justice.  

On 3.8.92, when the writ petition was listed before the Tax Bench  comprising of A.P. Choudhary and N.K. Sodhi, JJ, S.S. Sodhi, J. directed  the writ petition to be delisted from the Tax Bench before which it was  

E listed and transferred the case presided over by S.S. Sodhi, J, hi.m$Clf. It  appears this was the only case which was directed to be delisted from the  Tax Bench and transferred to the Division Bench presided over by the then  Acting Chief Justice.  

On 21.8.92, Chief Justice Mr. Rama Jois returned from leave and  F resumed charge. On 24.8.92 this Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.  

7700 of 1992 arising out of a connected Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3864 of  1992 directed the case be remanded to the High Court ordering ex- peditious disposal along with C.W.P. No. 1898 of 1992. On 1.9.92, Chief  Justice Rama Jois resigned. Thereupon, again, S.S. Sodhi, J, became Acting  

G Chief Justice. He continued in that capacity till 13.11.92. When the writ  petition was pending hearing, G.R. Majithia, J, sought an explanation from  the Registrar (Judicial) as to why the case was transferred from the Tax  Bench to the Bench presided over by the Acting Chief Justice. On 21.10.92,  S.S. Sodhi, J. delisted the wrii petition from his Bench and re-transferred  it to the Tax Bench comprising of A.L. Bahri and Ashok Bhan, JJ. The  

H case did not reach for hearing before this Bench. On 22.10.92, G.R.  

•

BHAJANLAL v. JINDAL STRIPS LTD. [MOHAN, J.] 449  

Majithia, J. once again wrote to the Registrar (Judicial) seeking compliance A  with his earlier order dated 20.10.92. This letter was forwarded by the  Registrar (Judicial) to the Acting Chief Justice soliciting orders in respect  thereof. It was directed that the note be placed in the file.  

On 14.11.92, justice S.D. Agarwala was appointed as chief Justice,  As result, S.S. Sodhi, J. became the seniormost puisne Judge. B  

On the re-opening of the High Court after summer vacation, the writ  petition along with other connected petitions were placed for hearing  before the Tax Bench comprising of S.S. Sodhi and Ashok Bhan, JJ. A  request was made for an early hearing of the writ petition on behalf of the C  first respondent. Accordingly a direction was issued that the writ petitions  be placed for final hearing on 13.9.93. The hearing went on on 13.9.93. A  preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the State about the main- tainability of the writ petition since the alternate statutory remedies avail- able to the first respondent had not been exhausted. The Division Bench  did not consider that objection but directed the arguments be addressed D  on merits. The petitions were adjourned for further order to 4.10.93.  

The records bear out G.R. Majithia, J. addressed a letter to the  learned Chief Justice on 13.9.93 referring to his earlier c~mmunication on  the subject and requested to know the circumstances under which the writ E  petition had been transferred to a Division Bench presided over by S.S.  Sodhi, J. Be that so. On 4.10.93, the hearing recommended on the writ  petition.  

The appellant on his return after long tour of Rajasthan and Delhi,  on 4.10.93, came to know about these happenings. They were the cause of F  some consternation and apprehension in his mind since allegations of  malaftdes had been levelled against him by the first respondent who is said  to be a political opponent. Therefore, on 4.10.93 an application C.M. No.  9909 of 1993 was moved requesting the Division Bench to transfer the  matter from their Bench. Notice was issued and the hearing was fixed on G  6.10.93.  

After hearing the arguments, the application for transfer was dis- missed. However, time was granted till 12.10.93 to approach this Court and  it was indicated that thereafter the matter would be taken up on day to day  basis. H

450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.  

A Appellant assails in this appeal the order refusing transfer. During  this civil appeal, an additional affidavit was filed on behalf of the appellant  giving details of the course which the writ petition took. He would have it,  on 3.8.93, when S.S. Sodhi, J. took over as Acting Chief Justice the writ  petition was listed at Serial No. 342 before A.P. Chaudhari and N.K. Sodhi,  

B JJ. S.S. Sodhi, J. orally directed the Registrar (Judicial), Shri B.R. Gulati  that the writ petition along with connected writ petitions be listed before  a Bench presided over by the then Acting Chief Justice. The note in  support of the same is produced as Annexure 'F'.  

The affidavit further proceeds to state that the deponent reliably  C learnt that the then Acting Chief Justice, in fact, went to the Chambers of  

N .K. Sodhi, J. and told him that by mistake it had been listed before a  Bench presided over by A.P. Chaudhari, J. N .K. Sodhi, J. was somewhat  agitated and told the Acting Chief Justice that the transfer of the case from  that Bench was not in accordance with the normal practice of the High  Court. There was no reason why the matter was removed from the roaster.  

D A.P. Chaudhari, J. also is said to have sent a formal note to the Registrar  as to why this particular matter had been removed from their Bench and  the note was apparently returned with an endorsement by the Registrar  (Judicial) indicating that this was done on to the oral directions of the  Acting Chief Justice. the deponent believed that S.S. Sodhi, J. thereafter  

E met N .K. Sodhi, J. to express his regret for what had happened. The list  of the Tax Bench comprising of A.P. Chaudhari and N.K. Sodhi, JJ. was  circulated on the evening of August, 1, 1992 on or the morning of August  2, 1992. The constitution of the Tax Bench of A.P. Chaudhari and N.K.  Sodhi, JJ. was circulated on the evening of 1st August or morning of 2nd  August, 1992. On 31.7.92 a request was made before S.S. Sodhi, J. that  

F CWP 1898/92, which he had while presiding over the Bench fixed for 3.8.92  may not be taken up on that day.  

G  

H  

His further averment is as under :  

"It is further reliably learnt that Hon'ble Chief Justice Rama  Jois returned to Chandigarh in August, 1992 and both Justice N.K.  Sodhi and Justice A.P. Chaudhari met the Hon'ble Chief Justice  and it seems that the Hon'ble Chief Justice conveyed to them that  he had already told the Acting Chief Justice that this should not  have been done and that the Acting Chief Justice should not hear  the matter when it came up for hearing. Under these circumstan-

BHAJANLAL v. JINDAL STRIPS LTD. [MOHAN, J.] 451  

ces, it was felt that the Hon'ble Judges from whose Bench it was A  de listed should not carry the matter any further.  

If these facts are correct, obviously Hon'ble Justice S.S. Sodhi  should not have heard this matter when it came up for hearing  before him in October, 1992.  

B  ...... The deponent feels that it is imperative in matters of this  

nature that the Court believes that the Executive does not file  applications of this nature irresponsibly and with a motivation to  have the mater heard by one Bench or another. The deponent has  disclosed these facts as they have come to his knowledge, so that  the court may not have an impression that the application was C  motivatedly filed and that by the filing of this application, the  dignity of the Court is being compromised. The deponent herein  respects the highest traditions and dignity of the Court, and would  in no circumstances ever compromise it. The facts set out herein  all stated instead of show that there was genuine apprehension in D  the mind of the deponent and that these facts were to the  knowledge of the Leaned Judge in the matter. Since the petition  involved allegations of personal malaftdes against the deponent,  and since the deponent was joined as a party- respondent, the  circumstaaces as set out hereinabove warranted that the Learned  Judge need not have heard the matter himself, and that the Hon'ble E  Chief Justice would have, in the circumstances, directed the matter  to be listed before any appropriate Bench. It is not that the  deponent was, and is wishing the matter to be heard by any  particular Bench. It is with this view that the present affidavit is  being filed."  

A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the first respondent  that the facts stated in the additional affidavit are not admitted by the first  respondent since he has no means to verify the correctness of the same.  Further, the appellant has not disclosed in his affidavit the source of his  information.  

On 18.11.93 serious arguments were addr·essed whether the affidavit  must disclose the source of information. The1·efore, the first respondent  tho~gh fit to file an affidavit that" his counsel Shri Shanti Bhushan con- tacted former Chief Justice Mr .. Rama Jois in the evening of 18.11.93 itself.  

F  

G  

He wrote about the contents of paragraph 8 and also informed him that H

452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.  

A the counsel for the appellant had stated before this Court that the infor- mation contained in that paragraph had been conveyed to the appellant by  Chief Justice Mr. Rama Jois. The counsel for the respondent asked Chief  Justice Mr. Rama J ois whether it was so to which the reply was that he  considered it improper to talk about any conversation which might have  

B taken place between the Chief Justice and other Judges of the High Court  in the Chambers. In view of this Principle he could not give any such  information to any person much less to a party or its counsel. Thus, it is  clear that Chief Justice Mr. Rama Jois Could not have conveyed any such  information to the appellant."  

C In response to this, the appellant stated that prior to the date of his  filing the petition for transfer on 4.10.93 he contacted the then Chief Justice  Mr. Rama Jois on telephone and asked him why S.S. Sodhi, J, had taken  up the matter. The appellant would state that he got the information that  Chief Justice Mr. Rama Jois had advised S.S. Sodhi, J. not to do so. This  was confirmed by Chief Justice Mr. Rama Jois. The appellant was also  

D informed that Chief Justice Mr. Rama Jois had informed S.S. Sodhi, J. that  it was wrong on the part of S.S. Sodhi, J. to have transferred the matter in  the ftrst place. The appellant states that the retired Chief Justice Mr. Rama  Jois was asked whether his name could be mentioned in the application lo  be moved by him. The appellant was replied that this would embarra&s him  

E and his name should not be brought into the proceedings. Therefore, he  did not mention the judge's name in the application and in the additional  affidavit filed by him.  

Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned counsel for the appellant submits that  F transfer of one case alone to the file of the then Acting Chief Justice would  

be enough to establish his interestedness. The right to fair trial is guaran- teed under the Constitution. It entitles a litigant to adjudication of a cause  by a judge who is perceptibly and demonstrably unbiased and without  prejudice. In order to dispel any suspicion of a litigant a judge should  recuse himself even though the judge is not conscious of any bias or  

G prejudice. Such a prejudice, a state of mind, cannot be proved by direct  and positive evidence. Therefore, it cannot be judged on the basis of an  objective standard but from the point of view of the litigant. In support of  his submission learned counsel cites the following cases :  

H Ex Parte American Steel Barrel Co. 57 Law Ed. U.S. 1379 at 1383-84.

BHAJANLAL v. JINDAL STRIPS LTD. [MOHAN, J.) 453  

Bell v. Chandler, 569 Federal Report 2d Series 556 at 558-559 where A  the test adopted is not bias or prejudice alone but the be~! of mind that  may prevent impartiality.  

United States v. Scuito, 531 Federal Report 842 at 845 wherein the  test is to accept the affidavit which is taken as true for the purpose of  motion.  

Metropolitan Properties Co. v. La111w11, [1969] 1 Queen's Bench  Division 577 at 599.  

B  

This Court had also adopted the same principle as seen from Ra11jit C  Thakur v. Union of India, [1988] 1 SCR 512 and Lalita v. State of Bihar,  AIR ( 1957) SC 198 at paragraphs 20 and 21.  

Thus, it is submitted that the learned Judges had gone wrong in  refusing to order transfer when the litigant entertained suspicion that he  may not get justice at the hands of this Bench, that too, in a sensitive matter D  where allegations of ma/a fides have been made against the appellant.  

Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel for the first respondent submits  that a clear finding has been recorded by the Bench there could be no  possible occasion for the appellant to entertain any apprehension that he  would not get justice from the Bench. The only ground for transfer urged E  was that the petition was taken up for hearing by S.S. Sodhi, J. after he had  directed the matter to be delisted from the Tax Bench and be listed before  his Bench. This ground is untenable. It was the normal practice if a date  was fJXed for final hearing by a particular Bench, it should come before the  same Bench. This practice has not been denied by the appellant. A request  was made by the Advocate General of Haryana, the counsel for the  appellant before S.S. Sodhi, J. that since he was busy otherwise the case  might not be taken up on 3.8.92. This request was acceded to. On 31.7.92,  when this request was made S.S. Sodhi, J. was not Acting Chief Justice.  

F  

The learned Advocate General knew that the matter should be listed G  before S.S. Sodhi J.'s Bench. However, when it was mistakenly shown on  2.8.92 before a different Bench and since 3.8.92 S.S. Sodhi, J. became  Acting Chief Justice he directed the matter be posted before him for  hearing. The case remained on the Bench of S.S. Sodhi, J. from 3.8.92 to  21.10.92 and no objection whatsoever was raised. The application of the  appellant was a belated attempt after three days of hearing and after 20 H

454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.  

A days of the commencing of final bearing on 13.9 .93 by which time the  arguments had reached an advance stage. In M. }'. Shareef v. The Hon'ble  Judges of the High Cowt of Nagpur, (1955] 1 SCR 757 this Court had  occasion to condemn the attempts for a change of Bench. The ratio of that  ruling will squarely apply to the facts of this case. To the same effect is the  

B case in Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, (1989] 2  SCR 357 at 362. No doubt, reasonable apprehension of bias which a  reasonable person can entertain may be a good ground for transfer. That  does not mean a litigant has a right to ask for a change of Bench. A mere  statement of a party to a proceeding about his entertaining in apprehension  may be inadequate as the facts of this case make it quite clear. Even in the  

C later affidavits filed, the source of information has not been disclosed. The  requirement of law is, there must be such a disclosure as seen from The  Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. The Company Law Board, (1966] Supp. 311 at  352, Sukhvinder Pal 3ipin Kumar v. State of Punjab, (1982] 2 SCR 31 at 40  and Smt. Savithramma v. CECIL Naronha, (1988] Supp. 2 SCR 561.  

D  The allegations relating to bias have paled into insignificance since  

the learned Judge (S.S. Sodhi,J) against whom bias is alleged is no longer  in the High Court Punjab and Haryana. Normally, therefore, we would  have rest content with the dismissal of this appeal as having become really  infructuous. But certain unhappy events have taken place in this case which  

E we view with concern. Therefore, we feel obliged to express our mind.  

The appellant is the Chief Minister of a State. Against him allega- tions of malafides are made by the first respondent. He might have  strongly resented such allegations quite understandably desired to defend  

F himself. On that score, it cannot be said, a particular Bench cannot hear  the case. Whatever might have been the reason for the transfer of the writ  petition from one Bench to another to make that a ground for allegation  of bias appears unjustified. May be, either because of a particular practice  prevailing in a court that the Bench which directed the posting of a case  should fmally hear the matter or because of the change of roasters, the  

G case would have come before a particular Bench. There is nothing to  indicate that the then Acting Chief Justice S.S. Sodhi evinced an interest  in hearing this matter or that, he was biased.  

Bias is the second limb of natural justice. Prima facie no one' should  H be a judge in what is to be regarded as 'Sua Causa', whether or not he is

BHAJANLAL v. JINDAL STRIPS LTD. [MOHAN, J.] 455  

named as a party. The decision-maker should have no interest by way of A  gain or detriment in the outcome of a proceeding. Interest may take many  forms. It may be direct, it may be indirect, it may arise from a personal  relationship or from a relationship with the subject-matter, from a close  relationship or from a tenuous one.  

In the case of non-pecuniary bias, as alleged in the instant case,  regard is to be had to be extent and nature of interest. Then alone, the  judge will be disqualified. In the leading case R v. Sussex Justices, ex p.  McCarthy, (1924] 1 KB 256, Lort Hewart observed thus :  

B  

"It is not merely of some importance but , is of fundamental C  importance that justice should not only be done, but should  manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to done ... Nothing is to be  done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an im- proper interference with the course of justice."  

In R v. Barnsley Licensing Justices, exp. Barnsley and Distn"ct Licensed D  Victuallers' Association, (1960] 2 QB 167 Justice Devlin LJ said at pages  186-87:  

, "We have not to inquire what impression might be left on the  minds of the present applicants or on the minds of the public  generally. We have to satisfy ourselves that there was a real E  likelihood of bias not merely satisfy ourselves that that was the sort  of merely satisfy ourselves that that was the sort of impression that  might reasonably get abroad. The term 'real likelihood of bias' is  not used, in my opinion, it import the principle in R v. Sussex  Justices to which Salmon J referred. It is used to show that it is not F  necessary that actual bias should be proved. It is unnecessary, and,  indeed might be most undesirable, to investigate the state of mind  of each individual justice. 'Real likelihood' depends on the impres- sion which the court gets from the circumstances in which the  justices were sitting. Do. they give rise to a real likelihood that the G  justices might be biased? The court might come to the conclusion  that there was such a likelihood, without impugning the affidavit  of a justice that he was not in fact biased. Bias is or may be an  unconscious thing and a man may honestly say that he was not  actually biased and did not allow his interest to affect his mind,  although, nevertheless, he may have allowed it unconsciously to do H

A  

B  

c  

D  

E  

F  

G  

456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.  

so. The matter must be determined upon the probabilities to be  inferred from the circumstances in which the justices sit."  

The present day law in England is based on reasonable suspicion.  Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577, an  authority relied on by Mr. Kapil Sibal, lays down :  

"In Hannam v. Bradford City Council, [1970] 2 All ER 690 [1970]  1 WLR 937 Cross LI expressed the view, at p. 949, that there is  really little, if any, difference between the real likelihood of bias  and reasonable suspicion of bias test :  

"If a reasonable person who has no knowledge of the matter  beyond knowledge of the relationship which subsists between some  members of the tribunal and one of the parties would think there  might well be bias, then there is in his opinion a real likelihood of  bias. Of course, someone else with inside knowledge of the char- acters of the members in question might say: 'Although things don't  look very well, in fact there is no real likelihood of bias.' That,  however, would be beside the point, because the question is not  whether the tribunal will in fact be biased, but whether a  reasonable man with no inside knowledge might well think that it  might be biased.'  

This view was accepted in R. v. Liverpool Justices, exp. Topping,  [1983] 1 All ER 490, (1983) 1 WRLR 119. The Divisional Court  considered that the correct test to apply is whether there is the  appearance of bias, rather than whether there is actual bias; and  that as to the way in which the test is to be applied the question  is: Would a reasonable and fair-minded person sitting in Court  and knowing all the relevant facts have a reasonable suspicion that  a fair trial for the applicant was not possible? 'Reasonable  suspiciDn' seems to have prevailed over 'reasonable likelihood' as  the test to be applied in determining bias.'  

It is in the light of this, the mater will have to be examined. So done,  we hardly find any ground to hold that there could be a reasonable  suspicion of bias in this case. That is evident from the facts. The case was  in the list of the Bench headed by S.S. Sodhi, J. from 3.8.92 to 21.10.92.  

H No objection was raised. Arguments were advanced for three days on the

BHAJANLAL v. JINDAL STRIPS LTD. [MOHAN,J.] 457  

main \\Tit petition. The application for transfer was taken out on the A  ground of alleged bias. By then the matter was coming to a close. It cannot  be said that there could be any reasonable apprehension of bias which a  reasonable person could entertain, as rightly urged by Mr. Shanti Bhushan.  It appears the attempt was to avoid the Bench headed by S.S. Sodhi, J.  

We are unhappy that the appellant should have felt compelled to B  seek information as to what transpired within 'the judicial fortress' among  the judicial brethren. Judges should not be dragged in and their names  mentioned in such matters. Rightly the former Chief Justice Mr. Rama J ois  refused to allow his name to be quoted considering it improper to talk  about any conversation which might have taken place between the Chief C  Justice and the other Judges of the High Court in their Chambers.  

Then, we came to G.R. Majithia, J. a senior judge. On 20.10,92 he  sought an explanation from the Registrar (Judicial) as to why the case was  transforred from the Tax Bench to the Bench presided over by the then  Acting Chief Justice, S.S. Sodhi, J. Secondly, on 22.10.92, he \\TOie a letter D  to the Registrar (Judicial) calling for a report.  

This letter, at the direction of the then Acting Chief Justice was  placed in the file. Again, on 13.9.93 the another letter was \\Titten by  Majithia, J. to the Chief justice.  

E  We have perused these l.etters. We are of the view that learned judge  

should not have sent these communications. This conduct might incur the  criticism of transgressing the proprieties of the high office. We cannot but  express our unhappiness about these letters; whatever might have been the  compulsions that impelled the learned Judge to do so. We presume that F  the learned Judge did so on his own impression of the proprieties of  procedure adopted by the Registry. But his enquiries and letters are not  consistent with the restraint expected of the high office.  

Courts are. indeed a storm centre facing the panoply of human  problems, crowded dockets and unrelenting work schedules. Justice Oliver G  Wendell Holmes said :  

''We are quiet here but it is the quiet of a storm centre."  

Jn Justice Benjamin Cardazo's memorable words, "the great tides and  currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their course, H

458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.  

A and pass judges by." We should only add that the judges must remain  unruffled and calm in the midst of contending forces. To recall the words  of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Public Utilities Commission of the District of  Columbia v. Franklin S. Pollak, 343 US 451 at 465-466 {96 Law. Ed. 1068  at 1079):  

B "The Judicial process demands that a judge move within the  framework of relevant legal rules and the covenanted modes of  thought for ascertaining them. He must think dispassionately and  submerge private feeling on every aspect of a case. There is a good  deal of shallow talk that the judicial robe does not change the man  

C within it. It does. The fact is that on the whole judges do lay aside  private views in discharging their judicial functions. This is  achieved through training, professional habits, self-discipline and  that fortunate alchemy by which men are loyal to the obligation  with which they are entrusted." {Emphasis supplied )  

D With this we leave.  

Civil appeal No. 5525/94 arising out S.L.P. (C) No. 16577of1993 and  Transfer Petition {Civil) No. 880 of 1993 are dismissed. No costs.  

D.K.T. Appeal dismissed.