14 February 1952
Supreme Court
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BATHINA RAMAKRISHNA REDDY Vs THE STATE OF MADRAS.

Bench: SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ),MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND,MUKHERJEA, B.K.,DAS, SUDHI RANJAN,AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA
Case number: Appeal Criminal 13 of 1951


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PETITIONER: BATHINA RAMAKRISHNA REDDY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF MADRAS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/02/1952

BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND DAS, SUDHI RANJAN

CITATION:  1952 AIR  149            1952 SCR  425  CITATOR INFO :  E          1954 SC  10  (12)  F          1959 SC 102  (3)  E          1971 SC 221  (15,18)  R          1978 SC 727  (44)  RF         1989 SC   1  (8)

ACT:     Contempt  of Courts Act (XII of 1926), s. 2  (3)--Indian Penal  Code (XLV of 1860), s. 499--Contempt  of  subordinate Court--Jurisdiction  of High Court to take  cognisance--Con- tempt  punishable  as defamation under  Penal  Code--Whether jurisdiction ousted--Scope and object of Contempt of  Courts Act.

HEADNOTE:     Sub-sec. (3) of section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926,  excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court  to  take cognisance  of a contempt alleged to have been committed  in respect of a Court subordinate to it only in cases where the acts  alleged to constitute contempt are punishable as  con- tempt  under specific provisions of the Indian  Penal  Code, but not where these acts merely amount to offences of  other description  for which punishment has been provided  for  in the Indian Penal Code.       The  fact that defamation of a judge of a  subordinate Court  constitutes an offence under sec. 499 of  the  Indian Penal Code does not, therefore, oust the jurisdiction of the High  Court to take cognisance of the act as a  contempt  of court.     Defamatory statements about the conduct of a judge  even in respect of his judicial duties do not necessarily consti- tute  contempt of Court.  It is only when the defamation  is calculated  to obstruct or interfere with the due course  of justice or proper administration of justice that it  amounts to contempt.     Kisan Krishna Ji v. Nagpur Conference of Society of  St. Vincent  de  Paul (A.I.R. 1943 Nag. 334)  disapproved.  V.M. Bason v. A.H. Skone ([.L.R. 53 Cal. 401) explained. Subordi- nate  Judge. First Class Hoshangabad v.  Jawaharlal  (A.I.R.

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1940 Nag. 407), Narayan Chandra v. Panchu Pramanick (A. L R. 1935  Cal. 684), Naresh Kumar v. Umaromal (A.I.R. 1951  Cal. 489),  Kaulashia  v. Emperor (I.L.R. 12 Pat.  1),  State  v. Brahma Prakash  (A.I.R. 1950 All. 556), Emperor v. Jagannath (A.I.R. 1938 All. 358), Bennet Colman v. C.S. Monga  (I.L.R. 1937 Lah. 34) approved.

JUDGMENT:     CRIMINAL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION:  Criminal Appeal  No. 13  of 1951.  Appeal by special leave from the judgment  and order  of  the  High Court of Madras  (Rajamannar  C.J.  and Balakrishna  Ayyar J.) dated 10 th April, 1950, in  Contempt Application No. 10 of 1949. 426 S.P. Sinha (S.S. Prakasam, with him), for the  appellant.   R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the respondent.      1952.   February  14.  The Judgment of  the  Court  was delivered by      MUKHERJEA  J.---This  appeal has come up  before  us  on special leave granted by this court on May 23, 1950, and  it is  directed against a judgment of a Division Bench  of  the Madras High Court dated April 10, 1950, by which the learned Judges  found the appellant guilty of contempt of court  and sentenced him to serve simple imprisonment for three months.       The appellant is the publisher and managing editor  of a Telugu Weekly known as "Praja Rajyam" which is edited  and published  at Nellore in the State of Madras.  In the  issue of  the  said paper dated 10th February,  1949,  an  article appeared  under the caption "Is the Sub-Magistrate,  Kovvur, corrupt?"  The purport of the article was that Surya Narayan Murthi,  the stationary Sub-Magistrate of Kovvur, was  known to the people of the locality to be a bribe taker and to  be in the habit of harassing litigants in various ways. He  was said to have a broker, through whom negotiations in  connec- tion  with these corrupt practices were carried on.  Several specific  instances were cited of cases tried by that  offi- cer,  where it was rumoured that he had either taken  bribes or  had  put the parties to undue harassment,  because  they were  obdurate enough to refuse the demands of  his  broker. The  article, which is a short one, concludes with the  fol- lowing paragraph:--     "There  are  party factions in many villages  in  Kovvur Taluk.   Taking   advantage of those  parties  many  wealthy persons  make  attempt to get the  opposite  party  punished either  by  giving  bribes or  making  recommendations.   To appoint  Magistrates who run after parties for a Taluk  like this.......   is to betray the public. It is  tantamount  to failure  of  justice. Will the Collector  enquire  into  the matter and allay the public of their fears?" 427     The  attention  of the State Government being  drawn  to this article, an application was filed by the AdvocateGener- al  of  Madras before the High Court on November  14,  1949, under  section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act (Act  XII  of 1926)  praying that suitable action might be  taken  against the  appellant as well as three other persons, of  whom  two were  respectively the editor and sub-editor of  the  paper, while  the third was the owner of the Press where the  paper was printed.       On receiving notice, the appellant appeared before the High Court and filed an affidavit taking sole responsibility for  the article objected to and asserting that the  article was  published because of his anxiety to uphold the  highest

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traditions  of the judiciary in  the  land and   to   create popular   confidence in  courts, the duty of which  was   to dispense  justice  without fear or favour  and  without  any discrimination  of caste, creed or community.  It  was  said that  before the article was published, numerous  complaints had  reached him from various quarters  imputing  corruption and  disreputable  conduct to this Magistrate and  the  only desire  of  the appellant was to draw the attention  of  the higher  authorities  to the state of public opinion  in  the matter and to invite an enquiry into the truth or  otherwise of the allegations which were not asserted as facts but were based only on hearsay.     The  High  Court after hearing the parties came  to  the conclusion  that the publication in question did  amount  to contempt  of court, as it was calculated to lower the  pres- tige  and  dignity of courts and bring  into  disrepute  the administration of justice. As the appellant was not prepared to  substantiate the allegations which he made and which  he admitted to be based on hearsay and did not think it  proper even  to express any regret for what he had done, the  court sentenced him to simple imprisonment for three months.     The  other  three respondents,  through  their  counsel, tendered  unqualified apology to the court and  the  learned Judges  considered that no further action against  them  was necessary. 428     The  propriety of the decision of the High Court so  far as it relates to the appellant has been challenged before us in this appeal and Mr. Sinha, who appeared in support of the same, raised before us a two-fold contention; his first  and main  contention  is that as the contempt in this  case  was said  to have been committed in respect of a court  subordi- nate  to  the  High Court and the allegations  made  in  the article in question constitute an offence under section  499 of the Indian Penal Code, the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognizance of such a case is expressly barred  under section  2  (3)  of the Contempt of Courts  Act.  The  other contention  advanced by the learned counsel relates  to  the merits  of the case and it is urged that in  publishing  the article  objected  to, the appellant acted in  perfect  good faith,  and  as the article amounted to nothing else  but  a demand  for enquiry into the conduct of a particular  person who  was believed to be guilty of corrupt practices  in  the discharge  of his judicial duties, there was no contempt  of court either intended or committed by the appellant.       So far as the first point is concerned, the determina- tion  of the question raised by the appellant  would  depend upon  the proper interpretation to be put upon section  2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act which runs as follows :--     "No  High  Court  shall take cognizance  of  a  contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court  subor- dinate  to it where such contempt is an  offence  punishable under the Indian Penal Code."       According to Mr. Sinha, what the sub-section means  is that if the act by which a party is alleged to have  commit- ted  contempt of a subordinate court constitutes offence  of any description whatsoever punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the High Court is precluded from taking cognizance  of it. It is said that in the present case the allegations made in  the article in question amount to an offence of  defama- tion as defined by section 499 of the Indian Penal Code  and consequently  the jurisdiction of the High Court is  barred. Reliance 429 is  placed in support of this proposition upon the  decision

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of  the  Nagpur  High Court in Kisan Krishna  Ji  v.  Nagpur Conference  of Society of St. Vincent de Paul(1). This  con- tention, though somewhat plausible at first sight, does  not appear  to us to be sound. In our opinion,  the  sub-section referred  to above excludes the jurisdiction of  High  Court only. in cases where the acts alleged to constitute contempt of  a  subordinate court are punishable  as  contempt  under specific  provisions of the Indian Penal Code but not  where these  acts merely amount to offences of  other  description for  which  punishment has been provided for in  the  Indian Penal  Code.  This would be clear from the language  of  the sub-section which uses the words "where such contempt is  an offence" and does not say "where the act alleged to  consti- tute such contempt is an offence". It is argued that if such was the intention of the Legislature, it could have express- ly  said that the High Court’s jurisdiction will  be  ousted only  when  the  contempt is punishable as  such  under  the Indian  Penal Code. It seems to us that the reason  for  not using  such  language  in the sub-section may  be  that  the expression "contempt of court" has not been used as descrip- tion of any offence in the Indian Penal Code, though certain acts,  which  would be punishable as contempt  of  court  in England, are made offences under it.       It  may  be pointed out in this connection   that  al- though  the powers of the High Courts in  India  established under the Letters Patent to exercise jurisdiction as Superi- or Courts of Record in punishing contempt of their authority or processes have never been doubted, it was a controversial point  prior to the passing of the Contempt of  Courts  Act, 1926, as to whether the High Court could, like the Court  of King’s Bench in England, punish contempt of courts  subordi- nate  to  it in exercise of its inherent  jurisdiction.  The doubt  has been removed by Act XII of 1926  which  expressly declares the right of the High Court to protect  subordinate courts against contempt, but (1) (1943) A.I.R. 1943 Nag. 334. 430 subject  to this restriction, that cases of  contempt  which have  already  been provided for in the Indian  Penal   Code should not be taken cognizance of by the High  Court.   This seems  to be the principle underlying   section  2(3)of  the Contempt  of Courts Act.  What these cases are need  not  be exhaustively  determined for purposes of the  present  case, but some light is undoubtedly thrown upon this matter by the provision  of  section 480 of the Criminal  Procedure  Code, which  empowers  any  civil, criminal or  revenue  court  to punish summarily a person who is found guilty of  committing any offence under sections 176, 178, 179, 180 or section 228 of  the  Indian Penal Code in the view or  presence  of  the court.  We are not prepared to say, as has been said by  the Patna  High Court in Jnanendra prasad v. Gopal(1), that  the only  section  of  the Indian Penal Code  which  deals  with contempt  committed against a court of justice  or  judicial officer  is section 228.  Offences under sections 175,  178, 179 and 180 may also, as section 480 of the Criminal  Proce- dure Code shows, amount to contempt of court if the  "public servant"  referred  to  in these sections happens  to  be  a judicial  officer  in a particular case.  It is  well  known that  the  aim of the contempt proceeding is "to  deter  men from offering any indignities to a court of justice" and  an essential  feature  of the proceeding is the exercise  of  a summary  power by the court itself in regard to  the  delin- quent.  In the cases mentioned in section 480 of the  Indian Penal  Code,  the  court has been  expressly  given  summary powers  to  punish a person who is guilty of  offending  its

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dignity  in the manner indicated in the section.  The  court is  competent also under section 482 of the Criminal  Proce- dure  Code  to  forward any case of this  description  to  a Magistrate  having jurisdiction to try it, if  it  considers that the offender deserves a higher punishment than what can be  inflicted under section 480.  Again, the court is  enti- tled  under  section 484 to discharge the  offender  on  his submitting an apology, although it has already adjudged  him to punishment under section 480 (1) I.L.R 12 Pat. 172. 431 or forwarded his case for trial under section 482. The  mode of purging contempt by tendering apology is a further  char- acteristic  of a contempt proceeding. It  seems,  therefore, that  there  are offences which are punishable  as  contempt under  the Indian Penal Code and as subordinate  courts  can sufficiently vindicate their dignity under the provisions of criminal law in such cases the legislature deemed it  proper to  exclude  them from the jurisdiction of  the  High  Court under  section  2(3) of the Contempt of  Courts  Act;but  it would   not be correct to’ say that the High Court’s  juris- diction  is excluded even in cases where the act  complained of, which is alleged to constitute contempt, is otherwise an offence under the Indian Penal Code.     This  view  has  been taken and, in  our  opinion  quite rightly,  in  a  number of  decisions  by  the  Calcutta,(1) Patna,(2)  Allahabad(3) and Lahore(4) High Courts. The  only authority  which  Mr.  Sinha could cite in  support  of  his contention is the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Kisan Krishna Ji v. Nagpur Conference of Society of St. Vincent de Paul(").   The authority is undoubtedly in his favour as  it proceeds  upon the assumption that the idea  underlying  the provision  of section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act  is that  if  a person can be punished by some  other  tribunal, then the High Court should not entertain any proceeding  for contempt.   It is to be noticed that the learned Judge,  who decided  this  case, himself took the opposite view  in  the case  of  Subordinate  Judge, First  Class,  Hoshangabad  v. Jawaharlal(6)  and  definitely  held  that  the  prohibition contained  in  section 2(3) of the Contempt  of  Courts  Act refers  to offences punishable as contempt of court  by  the Indian  Penal Code and not to offences punishable  otherwise than  as  contempt. This decision was  neither  noticed  nor dissented  from  in  the subsequent case, and  it  is  quite possible that      (1)  Narayan  Chandra v. Panehu Pramanik  (A.I.R.  1935 Cal. 684); Naresh Kumar.v. Umaromar (A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 489).     (2)Kaulashia v. Emperor (12 Pat. 1).    (3)  State  v. Brahma Prakash (A.I.R.  1950  All.  556); Emperor v. Jagannath (A.I.R. 1938 All. 358).    (4) Bennett Coleman v. G. S. Monga (I.L.R. 1937 Lah. 34). (5) A.I.R. 1943 Nag. 334. (6) A.I.R. 1940 Nag. 407. 56 432 the  attention  of the learned judge was not drawn  to  this earlier  pronouncement  of his, in which  case  the   matter would  certainly have been more fully discussed.   We  think further that the decision of the Calcutta High Court in V.M. Bason v. A. H. Skone(1) which was the basis of the  decision of the learned Judge in the subsequent case does not  really support   the view taken in it.  In the Calcutta  case  what happened was, that a clerk of the Attorney, who appeared for the  respondent decreeholder, went to serve a  notice  under Order  21, Rule 37(1), of the Civil Procedure Code upon  the

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appellant  judgment-debtor.  The judgmentdebtor  refused  to take  the  notice and abused and  assaulted  the  Attorney’s clerk.  Upon that, contempt proceedings were started against him and Mr. Justice C.C. Ghosh, sitting on the Original Side of the High Court of Calcutta, held the appellant guilty  of contempt  and fined him Rs. 200.  On appeal,  this  judgment was affirmed by the appellate Bench and there was a  general observation made by Chief Justice Sanderson at the close  of his judgment that it is not desirable to invoke the  special inherent jurisdiction of the High Court by way of proceeding for contempt if ordinary proceedings in a Magistrate’s court are sufficient to meet the requirements of a case.  This was not a case under section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts  Act at  all  and no question either arose or was decided  as  to whether  if  an act is otherwise punishable  as  an  offence under  the  Indian Penal Code the jurisdiction of  the  High Court  under that section would be ousted.  Undoubtedly  the High  Court had jurisdiction in that case and  whether  such jurisdiction, which is certainly of a special character  and is  exercised summarily, should be called in to aid  in  the circumstances  of  a particular case would depend  upon  the discretion  of the court.  This has, however, no bearing  on the  point that has arisen for consideration before  us.  We would hold, therefore, that the right view was taken by  the learned  Judge of the Nagpur High Court in the earlier  case and not in the later one, (1) I.L R. 53 Cal. 401. 433     It  is next urged by Mr. Sinha that even  assuming  that this  view  is correct, the language of section 499  of  the Indian Penal Code is wide enough to cover a case of contempt of  court.   What is said is, that if a libel  is  published against  a judge in respect of his judicial functions,  that also is defamation within the meaning of section 499 of  the Indian  Penal Code and as such libel constitutes a  contempt of  court, it may be said with perfect propriety that  libel on a judge is punishable as contempt under the Indian  Penal Code.  We do not think that this contention can be  accepted as  sound.   A libellous reflection upon the  conduct  of  a judge  in respect of his judicial duties may certainly  come under  section  499 of the Indian Penal Code and it  may  be open to the judge to take steps against the libeller in  the ordinary  way for vindication of his character and  personal dignity as a judge; but such libel may or may not amount  to contempt of court. As the Privy Council observed in Surendra Nath  Banerjee v. The Chief Justice and Judges of  the  High Court,(1) "although contempt may include defamation, yet  an offence  of contempt is something more than mere  defamation and is of a different character." When the act of defaming a judge  is calculated to obstruct or interfere with  the  due course  of  justice or proper administration  of   law,   it would  certainly amount to contempt.  TIle offence  of  con- tempt is really a wrong done to the public by weakening  the authority  and  influence of courts of law which  exist  for their good.  As was said by Willmot, C.J.(2)      "attacks  upon  the judges excite in the minds  of  the people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial  determi- nations......  and whenever man’s allegiance to the laws  is so  fundamentally shaken it is the most fatal and  dangerous obstruction  of  justice and in my opinion calls out  for  a more rapid and immediate redress than any other  obstruction whatsoever; not for the sake of the judges as private  indi- viduals  but  because  they are the channels  by  which  the King’s justice is conveyed to the people". (1) I.L.R. 10 Cal. 109 at 131.

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(2)  Willmot’s  Opinions page 256; Rex v. Davies  30  at  p. 40--41. 434   What  is made punishable in the Indian Penal Code  is  the offence of defamation as defamation and not as. contempt  of court.  If the defamation of a subordinate court amounts  to contempt of court, proceedings can  certainly be taken under section  2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, quite  apart  from the  fact  that other remedy may be open  to  the  aggrieved officer under  section 499 of the Indian Penal Code.  But  a libel  attacking  the integrity of a judge may  not  in  the circumstances  of a particular case amount to a contempt  at all,  although it may be the subject-matter of a libel  pro- ceeding.  This is clear from the observation of the Judicial Committee  in the case of The Matter of a Special  Reference from  the  Bahama Islands(1). The first  contention  of  Mr. Sinha, therefore, fails.    The  second point raised by the learned counsel does  not appear  to  us to have any real substance.  The  article  in question is a scurrilous attack on the integrity and honesty of  a judicial officer.  Specific instances have been  given where the officer is alleged to have taken bribes or behaved with  impropriety to the litigants who did not  satisfy  his dishonest  demands. If the allegations were true,  obviously it  would  be to the benefit of the public  to  bring  these matters into light.  But if they were false, they cannot but undermine the confidence of the public in the administration of  justice and bring judiciary into disrepute.  The  appel- lant,  though   he took sole  responsibility  regarding  the publication  of the article, was not in a position  to  sub- stantiate  by evidence any of the allegations made  therein. He  admitted that the statement was based on  hearsay.   Ru- mours may have reached him from various  sources, but before he  published  the article it was incumbent upon  him  as  a reasonable  man  to attempt to verify  the  informations  he received  and  ascertain, as far as he  could.  whether  the facts were true or mere concocted lies.  He does not  appear to have made any endeavour in this direction.  As the appel- lant did not act with reasonable care and caution, he cannot be said to have acted (1) [1893] A.C. 138. 435 bona fide, even if good faith can be held to be a defence at all in a proceeding for contempt.  What is more, he did  not express  any regret for what he had done either in the  High Court or before us and his behaviour does not show the least trace of contrition.  In these circumstances, we think  that the appeal cannot succeed and must be dismissed. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant: S. Subrahmanyam. Agent for the respondent: P.A. Mehta.