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PETITIONER: BHAGAT RAM PATANGA,

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PUNJAB

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/04/1972

BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN

CITATION:  1972 AIR 1571            1973 SCR  (1)  92  1972 SCC  (2) 170

ACT: Punjab Municipal Act (3 of 1911) s. 16(1) (e) and proviso s. 16(1)-Removal   of  member  of  Committee-Procedure  to   be followed Flagrant abuse of position, what is.

HEADNOTE: The respondent State served a notice on the appellant,  who was  a member of the Municipal Committee, under the  proviso to  s. 16(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 calling  upon him  to  show cause why he should not be  removed  from  the membership  of the committee under s. 16(1)(e).. The  notice charged the appellant with having brought outsiders into the ball where a meeting was being held for the election of  the President  and  Vice-President of the Committee  and  caused disturbance to the meeting that he did not maintain decorum, and t hat he did not obey the rulings of the Chairman of the meeting.   The appellant denied the allegations and  averred that  it  was  the Chairman who  was  actively  helping  the opposite  party and that it was he who brought in  outsiders to create confusion and disorder. The  Governor of Punjab passed an order under s.  16(1)  (e) read  with  the  proviso, removing the  appellant  from  the membership of the Committee and also disqualifying him for a period of three years under s. 16(2). The appellant challenged the order before the High Court and the  trial  judge  held that  the  allegations  against  the appellant in the show cause notice, even if true, would  not attract s. 16(1)(e) of the Act, and, therefore, quashed  the order.  The appellate Court, held, after examining the  note file produced by the State that the State had considered the explanation offered by the appellant and the other materials before  it, and that the State was justified in passing  the order. Dismissing the appeal to this Court, HELD : (1) Section 16(1) of the Act gives power to the State Government  to remove any member of the Committee if  he  is guilty  of one or other of the acts mentioned in  clauses(a) to  (g).  To attract clause (e), the State  Government  must form  an opinion that the appellant had  "flagrantly  abused his  position as a member of the Committee".  The  evression ’flagrantly’ means glaringly, notoriously, scandalously; and

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a position is said to be abused when it is put to a bad  use or  for a wrong purpose depending upon the circumstances  of the case.  When a meeting of the membership of the Committee was  being held the appellant had a right to participate  in the proceedings as a member of the Committee. if he had  not been  a member of the committee he would not be entitled  to be  present  at  the time of the meeting.   But  he  had  no business  to  go  outside and bring  in  hooligans  for  the purpose of creating confusion and chaos.  The appellant thus flagrantly abused his position as a member of the  Committee while  participating  in the meeting of the  Committee,  and therefore the State Government was, justified in passing the order. [100D-H]  93 (2) The High Court was justified in holdingthat the  State Government had considered the appellant’s representations as also  the  other relevant materials before  it  passed  the impugned Order. since there   had     been     a      proper consideration of the explanation   furnished   by    the appellant there was no violation of theprinciples        of natural justice. [1104C-F] (3)  In as much as very severe penal consequences result  by removing  a  person from the membership of a  committee  and appeal  is provided under the Act it is not  only  desirable but essential that the State Government should indicate  its reasons  for  forming  the  opinion  as  required  under  s. 16(1)(e)  of the Act.  It is obligatory on the part of  the’ State  Government to make available to the member  concerned the materials available before it and on the basis of  which the  show  cause  notice is issued, and it is  open  to  the member concerned, to request the State Government to  furish him the materials, so, that, be may love an effective answer to  the averments contained in the show cause notice and  to the  materials  on the basis of which it had,  been  issued. When such an order is challenged the State must place before the  Court  the. necessary materials  which  were  available before  it  and  which were  taken  info  consideration  for forming  the  opinion to, remove the person  concerned  from membership of ’the committee. in the present case,  however, the  appellant  had not made a grievance either  before  the High  Court  or  before  this  Court  that  the  proceedings initiated  against  him suffered from the infirmity  of  not having  been made available to him the materials  that  were before the Government when it passed, the order removing him from  the  membership  of the  Committee.  [102F-H;  103A-E; 104,B-C] The  averments  of  the appellant and the  Chairman  of  the meeting  raised  a  disputed  question  of  fact  on   which Government  was  not entitled to take a view  rejecting  the plea  of the appellant without having disclosed to  him  the alleg ations made in the report.  If disputed questions’  of fact arise for the consideration of the Government there  is no  provision  as  to how the State has  to  deal  with  the matter. Therefore, suitable provision may be made either in the  Act or  in the Rules for dealing with such disputed question  of fact. [1O4A-B]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1709 of 1969. Appeal  by Special Leave from the judgment and Decree  dated April 10, 1969 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 70 of 1964.

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J.   C. Talwar and R. C. Kohil, for the appellant. V.   C. Mahajan, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J. This appeal, by special leave, is  directed against  the judgment and order dated April 10, 1969 of  the Full  Bench  of the Punjab & Haryana High Court  in  Letters Patent Appeal No. 70 of 1964, dismissing Civil Writ Petition No.’ 22 of 1963 filed by the appellant to quash the order of the respondent dated September 1 1, 1962. 94 The-circumstances  that led to the filing of the Civil  Writ Petition  No.  22 of 1963 may be briefly stated-  :  In  the elections  held in October, 1959, the appellant was  elected as  a Member of the Municipal Committee, Phagwara.  On  June 20,  1960,  a  meeting  was held for  the  election  of  the President and Vice-President of the Committee.  The  meeting was  presided  over by the Sub-Divisional  Officer  (Civil). According  to the Appellant the Presiding Officer  conducted the elections of the President and the Vice-President in  an irregular  and illegal manner and was favouring  the,  party led  by  another  committee  member  Bhag  Ram.   When   the appellant and another member Om Prakash Agnihotri  protested against this conduct of the Sub-Divisional Officer  (Civil), the  group led by Bhag Ram brought into the Town  Hall  some unruly elements from outside who created panic and confusion and  manhandled  Om  Prakash  Agnihotri,  who  was  also   a candidate for the presidential office. It  may  be  stated  at this stage  that  according  to  the respondent,  Om  Prakash Agnihotri created a  scene  in  the meeting and the appellant who was a staunch supporter of  Om Prakash  Agnihotri brought into the Town Hall, a  number  of outsiders  with a view to cause chaos and confusion  in  the meeting and that the appellant did not maintain decorum  and did_not  care  to  obey  the  directions  of  the  Chairman. Ultimately, Bhag Ram was elected as the President. The  appellant  and certain other members of  the  Committee filed  Writ  Petition  No. 1095 of 1960 in  the  High  Court challenging the election of Bhag Ram as the President.   But the said writ petition was dismissed on the ground that  the disputed  facts involved therein could not be gone  into  by the  High  Court  in  proceedings  under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution. While the writ petition No. 1095 of 1960 was pending in  the High Court, the respondent State on December 5, 1960  served a  notice on the appellant under the proviso to s. 16(1)  of the  Punjab  Municipal Act, 1911 (Punjab Act  III  of  1911) (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) calling upon,him  to show cause within 21 days why he should not be removed  from the membership of the Committee under S. 16 (1 ) (e) of  the Act.   The  said  notice charged  the  appellant  of  having brought  outsiders  into the Town Hall on June 20,  1960  to cause  disturbance to the meeting that was being  then  held and,  that  he did not maintain decorum nor did he  care  to obey  the  rulings  of the  Chairman.   In  consequence  the appellant  was  charged  of  having  flagrantly  abused  his position as a member of the Committee. The appellant sent a reply on December 12, 1960  controvert- ing the allegations made in the notice.  In turn he  averred that the,  95 Sub-Divisional   Officer  (Civil)  who  presided  over   the meeting, was actively helping the party led by Bhag Rain and it  was  the  latter  who brought  in  outsiders  to  create confusion  and  disorder.   He  denied  having  brought  any outsiders  into  the  hall as alleged  in  the  notice.   He

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further  stated  that the crowd that was’ brought  into  the hall   by  Bhag,  Ram  manhandled  Om   Prakash   Agnihotri. He  .further denied the allegation that he did not  maintain decorum  and that he did not obey the Chair.  On  the  other hand, he stated that he was quite obedient to the Chair  and that he was not responsible for the confusion that prevailed at  the  meeting.  Finally he stated that even  if  all  the allegations  made in the show cause notice were  true,  they will  not  bring the matter under s. 16(1) (e)  of  the  Act justifying action being taken against him by way of removing him from the Committee. On September 11, 1962 the Governor of Punjab passed an order s. 16 ( 1 ) (e) read with proviso to s. 1 6 (1 ) of the  Act removing the appellant from the membership of the  Municipal Committee,  Phagwara.  By the same order the  appellant  was also  disqualified for a period of three years under  sub-s. (2) of s. 16 of the Act. The  appellant  challenged  the above  order  of  the  State Government  before  the High Court in Civil Writ No.  22  of 1963.   The  main plea that was taken in the  writ  petition appears to be that even if all the allegations contained  in the  show  cause notice of December 5, 1960  are  true,  the appellant  cannot be considered to have  "flagrantly  abused his position as a member of the Committee" so as to  attract the  penal  consequences under s. 16 ( 1 ) (e) of  the  Act. According to the appellant the allegations made against  him regarding  his conduct at the meeting of the Committee  held on June 20, 1960 have, no relevancy for invoking the  powers conferred  on the State Government under s. 16(1)  (e).   In consequence  he alleged that the order dated  September  11, 1962  removing him from the membership of the Committee  and disqualifying him was null and void and was an abuse of  the power vested in the Government under s. 16 of the Act. The  State  contested the writ petition on the  ground  that when  it was found at the Committee meeting that Om  Prakash Agnihotri could not secure support for being elected as  the President,  the appellant who was his ardent supporter  went out  and deliberately brought some hooligans into  the  Town Hall  and  created  trouble at  the  meeting.   Further  the appellant  behaved in a very disorderly manner and  did  not obey the rulings given by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) who  was then presiding over the meeting for the purpose  of conducting  the  election  of the President  and  the  Vice- President.  As the appellants conduct Was such as to attract the penal provisions of s. 16 (1 ) (e) of the Act, the  show cause notice 96 was  issued under the proviso to the said section for  which the   appellant  sent  a  very  elaborate  reply.   As   the explanation  sent  by  the appellant was  not  found  to  be acceptable the state went passed the order dated  September 11, 1962 and it was well within its powers. The  learned Single Judge who dealt with the  writ  petition was  of  the  view that  the allegations  made  against  the appellant  in the show cause notice, even if true, will  not attract s. 16 (1) (e) of the Act.  According to the  learned Judge  it is only when a member of the Committee  has  shown favour  or indulged in self-aggrandisement by virtue of  his position as a member that the said provision Will apply.  On this  reasoning,  the learned Judge held  that  the  grounds which  led  to the making of the order dated  September  11, 1962  were neither germane nor relevant for the  purpose  of attracting s. 16(i) (e).  However, deplorable the conduct of the  appellant as alleged may have been at the meeting  held on June 20, 1960, that by itself will not enable the  State

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Government  to take action under s. 16 (1) (e) of  the  Act. Ultimately,  by his judgment dated September 18,  1963,  the learned  Judge  quashed the order of  the  Government  dated September 11, 1962 as being illegal and void. The State carried the matter in Letters Patent Appeal No. 70 of 1964.  The said appeal was heard, in the first  instance, by a Division Bench.  The Division Bench was not inclined to agree  with the views of the learned Single Judge  regarding the  interpretation  placed on s. 16 ( 1 ) (e) of  the  Act. The  view of the Division Bench is that the conduct  of  the appellant, as alleged in the show cause notice amount to his having  "flagrantly abused his position as a member  of  the Committee’  so as to attract the penal provisions of  s.  16 (1) (e) of the Act. Another point appears to have been taken before the Division Bench,  namely,  that  the order dated  September  11,  1962 suffers  from the vice of not giving reasons for the  action taken  by the State Government and on that ground it has  to be struck down.  The Division Bench felt that this aspect of the matter is a fairly important one and as such it required consideration by a larger bench.  In the end by order  dated August  7, 1968 the Division Bench referred the appeal to  a Full Bench for consideration of all aspects. The  appeal came up before the Full Bench of  three  Judges. The  Full Bench agreed with the view of the  Division  Bench regarding the applicability of s. 16 (1) (e) of the Act  and held  that the  conduct  of  the  Appellant  amounted   to "flagrantly  abusing,  his  position as,  a  member  of  the Committee".  Regarding the question whether the order  dated September 11, 1962 has to be 97 struck down on the ground that it does not give any reasons, the  Full  Bench  felt  that the  said  question  should  be considered by a larger bench of five Judges.  Accordingly by its  order dated February 20, 1969, the Full Bench  directed the appeal to be heard before a Full Bench of five Judges. The  Letters  Patent appeal in consequence was  heard  by  a bench  of  five  Judges.  Three  questions  were  posed  for consideration:               (a)   Whether  the decision and order  of  the               State  removing the appellant herein from  his               membership  of the Committee under s.  16(1  )               (e) of the Act are quasi-judicial;               (b)   If they are quasi-judicial, whether  the               State was required by law to state reasons for               its decision; and               (c)   if the State was bound to give  reasons,               whether as a fact reasons have been, given for               its  decision by the State in the order  dated               September 11, 1962. After  a  fairly elaborate consideration of the  matter  the learned  Judges  held on points Nos. (a) and  (b)  that  the order  of the State removing a Municipal.  Committee  member under s. 16 (1) (e) of the Act is a quasi-judicial order and as such the State was bound to give its reasons for arriving at a decision.  Regarding point No. (c) the learned  Judges, after  a  thorough  examination of the  note  file  produced before them by the State, ultimately held that the State had considered  the  explanation offered by  the  appellant  and after  applying its mind to, the materials: before,  it  was justified  in passing the order removing the appellant  from his  membership of the Committee and also disqualifying  him for a period of three years.  In the result, the Full  Bench of  five  Judges by its order dated April 10,  1969  allowed Letters  Patent appeal filed by the State and set aside  the

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order of the learned Single Judge.  The result was that  the writ petition filed by the appellant herein was dismissed. Before  we advert to the contentions urged before us by  the learned  counsel, it is necessary to refer to  the  relevant provisions  of  the  Act as well as the  show  cause  notice issued  by the State as also the final order passed  by  it. We  will of course refer also to the substance of the  reply sent by the appellant to the show cause notice. 98 The  relevant provision is s. 16 (1 ) (e), its  proviso  and sub-s. (2)     of S. 16.  They-are as follows:               "16(1) The State Government may, by  notifica-               tion, remove any member of committee.               (e) if, in the opinion of the State Government               he has flagrantly    abused his position as  a               member of the committee or     has     through               negligence or misconduct been responsible  for               the  loss, or misapplication of any  money  or               property of the committee.               Provided  that  before  the  State  Government               notifies  the removal of a member  under  this               section, the reasons for his proposed  removal               shall be communicated to the member concerned,               and  he  shall  be  given  an  opportunity  of               tendering an explanation in writing.               (2)   A  person removed under this section  or               whose election or appointment has been  deemed               to  be  invalid under the provisions  of  sub-               section  (2) of section 24, or whose  election               has  been declared void for corrupt  practices               or   intimidation  under  the  provisions   of               section  255,  or  whose  election  the  State               Government  or  the  Deputy  Commissioner  has               under  section 24 refused to notify, shall  be               disqualified  for  election for a  period  not               exceeding five years               Provided  that  a  person  whose  election  or               appointment  has  been deemed  to  be  invalid               under  the  provisions of sub-section  (2)  of               section  24,  shall not  be  disqualified  for               election or appointment for a period exceeding               two years from the date of, disqualification." No  rules  framed under the Act, having-any bearing  on  the manner  in which the Government has to deal with the  matter have been brought to our notice. The  show  cause notice issued by the State on  December  5, 1960 was as follows :               "It  has  been brought to the  notice  of  the               Government that on the 20th June, 1960 the Sub               Divisional Officer (Civil) Phagwara,  convened               a meeting of the newly elected members of  the               Municipal  ’Committee,  Phagwara,  after   the               election of the Committee, held on  17-10-1959               in order to administer oath of allegiance               99               and  to conduct the election of the  President               of  the Committee to enable the new  Committee               to  take  over the charge, you  also  attended               that  meeting at the time of election  of               the  office of the President.  You  were  sup-               porter of the group headed by Shri Om  Parkash               Agnihotri,  member  of  the  Committee   whose               candidature  was  proposed  for  this  office.               During the course of the meeting when Shri  Om               Parkash Agnihotri became unruly and began to

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             tear his clothes, beat his chest and create  a               row you managed to bring some outsiders in the               Town Hall to cause disturbance at the meeting.               More over you did not maintain decorum or care               to  obey the chair.  By your aforesaid  action               you have flagrantly abused your position as  a               member of the Committee within the meaning  of               section 16(1) (e) of the Punjab Municipal  Act               1911.  I am directed to call upon you to  show               cause under proviso to section 16(1) ibid  why               you should not be removed from the  membership               of the Committee under s. 16(1) (e) ibid.  You               should  tender your explanation to the  Deputy               Commissioner  Kapurthala with an advance  copy               to, Government together with copy (copies)  of               documents, if any, so as to reach there within               a  period  of  twenty days from  the  date  of               despatch   of   this  letter.   In   case   no               explanation  is  submitted by you  within  the               stipulated period, it will be considered  that               you   have   no  explanation  to   offer   and               government  may proceed ahead to  notify  your               removal." The appellant sent a reply on December 16, 1960. No copy  of the  reply  sent  by the appellant has been  placed  in  the record available before us.  But the nature of the reply can be gathered in the summary given by the High Court.  In  his reply the appellant had denied the allegations made  against him in the show cause notice.  On the other hand, he averred that  the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) who  was  presiding over  the meeting was taking sides with Bhag Ram and it  was the  latter  who  brought hooligans in  the  Town  Hall  and created chaos and confusion.  He also denied the  allegation that he did not obey the rulings given by the Chair and that he behaved in a disorderly manner.  He further averred  that the  hooligans who were. brought into the Town Hall  by  hag Ram manhandled Om Parkash Agnihotri and created confusion at the meeting.  He further averred that even assuming that all the  allegations made against him in the show  cause  notice are true, s. 16 (1 ) (e) of the Act was not attracted as  he has  not "flagrantly abused his position as a member of  the Committee". The order of the State dated September 11, 1962 was a-, follows: 100               "Whereas  the Governor of Punjab after  giving               an  opportunity  to Shri  Bhagat  Ram  Patanga               member   Municipal   Committee   Phagwara   of               tendering an explanation under the proviso  to               section 16 of the Punjab Municipal Art 1911 is               satisfied  that  the  said  Shri  Bhagat   Ram               Patanga has flagrantly abused his position  as               a  member  of the  aforesaid  committee,  now,               therefore, in exercise of the powers vested in               him  under  clause (e) of,  sub-section  1  of               section  16  ibid, the Governor of  Punjab  is               pleased  to  remove the said Shri  Bhagat  Ram               Patanga  from the membership of the  Municipal               Committee   Phagwara   from   the   date    of               Publication   of  this  notification  in   the               official  Gazette and is further  pleased.  to               disqualify  the said Shri Bhagat  Ram  Patanga               for   a  period  of  three  years   from   the               aforementioned  date under Sub-section (2)  of               Section 16 ibid."

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It will be seen that s. 16(1) of the Act gives power to  the State  Government to remove any member of a committee if  he is guilty of one or other of the acts mentioned in cls.  (a) to  (g).  In particular we are, concerned with cl. (e).   To attract  that  provision the State Government must  form  an opinion  that  the  appellant has  "flagrantly  abused  his. position  as  a  member  of  the  Committee".   We  are  not concerned  with the other grounds mentioned in cl.  (e)  for which  also  the removal of a member can be  ,ordered.   But before   notifying  the  removal  of  a  member   from   the ,Committee,  there is an obligation on the State  Government by virtue of the proviso to section 16(1) to communicate  to the  member concerned the reasons for his proposed  removal. There  is  also a further obligation to  give-the  concerned member  an  opportunity  of  tendering  an  explanation   in writing.   Sub-section  (2)  gives power  to  the  authority concerned  when  removing  a member to  disqualify  him  for election for a period not exceeding five years.  In view  of the proviso to s. 16(1) the show cause notice was issued’ on December  5, 1960.  The grounds for the action proposed  to, be  taken  were also indicated therein as coming  within  s. 16(1)   (e)  of  the  Act.   The  appellant  was  given   an opportunity  of  tendering his explanation in  writing.   As mentioned  earlier,  he  also availed himself  of  the  said opportunity.  But the point to be noted is that in order  to attract  s. 16 (1) (e) of the Act, the appellant  should  be found to have flagrantly abused his position as a member  of the  committee.  In the case before us the State  Government has coming to a finding that the conduct attributed to-  the appellant at, the meeting held on June 20’ 1960 amounted  to having  "flagrantly abused his position as a member  of  the Committee" and it was on this basis that he was removed from the committee This conclusion arrived at by the  Government, though  ,not approved by the learned Single Judge, has  been accepted as 101 correct  by the Division Bench in its order dated August  7, 1968 in the Letters Patent appeal.  The view of the Division Bench has been approved by the Full Bench of three Judges as also of five Judges. On  behalf  of  the  appellant Mr.  J.  C.  Talwar,  learned counsel,  raised two contentions : (1) The allegations  made against  the  appellant  in  the  show  cause  notice  dated December  5, 1960, even if true, are not such as to  attract s.  16  (  1  ) (e) on the ground  that  the  appellant  has "flagrantly   abused  his  position  as  a  member  of   the committee";  and (2) The larger bench of five Judges  having held  that the proceedings, initiated by the  State  against the  appellant  are, quasi-judicial and that the  State  was bound  to  give  reasons, erred in holding  that  the  files produced   before  it  disclosed  that  there  has  been   a consideration  of the appellant’s explanation by the  State. This view of the High Court is erroneous. Mr.  V. C. Mahajan, learned counsel for the State,  has  not challenged  the  finding of the High Court  in  the  Letters Patent  appeal regarding the proceedings  initiated  against the appellant being of a quasi-judicial nature and the State being bound to give reasons for the order.  But the  counsel urged that the appellant has no where raised the  contention that there has been no consideration by the State Government of  the  explanation offered by him before the  order  dated September  11,  1962 was passed.  He also pointed  out  that there has been district compliance of the provisions of  the statute  by  the State Government before passing  the  order dated  September 11, 1962.  The counsel further  urged  that

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the  conduct  of the appellant as disclosed by  the.  events ’that took place at the meeting of June 20, 1960  constitute a  flagrant  abuse  by the appellant of his  position  as  a member  of the committee so as to, attract s. 16 (1) (e)  of the Act. We  are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr.  Talwar that  the allegations made against the  appellant  regarding his conduct at the meeting of June 20, 1960 do not amount to his having flagrantly abused his position as a member of the committee .Mr. Talwar’s contention appears to be that it  is only  when  a  abuses  his position  as  a member  of  the committee  and  shows  favour  to  others  or  gains  undue, advantage  to  him  that  he,  can  be  considered  to  have flagrantly abused his position as a member of the committee. No doubt, such a contention has found favour at the hands of the learned Single Judge.  But, in our opinion, the Division Bench  was  right  when it differed from this  view  of  the learned  Single Judge.  The nature of the  allegations  made against   the  appellant  is  self-evident  from   averments contained  in the show cause notice, extracted  above.   The allegations  clearly show that the appellant had brought  in outside elements in order 102 to   create  confusion  and  chaos  at  the  meeting.    The expression   "flagrantly"  means   glaringly,   notoriously, scandalously.   A position is said to be abused when  it  is put to a bad use or for wrong purpose.  No doubt it may vary with  the circumstances.  When a meeting of the  members  of the  committee was being held, the appellant had no doubt  a right  to participate in the proceedings as a member of  the committee.    But   he  had  no  business,   as   a   member participating in the meeting of the committee, to go outside and bring in hooligans for the purpose of creating confusion and chaos.  This behaviour of the appellant was to, say  the least  scandulous.   If  he had not been  a  member  of  the committee, he would not be entitled to be present inside the Town  Hall. at the time of the meeting.  The  appellant  did flagrantly  abuse his position as a member of the  Committee while participating in the meeting of the committee, when he brought  in  rowdies for creating disturbance so  that  the Committee  meeting may not be held peacefully and  properly. Therefore,  the State Government was perfectly Justified  in coming  to  the  conclusion  that action  has  to  be  taken ’against  the  appellant  under s. 16(1)  (e)  of  the  Act. Therefore  the first contention of the learned  counsel  for the appellant will have to be rejected. Coming to the second contention, it has to be noted that the appellant  does  not appear to have raised  this  contention before  the  learned  Single Judge, nor  even  in  his  writ petition.   It  was only when the State went up  in  appeal, that   the  appellant  raised  the  ’Contention   that   the proceedings initiated against him are quasi-judicial and  as such  the State was bound to give reasons in its order.   To this  limited  extent  the Full Bench has  agreed  with  the appellant.  The appellant raised in consequence the  further contention that the order dated September 11, 1962 has to be struck, down inasmuch as it does not give any reasons.   So. far  as  this  last aspect is  concerned,  we  have  already referred to the fact that the Fall Bench of five Judges went through  the  file produced before it by the State  and  has come  to  the conclusion that there is a  clear  indication that  the representations of the appellant were  taken  into account  and considered by the Government before  the  order dated  September 11, 1962 was passed.  At this stage we  may say that inasmuch as very severe penal consequences:  result

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by removing a person from the membership of a committee,  to which  he:  has,  been  duly elected and  as  no  appeal  is provided’  under the statute against an order  so,  removing him,  it is not only desirable but also essential  that  the State Government should indicate its reasons for forming the opinion as required under s. 16 (1 ) (e) of the Act.   When such an order is challenged, the State must place before the Court  the necessary materials which were avail-able  before it  and which were taken into consideration for forming  ,an opinion to remove the person concerned as a member of the  103 committee.  In this case, it is not possible for us to, know whether  the State referred in its counter affidavit in  the writ  petitioN  to  the various  matters  contained  in  the relevant  file, as the, appellant has not Placed  before  us either a copy of his writ petition or the counter  affidavit of  the State.             Therefore it is not possible  for us  to know the actual avertments made by the appellant  and the answers given   by the State in the writ petition.   The facts  given  by  us, in the earlier part  of  the  judgment regarding the plea of the- appellant and the defence  raised by  the State were all gathered by us from the judgments  of the learned Single Judge and of the Letters Patent Bench. When once the Letters Patent Bench has held that the order passed  by  the  State Government  is  of  a  quasi-judicial nature, it is obligatory on the part of the State Government to make available   to  the member concerned  the  materials available before it and on    the  basis of which  the  show cause notice is issued. Even if those   materials  are   not referred to in the show cause notice in any great detail, it is  open  to  the  member concerned  to  request  the  State Government  to furnish him the materials on which  the  show cause  notice  has  been  issued so  that  he  may  give  an effective answer not only to the averments, contained in the show cause notice but also to the materials, on the basis of which the show cause notice has    been     issued.      For instance, in the case before us, the High Court has referred to the information contained in the relevant file before  it that there was the report of the Sub-Divisional Officer, who presided over the meeting held on June 20, 1960, giving  his version  of the part played by the appellant. In his  answer to the show    cause  notice the appellant had denied that he ever brought any outsider into the Town Hall and that, on the other hand, it was   Bhag   Rain,   who   had    brought outsiders in the Town Hall and     created  the   confusion. This  raises  a  disputed  question of  fact  on  which  the Government is not entitled to take view rejecting the  plea of the appellant without having disclosed to him the actual allegations made in the report. But it is unnecessary for us t    pursue  this aspect further because the  appellant  has not made a grievance either before the High Court or  before us  that the proceedings initiated against him  suffer  from the infirmity of not     having  made available to  him  the materials that were before the     Government when it passed the order removing him from the    membership     of     the committee. As pointed out earlier, the only other contention in  this regard raised by him and that too at the  stage  of Letters  Patent Appeal was that the order of the  Government does not show that his representations have been taken into account  by the State. Again there is also  the  possibility that the  term  of  the  office of the  appellant,  who  was elected to the committee, as early as 1959 may have  expired long   ago.  If  disputed  questions  of  fact   arise   for consideration by the Government, there 104

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is,  no provision, so far as we could see, in the Act as  to how the State is to deal with the matter.  Further no  Rules also  have  been  brought  to our  notice  laying  down  the Procedure  to be a by the, state under  such  circumstances. These  are  all  matters of  considerable  importance  which should  attract  the attention of the State  Government,  so that suitable provisions may be made either in the Act or in the Rules made by virtue of the rule making power. In  the  particular circumstances of this case,  we  are  in agreement  with  the High Court that the, file  produced  by the, Government does disclose that the State has  considered the  appellants representations as also the  other  relevant materials  before it when passing the order dated  September 11, 1962.  The’various reports that were before the State  Government, notes  made by the concerned department on the basis of  the said  reports  and  on  the  explanation  furnished  by  the appellant as well as the jottings made from time to time  by the Minister concerned, have all been very elaborately dealt with  by the Full Bench of five Judges.  We do not think  it necessary  to  cover  the ground over  again.   The  learned Judges   after  a  consideration  of  all  those   materials contained in the file, produced before them, have recorded a finding that the State Government was justified in rejecting the  explanation  offered by the appellant and  passing  the order  under  attack accepting the reports of  the  officers concerned.   ’We  are  in entire agreement  with  the  views expressed  in  this  regard by the  learned  Judges  in  the Letters Patent Appeal. From what is stated above, it is clear that there has been a proper  consideration  of the explanation furnished  by  the appellant  and  that  there has been  no  violation  of  the principles of natural Justice.  The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant also fails. In  the result, the judgment and order of the High Court  in the  Letters  Patent  Appeal are confirmed  and  the  appeal dismissed.  However, there wilt be no order as to costs. V.P.S.                                                Appeal dismissed. 105