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PETITIONER: BHAG SINGH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH, THROUGH THE LAND ACQUISITIONC

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/08/1985

BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ) BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ) SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J) MADON, D.P.

CITATION:  1985 AIR 1576            1985 SCR  Supl. (2) 949  1985 SCC  (3) 737        1985 SCALE  (2)246  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1987 SC 720  (7)  RF         1987 SC1565  (9)  RF         1988 SC 943  (11,12,14)  RF         1988 SC1652  (9,23,24)  O          1989 SC1933  (4,5,30,32,34,35)  O          1990 SC 981  (9)  D          1991 SC 730  (5)

ACT:      Land Acquisition  Act 1894,  Sections 23  and 28 & Land Acquisition (Amendment)  Act 1984, Sections 15(b), 18(a) and 30(2).      Land acquisition - Solatium and compensation - Enhanced rates of  ’thirty  per  centum’  and  ’nine  per  centum’  - Entitlement of  - When  arises - Awards made after April 30, 1982 - Appeals arising from such awards - Whether covered.      Compensation -  Determination of  by  courts  -  Market value of the land acquired - Courts restricting compensation to amount of court-fee paid by claimants - Whether legal and valid.

HEADNOTE:      The Land  Acquisition (Amendment)  Act, 1984 by Section 15(b) amended  section 23(2)  of the  Land Acquisition  Act, 1894 to  provide that  in sub-section  (2) of section 23 for the words  "fifteen  per  centum",  the  words  "thirty  per centum" shall  be substituted, and by Section 18(a) provided that in  Section 28  of the Principal Act for the words ’six per  centum   the  words   ’  nine   per  centum’  shall  be substituted. Section  30(2) of  the Amendment  Act  provided that  the  increased  Solatium  was  to  be  applicable  "in relation to  any award  made by the collector or Court or to any order  passed by  the High  Court’ or  Supreme Court  in appeal against  any such  award under  the provisions of the Principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of  the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the  House of  the People) and before the commencement of this Act.      The State  Government issued  a  notification  on  19th October 1974  under section  4 of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  for   acquisition  of   land  for   the   purpose   of

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establishment  of   a  cantonment.   The  Land   Acquisition Collector thereafter  issued a  notice under  section 9  and required persons  interested in  the land  to  submit  their claims for  compensation. The  claims submitted  by  various claimants including  the appellants,  were considered by the Land Acquisition  Collector and an award made on 9th October 1975  dividing  the  land  acquired  into  three  belts  and awarding compensation  at varying  rates. The appellants and other 950 claimants being  aggrieved by  the  aforesaid  award  sought references under  section 18  of the Act, and the Additional District Judge,  enhanced the  rates  of  compensation.  The appellants who  were still dissatisfied preferred appeals to the High Court.      A single Judge of the High Court enhanced the amount of compensation, and  directed  that  the  claimants  shall  be entitled to  interest at  the  rate  of  6%  per  annum  and Solatium at  the rate  of 15%  on  the  enhanced  amount  of compensation. This order awarding enhanced compensation was, however, made  subject to  the claims  put  forward  in  the memoranda of appeal preferred by the claimants and the Court fee paid  on such claims. As the appellants had not paid the requisite court  fee on  the enhanced amount of compensation they could not get the benefit of the said order.      The appellants  preferred Letters  Patent Appeals.  The Division Bench  dismissed the  appeals taking  the view that the appellants  were entitled  to  the  enhanced  amount  of compensation for  acquisition of their land, but restricting the benefits  of the  enhanced compensation  only  to  those claimants who had made payment of proper court fee.      In the Appeals to this Court it was contended on behalf of the  appellants: (1)  that they should have been given an opportunity of paying up the deficit court fee, so that like other claimants,  they could also get enhanced compensations and (2) that by virtue of Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act of 1984,  the claimants  are entitled to be paid Solatium at the rate  of 30  of the  compensation ultimately  awarded to them instead  of 15  awarded by  the Division  Bench as also interest at  the rate  of 9  instead of  6% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation.      Allowing the Appeals, ^      HELD: 1.  (i) The order passed by the Division Bench in so far  as it  refused to grant enhanced compensation to the appellants on account of non-payment of deficit court fee is set aside.  It is directed that the appellants shall be paid enhanced compensation at the rate determined by the Division Bench. They  shall also  receive Solatium  calculated at the rate of 30% on the amount of enhanced compensation under the amended Section  23 sub-section  (2) as also interest at the rate of  9% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation from the date on which 951 possession was  taken up  to the  date of  payment  cf  such enhanced  compensation.  The  appellants  will  pay  up  the deficit amount of court fee within two months. [963 A-C]      (ii) The Division Bench and the single judge should not have adopted  a technical approach and denied the benefit of enhanced compensation  to the appellants merely because they had not  initially paid the proper amount of court fee. They should have  allowed the  appellants to  pay up  the deficit court fee  and awarded  to them  compensation at  the higher rate or rates determined by them. [956 B]      (iii) In  the instant  case, a  claim was  made by  the

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appellants against the State Government for compensation for acquisition of  their land  and under the law, the State was bound to  pay to the appellants compensation on the basis of the market  value of  the land  acquired and if according to the judgments  of the  single Judge  and the Division Beach, the market  value of  the land acquired was higher than that awarded by  the Land Acquisition Collector or the Additional District Judge  there is no reason why the appellants should have been  denied the benefit of payment of the market value so determined.  To deny this benefit to the appellants would be tantamount  to permitting the State Government to acquire the land  of the appellants on payment of less than the true market value.  Under agrarian reform legislation, the holder of land  may legitimately, as a matter of social justice, be deprived of land which is not being personally cultivated by him or  which is  in excess of the ceiling area with payment of little  compensation or no compensation at all, but where land is  acquired under  the Land  Acquisition Act, 1894, it would not  be fair  and just  to deprive  the holder of land without payment  of the  true  market  value  when  the  law declares that he shall be paid such market value. [955 E-H] 2.   (i) Under  Section 30 sub-section (2) the provisions of the amended  Section 23  sub-section (2)  and Section 28 are made applicable  to all proceedings relating to compensation pending on 30th April 1982 or filed subsequent to that date, whether before the Collector or before the Court or the High Court or  the Supreme  Court,  even  if  they  have  finally terminated before the enactment of the Amending Act. [961 H]      (ii) The Amendment Act came into force with effect from 24th September 1984 but the Bill which ultimately became the Amending Act  was introduced  in Parliament  on  30th  April 1982. 952 Parliament desired that the amended provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2)  and Section  28 should be given effect from the date  of introduction  of the  Bill  in  Parliament  and therefore enacted  Section 30  sub-section  (2)  making  the provisions of  the amended  Section 23  sub-section (2)  and Section 28  applicable to and in relation to "any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or  Supreme Court in appeal against any such award and before the  commencement of this Act", that is, the Amending Act after the 30th day of April 1982. [959 F, 962 D-G]      (iii) The  intendment of Parliament in enacting Section 30 sub-section  (2), is brought out in no uncertain terms by the express  language of  Section 30  sub-section  (2).  The adverbial phrase  "after the  30th day  of  April  1982  and before the  commencement of  this Act"  governs not only the words "any  award made  by the  Collector or Court" but also the words  "any order  passed by  the High  Court or Supreme Court  in  appeal  against  any  such  award".  The  amended provisions of  section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 are applicable not  only in  relation to  an award  made by  the Collector or  court after  30th April  1982 and  before  the commencement of  the Amending Act but also in relation to an order passed  by the  High Court  or Supreme Court in appeal between 30th April 1982 and the commencement of the Amending Act. [960 E-F]      (iv) Parliament  deliberately and  advisedly introduced the adverbial  phrase "after the 30th day of April, 1982 and before the  commencement of this Act", so as to qualify both "any award  made by  the Collector  or Court"  as also  "any order passed  by the  High Court  or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award. The word "such award" in the context in which  they  occur  mean  only  the  award  made  by  the

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Collector or  court and do not import the time element which finds place  only  at  the  end  of  the  sentence  and  not immediately following  the words  "any  award  made  by  the Collector or Court". [961 F-G]      In the  instant case,  the award  of the  Collector was made on 9th October 1975 and the award of the court was made on 31st  July 1979.  The award  of the  Court as well as the award of  the Collector  were thus  made prior to 30th April 1982. So  also was  the order  passed by the single Judge of the High Court in appeal against the award of the court made on 10th November 1981, that is, before 30th April, 1982. But on 30th  April, 1982  the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the appellants  was pending before the Division Bench of the High Court and that was disposed of on 8th December 1982 and this was followed by the present appeal before 953 this Court.  The present  appeal was  pending at the date of commencement of  the Amending  Act and therefore, this Court 18 bound  to given  effect to  the provisions of the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 in determining the amount of compensation. [962 D-G]      State of  Punjab v.  Mohinder Singh  & another approved Kamalajamannivaru v.  Special Land  Acquisition Officer 1985 (1) SCC 582 disapproved.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1519-23 of 1985.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  22.9.1982  of  the Punjab and  Haryana High  Court in  R.F.A. Nos.  2317, 2318, 2319, 2320 of 1980 and 331 of 1981.      A.K. Goel, for the Appellants.      Atul Jain and Raj Birbal, for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      BHAGWATI, CJ.  This appeal  by special  leave raises  a short but  interesting  question  of  law  relating  to  the interpretation of  Section 30  sub-section (2)  of the  Land Acquisition (Amendment)  Act, 1984  (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act). There are divergent views expressed by different  Benches   of  this   Court  in   regard  to   the interpretation, of  this provision and hence it is necessary to examine  this question  afresh in  order to  arrive at  a proper interpretation, particularly since the interpretation placed by  us will  affect the determination of compensation in a large number of cases.      The facts giving rise to this appeal are few and may be briefly  stated   as  follows.   On  9th   October  1974   a notification was issued by the State of Punjab under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the  Act) stating  that a large chunk of land admeasuring 10768 Bighas  18 Biswas  was likely  to be  needed  for  the purpose of  establishment of a cantonment within the revenue estate  of  Bhatinda.  This  notification  was  followed  by another notification  issued by  the State  of PunJab under- section  6  of  the  Act  declaring  that  the  entire  area admeasuring 10768  Bighas  18  Biswas  was  needed  for  the establishment  of   a  cantonment.   The  Land   Acquisition Collector thereafter 954 issued a  notice under-section  9 of  the Act  and  required persons interested in the land forming the subject matter of the declaration  to submit their claims for compensation for acquisition of  their  interest  in  the  land.  The  claims

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submitted by  various claimants  including the appellants in the present  appeal were  considered by the Land Acquisition Collector and  he made  an award  on 11th June 1975 dividing the land acquired into three belts and awarding compensation at varying rates according to the belt in which a particular piece  of  land  was  situated.  The  appellants  and  other claimants being  aggrieved by  the award  made by  the  Land Acquisition Collector, sought references under-section 18 of the Act and the Additional District Judge, Bhatinda, hearing the references,  amalgamated belts  2 and 3 and enhanced the rates of  compensation for the two belts. The appellants and the other  claimants were  still dissatisfied with the award made by  the Additional  District Judge  and they  thereupon preferred appeals  to the High Court. On appeal, the learned single Judge  of the  High  Court  enhanced  the  amount  of compensation by awarding the rate of Rs. 72,600 per acre for the first  belt and  Rs. 25000  per acre for the second belt and in  addition,  directed  that  the  claimants  shall  be entitled to  interest at  the  rate  of  6%  per  annum  and solatium at  the rate  of 15%  on  the  enhanced  amount  of compensation. This order awarding enhanced compensation was, however, made  subject to  the claims  put  forward  in  the memoranda of appeal preferred by the claimants and the court fee paid  on such  claims. It  seems that the appellants had not paid  the requisite  court fee on the enhanced amount of compensation and  they, therefore, could not get the benefit of the  order of  the learned  single Judge.  They according preferred a letters patent appeal to a division Bench of the High Court  and the  other claimants also being dissatisfied with the  order made  by the  learned single Judge preferred letters patent  appeals to  the Division Bench. The Division Bench of  the High  Court, by  an order  dated 8th  December 1982, affirmed  the judgment  of the learned single Judge in regard to  the rate  of compensation tor the land situate in first belt but so far as the land situate in the second belt was concerned,  it enhanced  the rate of compensation to Rs. 38,720 per acre. The Division Bench, however, restricted the benefit of the enhanced compensation only to those claimants who had  made payment  of proper  court fee.  The result was that  the  letters  patent  appeal  of  the  appellants  was dismissed,  though  according  to  the  view  taken  by  the Division Bench  the appellants were entitled to the enhanced amount of  compensation tor  acquisition of  their land. The appellants  thereupon  preferred  the  present  appeal  with special leave obtained from this Court. 955      We are  of the  view that when the learned single Judge and the  Division Bench  took the  view that  the  claimants whose land  was acquired  by the  State of  Punjab under the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, were entitled to  enhanced  compensation  and  the  case  of  the appellants stood  on the  same footing, the appellant should have been  given an  opportunity of  paying up  the  deficit court fee so that, like other claimants, they could also get enhanced compensation  at the  same rate  as the others. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench should not have, in our  opinion, adopted a technical approach and denied the benefit of  enhanced compensation  to the  appellants merely because they  had not  initially paid  the proper  amount of court fee. It must be remembered that this was not a dispute between two  private citizens  where it  would be quite just and legitimate  to confine the claimant to the claim made by him and not to award him any higher amount than that claimed though even  in such a case there may be situations where an amount higher  than that  claimed  can  be  awarded  to  the

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claimant as  for instance  where an amount is claimed as due at the  foot of  an account.  Here was  a claim  made by the appellants against the State Government for compensation for acquisition of  their land  and under the law, the State was bound to  pay to the appellants compensation on the basis of the market  value of  the land  acquired and if according to the judgments  of  the  learned  single  Judgement  and  the division Bench,  the market  value of  the land acquired was higher than  that awarded  by the Land Acquisition Collector or the Additional District Judge, there is no reason why the appellants should have been denied the benefit of payment of the market  value so determined. To deny this benefit to the appellants  would   tantamount  to   permitting  the   State Government to  acquire the land of the appellants on payment of less  than the  true market  value. There  may  be  cases where, as  for instance,  under-agrarian reform legislation, the holder  of land may, legitimately, as a matter of social justice with  a view to eliminating concentration of land in the  hands  of  a  few  and  bringing  about  its  equitable distribution,  be  deprived  of  land  which  is  not  being personally cultivated  by him  or which  is in excess of the ceiling area  with payment  of  little  compensation  or  no compensation at  all, but  where land  is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it would not be fair and just to deprive the  holder of  his land without payment of the true market value  when the  law, in so many terms, declares that he shall  be paid  such market  value. The  State Government must do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not, as far  as possible, except in cases where tax or revenue is received or  recovered without  protest or  where the  state Government would 956 otherwise  be   irretrievably  be   prejudiced,  take  up  a technical plea  to defeat  the legitimate  and just claim of the citizen.  We are,  therefore, of  the view  that, in the present case,  the Division  Bench as  well as  the  learned single Judge  should have  allowed the  appellants to pay up the deficit  court fee  and awarded  to them compensation at the higher rate or rates determined by them.      But this  view taken  by us  does not  an  end  to  the present appeal  because another  more important question has been raised  before us arising out of Section 30 sub-section (2) of the Amending Act. The appellants on the basis of this provision, have  contended that they are entitled to be paid solatium at  the rate  of 30% of the compensation ultimately awarded to them instead of 15% awarded by the Division Bench as also  interest at  the rate of 9% instead of 6% per annum on the  enhanced amount of compensation. It is necessary, in order to  adjudicate upon the validity of this contention to refer to  a few  relevant provisions  of the Act as it stood prior to  its amendment by the Amending Act. Section 23 sub- section (2)  of the  unamended Act  provided inter  alia  as follows:-           "23 (2)  In addition  to the  market value  of the           land as  above provided,  the Court shall in every           case award  a sum  of fifteen  per centum  on such           market value,  in consideration  of the compulsory           nature of the acquisition. Section 28  of the  unamended Act  provided for  payment  of interest on excess compensation in the following terms:           If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the           Collector ought  to have,  awarded as compensation           is in  excess of  the sum  which the Collector did           awarded   as compensation,  the award of the Court           may direct  that the  Collector shall pay interest

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         on such  excess at  the rate of six per centum per           annum from  then date  on which he took possession           of the  land to the date of payment of such excess           into Court." The Act  was amended  by the Amending Act h effect from 24th September 1984.  Section 15  clause (b)  of the Amending Act reads as follows : 957           15. In section 23 of the Principal Act :           (a) .......................... ..........           (b) in  sub-section (2),  for the  words  "fifteen           per centum", the words "thirty per centum" , shall           be substituted." Section 18  clause (a) of the Amending Act provides that "in Section 28  of the  principal Act  for the  words  ’six  per centum’ the  words ’nine  per centum’  shall be substituted. Section 30  sub-section (2)  is the material provision which falls to  be construed  and  since  the  entire  controversy between the  parties turns  upon the  true interpretation of this provision,  we may  reproduce it in extenso. It runs as follows :           "30(2).  The  provisions  of  sub-section  (2)  of           section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act, as           amended by clause (b) of section 15 and section 18           of this  Act respectively,  shall apply, and shall           be  deemed  to  have  applied,  also  to,  and  in           relation to,  any award  made by  the Collector or           Court or  to any order passed by the High Court or           Supreme Court  in appeal  against any  such  award           under the  provisions of  the principal  Act after           30th day  of April, 1982 (the date of introduction           of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in           the House  of People)  and before the commencement           of this Act.’ The  question   is  as  to  what  is  the  extent  to  which retrospective effect  is given  by the  provision enacted in Section 3()  sub-section  (2).  Does  it  make  the  amended provisions in  Section 23  sub-section (2)  and  Section  28 applicable only  to cases  where an  award is  made  by  the Collector or  Court after  30th April  1982 or  does it make these amended  provisions applicable  also to cases where an award may  have been made by the Collector or Court prior to 30th April  1982 but  the proceedings  by way of appeal were pending in the High Court or the Supreme Court on 30th April 1982 and  were disposed  of subsequent  to  that  date.  The former view  has prevailed  with  Chinnappa  Reddy,  J.  and Sabyasachi Mukharji,  J. in  Kamalajammanniavaru v.  Special Land Acquisition  Officer [1985] S.C.C. 582 while the latter view has  found acceptance  with S.  Murtaza Fazal  Ali, J., Varadarajan, J.  and Ranganath Misra, J. in Civil Appeal No. 3267 of  1979, State  of Punjab  v. Mohinder  Singh &  Anr.. decided on 1st May 1985. Since the latter decision is one 958 given by  a Bench  of three Judges, we would have ordinarily regarded  it   as  over-ruling   the  earlier   decision  in Kamalajammanniavaru case  which was  a decision  of only two Judges, but it seems Chat the earlier decision was not cited before the  Bench of  three Judges  in Mohinder Singh’s case and moreover there is no discussion of the provision enacted in Section  30 sub-section (2) and hence we have to consider for ourselves  which decision,  on a  true interpretation of the language  of Section  30 sub-section  (2) represents the correct view.      We may  first consider  what would  be the  position if Section  30   sub-section  (2)  were  not  enacted  and  the

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amendments in Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 were effective only from the date on which they were made, namely 24th September  1984 when  the  Amending  Act  received  the assent of  the President  and was  brought into force. If at the date  of the  commencement  of  the  Amending  Act,  any proceedings for  determination of  compensation were pending before the Collector under Section 11 of the Act or  before  the Court  on a  reference under  Section 18 of the Act, the  amended Section  23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would admittedly  be applicable  to such  proceedings.  This much indeed was conceded by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of  the respondents  and even  in Kamalajammanniavaru case (supra)  it was  accepted to  be the  correct position. Chinnappa Reddy,  J. speaking  on behalf  of  the  Court  in Kamalajammanniavaru case (supra) observed : "The new Section 23 (2),  of course, necessarily applies to award made by the Collector or  court after  the commencement" of the Amending Act. But  if an  award were made by the Court on a reference under Section  18 prior  to the commencement of the Amending Act and an appeal against such award were pending before the High Court  under Section 54 at the date of the commencement of the  Amending Act,  which provisions would the High Court have to  apply in  deciding the  appeal and  determining the amount of  compensation :  the amended provisions in section 23  sub-section   (2)  and   Section  28  or  the  unamended provisions. The answer can only be that the High Court would have to  apply the provisions in the amended Section 23 sub- section (2)  and Section  28. The  appeal against  the award would be  a continuation  of the proceeding initiated before the Court  by way of reference under Section 18 and when the High Court  hears the  appeal, it  would be  in  effect  and substance be hearing the reference and while determining the amount of  compensation, it  would have  to give  effect  to Sections 23 and 28 as it finds them  at the date of decision of the appeal. then Section 23 sub- section (1) provides that in determining the amount of 959 compensation the court shall take into consideration matters specified in the various sub-clauses of that sub-section and sub-section (2)  of Section  23 directs  that in addition to the market  value of  the land the court shall in every case award a  sum of  15 per  centum  of  such  market  value  in consideration of  the compulsory  nature of the acquisition, the mandate  of these  two sub-section  must  apply  equally whether the  court is  hearing a reference or the High Court is hearing  an appeal  against an  award has been decided by the Court  amended provisions  in Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section  28 would  therefore have  to be  applied by the High Court  in determining  the amount  of condensation. The same position  would obtain where an appeal against an award has been decided by the High Court prior to the commencement of the  Amending Act  and an appeal against the order of the High Court  is pending  before the Supreme Court at the date of commencement  of the  Amending Act or is filed after such date. me  Supreme Court  also while  deciding the appeal and determining the  amount of  compensation would  have to take into account  the amended  provisions  in  Section  23  sub- section (2)  and Section  28, because when the Supreme Court decides  the   appeal   and   determines   the   amount   of compensation, it  would have  to  comply  with  the  mandate contained in  Section 23  sub-section (2) and Section 28 and that mandate  would be as found in the amended provisions of Section 23  Sub-Section (2) and Section 28. Thus the amended provisions of  Section 23  sub-section (2)  and  Section  28 would apply  in determination  of the amount of compensation

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where  proceedings   are  either  pending  at  the  date  of commencement of  the amending Act or are filed subsequent to the date,  whether before  the Collector or before the Court or before the High Court or the Supreme Court.       Now,  as  we  have  already  pointed  out  above,  the Amending Act came into force with effect from 24th September 1984 but  the Bill  which ultimately became the Amending Act was introduced  in Parliament on 30th April 1982. Parliament obviously desired  that the amended provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2)  and Section  28 should be given effect from the date  of introduction  of the  Bill  in  Parliament  and therefore enacted  Section 30  sub-section  (2)  making  the provisions of  the amended  Section 23  sub-section (2)  and Section 28  applicable to and in relation to "any award made by the Collector or court or to any order passed by the High Court  or   Supreme  Court   in  appeal   against  any  such award...... after  the 30th  day  of  April  1982......  and before the  commencement of this Act", that is, the Amending Act. The  object of  Parliament clearly was that the amended provisions of  Section 23  sub-section (2)  and  Section  28 should be applicable in determination of 960 compensation where  proceedings before  the collector or the court or the high Court or the Supreme Court were pending on 30th April  1982 or  were commenced after that date, even if such proceedings and finally terminated before the enactment of the  Amending Act  and no proceedings were pending before the Collector  or the court or the High Court or the Supreme Court at  the date  of enactment  on the  Amending.  If  the proceedings had  not finally  concluded before the enactment of the  Amending Act  and were  pending on that date or were started subsequently,  whether before  the Collector  or the Court or  the High  Court or  the Supreme Court, the amended pervasions of Section 23 subsection (2) and section 28 would apply on their own terms in determining compensation. But by virtue of Section 30 sub-section (2), the amended provisions of Section  23 sub-section  (2) and  Section  28  were  made applicable also  where the  proceedings  were  pending  30th April 1982  or were  commenced after  that date  even though they might  have finally come to an end before the enactment of the  amending Act.  Of course,  if  the  proceedings  had finally terminated on or before 30th April 1982, the amended provisions of  Section 23  sub-section (2)  and  Section  28 could not possibly be intended to apply to the determination made in such proceedings. This was clearly the intendment of Parliament in enacting Section 30 sub-section (2).      This intendment is brought out in no uncertain terms by the express  language of Section 30 sub-section (2). It says that the  t provisions of the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and  Section 28  shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied to  and  in  relation  to  any  award  made  by  the Collector or  court or to any order passed by the High Court or the  Supreme court in appeal against any such award after 30th April  1982 and before the commencement of the Amending Act. It  is significant that the adverbial phrase "after the 30th day  of April 1982  and before the commencement of this Act" governs  not only  the words  ’any award  made  by  the Collector or  court but  also the words "any order passed by the High  Court or  Supreme Court in appeal against any such award" The  amended provisions Of Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section  28 are  applicable not  only in  relation to an award made  by the  Collector or court after 30th April 1982 and before  the commencement of the amending Act but also in relation to  an order  passed by  the High  Court or Supreme Court in appeal between 30th April 1982 and the commencement

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of the Amending Act. The appeal in which the order is passed by the  High Court  or Supreme Court may be against an award made by  the Collector  or court prior to 30th April 1982 or subsequent to  that date.  The only  requirement is that the order must have been 961 passed by  the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against such  award,   after  30th   April  1982   but  before   the commencement of the amending Act. If it was the intention of Parliament to confine the applicability of the provisions Of the amended  section 23  sub-section (2) and section 28 only to an  award made by the collector or Court after 30th April 1982 and  before the commencement of the Amending Act and to an order  made by  the High  Court or  the Supreme  Court in appeal only  against such  an award,  Parliament would  have inserted the  adverbial phrase  after the  30th day of April 1982......  and   before  the   commencement  of   this  Act immediately after the words "any award made by the Collector or court  , so  as to indicate clearly and beyond doubt that the adverbial  phrase was intended to govern only award made by the  Collector or court and in that event the words "such award" would  have carried  only one  meaning, namely, award made by  the Collector  or court  after 30th  April 1982 and before the  commencement of the Amending Act. The words "any order passed  by the  High Court  or Supreme Court in appeal against any  such award"  would  then  have  had  a  limited meaning, namely,  order passed  by the High Court or Supreme Court in  an appeal  preferred against  an award made by the Collector or  court after  30th April  1982 and  before  the commencement of  the Amending  Act.  The  words  "any  order passed by  the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such  award would  then  have  had  a  limited  meaning, namely, order  passed by the High Court or Supreme Court, in an appeal  preferred against  an award made by the Collector or Court  after 30th April, 1982 and before the commencement of the  Amending Act.  These words  would not  in that event have comprehended  order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in  appeal against  an award  made by the Collector or court  on   or  before   30th  April  1982.  But  Parliament deliberately and advisedly introduced the adverbial phrase F after the  30th day  of April  1982.......  and  before  the commencement of  this Act" at the end of the sentence, so as to quality both "any award made by the Collector or court as also   any  order passed  by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award". The words ’such award’ in the context  in which they occur mean only the award made by the Collector  or court  and do  not import the time element which finds  place only  at the  end of the sentence and not immediately following  the words  ’any  award  made  by  the Collector or  court".  It  is  therefore  clear  that  under Section 30  sub-section (2)  the provisions  of the  amended Section  23   sub-section  (2)   and  Section  28  are  made applicable  to  all  proceedings  relating  to  compensation pending on 30th April 1982 or filed subsequent to that date, whether before the Collector or before the court or the High Court or the Supreme Court, 962 even if they have finally terminated before the enactment of the Amending  Act. It  would not be a correct interpretation of Section  30 sub-section (2) to say that the provisions of the amended  section 2  sub-section (2) and Section 28 would be applicable  in relation  to an  order passed  by the High Court or Supreme Court only if the order is passed in appeal against an award made by the Collector or Court between 30th April 1982 and the commencement of the Amending Act. Even if

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an award is made by the Collector or court on or before 30th April 1982  and an  appeal against  such  award  is  pending before the  High Court  or the  Supreme Court  on 30th April 1982 or  is filed subsequent to that date, the provisions of the amended  Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 23 would be applicable  in relation to an order passed in such appeal by the  High Court  or the  Supreme  Court,  we  accordingly affirm the  view taken  by the  Bench  of  three  Judges  in Mohinder Singh’s  case (supra)  and express  our  respectful disagreement with  the view taken by the Bench of two Judges in Kamalammanniavaru‘s  case (supra).  The  latter  decision cannot be  rewarded as laying down the correct law in regard to the interpretation of Section 30 sub-section (2).      Here in the present case the award of the Collector was made on  11th June  1975 and the award of the court was made on 31st  July, 1979.  The award  of the court as well as the award of  the Collector  were thus  made prior to 30th April 1982. So  also was  c the order passed by the learned single Judge of  the High  Court in appeal against the award of the Court made on 10th November 1981, that is, before 30th April 1982. But  on 30th  April 1982,  the Letters  patent  appeal preferred by  the appellants was pending before the Division bench of  the High  Court and  that was  disposed of  on 8th December 1982  and this  was followed  by the present appeal before this  court. The  order in  the letters patent appeal was thus  passed by the Division Bench after 30th April 1982 and before  the commencement  of the  amending Act  and  the provisions of  the amended  Section 23  sub-section (2)  and Section 28  were therefore  applicable in  relation to  this order passed  by the  Division Bench,  on the interpretation placed by  us on  Section 30  sub-section (2). Moreover, the present appeal  was pending  at the  date of commencement of the Amending  Act and  therefore, in any view of the matter, this court is bound to given effect to the provisions of the amended  Section  23  sub-section  (2)  and  Section  28  in determining the amount of compensation.      We must  therefore allow  the present  appeal  and  set aside the order passed by the Division Bench in so far as it refused to  grant enhanced compensation to the appellants on account of 963 non-payment  of  deficit  court  fee  and  direct  that  the appellants A shall be paid enhanced compensation at the rate determined by  the Division  Bench, according  as  the  land belonging to  them fell  within one  or the  other belt, and they shall  also receive  solatium calculated at the rate of 30% on the amount to enhanced compensation under the amended Section 23  sub-section (2)  as also interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation from the date on  which possession  of their land was taken up to the expiration of  a period  of one  year and  thereafter at the rate of 15% per annum. The appellant will pay up the deficit amount of court fee within two months from today and a final order in  the above  terms will be drawn up in favour of the appellants only  after payment  of the  deficit court fee is made within  the time  stipulated by  us. We  think that the fair order  of costs  in the present case would be that each party shall bear and pay its own costs throughout. N.V.K.                                      Appeals allowed. 1