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PETITIONER: BEGUM SUBANU ALIAS SAIRA BANU & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: A.M. ABDUL GAFOOR

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/04/1987

BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 1103            1987 SCR  (2) 773  1987 SCC  (2) 285        JT 1987 (2)    55  1987 SCALE  (1)672

ACT:     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973--Section 125 and Expla- nation     to     second     proviso     of      sub-section (3)--Maintenance--Right of a Muslim wife to live  separately and claim maintenance against the husband who marries anoth- er  wife or takes a mistress--Liability to pay  maintenance- Husband not absolved by offer to take back wife and maintain her--Right of Muslim husband to take more than one wife  not affected--Scope and effect of.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellant was married to the respondent on May  11, 1980. A girl was born on May 9, 1981. On grounds of  neglect and  failure to provide maintenance, the appellant  filed  a petition  under Section 125 of the Code of  Criminal  Proce- dure, 1973, seeking maintenance for herself and the child at Rs.500  and  Rs.300 per month respectively.  The  Magistrate dismissed the petition on the ground that the appellant  had failed to establish adequate justification for living  sepa- rately.     The  appellant  preferred  a Revision  Petition  to  the Sessions Judge. During the pendency of the said petition the respondent  married again on October 18, 1984. It was  urged on  behalf  of the appellant in the revision  petition  that irrespective  of the other grounds, the second  marriage  of the  respondent was by itself a ground for grant of  mainte- nance. The Sessions Judge, however, held that the  appellant was  not entitled to claim maintenance since the  respondent had  contracted the second marriage after giving the  appel- lant sufficient time and opportunity to rejoin him and since he  had offered to take her back even after the second  mar- riage. Insofar as the child was concerned the Sessions Judge granted maintenance at Rs.100 per month.     The  appellant  preferred a Petition to the  High  Court under  Section 482 for grant of maintenance to her  and  for enhancing the maintenance awarded to the child and the  High Court  declined to interfere on the ground that the  concur- rent  findings  of the Court below precluded  the  appellant from agitating her claim. In  the appeal to this Court by special leave the  appellant con-

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774 tended that the second marriage of the respondent had  added a  new dimension to her maintenance action and that she  had become  entitled  under  law to live  separately  and  claim maintenance.  The appeal was contested by the respondent  on the  ground that he was driven to the necessity of  marrying again because the appellant failed to rejoin him and he  had offered to take her back to maintain her and the said  offer exonerated him from his liability to pay maintenance. It was further contended that as he was permitted by Muslim Law  to take more than one wife his second marriage cannot afford  a legal ground for the appellant to five separately and  claim maintenance.     On  the  questions whether the second  marriage  of  the respondent confers a right upon the appellant to live  sepa- rately  and  claim maintenance and whether  the  appellant’s rights stand curtailed in any manner because of the personal law governing the parties permitting a husband to marry more than one wife, and whether, even if the respondent is liable to  pay  maintenance, he stands absolved  of  his  liability after his offer to take back the appellant and maintain her. Allowing the Appeal,     HELD:  1.1 Section 125 of the Criminal  Procedure  Code, 1973,  its  fore-runner being section 488  of  the  Criminal Procedure Cede 1898, has been enacted with the avowed object of  preventing vagrancy and destitution. It is  intended  to ensure  the  means of subsistence for  three  categories  of dependents  viz. children. wives and parents who are  unable to maintain themselves. [782D-E]     1.2.  Before an order of maintenance can be  passed  the three essential requisites to be satisfied are that: (1) the person  liable to provide maintenance has sufficient  means; (2)  that he has neglected or refused to maintain;  and  (3) the   dependent/dependents   is/are   unable   to   maintain himself/herself/themselves as the case may be. [782E-F]     1.3  The Legislature being anxious that for the sake  of maintenance,  the dependants should not resort  to  begging, stealing or cheating etc., the liability to provide  mainte- nance for children has been fixed on the basis of the pater- nity of the father and the minority of the child and in  the case of major children on the basis of their physical handi- cap  or mental abnormality without reference to  factors  of legitimacy  or illegitimacy of the children and their  being married or not. [782F-G] 1.4  In  the case of wives, whether their ties  of  marriage subsist or 775 not, the anxiety of the Legislature is that they should  not only  not resort to begging, stealing or cheating  etc.  but they  should also not feel compelled, for the sake of  main- taining  themselves, to resort to an adulterous life  or  in the case of divorced women, to resort to remarriage, if they have  sentimental attachment to their earlier  marriage  and feel morally bound to observe their vows of fidelity to  the persons whom they had married. [782G-H]     2.1 By reason of sub-sections (4) and (5) a husband  can avoid his liability to pay maintenance if his wife is living in  adultery. Correspondingly a right has been conferred  on the wife under the Explanation to live separately and  claim maintenance from the husband if he breaks his vows of fidel- ity  and marries another woman or takes a mistress. It  mat- ters not whether the woman chosen by the husband to  replace the wife is a legally married wife or a mistress. [783B-C]     2.2  The  Explanation is of uniform application  to  all wives  including  Muslim wives whose  husbands  have  either

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married another wife or taken a mistress. [783C-D]     2.3 The purpose of the Explanation is not to affect  the rights of a Muslim husband to take more than one wife or  to denigrate  in  any manner the legal and social status  of  a second wife to which she is entitled to as a legally married wife,  as  compared to a mistress but to place on  an  equal footing the matrimonial injury suffered by the first wife on account  of the husband marrying again or taking a  mistress during the subsistence of the marriage with her. [781E-F]     2.4 This Explanation has to be construed from the  point of view of the injury to the matrimonial rights of the  wife and  not  with  reference to the husband’s  right  to  marry again. [782B]     3. The offer to take back the wife and maintain her does not absolve the husband of his liability to pay maintenance. A husband who marries again cannot compel the first wife  to the  conjugal  home with the co-wife and as such  unless  he offers  to set up a separate residence for the  first  wife, any offer to take her back cannot be considered to be a bona fide offer. [783D-F] Chand  Begum  v. Hyderbaig, [1972] Crl.  Law  Journal  1270, referred to. In  the instant case, the offer to take back  the  appellant had been 776 made  only  before Revisional Court and that too  after  the second  marriage had taken place. The offer was not  to  the effect  that  he would set up a separate residence  for  the appellant  so  as to enable her to live in  peace  and  with dignity.  The  offer was only a make-believe one and  not  a genuine and sincere offer. On the basis of such an insincere offer the appellant’s rights cannot be negated or  defeated. [783D-F]     The  Court  granted maintenance  to  the  appellant-wife Rs.300  per month and enhanced the maintenance to the  minor girl to Rs.200 per month. [784B; C]     Bayanna  v.  Devamma, [1953], Mad. W.N. Crl. 243  =  AIR 1954  Mad. 226; Kundaswami v. Nachammal, AIR 1963 Mad.  263; Syed  Ahmed  v.N.P. Taj Begum, AIR 1958 Mys 128;  Shambu  v. Ghalamma, AIR 1966 Mys 311; Teja Bai v. Shankarrao, AIR 1966 Bom  48;  Mohammed Haneefa v. Mariam Bi, AIR 1969  Mad  414; Bela  Rani v. Bhupal Chandra, AIR 1956 Cal 134; Rupchand  v. Charubala,  AIR  1966 Cal 83; Ishar v. Soma Devi,  AIR  1959 Punj  295; Dhan Kaur v. Niranjan Singh, AIR 1960  Punj  595; Ramji Malviya v. Munni Devi, AIR 1959 All. 767;  Sahulmmeedu v. Subaida Beevi, [1970] Kerala Law Times Page 4; and  Mohd. A.  Khan  v. Shah Bano Begum, [1985] 3 SCR 844 at  856,  re- ferred to.

JUDGMENT:     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 605 of 1986.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  27.5.1985  of  the Kerala High Court in Crl. Misc. Case No. 211 of 1985. Mrs. Geeta Luthra and D. Goburdhan for the Appellants. S.C. Birla for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     NATARAJAN, J. Is a Muslim wife whose husband has married again  worse off under law than a Muslim wife whose  husband has taken a mistress to claim maintenance from her  husband? Can  there be a discrimination between Muslim women  falling in  the two categories in their right to  claim  maintenance under  Section 125 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure,  1973

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(for  ’short the "Code")? These fundamental questions  of  a startling  nature  run as undercurrents beneath  the  placid waters of this seemingly commonplace action for  maintenance by a 777 Muslim  wife  against her husband. We have  projected  these fundemental  issues  in the prefatory itself  because  these larger  questions also arise for consideration in  this  ap- peal.     Now for a resume of the facts. The appellant was married to the respondent on 11.5.80 and she begot him a girl  child on  9.5.81.  On grounds of neglect and  failure  to  provide maintenance  she filed a petition under Section 125  of  the Code  in the Court of the Judicial First  Class  Magistrate, Kasargod  to seek maintenance for herself and the  child  at Rs.500  and  Rs.300 per month respectively.  The  Magistrate dismissed  the petition saying the appellant had  failed  to establish  adequate justification for living  separately.  A revision was preferred to the Sessions Judge of Tellicherry. During  the pendency of the revision the respondent  married one  Sahida Begum on 18.10.84, as his second wife.  It  was, therefore,  urged in the revision that irrespective  of  the other  grounds the second marriage of the respondent was  by itself a ground for grant of maintenance. The Sessions Judge skirted  the issue by taking a devious view that  since  the respondent  had contracted the second marriage after  giving the appellant sufficient time and opportunity to rejoin  him and  since  he had offered to take her back even  after  the second  marriage,  the appellant was not entitled  to  claim maintenance.  However, in so far as the child  is  concerned the  Sessions Judge granted maintenance to it at Rs.100  per month.  The appellant then preferred a petition to the  High Court under Section 482 of the Code for grant of maintenance to  her  and for enhancing the maintenance  awarded  to  the child. The High Court declined to interfere saying that  the concurrent findings of the courts below precluded the appel- lant  from  agitating her claim any further.  The  aggrieved appellant  has  approached this Court of last  resort  under Article 136 of the Constitution for redressal of her  griev- ance.     The  principal controversy in the appeal  centres  round the  rights of liabilities of the parties in the context  of the  second  marriage  entered into  by  the  respondent  on 18.10.84.  The appellant’s case is that the second  marriage has added a new dimension to her maintenance action and  she has  become entitled under law to live separately and  claim maintenance. The counter argument of the respondent is  that he was driven to the necessity of marrying again because the appellant failed to rejoin him but even so he had offered to take her back and maintain her and the said offer exonerated him from his liability to pay maintenance. The main defence, however,  urged is that since he is permitted by Muslim  Law to take more than one wife his second marriage cannot afford a legal ground for the appellant to live 778 separately  and claim maintenance. These  rival  contentions fall for our determination in this appeal.     The  justification put forward for the  second  marriage cannot be taken as a tenable defence, even if such a defence is  open,  because  there is no evidence to  show  that  the respondent had asked the appellant to rejoin him and she had declined  to  do so before the respondent  took  his  second wife. Therefore, what really needs consideration is  whether the  second marriage of the respondent confers a right  upon the  appellant to live separately and claim maintenance  and

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secondly  whether her rights stand curtailed in  any  manner because of the personal law governing the parties permitting a husband to marry more than one wife. The further  question to be decided is whether even if the respondent is liable to pay  maintenance, he stands absolved of his liability  after his offer to take back the appellant and maintain her.     For  adjudicating  the  rights of the  parties  we  must construe the Explanation and determine its scope and effect. The Explanation reads as follows:- "If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman  or keeps  a mistress, it shall be considered to be just  ground for his wife’s refusal to live with him."     Before  entering  upon our discussion, we may  refer  to some  of  the decisions rendered by the High Courts  on  the scope and effect of the Explanation. We are setting out only some  of  the cases and not making an  exhaustive  reference because  the  purpose of the reference is only to  show  the divergent  views taken by several High Courts.  Furthermore, we  have grouped the cases on broad classifications and  not with  reference  to the line of reasoning  adopted  in  each case.  In  the following cases it was held that  the  second marriage  of  the husband entitled the wife to an  order  of maintenance  under Section 488, Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1898:-   (1)  Bayanna v. Devamma, [1953] Mad. W.N. Crl. 243  =  AIR 1954 Mad. 226. (2) Kundaswami v. Nachammal, AIR 1963 Mad. 263 (3) SyedAhmedv. N.P. TajBegum, AIR 1958 Mys 128 779 (4) Shambu v. Ghalamma, AIR 1966 Mys 311 (5) Tela Bai v. Shankarrao, AIR 1966 Bom 48 (6) Mohammed Haneefa v. Mariam Bi, AIR 1969 Mad 414.     In the following cases a contrary view was taken holding that  the mere fact that a husband has  contracted  marriage with another wife or keeps a mistress cannot without more be said  to  amount to neglect or refusal on the  part  of  the husband  to  maintain his wife within the  meaning  of  sub- section (1) of Section 488:- (7) Bala Rani v. Bhupal Chandra, AIR 1956 Cal 134 (8) Rupchand v. Charubala, AIR 1966 Ca183 (9) Ishar v. Soma Devi, AIR 1959 Pun} 295 (10) Dhan Kaur v. Niranjan Singh, AIR 1960 Punj 595.     A third line of view was taken in Ramji Malviya v. Munni Devi,  AIR 1959 All. 767 where it was held  that  ordinarily remarriage will be a sufficient ground for refusing to  live with  the husband but if the remarriage had been  occasioned by  the wife’s unjust refusal to live with her  husband  she cannot  take  advantage of her own wrong and  claim  mainte- nance.     There  are two decisions, one of the Kerala  High  Court rendered by V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., as the then was, and  the other of the Andhra Pradesh High Court rendered by Chinnappa Reddy,  J.,  as he then was, which require  mention  because they  pertain to maintenance actions by Muslim  wives  whose husband had married again. Krishna lyer, J. held as  follows in  Sabulameedu  v. Subaida Beevi, [1970] Kerala  Law  Times Page  4. "It behoves the Courts in India to enforce  Section 488(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in favour of Indian women, Hindu, Muslim or other. I will be failing in my  duty if  I accede to the argument of the petitioner  that  Muslim women  should  be  denied the advantage of para.  2  of  the proviso  to  Section 488(3)." Chinnappa Reddy,  J.  held  in Chand  Begum v. Hyderabaig, [1972] Crl. Law Journal 1270  as under:-               "Therefore, a husband who married again cannot

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             expect  the court to come to his rescue if  he               wants the first wife to               780               share the conjugal home with a co-wife. If she               decides  to  live separately he  is  bound  to               provide a home for her and maintain her. If he               does  not do that, he neglects or  refuses  to               maintain  her  within the meaning  of  Section               488(1) Cr.P.C. Thus the offer of a husband who               has taken a second wife, to maintain the first               wife  on  condition  of her  living  with  him               cannot  be considered to be a bona fide  offer               and  the  husband will be considered  to  have               neglected or refused to maintain the wife."     Lastly, we must also refer to the decision of this Court in Mohd. A. Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, [1985] 3 scr 844 at 856 wherein  the  Explanation came to be scanned  by  the  Court while examining the larger question regarding the rights  of divorced Muslim wives to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code. The relevant observation of the Court is in the following terms:-                     "The conclusion that the right conferred               by  Section 125 can be exercised  irrespective               of  the personal law of the parties is  forti-               fied, especially in regard to Muslims, by  the               provision contained in the Explanation to  the               second proviso to Section 125(3) of the  Code.               That  proviso says that if the husband  offers               to  maintain  his wife on condition  that  she               should live with him, and she refuses to  live               with  him,  the Magistrate  may  consider  any               grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make               an  order of maintenance  notwithstanding  the               offer of the husband, if he is satisfied  that               there  is  a just ground for passing  such  an               order   .........The explanation confers  upon               the wife the right to refuse to live with  her               husband  if  he  contracts  another  marriage,               leave alone 3 or 4 other marriages. It  shows,               unmistakably,  that Section 125 overrides  the               personal law, if there is any conflict between               the two."     Having  referred to the views taken by some of the  High Courts and this Court about the ambit of the Explanation, we will  now  proceed to consider its terms and  its  operative force.  Though we stand benefited by the  enlightenment  de- rived from the decisions referred to above, we are of  opin- ion that the Explanation calls for a more intrinsical exami- nation  than  has  been done hitherto.  Sub-section  (1)  of Section  125  inter alia provides that if  a  person  having sufficient  means neglects or refuses to maintain  his  wife who is unable to maintain herself, the Magistrate may,  upon proof of such neglect or refusal, 781 order the person to make a monthly allowance for the mainte- nance  of  his wife. The second proviso to  sub-section  (3) lays down that if a person liable to pay maintenance  offers to  maintain his wife on condition of her living  with  him, and she refuses to live with him, the Magistrate may consid- er the grounds of refusal, and may make an order for mainte- nance  notwithstanding the husband’s offer, if he is  satis- fied  that  there is just ground for  ordering  maintenance. Then comes the Explanation which says that if a husband  has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a  mistress, it  shall  be considered to be just ground  for  the  wife’s

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refusal  to live with him. In the reported  decisions  where the  Explanation has been construed, as entitling  a  Muslim wife  to claim maintenance on the basis of the  Explanation, the courts have only taken into consideration the first limb of  the Explanation viz. "If a husband has  contracted  mar- riage with another woman." Focussing attention on that  part of  the Explanation, the courts have held that the  Explana- tion  is of common application to all wives  whose  husbands have  contracted another marriage irrespective of  the  fact the  personal  law  governing the  parties  permits  another marriage during the subsistence of the earlier marriage.  We would  like to point out that the  Explanation  contemplates two  kinds of matrimonial injury to a wife viz. by the  hus- band either marrying again or taking a mistress. The  Expla- nation  places  a  second wife and a mistress  on  the  some footing  and does not make any differentiation between  them on  the basis of their status under matrimonial law.  If  we ponder  over the matter we can clearly visualise the  reason for  a second wife and a mistress being treated  alike.  The purpose of the Explanation is not to affect the rights of  a Muslim husband to take more than one wife or to denigrate in any manner the legal and Social Status of a second wife.  to which  she  is  entitled to as a legally  married  wife,  as compared to a mistress but to place on an equal footing  the matrimonial injury suffered by the first wife on account  of the  husband marrying again or taking a mistress during  the subsistence of the marriage with her. From the point of view of the neglected wife, for whose benefit the Explanation has been provided, it will make no difference whether the  woman intruding into her matrimonial life and taking her place  in the  matrimonial bed is another wife permitted under law  to be married and not a mistress. The legal status of the woman to  whom  a husband has transferred  his  affections  cannot lessen her distress or her feelings of neglect. In fact from one point of view the taking of another wife portends a more permanent  destruction  of  her matrimonial  life  than  the taking of a mistress by the husband. Be that as it may,  can it  be  said that a second wife would be more  tolerant  and symapthetic  than a mistress so as to persuade the  wife  to rejoin her husband and lead life 782 with  him and his second wife in one and the same house?  It will  undoubtedly lead to a strange situation if it were  to be held that a wife will be entitled to refuse to live  with her husband if he has taken a mistress but she cannot refuse likewise  if he has married a second wife.  The  Explanation has to be construed from the point of view of the injury  to the matrimonial rights of the wife and not with reference to the  husband’s  right to marry again. The  Explanation  has, therefore,  to be seen in its full perspective and not  dis- junctively. Otherwise it will lead to discriminatory  treat- ment  between  wives whose husbands  have  lawfully  married again  and wives whose husbands have taken  mistresses.  Ap- proaching the matter from this angle, we need not resort  to a  comparison of Muslim wives with Hindu wives or  Christian wives but can restrict the comparison to Muslim wives  them- selves who stand affected under one or the other of the  two contingencies  envisaged in the Explanation and  notice  the discrimination.  It  is this aspect of the matter  which  we feel has not been noticed hitherto.     Even if the Explanation is viewed in the larger  context of  the  provisions of Section 125  the  conclusion  reached above  is  inescapable. Section 125, its  fore-runner  being Section  488,  has been enacted with the  avowed  object  of preventing vagrancy and destitution. The Section is intended

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to  ensure the means of subsistence for three categories  of dependents  viz. children, wives and parents who are  unable to maintain themselves. The three essential requisites to be satisfied  before an order of maintenance can be passed  are that (1) the person liable to provide maintenance has suffi- cient  means; (2) that he has neglected or refused to  main- tain  and  (3)  the dependent/dependents  is/are  unable  to maintain himself/herself/themselves as the case may be.  The Legislature being anxious that for the sake of  maintenance, the  dependents  should not resort to begging,  stealing  or cheating  etc.  the  liability to  provide  maintenance  for children has been fixed on the basis of the paternity of the father  and  the minority of the child and in  the  case  of major  children on the basis of their physical  handicap  or mental abnormality without reference to factors of legitima- cy  or illegitimacy of the children and their being  married or not. In the case of wives, whether their ties of marriage subsist or not, the anxiety of the Legislature is that  they should not only not resort to begging, stealing or  cheating etc.  but they should also not feel compelled, for the  sake of  maintaining themselves, to resort to an adulterous  life or  in the case of divorced women, to resort to  remarriage, if  they have sentimental attachment to their  earlier  mar- riage and feel morally bound to observe their vows of fidel- ity  to  the persons whom they had  married.  This  position emerges  when we take an overall view of  sub-sections  (1), (4) and (5). 783 While  sub-section  (4) provides that a wife  shall  not  be entitled  to receive maintenance from her husband if she  is living  in  adultery  or if without  sufficient  reason  she refuses to live with her husband or if She lives  separately by mutal consent, sub-section (5) provides that an order  of maintenance  already passed can be cancelled for any of  the abovesaid  reasons. Thus by reason of sub-sections  (4)  and (5) a husband can avoid his liability to pay maintenance  if his wife is living in adultery. Correspondingly a right  has been  conferred  on the wife under the Explanation  to  live separately  and  claim maintenance from the  husband  if  he breaks  his  vows of fidelity and marries another  woman  or takes  a mistress. As already stated it matters not  whether the  woman  chosen by the husband to replace the wife  is  a legally married wife or a mistress. Therefore, the  respond- ent’s  contention  that  his taking another  wife  will  not entitle the appellant to claim separate residence and  main- tenance  cannot be sustained. The Explanation is of  uniform application  to all wives including Muslim wives whose  hus- bands were either married another wife or taken a mistress.     It  only  now  remains for us to  consider  the  further defence of the respondent that in view of his offer to  take back the appellant and maintain her he stand absolved of his liability  to  pay maintenance. The offer to take  back  the appellant had been made only before the Revisional Court and that  too  after the second marriage had  taken  place.  The offer was not to the effect that he would set up a  separate residence  for the appellant so as to enable her to live  in peace  and  with dignity. As has been pointed out  in  Chand Begum  v.  Hyderbaig (supra) a husband,  who  marries  again cannot compel the first wife to share the conjugal home with the  co-wife and as such unless he offers to set up a  sepa- rate  residence  for the first wife, any offer to  take  her back  cannot be considered to be a bona fide offer.  It  is, therefore,  obvious that the offer was only  a  make-believe one  and  not a genuine and sincere offer. On the  basis  of such  an  insincere offer the appellant’s rights  cannot  be

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negated  or  defeated.  It is highly  unfortunate  that  the Sessions  Judge and the High Court should have  declined  to grant  maintenance to the appellant in spite of  the  appel- lant’s case falling squarely under the Explanation.     As  the record contains evidence regarding the  earnings of  the  respondent we are in a position  to  determine  the quantum  of  maintenance for the appellant  in  this  appeal itself instead of remitting the matter to the Trial Court or the  Revisional  Court.  The respondent has  stated  in  his counter-affidavit  in  the special leave petition  that  his income is only Rs.1,000 per month. The appellant has  stated in her 784 petition for maintenance that the respondent was getting Rs. 1,500 per month by way of salary and Rs.500 per month by way of income from properties. In the four years that have  gone by since the maintenance action was instituted the  respond- ent’s  income  must  have  certainly  increased.  Therefore, taking all factors into consideration we fix the quantum  of maintenance  for  the appellant at Rs.300  per  month.  This amount  will  be  paid with effect from  18.10.84  when  the respondent married a second wife. The arrears of maintenance will  be paid by the respondent in five  equal  instalments, the  first of such instalments to be paid during  the  first week  of June 1987. The subsequent instalments will be  paid at  intervals  of three months thereafter  i.e.  during  the first  week of September 1987, first week of December  1987, first week of March 1988 and first week of June 1988. Future maintenance must be paid before the cloth of every  succeed- ing month. We also enhance the maintenance to the minor girl (second  appellant)  to Rs.200 per month from  Rs.  100  per month  with  effect  from 1.1.1987. Default  in  payment  of future  maintenance or any instalments of the  arrears  will entitle the appellant to levy execution against the respond- ent under Section 125(3) of the Code and realise the amount. The appeal will stand allowed accordingly. N.P.V.                                          Appeal   al- lowed. 785