http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 3  

PETITIONER: BHAGWAN DAS & ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SARDAR ATMA SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/11/1995

BENCH: HANSARIA B.L. (J) BENCH: HANSARIA B.L. (J) RAMASWAMY, K.

CITATION:  1996 AIR  999            1996 SCC  (7) 273  1995 SCALE  (6)603

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T HANSARIA. J.      Leave granted. 2.   Appellants are  tillers of  the land.  They are pitched against the respondent (a retired Garrison Engineer), who is an absentee  landlord. Their  grievance is  that  the  land, which is  the subject-matter  of this appeal, which has been in their  possession  for  long,  has  been  ordered  to  be delivered wrongfully  to the  respondent on  his seeking the same by  filing the  present suit,  after he had lost to get possession in  a proceeding  under the  Madhya Pradesh  Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter ‘the Code’). 3.   The case  of the  respondent is  that the  agricultural land in  question was  provisionally allotted  to one Idnani under the  provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)  Act, 1954  by issuing a temporary sanad on 27.4.1954. Admitted case of the parties is that father of appellant No.1,  Ramnath was put into possession of the land by Idnani.  According to  the respondent,  this had  been so done because  Ramnath was  employed as  a servant by Idnani, whereas the  case of  the appellant  is that  Ramnath was  a lessee. There  is no  dispute that  on 10.8.1965, Idnani was given permanent  sand under the aforesaid Act. There is also no dispute  that the  land was  sold to  the  respondent  by Idnani on  9.11.1966. It  is after  the  purchase  that  the respondent invoked  section 250 of the Code seeking delivery of possession,  which petition  came to  be allowed  by Naib Tahsildar. The  appeal by  the first  appellant’s mother was allowed by  Sub-Divisional Officer.  The respondent appealed against  that   order  to   Additional   Commissioner,   but unsuccessfully. Revision  to the  Board of  Revenue  by  the respondent was  also dismissed;  so too the review. This led the respondent  to invoke  the writ jurisdiction of the High Court which  came to  be dismissed.  This is  the end of the first round of litigation.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 3  

4.   The second  bout begins  by  filing  the  suit  by  the respondent claiming  possession, which  came to be dismissed by the  Civil Judge.  The appeal against this order was also dismissed. It is in the second appeal by the respondent that the appellants  lose because  of the  view of the High Court that the  appellant had  not acquired  the Bhumiswami  right which he  had claimed in the suit on the strength of certain provisions of  the Code, as section 264 of the Code states : "Nothing contained  in this Code shall apply to a person who holds land  from the  Central Government." Feeling aggrieved with the order of the High Court, this appeal has been filed by the appellant under Article 136 of the Constitution. 5.   Two questions  call for  our  decision.  The  first  is whether section  264 could  be pressed  into service  by the respondent  ?  Secondly,  whether  the  appellants  acquired Bhumiswami right under the Code ? 6.   Both the questions are inter-related. It may be pointed out that  the Code  came into  force in 1959, whereas Idnani had been  given sanad,  to start  with temporary,  in  1954, which sanad  admittedly was  made permanent  subsequently in 1965. Now,  if under  the law  Idnani had become Bhumiswami, appellants have  to be  conceded that status because of what has been  stated in  section 190 of the Code, as there is no dispute that  the ingredients of this section are satisfied. And if  the appellants had come to be closed with Bhumiswami rights, there  is again no dispute that the respondent could not have sought for possession. 7.   Shri  Sanghi,   appearing  for   the  respondent,   has submitted that  Idnani  could  not  have  become  Bhumiswami because of  what has been stated in section 264 of the Code. According  to  the  learned  counsel,  the  land  which  was allotted to  Idnani being  an evacuee property had vested in the Central  Government and  it  is  because  of  this  that section 264 would not permit application of any provision of the Code  to the  land in  question. But  then if Idnani had acquired Bhumiswami  right, the land had ceased to belong to the Central  Government. Shri Sanghi urges that as permanent sanad was  given to  Idnani in 1965 and as the Code had come into  force   by  1959,   Idnani  could  not  have  acquired Bhumiswami right  under the  Code, because  of what has been stated in  section 260.  Shri Subba  Rao, appearing  for the appellants, joins  issue with Shri Sanghi and contended that though Idnani was given permanent sanad in 1965, that has to relate back  to 1954  when temporary  sanad had  been given. There being  continuity of  possession and  of right,  it is urged that  Idnani for  all purposes  must be deemed to have become Bhumiswami  in 1954.  We find  this  submission  well founded. 8.   Finding the ground slipping under the feet, Shri Sanghi submits that  though Code  had come  into force in 1959, its predecessor statue,  namely Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code was  in  existence  in  1954.  That  Code,  however,  having received assent of the President on 5.2.1955 was also not in operation when  temporary sanad  had been given to Idnani on 7.4.1954. 9.   The aforesaid  legal and  factual spectrum would permit us, indeed require us, to accept the case of the appellants. We, therefore,  hold that  possession of  the land could not have been  demanded by  the respondent,  because  the  first appellant’s father  Ramnath had  been accepted  as a lessee, and not  an employee, in the first round of litigation noted above. As  to the finding in that proceeding, the submission of Shri  Sanghi is that that cannot operate as res judicata, to which  the reply  of Shri  Subba Rao  is  that  would  so operate, in  view what  has  been  held  by  this  Court  in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 3  

Sulochana Amma  vs. Narayanan Nair, 1994 (2) SCC 14, at page 18 on  which it  has been  observed that Explanation VIII to section 11  of C.P.C. would apply to the findings of Code of either  limited   pecuniary  jurisdiction   or  of   special jurisdiction like Revenue Tribunal. 10. The  result of  the aforesaid  discussion  is  that  the ground given  by the  High  Court to defeat the claim of the appellants is  not sustainable. So, the land would remain in the possession  of the  appellants, who  are tillers  of the land. Social justice itself would have required so. 11. The  appeal, therefore,  stands  allowed  with  cost  by setting aside  the order  of the  High Court  and by stating that the suit filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed. We quantify the cost at Rs.10,000/-.