REPORTABLE

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF  INDIA           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   

   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1466  OF 2005

BEERE GOWDA ..  APPELLANT(S)

vs.

STATE OF KARNATAKA  ..  RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E  R

This appeal at the instance of the accused arises  

out of the following facts:

Pallavi, aged two and half years, was the daughter  

of the appellant Beere Gowda and his first wife Jayanthi  

Gowda. The marriage between the appellant and Jayanthi had  

taken place about five or six years earlier.  It appears  

that at the time of the marriage Jayanthi was pregnant but

after some time the two fell out and the  appellant left  

her in her parents' home promising to take her back after  

performing the marriage of his sister.  A few days later  

however he performed a marriage with Indramma  co-accused,  

since acquitted.  After the marriage of the appellant and  

Indramma the relations between the appellant and Jayanthi  

became unpleasant and Jayanthi was often assaulted and was  

made to do all the household chores and was also compelled  

to   undergo  a   Family   Planning   Operation   at  

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Kalsapura P.H.C., as the appellant apparently did not want  

to  have  any  child  from  her.  It  is  the  case  of  the  

prosecution that as Pallavi was an unwanted child, the two

accused,  thought it fit to get rid of her so that she  

could not claim any share in her father's property.  The  

appellant accordingly obtained nitric & sulphuric acid from  

PW.16 Ranganatha-Chari, a goldsmith, and it is further the  

prosecution case that this was administered to Pallavi on  

22nd September 1996 which ultimately led to her death.  An  

FIR was accordingly lodged by Jayanthi PW.1 in which the  

above facts were given in detail.  The appellant who had in  

the meanwhile, absconded was arrested on 26th September 1996  

and on his statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act a  

bottle containing a mixture of the two acids was found from  

the  kitchen  of  his  home.   On  the  completion  of  the  

investigation the appellant and  Indramma were charged for  

offences punishable under Sections 498A and 302 read with  

Section 34 of the IPC and as they denied all allegations  

they were brought to trial.

The Sessions Judge vide his judgment dated 28th April  

1999 held that the greater possibility on the evidence was  

that Pallavi had taken the acid by accident and that there  

was no evidence to suggest that it had been administered to  

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her forcibly.  The Court further held that there was no  

evidence to show that the  two accused had in any way  

misbehaved with Jayanthi prior to the murder.  The Trial  

Court also observed that the discrepancies inter se the  

statements of the witnesses went to the root of the matter  

and as such there was a doubt as to the truthfulness of the  

prosecution story.

An appeal was thereafter taken to the High Court.  

The High Court has, by the impugned judgment, set aside the

acquittal of appellant No.1 while maintaining that of  the  

second  accused  and  convicted  and  sentenced  him  under  

Section 302 of the IPC, with a sentence of imprisonment for  

life and fine of Rs.2000/- and in default six months R.I.

It is in this situation the present appeal is before  

us.

Mr. Ajit Kumar Panda, the learned amicus curiae for  

the appellant, has raised three arguments before us in the  

course of the hearing of this appeal. He has first pointed  

out that it was by now well settled that if two views were  

possible on the evidence and the Trial Court had chosen to  

take one view in favour of an accused  it was not open to  

the  High  Court  to  take  a  different  view,   unless  the  

judgment of the Trial Court could be said to be perverse  

although  the High Court was entitled to  reappraise the  

evidence in its entirety. It has  also been submitted that

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the  finding  of  the  High  Court  that  the  acid  had  been  

forcibly   administered  to  Pallavi  was  based  on  mere  

conjectures and did not emanate from the evidence. It has  

finally been urged that Indramma, the co-accused, having  

been given the benefit of doubt,  the appellant ought to  

have been given the same benefit as well.

The learned State counsel has however pointed out  

that the Trial Court had completely ignored the fact that  

it was on the statement of the appellant under Section 27  

of the Evidence Act that a bottle containing a mixture of  

nitric acid and sulphuric acid had been recovered from his  

house  and the fact that it was not possible for the child  

to  have  consumed  the  acid  accidentally  was  the  only

possible view on the evidence, was erroneous.

We have heard the arguments advanced by the learned  

counsel for the parties very carefully.  It is undoubtedly  

true that if two views are possible and the Trial Court has  

recorded  an  acquittal   interference  by  the  High  Court  

should be restricted. However, in case the High Court finds  

that the view taken by the Trial Court was not based on the  

evidence, it would defeat the ends of justice if the order  

was not set aside. We are of the opinion that the present  

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case  falls  under  the  category  where  the  High  Court  was  

fully justified in interfering in the matter.  The view

taken by the Trial Court to our mind was not justified to  

say the least.  There is one strong circumstance which has  

not been noticed by the either of the courts below but has  

been pointed out by the learned State Counsel, that  nitric  

and sulphuric acid would not be of any domestic use and  

would not be available as a household article.  It has come  

in evidence that the acid had been obtained from PW.17 and  

after the two acids had been mixed the concoction had been  

put into the mouth of child.  The High Court's observation  

that acid had been forcibly  put into the mouth is based on  

the medical evidence as injuries had been found all over  

the  body  including  the  mouth,  arms  and  the  chest  which  

clearly showed that the child had tried to save herself and  

had fought back when the acid was being administered.  It  

has rightly been pointed out by the High Court that if  the  

acid had been taken accidentally by the child there would

have been no burn injuries on other parts of the body as  

they would have been confined only to the mouth and the  

lips.

We also find no merit in Mr. Panda's arguments with  

regard to the parity claimed vis-a-vis Indramma.  This  

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matter has been dealt with by the High Court and it has  

been  observed   that  though  there  appeared  to  be  some  

suspicion,  but  no  concrete  evidence  of  abetment  of  the  

murder by her as  she had come to the house after the

incident. We therefore find no merit in this appeal.   

Dismissed.

                     .................J.          (HARJIT SINGH BEDI)

.................J.                                      (C.K. PRASAD) New Delhi,

    July 28, 2010.