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PETITIONER: BHAGWAN DAS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PARAS NATH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/09/1968

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. SIKRI, S.M. BACHAWAT, R.S.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  971            1969 SCR  (2) 297  CITATOR INFO :  F          1970 SC1919  (2,6,8,9)  R          1972 SC1910  (13)  RF         1981 SC1284  (10)

ACT:     U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act  1947, ss.  3 and 7(F)--District Magistrate refusing permission  to landlord   to  sue  tenant  for  eviction--Commissioner   in revision  granting it--Landlord filing  suit  and  obtaining decree--state  Government thereafter revoking permission  by order   u/s   7(F)--Such  order   whether   renders   decree unenforceable,

HEADNOTE:     The appellant was a tenant of the respondent in  respect of a shop in Agra, Uttar Pradesh.  The respondent applied to the   District  Magistrate  under  s.  3(1)  of   the   U.P. (Temporary)  Control  of  Rent and Eviction  Act,  1947  for permission  to  institute a suit against the  appellant  for evicting him from the shop.  The application was rejected by the  District  Magistrate, but the  Commissioner,  by  order under  s.  3(3  ), granted the  permission.   The  appellant thereupon   moved  the State Government  under s.,  7(F)  of the  Act, but it was only after the respondent had  flied  a suit and ,obtained a decree that the State Government passed an   order   revoking   the  permission   granted   by   the Commissioner.   The first  Appellate Court, in view  of  the order  under 7(F) act aside the decree of the  trial  Court. However  in  second appeal the High  Court, relying  upon  a Full Bench decision of that Court in Bashi Ram v. Mantri Lal (1965)  1 All 545, decided in favour of the respondent.   In appeal  before  this  Court by. special leave, the  question for consideration was whether a decree for eviction obtained in  a suit instituted after obtaining the permission of  the Commissioner   under   s.   3(3)   of   the   Act    becomes unenforceable  if the State Government acting under s.  7(F) of   the   Act  revokes  the  permission  granted   by   the Commissioner after the decree is passed.     HELD: The order of the District Magistrate is by s. 3(1) specifically  made subject to the order of the  Commissioner in  revision  under s. 3(3 ), but the  Commissioner’s  order

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according to s. 3 (4 ) is final though subject to the  order of  the  State  Government  under  s.  7(F).   There  is  no provision   in  the  Act  providing  that  a  suit   validly instituted after getting the required permission under s.  3 (1 ) ceases to be maintainable because of any order made  by the State Government under s. 7(F). [305 G--H]     Similarly there is no provision in the Act  invalidating a  decree passed after the Act came into force in a  validly instituted suit.  The finality or the force of a decree  can be taken away by a statute, .but the Court will not  readily infer  that a decree passed by a competent Court has  become unenforceable unless it is shown that a provision of law has specifically  or by necessary implication made  that  decree unenforceable.  [305  H--306 C-D]     On an examination of the relevant provisions of the  Act the conclusion must be that when the Commissioner sets aside the  order  passed  by  the  District  Magistrate   granting permission to file a suit for ejecting  a tenant, the  order of the Commissioner prevails.  If he cancels the  permission granted  by the District Magistrate, there is  no  effective permission  left and the suit instituted by.  the  plaintiff without  awaiting  his decision must be treated as one filed without any valid permission by the District Magistrate.  To this  extent  the  decision  in   Munshi   Lal   and    ant. v.Shambhu  Nath  Ramkishan, (1958) A.L.J. 584  was  correct. [305 D--F] Sup. C1/69--2 298     It follows that the Full Bench  decision in Bashi  Ram’s case to the extent it held that a suit filed by the landlord after  obtaining the permission of the  District  Magistrate cannot become infructuous even if  the Commissioner  revokes the permission, was incorrect. [306 F]     Bashi Ram’s case was however correctly decided in so far as it held that a suit validly instituted after obtaining  a permission  as  required  by s. 3(1) does not  cease  to  be maintainable even if the State Government revokes, after the institution  of  the suit, the permission granted.   if  the State  Government revokes the permission granted before  the institution  of  the  suit, then there  would  be  no  valid permission  to sue.  In other words the  State  Government’s power  to revoke the permission  granted under s. 3(1)  gets exhausted once the suit is validity instituted. [306 G]     Bashi Ram v. Mantri Lal,  (1965) 1, All. 545 and  Munshi Lal  and ant. v. Shambhu Nath Ram Kishan, (1958) A.L.J.,  p. 584; considered.     Dr.  S.L. Khoparji v. State Government,  (1958)   A.LJ., p.   724; Basant Lal Sah v. Bhagwan Prasad Sah, A.I.R.  1964 All.  p.  210  and Shri Bhagwan and ant. v.  Ram  Chand  and anr., 1965 3 S.C.R., 218; referred

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1617  of 1968.     Appeal  by  special leave from the judgment  and  decree dated March 19, 1968 of the Allahabad High Court in  Second’ Appeal No. 2296 of 1961.     1. P. Goyal and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant.     C.B.Agarwala and R. Mahalingier, for the respondent.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Hegde,  J. The question of law that arises for  decision in this appeal by special leave is not free from difficulty. That question is whether a decree for eviction obtained in a

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suit  instituted  after  obtaining  the  permission  of  the Commissioner under sub-s. 3 of s. 3 of the U.P.  (Temporary) Control  of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (to  be  hereinafter referred  to as the Act) becomes unenforceable if the  State Government  acting  under s. 7(F) of that  Act  revokes  the permission  granted by the Commissioner after the decree  is passed ?     The appellant was a tenant of the respondent in  respect of  a  shop in Balugani in Agra.  On January  2,  1959,  the respondent applied to the District Magistrate under s.  3(1) of  the Act for permission to institute a suit  against  the appellant for evicting him from the shop in question.   That application  was rejected by the District Magistrate as  per his  order  of  July 9, 1959.  The respondent  took  up  the matter in revision to the Commissioner under sub-s. 2 of  s. 3.  The  Commissioner  reversed the order  of  the  District Magistrate  and granted the permission asked for on  October 16,  1959.   As against that order the appellant  moved  the State  Government  under s. 7(F) on November 17,  1959.   On January 299 1,  1960,  the respondent served on the appellant  a  notice under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.  The appellant replied to that notice on January 6, 1960.  In that reply he informed the respondent that he had already moved the  State Government   to  revoke  the  permission  granted   by   the Commissioner.    On   February  13,  1960   the   respondent instituted  suit  No. 115 of 1960 in the Court  of  Munsiff, Agra  seeking  the eviction of the appellant from  the  suit premises.  The appellant filed his written statement in that case on May 7, 1960. Therein again he took the plea that the permission  granted by the Commissioner is not final  as  he had  moved the Government to revoke the same.  The suit  was decreed  by the  learned Munsiff on November 2, 1960.    The appellant  went up in appeal as against that order  to   the Civil   Judge,  Agra.   On  January  27,  1961,  the   State Government   revoked   the   permission   granted   by   the Commissioner during the pendency of the appeal.  Relying  on this  order the Civil Judge of Agra allowed  the  appeal  of the appellant on February 9, 1961. As against that  decision the  respondent went up in second appeal to the High  Court. The High Court allowed the second appeal on 19th March  1968 following the Full Bench decision of the Court in Bashi  Ram v.  Mantri  Lal(1).  This appeal is  directed  against  that decision.     The Act was intended as a temporary measure as could  be gathered  from  its title as well as the  preamble.   It  is deemed  to  have come into force on the 1st day  of  October 1946  though  it  was  passed in 1947.   Under  the  Act  as originally  stood, the decision of the  District  Magistrate under s. 3 was neither appealable nor revisable. As per  the amendments effected in 1952 a Limited power of revision  was conferred  on the Commissioner.  By the Amending Act  17  of 1954,  the power conferred on the Commissioner was  enlarged and s. 7(F) was incorporated in the Act which says that:                     "the  State Government may call for  the               records  of any case granting or  refusing  to               grant permission for the filing of a suit  for               eviction  referred to in s. 3  ..... and  make               such order as appears to it necessary for  the               ends of justice." The  only  sections in the Act material for the  purpose  of this appeal are ss. 3 and 7(F).  Section 3 reads thus.:                     "Restrictions on evictions.--Subject  to               any  order passed under sub-section ( 3 ),  no

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             suit   shall:  without the permission  of  the               District  Magistrate,  be filed in  any  civil               court  against a tenant for his eviction  from               any  accommodation,  except  on one or more of               the following grounds: (1) (1965) 1 A11. 545. 300               (a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent  for               more than three months and has ,failed to  pay               the  same to the landlord within one month  of               the service upon him of a notice of demand;               (b)  the at the tenant has wilfully caused  or               permitted     to be caused substantial  damage               to  the  accommodation;               (c)   that  the  tenant   has,   without   the               permission in writing of the landlord, made or               permitted  to be  made any  such  construction               as, in the opinion  the court, has  materially                             altered   the   accommodation  or   is    likely               substantially to diminish its value;               (d) that the tenant has created a nuisance  or               has  done any act which is inconsistent   with               the  purpose  for which he was   admitted   to               the tenancy of the accommodation, or which  is               likely  to affect adversely and  substantially               the landlord’s interest therein;               (e)  that the  tenant has on or after the  1st               day of October, 1946, sub-let the whole or any               portion   of  the  accommodation  without  the               permission of the landlord;               (f)   that  the  tenant  has   renounced   his               character  as such or denied the title of  the               landlord  and  the latter has not  waived  his               right or condoned the  conduct of the tenant;               (g) that the tenant was allowed to occupy  the               accommodation  as  a part of his  contract  of               employment   under   the  landlord   and   his               employment has been determined.                      Explanation.  For the purposes of  sub-               section  (e) lodging a person in a hotel or  a               lodging-house  shall not be deemed to be  sub-               letting.               (2)  Where any application h:as been  made  to               the District Magistrate/or permission to sue a               tenant for eviction from any accommodation and               the District Magistrate grants or refuses  the               permission,  the party aggrieved by his  order               may within 30 days from the date on which  the               order  is  communicated to him, apply  to  the               Commissioner to revise the order.               (3)   The   Commissioner   shall   hear    the               application made under sub-section (2), as far               as may be, 301               within  six weeks from the date of making  it,               and  he may, if he is not satisfied as to  the               correctness,  legality  or  propriety  of  the               order passed by the District Magistrate or  as               to  the regularity of proceedings held  before               him,  alter or revise his order, or make  such               other order as may be just and proper.               (4)  The  order  of  the  Commissioner   under               subsection   (3) shall, subject to  any  order                             passed.’ by the State Government under

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 section               7 (F) be We have earlier quoted the relevant portion of s. 7 (F). Conflicting opinions were expressed by different Benches  of the  Allahabad High Court as to the scope of s. 3, till  the decision of the Full Bench in Bashi Ram’s case(x). The  Full Bench  held  that a decree obtained in a suit  for  eviction instituted after obtaining the requisite permission will not become  unenforceable even if the State Government  revoked, after  the  decree  is passed, the  permission  granted,  in exercise of its powers under s. 7(F). Majority of the Judges in  that  case further held that once a suit  is  instituted after  obtaining the permission of the District  Magistrate, any  further  order made either by the Commissioner  or  the State  Government cannot affect the course of that suit   or the  decree passed therein.  Dwivedi J. the other Judge  did not express any opinion on that question but even  according to him in the appeal filed against the decree, the appellate court cannot receive in evidence the order made by the State Government which means that the decree cannot be reversed on the  ground  that  the  State  Government  had  revoked  the permission  granted.   The  correctness of  the  Full  Bench decision is challenged by the appellant in this appeal.   In support  of his interpretation of ss. 3 and 7(F)  he  placed reliance  on  the decision of a Division Bench of  the  High Court   of   Allahabad  in  Dr.  S.L.  Khoparji   v.   State Government(a). He also sought support from the decision of a Single  Judge  of that Court in Basant Lal  Sah  v.  Bhagwan Prasad Sah(3).  It is not necessary to refer to the  various decisions  of  the Allahabad High Court  on  this  question. Suffice  it  to  say that in that Court  there  was  serious cleavage of opinion on the question that we are  considering in this appeal till the decision of the Full Bench in  Bashi Ram’s case(x).  We were given to understand that Dhavan,  j. had  doubted  the correctness of the decision  of  the  Full Bench  and had requested the Chief Justice to  constitute  a larger Bench to consider the correctness of the decision  in Bashi  Ram’s  case(1) but in view of the  pendency  of  this appeal,   the  constitution  of  a  larger  bench  was   not considered necessary. (1) (1965) 1 All. 545.   (3) A.I.R. 1964 All p. 210. (2)  (1958) A.L.J. 724. 302     The  contention of Mr. Goyal, the learned  Counsel   for the  appellant  was that the Act  generally  speaking,’  has restricted the right of the landlord to evict his tenant, to one or other of the grounds mentioned in cls. (a) to. (g) of s.  3(1 ); but in order to meet any exceptional case, it  is provided  in  s.  3 (1 ) that a suit  for  eviction  may  be instituted on any ground other than those mentioned in  cls. (a)  to (g) if the permission of the District Magistrate  is obtained;  the  order  made by the  District  Magistrate  is revisable  both  by the Commissioner as well  as  the  State Government; the only order that is final is that made by the State  Government.If a landlord chooses to institute a  suit on  the  basis  of the permission granted  by  the  District Magistrate  or  the  Commissioner without  waiting  for  the decision  of the State Government he takes the risk; if  the State  Government  revokes  the permission  granted  by  the District  Magistrate or the Commissioner then the suit  must be  deemed  to have been instituted without  permission  and consequently not maintainable.  Mr. Goyal urged that if  the decision in Bashi Ram’s case(1) is accepted as correct  then so  far as the tenant is concerned, generally  speaking,  he cannot  invoke the powers of the State Government  under  s.

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7(F)   because  immediately  after  the  decision   of   the Commissioner, if the same is in his favour, the landlord  is likely to institute a suit for eviction and thus nullify the power  of the State Government under s. 7(F). He urged  that as  s. 7(F) empowers the  State  Government  to  revise  the order  made by the subordinate authorities whether the  same is  in  favour of the landlord or the tenant we  should  not place an interpretation on s. 3 which would affect the power of  the  State Government to do justice to the  tenants  for whose benefit the Act has been enacted.     On  the  other hand it was urged by Mr.  C.B.  Aggarwal, learned  Counsel for the respondent that the landlord has  a right  to  sue  for the eviction of  his  tenant  under  the provision  of  the Transfer of Property Act subject  to  the restrictions stipulated therein. That is a statutory  right. The  provisions  contained  in the Act to  the  extent  they encroach upon the rights of the landlord either specifically or  by necessary implication further control the  rights  of the  landlord.  In other  respects the   landlord’s   rights under  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act  remain  unaffected. According to him the only restriction placed on the landlord in the matter of instituting a suit for eviction on  grounds other than those mentioned in cls. (a) to (g) of s. 3(1)  is to  obtain the prior permission of the  District  Magistrate subject  to the order made under sub-s. (3) of s. 3  by  the Commissioner;   once  a  suit  is  validly   instituted   in accordance  with  those provisions, no order  of  the  State Government can either interfere with the course of that suit or invalidate the decree obtained therein. He urged that  if the position is as (1) 1965) 1 Ali. 545 303 contended  by  the.  learned  Counsel  for  the   appellant, curious  results are likely to follow.  Section 7  (F)  does not  fix any period within which the State  Government  must act.  It can exercise its power under that provision at  any time  it  pleases--may be after 10 years or  20  years;  the power conferred on the State Government is extremely wide as observed by this Court in Shri Bhagwan and anr. v. Ram Chand and anr.(1). Therefore it can revoke the permission  granted after the decree for eviction is confirmed by the High Court or  even the Supreme Court and thus make  a mockery  of  the judicial process; this could not have been the intention  of the  legislature.  According to Mr. Aggarwal from  the  very scheme  of  the Act and from the very nature  of  the  power conferred  on the State Government, it cannot  be  exercised after  a  suit  is  instituted  after  complying  with   the requirements of subs. (1 ) of s. 3.  His further  contention was  that on a proper construction of sub-s. ( 1 ) of s.  3, it  would be seen that the suit instituted  after  obtaining the required permission being a validly instituted suit, its progress  cannot be interrupted;  the   permission  required under s. 3 (1 ) is the permission of the District Magistrate subject  to any order under s. 3(3) by the Commissioner;  in other words the permission given by the District  Magistrate is not final till affirmed by the Commissioner; till then it remains tentative; once the Commissioner affirms the same or grants  the permission asked for it becomes final  and  thus amounts to a valid permission to sue; hence a suit filed  on the  basis of that permission is a validly  instituted  suit unless  the  permission  granted was  revoke  by  the  State Government  before the institution of the suit.   Proceeding further  he  stated that it is true that the  order  of  the Commissioner  though  final yet it is subject to  any  order that  may be passed by the State Government; but s. 3 (1  ), the provision dealing with the permission to file a suit for

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eviction does not refer to the order under s. 7(F); it  only speaks of the permission granted by the District  Magistrate subject  to  the order of the Commissioner and  not  further subject to any orders made by the State Government. In  this connection  he  invited our attention to the fact  that   as against  the order passed by the District  Magistrate  under subs. ( 1 ) of s. 3, a revision petition can be filed before the  Commissioner  within  30 days of  that  order  and  not thereafter.  The  Commissioner  has not even  the  power  to condone the delay in filing the revision petition.   Further under  subs.  (3) of s. 3, the Commissioner is  required  to hear  the application made under sub-s. (2) of s. 3, as  far as may be, within six week from the date of making it.   All these  provisions indicate that the legislature was  of  the opinion that the proceedings under s. 3 should be  carded_on expeditiously and the decision of the Commissioner should be considered as final.  According to Mr. Aggarwal the question of  granting or refusing to grant the permission under s,  3 are primarily to be (1) [1965] 3 S.C.R.218, 304 dealt   with  only  by  the  District  Magistrate  and   the Commissioner.  They are the only tribunals in the  hierarchy of  the tribunals constituted for that purpose.   The  power given   to  the  Government  under  s.  7(F)  is  merely   a supervisory power.  That is why no limitation is imposed  on the  exercise  of that power either in the  matter  of  time within  which  it should be exercised or  the  circumstances under which it can be exercised.  Such a power according  to him  is  a reserve power and therefore has to  be  exercised before the court’s jurisdiction is invoked,  He particularly laid  emphasis  on  the fact that sub-s. (1) of  s.  3,  the compliance of which is necessary before validly  instituting the suit does not at all refer to an order under s. 7(F).     After  examining  the  provisions of this  Act,  we  are constrained to observe that the drafting of this Act  leaves considerable  room for improvement despite the fact that  it was  amended  twice  over. Though it was intended  to  be  a temporary measure when it was originally enacted it has  now reminded in the statute book for over 20 years and there  is no  knowing how long the same will continue to be in  force. Therefore it is but appropriate that the provisions of  this Act should be clear and unambiguous.  From sub-s. (1 ) of s. 3 it is not possible to find out the contents of the  powers of  the District Magistrate.  No guide-lines are  laid  down therein  to  regulate  the exercise of the  powers   of  the District  Magistrate.  It is not possible to find  out  from that   provision  under  what  circumstances  the   District Magistrate can grant the permission asked for and under what circumstances  he  can refuse the same.  It is  likely  that different District Magistrates are exercising that power  in different ways. One consideration may appeal to one District Magistrate   and  a  totally  different  consideration   may influence  another District Magistrate.  It would have  been appropriate if the legislature had defined the scope of  the powers  of  the District Magistrate or at  least  laid  down certain  guide-lines for regulating his discretion.   Sub-s. (3 ) of s. 3 says that if the Commissioner is not  satisfied as  to the correctness, legality or propriety of  the  order passed  by the District Magistrate, he may alter or  reverse the  order  of the District Magistrate or  make  such  other order as may be just and proper.  It is not possible to find out  on  what  basis  the  Commissioner  can  determine  the correctness, legality or propriety of the order made by  the District  Magistrate. As seen earlier, no  restrictions  are

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placed on the powers of the District Magistrate in  granting or refusing  to grant the permission asked for under s. 3 (1 ).   Therefore the only thing the Commissioner can do is  to exercise  his  discretion in preference  to  the  discretion exercised  by  the District Magistrate.  Now coming  to  the power  conferred on the State Government under s. 7 (F),  it would be seen that it is a power of wide amplitude.  It  can be  exercised by it in any way it pleases.   No  restriction either as to the time 305 within which it can be exercised or as to the  circumstances under  which  it can be exercised is placed   on  the  State Government.Under these  circumstances the anomalies  pointed out   by Mr.Goyal as well as by Mr. Agarwal are  inevitable. Therefore in construing this Act, no useful purpose will  be served  by  taking into consideration the  hardship  to  the parties.   In  whatever way we may construe ss. 3  and  7(F) hardship  to one party or the other is inevitable.   Neither Counsel suggested to us any interpretation which could steer clear of the anomalies pointed out at the bar.  Therefore we have to fall back on  the grammatical construction of sub-s. (1 ) of s. 3 and leave out of consideration all other  rules of  construction  for  finding  out  the  intention  of  the legislature.  Section 3(1) does not. restrict the landlord’s right to evict his tenant on any of the grounds mentioned in cls.  (a ) to (g) of that sub-section.  But if he  wants  to sue  his tenant for eviction on any ground other than  those mentioned   in   those  clauses then he has  to  obtain  the permission  of the District Magistrate whose  discretion  is subject to any order passed under sub-s. (3) of s. 3 by  the Commissioner.  These are the only restrictions placed on the power of a landlord to institute a suit for eviction of  his tenant.  If a landlord files a suit for the eviction of  his tenant  without  obtaining the permission  of  the  District Magistrate  that suit is not maintainable but if he files  a suit   after  obtaining  the  permission  of  the   District Magistrate  and if the Commissioner revokes  the  permission granted   by  the  District   Magistrate   in   a   properly instituted   application  under  s.  3(2)  then   the   suit instituted  by him will be considered as having  been  filed without the permission of the District Magistrate because s. 3  (1 ) in specific terms says that the permission given  by the District Magistrate is subject to any order passed under sub-s.  (3).  In  other words the permission  given  by  the District  Magistrate  does not acquire  any  finality  until either the period fixed for filing an application under sub- s. (2) of s. 3 expires and no application under that section was  filed within  that time or if an application  had  been filed within that time, the same had been disposed of by the Commissioner.   The permission to file a suit  for  eviction assumes  finality  under  s. 3 (1 )  once  the  Commissioner decides  the revision petition pending before him.  In  fact sub-s.  (4) of s. 3 says that the order of the  Commissioner is final.  It is true that that order despite the fact  that it is final is subject  to  any  order  passed by the  State Government under s. 7(F).  There is no provision in the  Act providing  that a suit validly instituted after getting  the required   permission  under  s.  3  (1  )  ceases   to   be maintainable  because  of  any  order  made  by  the   State Government under s. 7(F). Similarly there is no provision in the Act invalidating a decree passed after the Act came into force in a validly instituted suit. Section 14 provides :-- 306                  "no  decree  for the eviction of  a  tenant               from any accommodation passed before the  date

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             of  commencement of this Act shall, in so  far               as  it relates to the eviction of such  tenant               be  executed against him ’as long as this  Act               remains in force except on any of the  grounds               mentioned in s. 3:                   Provided that the tenant agrees to pay  to               the  landlord "reasonable annual rent" or  the               rent payable by him before the passing of  the               decree  whichever  is higher ." This   provision applies only to decrees passed  before  the date of the commencement of the Act.  A decree of a Court in a suit validly instituted is binding on the parties to.  the same.  It is true that the finality or the force of a decree can  be  taken  away by a statute, but the  Court  will  not readily infer that a decree passed by a competent Court  has become unenforceable unless it is showy that a provision  of law  has specifically or by necessary implication made  that decree unenforceable.  No such provision was brought to  our notice.  On an examination o/the relevant provisions of  the Act our conclusion is that when the Commissioner sets  aside the  order  passed  by  the  District  Magistrate   granting permission  to file a suit for ejecting a tenant, the  order of the Commissioner prevails.  If he cancels the  permission granted  by the  District Magistrate there is  no  effective permission  left  and the suit instituted by  the  plaintiff without  awaiting his decision must be treated as one  filed without any valid permission by the District Magistrate.  To this  extent  we  are  in agreement  with  the  decision  of Upadhyaya,  J. in Munshi Lal and anr. v. Shambhu  Nath   Ram Kishan(1).   From  this  it follows  that  the  Full   Bench decision in Bashi Ram’s case(2) to the extent it held that a suit filed by the landlord after obtaining the permission of the  District Magistrate cannot become infructuous  even  if the Commissioner revokes the permission, is incorrect.   But we agree with the Full Bench that a suit validly  instituted after  obtaining a permission as required by s. 3 (1 )  does not  cease to be maintainable even if the  State  Government revokes  after the institution of the suit,  the  permission granted.   If  the State Government revokes  the  permission granted before the institution of the suit then there  would be  no  valid permission to sue. In other  words  the  State Government’s power to revoke the permission granted under s. 3(1) gets exhausted once the suit is validly instituted.     For  the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails  and the  same  is dismissed.  But in the  circumstances  of  the case, we make no order as to costs. R.K.P.S.                                 Appeal dismissed. (1) (1958) A.L.J., p. 584.   (2) (1965) 1 All. 545, 307