http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 3  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3957 of 1998

PETITIONER: Basic Shiksha Parishad & Anr.    

RESPONDENT: Smt. Sugna Devi & Ors.                  

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/12/2003

BENCH: S. RAJENDRA BABU & RUMA PAL.

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

RAJENDRA BABU, J. :

Whether the Respondent No 1- Smt. Sugna  Devi could be considered as a teacher employed  by the Petitioner No 1 - Basic Shiksha Parishad,  Allahabad (UP) is the short question for  consideration in this matter.  

Respondent No 1 maintained the case that  she was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in  Kanya Pathshala, Mallawan in district Gonda on  22/03/1966 by the then President of District Board  Gonda. Subsequently she was transferred to  Paraspur. Later she was transferred back to  Mallawan. Consequent to her prolonged illness she  took leave between July 1970 and 14/05/1971  and thereafter between July 1971 and  29/12/1971. When she returned on 30/12/1971  the Headmistress told her that she was terminated  from services. But she was not served with any  termination orders. She was told by the  Headmistress to approach the Zila Parishad to  seek for a transfer. Accordingly she placed  representation before the Chairman, Zila Parishad  for transferring her to another school. Several  follow up reminders for this representation was  sent. By the time vide UP Act No 34/1927 the  Basic Education was taken over by the Basic  Shiksha Parishad from Zila Parishad. Thereafter  Respondent No 1 approached District Basic  Education Officer, Secretary \026 Basic Shiksha  Parishad and even the Minister and made several  representations. Thereafter she filed a Claim  Petition before the UP Public Services Tribunal.  

Basic Shiksha Parishad maintained the stand  that that she was never been their employee and  since she could not produce any documents that  could authenticate the factum of her service the  case has to be rejected as a concocted one.  Learned Tribunal found that since she could not  prove that the President of District Board Gonda  validly appointed her or she was working as a  teacher the Claim Petition was rejected both on  grounds of prolonged delay and on merits.

She preferred a Writ Petition challenging the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 3  

Tribunal’s order before the High Court. Along with  the Writ Petition she annexed all the documents  that were relied upon by her before the Tribunal.  By the time she also filed an application before the  Basic Shiksha Adhikari to furnish her copies of all  the relevant documents such as salary / pay bills,  vouchers etc. Though the Basic Shiksha Adhikari  had directed to furnish all the documents required  by her, the Record In-Charge refused to give it to  her under one pretext or another. At the outset  the High Court noted that these documents were  not made available either to the Tribunal or to the  High Court.   

Primarily the High Court relied upon the  documents filed by Respondent No 1 such as - the  document that proves the payment of Rs. 80 as  arrears, her transfer orders, joining reports, letter  of Adhyaksha calling upon her to present her  testimonials etc. and found that she was working  as a teacher. High Court also noted that that the  Zila Parishad has not disputed Sugna Devi’s case  nor was there any valid reason on record that  shows that she was not working as a teacher.  Another pertinent finding of the High Court is that  once the name of a staff was found in the list, the  Basic Education Board was under legal obligation  to give reasons or explanation as to under what  circumstances or for what reasons the services of  that staff was not treated to have been  transferred under the mandatory provisions of  Section 9(1) of the Act. This was not complied in  the case of Respondent No 1. Hence her service  was considered as transferred to the Basic Shiksha  Parishad. For these reasons the High Court set  aside the findings of the Learned Tribunal and held  that she had continued to be in service. Due to the  fact that the salary was recurring every month the  cause of action was continuing. Therefore the  finding of the Tribunal on account of bar of  limitation was also held to be erroneous.  Considering all these facts the High Court ruled  that Sugna Devi is entitled to salary for three  preceding years before the date of superannuation  to be computed on the basis of revised pay scales  as existing at the time of her retirement. By this  finding the Writ petition was allowed. This  judgment is impugned before us.  

The only point for consideration is whether  the Respondent No. 1 was in service or not on the  relevant date. The Tribunal only on the basis that  she was not able to produce the appointment  letter ruled that she was never in service. On the  other hand the High Court relied on documents  like transfer orders and joining reports found that  she was validly in service. There is also positive  evidence to the effect that she was paid arrears  during the relevant period. All this goes to show  that the President of District Board appointed her  as a teacher and she was working as one.  Therefore the finding of the Tribunal is difficult to  subscribe. We uphold the view adopted by the  High Court and hold that Respondent No 1 was  appointed as a teacher. By virtue of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 3  

enactment of UP Basic Education Act, 1972 her  service was transferred to the Basic Shiksha  Parishad. Since her services were never  terminated, why her name was missing form the  list of transferred employees has to be explained  by the Appellant No 1. In contrast, Appellant No 1  strongly maintained the stand that she was never  in service. In the facts and circumstances of this  case we find it difficult to accept this contention.  Failing which, the case of the Respondent No 1  that the competent authority duly appointed her  as an assistant teacher and she was prevented  from joining, as a teacher after leave has to be  accepted. Once no order of termination or  dismissal is produced, her service has to be  treated as stood transferred to the Basic Education  Board by operation of law. In that event she has  to be treated as continuing in service and salary  was accruing every month that accorded her a  continuing cause of action. Therefore the question  of limitation also won’t arise in this case. In this  context the view adopted by the High Court is  perfectly justified. We don’t propose to interfere.  The view of the High Court that Respondent No 1  is entitled to compensation equivalent to the  salary for the three preceding years before the  date of superannuation on the basis of revised pay  is also quite reasonable.   

Accordingly we dismiss this Petition. The High  Court order shall be given effect to within a period  of three months from today.