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PETITIONER: BAR COUNClL OF MAHARASHTRA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M. V. DABHOLKAR ETC. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/08/1975

BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) KHANNA, HANS RAJ MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH KRISHNAIYER, V.R. GUPTA, A.C. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA

CITATION:  1975 AIR 2092            1976 SCR  (1) 306  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1976 SC 578  (27)  RF         1976 SC2602  (20)  E          1980 SC 856  (14)  RF         1981 SC 116  (17)  R          1981 SC 344  (48)  RF         1981 SC 477  (3,5)  R          1982 SC 149  (606,963)  RF         1985 SC  28  (30)

ACT:      Advocates Act, 1961-Sections 37 and 38 Scope of-"Pelson aggrieved" if  a  State  Bar  Council  could  be  a  "person aggrieved".

HEADNOTE:     The State  Bar Councils  created by  the Advocates Act, 1961 have  been entrusted  with the  functions inter alia of entertaining and  determining cases  of  misconduct  against advocates on  their rolls  and to  safeguard  their  rights, privileges and  interests. The Bar Council of India which is a national  body created  by the  Act is  entrusted with the work of  laying down  standards of  professional conduct and etiquette and  overseeing the  functioning of  the State Bar Councils. Under  s. 35  of the  Act, if a State Bar Council, either on  receipt of a complaint or otherwise has reason to believe that  any advocate  on its  roll has  been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case to its Disciplinary  Committee which,  after  due  inquiry  may impose certain penalties. An appeal from the decision of the State Bar  Council lies  to the  Bar Council  of India.  Any "person aggrieved" by an order of the Disciplinary Committee of the  Bar Council of India may, under s. 38, appeal to the Supreme Court.  In exercise  of the  Powers conferred by the Act the  Bar Council  of  India  framed  rules  relating  to professional conduct and etiquette, r. 36 of which says that advocates shall not solicit work or advertise themselves.      The State  Bar Council,  in the  present  case,  issued notices to the respondents suo motu alleging that they stood

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at the  entrance  of  the  court  house  at  the  Presidency Magistrate’s Court, Fort Bombay and solicited work etc., and that the  said act  amounted to  professional  and/or  other misconduct. ’the  Disciplinary Committee  of the  State  Bar Council  found  the  respondents  guilty  of  conduct  which absolutely lowered  the reputation of the Bar in the eyes of the public  and suspended them from practising as advocates. The respondents’  appeal to  the Bar Council of India having been allowed, the State Bar Council has come up in appeal to this Court  under s. 38. Before the Bar Council of India the State Bar Council had not appeared. F      On the  question whether  the State  Bar Council  is  a "person aggrieved,"       Allowing the appeals, Held: ^ [By the full Court],      The State  Bar Council  is  an  "aggrieved  person"  to maintain an appeal under the Act. per Ray,  C.J., Khanna, Mathew, Gupta and Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ):      (1) The Bar Council is a "person aggrieved" because (i) the words  "person aggrieved"  in the Act are of wide import in the  context of the purpose and provisions of the statute and should  not be  subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession  or denial  of  legal  rights  or  burdens  or financial interests.  In disciplinary proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee  there is  no lis  and there  are  no parties. The  word ’person’  will embrace  the  Bar  Council which represents  the Bar of the State; (ii) the Bar Council represents the  collective conscience  of the  standards  of professional conduct  and etiquette. The Bar Council acts as the protector  of the  purity and dignity of the profession; (iii) the  function  of  the  Bar  Council  in  entertaining complaints against  advocates indicates that the Bar Council is interested  in the  proceedings for  the  vindication  of discipline. dignity and decorum of the profession; (iv) when the Bar Council ini- 307 tiates proceedings  by referring  eases of misconduct to the Disciplinary Committee,  the Bar Council, in the performance of its  function under the Act, is interested in the task of seeing that  the advocates  maintain  proper  standards  and etiquette of  the profession  and (v)  the  Bar  Council  is vitally concerned  with the  decision, in the context of its functions. The  Bar Council  will have  a grievance  if  the decision  prejudices   the  maintenance   of  standards   of professional conduct and ethics. [315G: 316D-G]      (2) (a)  The  Bar  Council  acts  as  the  sentinel  of professional code  of conduct  and is  vitally interested in the rights  and privileges  of the  advocates as well as the purity and dignity of the profession. [316A-B]      (b) The grievance of the Bar Council is to be looked at purely from  the point  of view of standards of professional conduct and  etiquette. If  any decision of the Disciplinary Committee of  the Bar  Council of  India is according to the State Bar  Council such  as will  lower  the  standards  and imperil the high traditions and values in the profession the State Bar  Council is an "aggrieved person" to safeguard the interests of the public, the interests of the profession and the interests of the Bar. [316B-C]      (3) The  most significant  feature  in  the  matter  of initiation of  proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee is that  no  litigant  and  no  member  of  the  public  can straightaway commence  disciplinary proceedings  against  an advocate It  is the  Bar Council  of a State which initiates

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the disciplinary proceedings. There is no lis in proceedings before  the  Disciplinary  Committee  The  Bar  Council,  in placing a  matteu. before  the Disciplinary  Committee, does not act  as a  prosecutor in  a criminal case. A complainant who prefers  a complaint  against an  advocate is not like a plaintiff in  a civil  suit. The  Bar Council may act on its own initiative  on information  which has come to its notice in the  course of  its duties.  There is  no  party  to  the disciplinary  proceedings   because  the  Bar  Council,  the Attorney General, the Advocate General act in protecting the interests of  advocates and the interests of’ the public. In so acting  there is no conflict between the advocate and any other   person   because   it   is   professional   conduct, professional etiquette,  professional  ethics,  professional morality, which  are to  be upheld.  transgression of  which results in  reprimanding the advocate or suspending him from practice or removing his name from the roll. [314B-F]      Adi  Pherozshah  Gandhi  v.  H.  M.  Seervai,  Advocate General of Maharashtra. Bombay [1971] I S.C.R. 863, referred to Beg J. (concurring):      (1) There is no objection to a participation of a State Bar Council  in its  executive capacity  in  a  disciplinary proceeding against  an advocate  on its  roll either  at the initial or  at the  appellate stages. Before it can become a "person aggrieved"  by  an  order  against  which  it  could appeal, there  must have  been a  lis or  a  dispute  to  be decided which gives rise to the order complained of. To such a "lis"  the State  Bar Council,  in its executive capacity, must be  deemed to  be a  party. There  seems to be no legal obstacles in  the way  of its  separate representation  even before its  own Disciplinary  Committee. Its right to appeal as  a   "person  aggrieved"   is  squarely  covered  by  the provisions of  ss. 37 and 38 of the Act. In the present case the respondents  themselves treated  the Bar  Council  as  a party interested  in the  lis when  they impleaded the State Bar Council  as a  respondent in  their appeals  to the  Bar Council of  India. Its statutory right to appeal under s. 38 is not  affected by  the mere  fact that  it did  not put in appearance before the Bar Council of India. [319D-G]      (2)  The   State  Bar   Council  operates  through  its committees.  Each   committee  has  distinct  and  separable functions. Each  could be  said to  have a  "persona" and an identity of  its own,  which is distinguishable from that of the Bar Council as a whole [317G]      3 (a)  If the Bar Council has a separable interest as a guardian of  the rights and privileges of the members of the Bar, specifically  mentioned by s. 6(1)(d) of the Act. there is no  reason why  a right to represent this interest before its 308 own Disciplinary Committee as well as before the Bar Council of India,  on an  A appeal  under s.  37 of the Act, or., on further appeal  to this  Court under s. 38 of the Act should be denied to it. [318C-D]      4(a) When  the State  Bar Council can have locus standi and rights  of a  "person aggrieved" affected by the results of such  proceedings there is no reason why it should not be in the  position of  a party  lo a  lis or  dispute’ between itself and the allegedly delinquent advocate. [318D-E]      (b) The  term ’lis’  is not  confined to  litigation by means of a suit in a court of law. [318E]      Butler v.  Mountgarret 7  H.L. Ca. 641 and B. Johnson & Co. (Builders)  v. Minister of Health [1947] 2 All. E.R. 395  399, referred to.

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    5. The State Bar Council in its executive capacity acts as the  prosecutor through its Executive Committee. There is no incongruity  in its  Disciplinary Committee  representing its judicial  wing, functioning  as an impartial judge whose decisions are  binding upon  the State  Bar Council. It is a "person aggrieved"  within the  meaning of  that  expression used in ss. 37 and 38 of the Act. [318G-H] Krishna Iyer, J. (concurring):      (1) The  Bar is  not a  private  guild,  like  that  of ’barbers, butchers  and candlestick-makers’  but,  a  public institution committed to public justice and pro bono publico service. The  grant of a monopoly licence to practice law is based on  three assumptions;  (i) there is a socially useful function for  the lawyer  to perform;  (ii ) the lawyer is a professional person  who will  perform  that  function;  and (iii) his  performance as a professional person is regulated by himself  and more formally, by the profession as a whole. The central  function that the legal profession must perform is nothing less than the administration of justice. [322G-H]      (2) In  a developing  country  the  pattern  of  public oriented litigation  better fulfils the rule of law if it is to rule  close to  the rule of life. The Bar Council clearly comes within this category of organisations when a lawyer is involved.      (3) A  case of  professional misconduct is not a lis in the British sense nor a case and controversy in the American meaning. It  is a  public investigation  about misconduct by one belonging  to a  public profession where every member of the Bar  with a  reputation to lose has a stake and everyone concerned with  the justice  administration  is  interested. ’the Bar  has a  share in being the sentinel on the qui vive when the  legal dykes  of right  and justice are breached by authoritarianism or citizen wrongdoing. [323F-Gl      (4)  The  possible  apprehension  that  widening  legal standing with  a public  connotation may  unloose a flood of litigation which  may  overwhelm  the  judges  is  misplaced because public  resort to  court to suppress public mischief is a tribute to the justice system. In this case to grant an exclusionary windfall  on the  respondents is to cripple the Bar Council  in its  search for  justice and  insistence  on standards. [326B] G      A. P. Gandhi v. H. M. Seeravai, [1971] 1 S.C.R. refered to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeals Nos. 1461 to 1468 of 1 974.      From the  Judgment and order dated the 14th April, 1974 of the  Disciplinary Committee  of the Bar Council of India, New Delhi.  in C.  Appeals Nos.  15 to  19, 21, 22 and 25 of 1973 respectively. H      V. S.  Desai, Vimal  Dave and  Kailash Mehta,  for  the appellant (in all the appeals). 309      M. V.  Dabolkar, for  the  respondent  (In  C.  A.  No. 1461/74).      Z. F. Bootwala and Urmila Sirur, for the respondent (In C. A.  Nos. 1462-64/74) . V. N. Ganpule and V. H. Dixit, for the respondent (In C. A. No. 1465/74).      K. G.  Mandalia, for  the  respondent  (In  C.  A.  No. 1466/74).      E. Udayarathallam  and A.  K. Doshi, for the respondent (In C.A. No. 1467/ 74).

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    D. K.  Raisinghani, for  the respondent  (In  C.A.  No. 1468/74).      K. K.  Sinha and  S. K.  Sinha, for the Bihar State Bar Council.      D. V.  Patil and  K. Hingorani,  for the Bar Council of India.      The Judgment  of A.  N. RAY,  C.J., H. R. KHANNA, K. K. MATHEW, A. C. GUPTA AND S. M. FAZAL ALl, was delivered by A. N. RAY,  C.J., M.  BEG and  V. R.  KRISHNA  IYER,  JJ.  gave separate opinions.      RAY, C.J.-These  appeals were  placed before this Bench for consideration of the question whether the Bar Council of a State  is "a person aggrieved" to maintain an appeal under section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 hereinafter called the Act.      The Bar  Council  of  Maharashtra  on  8  August,  1964 considered a  complaint received from the High Court against the respondents  and resolved  that the  complaint  received from the  High Court  against the respondents be referred to the disciplinary committee. Another resolution was passed by the Bar  Council of  Maharashtra on  the  same  day  whereby Messrs Hotchand  Advani, R.  W. Adik  and S.  C. Chagla were elected as  members of the disciplinary committee to enquire into the complaints.      The aforesaid  disciplinary committee  met on 19 March, 1965 and  heard the  advocates for  the Bar  Council of  the State of  Maharashtra. After  considering the  papers placed before the  committee, it  directed the  Registrar to  issue notices under  section 35(2)  of the  Act  to  the  "parties concerned including  the  Advocate-General".  The  committee also expressed the opinion that "there is a prima facie case of professional misconduct".      The Bar  Council of  Maharashtra on 18 May, 1965 issued notices under  section 35 of the Act to the respondents. The notice was  described as  a suo  motu  inquiry  against  the respondents. The  notice proceeded  with the recital that it came to  the notice  of the  Bar Council of Maharashtra that the respondents  stood at the entrance of the Court House at the Presidency  Magistrate’s Court,  Esplanade, Fort  Bombay and solicited work and generally behaved at that place in an undignified  manner   and  the   said   acts   amounted   to professional and/or  other misconduct  and the  Bar  Council constituted  disciplinary  committee  and  the  inquiry  was entrusted to  the  committee  consisting  of  Messrs  H.  G. Advani, R. W. Adik and S. C. Chagla. 310      The said  disciplinary committee heard evidence upto 31 August,  1968.   On  14  June,  1969,  the  Bar  Council  of Maharashtra passed  a resolution  requesting  the  aforesaid disciplinary committee to proceed with the inquiry which was pending before them prior to 31 March, 1969.      The  disciplinary  committee  of  the  Bar  Council  of Maharashtra on 27 June, 1973 found the respondents guilty of conduct which seriously lowered the reputation of the Bar in the eyes  of the public. The disciplinary committee directed that the  respondents would  stand suspended from practising as advocates  for a  period of  three years.  The suspension orders were to be operative from 1 August 1973.      The  respondents   preferred  appeals  before  the  Bar Council  of   India.  In   these  appeals,  the  respondents impleaded the Bar Council of Maharashtra as respondents. The disciplinary committee  of the  Bar Council  of India  on 14 April, 1974  allowed the appeals and set aside the orders of the  disciplinary   committee  of   the   Bar   Council   of Maharashtra.  While   setting  aside   the  orders   of  the

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disciplinary committee  of the  Bar Council  of Maharashtra, the disciplinary  committee of  the  Bar  Council  of  India stated as follows:-           "The Bar  Council of  Maharashtra has not appeared      even though  they started  the proceedings suo motu and      we do  not pass  any orders  as to  costs and we direct      each party will bear their costs. However, we have gone      through the  evidence ourselves  and also  the same has      been placed  in detail  by the  appellants. All that we      can  say  is  that  we  expected  the  Bar  Council  of      Maharashtra to  be represented  in the ap- peal because      proceedings were started suo motu"      These statements  of the  disciplinary committee of the Bar Council  of India  indicate  that  the  Bar  Council  of Maharashtra should  have appeared  before  the  disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India.      The scheme of the Advocates Act in short is as follows:      There are  State Bar  Councils. There is Bar Council of India Every Bar Council is a body corporate.      The functions  of a State Bar Council are inter alia to entertain  and   determine  cases   of  misconduct   against advocates  on   its  roll   and  to  safeguard  the  rights, privileges and interests of advocates on its roll.      The functions  of the  Bar Council  of India  are inter alia to  lay down  standards  of  professional  conduct  and etiquette, to  lay down  the procedure to be followed by its disciplinary committee  and the  disciplinary  committee  of State Bar  Councils, to safeguard the rights, privileges and interests of  advocates and  to exercise general supervision and control over State Bar Councils      Disciplinary committees  are constituted  by  each  Bar Council. A Bar Council is required to constitute one or more disciplinary committees each of which shall consist of three persons of whom two shall 311 be persons  elected by  the Council from amongst its members and the other shall be A person co-opted by the Council from amongst advocates  who possesss the qualifications specified in the  proviso to  section 3(2)  of the  Act  and  are  not members of the Council, and the senior most advocate amongst the  members  of  a  disciplinary  committee  shall  be  its Chairman.      When the  Executive Committees  of a  State Bar Council and of  the Bar- Council of India and an Enrolment Committee of a  State Bar Council and the legal education committee of the Bar  Council of  India are to consist of members erected by the  Council from  amongst its  members, it is noticeable that the  disciplinary committees of Bar Council of State as well as  of Bar  Council of  India shall  consist  of  three persons of  whom two  shall be  elected by  the Council from amongst its members and the other shall be a person co-opted by the  Council from advocates who are not otherwise members of the Council.      Chapter  V  of  the  Act  relates  to  the  Conduct  of Advocates. Chap ter V contains sections 35 to 44. Section 35 states that  where on  receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll  has been  guilty of professional other misconduct, it shall  refer the  case for  disposal to  its disciplinary committee. The  State Bar  Council may,  either of  its  own motion  or   on  application   made  to  it  by  any  person interested,  withdraw   a  proceeding   pending  before  its disciplinary committee and direct that inquiry to be made by another disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council. The disciplinary committee  of a  State Bar  Council shall fix a

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date for the hearing of the case and shall cause a notice to be given.  to the  advocate concerned  and to  the Advocate- General of  the State.  The disciplinary  committee  of  the State Bar  Council may  make any  of  the  following  orders namely, (a)  dismiss the complaint, or where the proceedings were initiated  at the  instance of  the State  Bar Council, direct that  the proceedings  be filed,  (b)  reprimand  the advocate, (c) suspend the advocate for such period as it may deem fit, (d) remove the name of the advocate from the state roll of advocates.      Section 36  speaks of  disciplinary powers  of the  Bar Council of  India and  provides that  where on  receipt of a complaint or  otherwise the  Bar Council of India has reason to believe  that any  advocate whose  name is not entered on any State  roll has  been guilty  of professional  or  other misconduct, it  shall refer  the case  for disposal  to  its disciplinary committee.  The disciplinary  committee of  the Bar Council  of India  may either  of its own motion or on a report by any State Bar Council or on an application made to it by  any person  interested, withdraw  for inquiry  before itself any  proceeding for  disciplinary action  against any advocate pending  before the  disciplinary committee  of any State Bar Council and dispose of the same.      Section 37  speaks of  appeal to  the  Bar  Council  of India. This  section states  that any person aggrieved by an order of the disciplinary 312 committee of  a State Bar Council or the Advocate-General of the  state   may,  within   sixty  days   of  the   date  of communication of  the order,  prefer an  appeal to  the  Bar Council of India.      Section 38  provides for  appeal to  the Supreme Court. Section 38 states that any person aggrieved by an order made by the  disciplinary committee  of the  Bar Council of India under section  36 or  section 37  or the Attorney-General of India or  the Advocate-General of the State, as the case may be, may prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court.      Section 49  of the Act provides that the Bar Council of India may make rules for discharging its functions under the Act and  in particular  such rules  may prescribe inter alia the standards  of professional  conduct and  etiquette to be observed by  advocates. The Bar Council of India in exercise of the  rule making  power under section 49(c) of the Act on 10 and  l l  July, 1954,  approved the rules of standards of professional  conduct   and  etiquette.   The  standards  of professional conduct  and etiquette  are described  in  five sections. The  first section deals with duty of advocates to the Court. The second section speaks of duty of advocates to the clients.  The third  section consists of rules regarding duty of advocates to opponent. The fourth section prescribes duties of  advocates to  colleagues. The  fifth section lays down restrictions on advocates on other employments.      The present  appeals touch  on Rule  36 of the Rules of the Bar Council of India. Rule 36 is in fourth section under the heading  "duty to  colleagues Rule  36 speaks  that  "an advocate shall not solicit work or advertise either directly or indirectly,  whether by  circular, advertisements, touts, personal  communications,   interviews  not   warranted   by personal  relations   furnishing   newspaper   comments   or procuring his  photograph to be published in connection with cases in which he has been engaged or concerned.      The question  for consideration  is the  meaning of the words  any   person  aggrieved  by  an  order  made  by  the disciplinary  committee   of  the   Bar  Council  of  India" occurring in section 38 of the Act. It is noticeable that in

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section 37, the Advocate-General of the State and in section 38, the  Attorney-General or  the  Advocate-General  of  the State, as  the case  may be, have been given specific rights of appeal.  These rights  were introduced  into the  Act  by amendments made in the year 1974 by Amending Act 60 of 1973.      In Adi  Pherozshah Gandhi  v. H.  M. Seervai, Advocate- General of  Maharashtra, Bombay(1),  the question which fell for consideration  was  whether  the  appeal  filed  by  the Advocate-General of  Maharashtra before  the Bar  Council of India  was   competent.  The  majority  view  was  that  the Advocate-General of  the State  was not competent to file an appeal to  the Bar Council of India. In the Maharashtra case (supra), the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council was satisfied  that that  there was  no reason  to hold  Adi Pherozshah Gandhi guilty of professional misconduct or other misconduct. The Advocate-General      (1) [1971] 1 S. C. R. 863. 313 of Maharashtra  filed an  appeal before  the Bar  Council of India.  The  appellant  objected  to  the  locus  standi  of Advocate-General before  the  Bar  Council  of  India.  That objection  was   overruled  and  the  appeal  filed  by  the Advocate-General was  accepted by the disciplinary committee of the  Bar Council  of India. The disciplinary committee of the Bar  Council of  India held the advocate, Adi Pherozshah Gandhi guilty  of misconduct and suspended him from practice for one year. The advocate preferred an appeal under section 38 of  the Act  to this Court. In view or majority decision, the appeal  filed by  Adi Pherozshah  Gandhi was accepted by this Court  on  the  ground  that  the  Advocate-General  of Maharashtra was incompetent to file an appeal. It is in this background  that   amendments  have   been  introduced  into sections 37  and 38 of the Act conferring right of appeal on the Advocate-General  of State  and the  Attorney-General of India under sections 37 and 38 respectively.      The respondents  contended on  the ruling of this Court in Adi Pherozshah Gandhi s case (supra) that the Bar Council of the State is not a person aggrieved to maintain an appeal against a  decision of  its disciplinary committee for these reasons. First,  the Bar  Council  of  a  State  is  not  an aggrieved person  because Bar  Council has not suffered ally legal grievance,  and the  decision of  the Bar  Council  of India has  not deprived  the  Bar  Council  of  a  State  of anything.  Second,   the  allegation   that  order   of  the disciplinary committee  of  the  Bar  Council  of  India  is wrongfully made does not by itself give any grievance to the Bar Council  of a State. The person must be aggrieved by the order and  not by the consequences which ensue. Third, it is not the  duty of  the State  Bar Council  to attempt  to set right any alleged error of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council  of India.  The reason  is that no such duty has been imposed  or cast  by law on the Bar Council of a State. Fourth, a  person can  be said  to be  aggrieved by an order which is  to his detriment, pecuniary or otherwise or causes him some  prejudice in  some form  or other.  Fifth, the Bar Council of  a State  is subordinate  to Bar Council of India and is,  therefore, not  competent  to  appeal  against  any orders of  the superior  body. Finally, an appeal could have been filed  by the  Advocate-General or the Attorney-General of India  who have  the right to appeal but they have chosen not to do so.      The scheme and the provisions of the Act indicates that the constitution  of State  Bar Councils  and Bar Council of India is  for one  of the principal purposes to see that the standards of professional conduct and etiquette laid down by

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the Bar Council of India are observed and preserved. The Bar Councils therefore  entertain cases  of  misconduct  against advocates. The  Bar Councils  are to  safeguard the  rights, privilege and  interests of  advocates. The Bar Council is a body corporate.  The disciplinary committees are constituted by the  Bar Council. The Bar Council is not the same body as its disciplinary  committee. One  of the principal functions of the  Bar Council  in regard  to standards of professional conduct and  etiquette of advocates is to receive complaints against advocates  and if  the Bar  Council  has  reason  to believe that any advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. The Bar Coun- 314 cil of  a State  may also of its own motion if it has reason to believe that any advocate has been guilty of professional or other  misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary  committee. It is apparent that a State Bar Council not  only receives  a complaint  but is  required to apply its  mind to  find out  whether there is any reason to believe that  any advocate has ben guilty of professional or other misconduct.  The Bar  Council of  a State acts on that reasoned belief.  The Bar  Council has a very important part to play  first, in  the  reception  complaints,  second,  in forming reasonable  belief of guilt of professional or other misconduct and  finally in  making reference  of the case to its  disciplinary   committee.   The   initiation   of   the proceedings before  the disciplinary committee is by the Bar Council of  a State.  A most  Significant feature is that no litigant and  no  member  of  the  public  can  straightaway commence disciplinary proceedings against an advocate. lt is the Bar  Council of a State which initiates the disciplinary proceedings.      In  finding  out  the  meaning  of  the  words  "person aggrieved by  an order made by the disciplinary committee of the Bar  Council of  India", two  features are to be kept in the fore-front. First, there is no lis in proceedings before the disciplinary  committee. When the disciplinary committee exercises the  power to  reprimand the  advocate, or suspend the advocate  from  practice  or  remove  the  name  of  the advocate, the  committee does  not decide a suit between the parties. The  Bar Council  in placing  a matter  before  the disciplinary committee  does not  act  as  prosecutor  in  a criminal case. A complainant who prefers a complaint against an advocate  is not  like a  plaintiff in  a civil suit. The complaint is  examined by  the Bar  Council in order to find out whether there is any reason to believe that any advocate has been  guilty of  misconduct. ’The Bar Council may act on its own  initiative on  information which  has come  to  its notice in  the course  of its  duties. Second,  there is  no party to the disciplinary proceedings. It is because the Bar Council, the  Attorney-General, the Advocate-General, as the case  may  be,  all  act  in  protecting  the  interests  of advocates, the  interests of  the public. In so acting there is no  conflict between the advocate and another person. The reason is  that it  is  professional  conduct,  professional etiquette, professional ethics, professional morality, which are  to   be  upheld,  transgression  of  which  results  in reprimanding the advocate of suspending him from practice or removing his name from the roll.      With regard  to the conduct of the advocates, the State Bar  Council   plays  an   important  part,   vis-a-vis  the disciplinary committee constituted by the State Bar Council. First, under section 35(1A) of the Act the State Bar Council may either of its own motion or on an application made to it

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by any  person interested,  withdraw  a  proceeding  pending before its  disciplinary committee and direct the inquiry to be made by ant other disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council. This indicates the watch that the State Bar Council has to  keep. Its  task does  not cease  on placing a matter before the  disciplinary committee.  This provision shows on one hand  the abiding  interest of  the State Bar Council in the matter  and on  the  other  the  duty  of  guarding  the professional ethics  with which  it  is  entrusted.  Second, under section  36(2) of  the Act,  a ’State  Bar Council may make a report to the Bar Council of India to 315 withdraw  before  the  disciplinary  committee  of  the  Bar Council of  India any  proceeding  for  disciplinary  action against  any   advocate  pending   before  the  disciplinary committee of  a State Bar Council. These provisions indicate that after  the State  Bar Council  has  placed  the  matter before its disciplinary committee, the Bar Council continues its check  on the  proceedings. These  courses of action are procedural. These  steps do  not give  the State Bar Council any power  to deal  with the  decisions of  the disciplinary committee. The reason why the State Bar Council is empowered under the  Act to withdraw proceedings from one disciplinary committee and give it to another or to have the disciplinary proceedings withdrawn  from the  State for  determination by the disciplinary  committee of  the Bal- Council of India is that the State Bar Council is all the time interested in the task of  preserving the profession against impurities in the standards of  conduct. The  Bar Council  is  the  collective representative of  the lawyers, the public, in regard lo the observance of  professional ethics  by persons  belonging to the noble profession.      The words  ‘person  aggrieved"  are  found  in  several statutes. The  meaning of  the words "person aggrieved" will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of  the statute.  Some times, it is said that the words "person  aggrieved" correspond  to the  requirement of locus standi which arises in relation to judicial remedies.      Where  a   right  of   appeal  to   Courts  against  an administrative or  judicial decision  is created by statute, the right  is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who  claims to be aggrieved. The meaning of the words "a person  aggrieved" may  vary according to the con text of the statute.  One of  the meanings  is that a person will be held to  be aggrieved  by a  decision if  that  decision  is materially adverse  to him.  Normally, one  is  required  to establish  that   one  has  been  ’denied  or  deprieved  of something to  which one is legally entitled in order to make one "a  person aggrieved".  Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden  is imposed  on him. The meaning of the words a "person aggrieved"  is sometimes  given a restricted meaning in  certain   statutes  which   provide  remedies   for  the protection of  private legal  rights. The restricted meaning requires denial  or deprivation  of  legal  rights.  A  more liberal approach  is required  in the background of statutes which do  not  deal  with  property  rights  but  deal  with professional conduct  and morality.  The  role  of  the  Bar Council under the Advocates Act is comparable to the role of a  guardian  in  professional  ethics.  The  words  "persons aggrieved" in  sections 37  and 38  of the  Act are  of wide import  add   should  not   be  subjected  to  a  restricted interpretation of  possession or  denial of  legal rights or burdens or  financial interests.  The test  is  whether  the words "person aggrieved" include "a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially

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affects his  interests". It  has therefore,  to be found out whether the  Bar Council  has a  grievance in  respect of an order or  decision affecting  the professional  conduct  and etiquette.      The pre-eminent  question is: what are the interests of the Bal.  Council? The  interests of the Bar Council are the maintenance  of   standards  of   professional  conduct  and etiquette. The Bar Council has 316 no personal  or pecuniary  interest. the Bar Council has the statutory A  duty and  interest to  see that  the rules laid down by the Bar Council of India in relation to professional conduct and  etiquette are  upheld and not violated. The Bar Council acts as the sentinel of professional code of conduct and is  vitally interested  in the  rights and privileges of the advocates  as well  as the  purity and  dignity  of  the profession.      The interest  of the Bar Council is to uphold standards of professional  conduct and  etiquette in  the  profession, which is  founded upon  integrity and  mutual trust. The Bar Council acts  as the custodian of the high traditions of the noble profession.  The grievance of the Bar Council is to be looked at  purely from  the point  of view  of standards  of professional conduct  and etiquette.  If any decision of the disciplinary committee  of  the  Bar  Council  of  India  is according to  the State  Bar Council  such as will lower the standards and  imperil the high traditions and values in the profession, the  State Bar Council is an aggrieved person to safeguard the  interests of the public, the interests of the profession and the interests of the Bar      The Bar  Council is  "a  person  aggrieved"  for  these reasons First,  the words  "person aggrieved" in the Act are of wide  import in the context of the purpose and provisions of the  statute.  In  disciplinary  proceedings  before  the disciplinary committee  there is  no lis  and there  are  no parties. therefore,  the word  "person" will embrace the Bar Council which  represents the  Bar of the State. Second, the Bar Council  is "a  person aggrieved"  because it represents the collective  conscience of  the standards of professional conduct and etiquette. The Bar Council acts as the protector of the  purity and  dignity of  the profession.  Third,  the function of  the  Bar  Council  in  entertaining  complaints against advocates  is whn  the Bar  Council has  reasonable belief that there is a prima facie case of misconduct that a disciplinary committee  is entrusted with such inquiry. Once an inquiry  starts, the  Bar Council has no control over its decision.  The   Bar  Council  may  entrust  it  to  another disciplinary committee  or the Bar Council may make a report to the  Bar Council  of India.  This indicates  that the Bar Council is  all the  time interested  in the proceedings for the vindication  of discipline,  dignity and  decorum of the profession. Fourth,  a decision  of a disciplinary committee can only  be corrected by appeals as provided under the Act. When the  Bar Council  initiates  proceedings  by  referring cases of  misconduct  to  disciplinary  committee,  the  Bar Council in the performance of its functions under the Act is interested in the task of seeing that the advocates maintain the proper  standards  an(l  etiquette  of  the  profession. Fifth,  the  Bar  Council  is  vitally  concerned  with  the decision in the context of the functions of the Bar Council. The Bar  Council will  have  a  grievance  if  the  decision prejudices the  maintenance  of  standards  of  professional conduct and ethics.      For these  reasons we  hold that  the Bar Council is an aggrieved person to maintain an appeal under the Act.

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    The appeals  will now  be heard on merits by a Division Bench. 317      BEG, J.-I  not only  concur with the conclusion reached by My  Lord the  Chief Justice  and  the  reasons  given  to support it.  but I  think that  we can  and should hold that there was  actually a  "lis" between tho Bar Council and the allegedly delinquent Advocates who were hauled up before its Disciplinary Committee,  on complaints sent by the Executive Committee of the State Bar Council, for what were said to be acts of professional misconduct,      The  learned   Chief  Justice   has  very  clearly  and succinctly set  out the reasons why a State Bar Council is a "person aggrieved"  entitled to  appeal  against  orders  in disciplinary proceedings  against members  of the Bar of the State. It represents the Bar of the State. It is the "keeper of the  conscience" and  the guardian  of the  interests  of members of  the Bar. It acts "as the protector of the purity and dignity  of the (‘ profession." Its function in relation to disciplinary  proceedings,  is  to  entertain  complaints against Advocates,  and, when there is a prima facie case of misconduct, to initiate proceedings by sending the complaint to its  Disciplinary Committee. It has an interest in seeing that correct  decisions are  given  upon  matters  involving allegations of  misconduct against members of the Bar of the State. My  learned brother  Krishna Iyer  has indicated  the wide range  and the  social significance  and dimensions  of this interest.      A State  Bar Council  is composed  primarily of members elected from  amongst Advocates  of a  State. Its  statutory functions are  given in Section 6 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred  to as  ’the Act’).  Amongst these, we are especially  concerned here  with clauses  (c) and (d) of Section 6(t) of the Act, which read as follows:           (c)  to   entertain   and   determine   cases   of                misconduct against advocates on its roll;           (d)  to   safeguard  the  rights,  privileges  and                interests; of advocate on its roll;"      Under Section  9 of  the Act,  the  State  Bar  Council constitutes its  Disciplinary Committee consisting of "three persons of whom two shall be persons elected by the. Council from amongst  its members  and the  other shall  be a person elected by  the Council  from amongst  Advocates who possess the  qualifications  specified....".  Under  Section  10  it elects  an  Executive  Committee  of  five  members  and  an Enrolment Committee  of three  members. Thus,  the State Bar Council operates  through its Committees. Each Committee has distinct and  separable functions. Each could, therefore, be said to have a "persona" and an identity of its own which is distinguishable from  that of  the Bar  Council as  a whole. Each Committee,  no doubt, acts for the Bar Council, but its members are  likely to  be different  although this  is  not necessarily so.  In any case, when the State Bar Council has sent a  case to its Disciplinary Committee, under Section 35 of the  Act, that  Committee proceeds  as an independent and impartial authority  which  tries  a  complaint  and  either dismisses lt  or directs  proceedings to  be filed, or, upon finding  an   advocate  guilty,   punishes  him   by  either reprimanding  him,   suspending  him  from  practice  for  a specified period, or orders removal of his name      7-L 839 Sup CI/75 318 from its roll of advocates. Indeed, Section 42(1) of the Act gives the Disciplinary Committee the powers of a Civil Court under the  Civil Procedure  Code; and,  Section 42(2) enacts

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that its  proceedings  shall  be  "deemed"  to  be  judicial proceedings for the purposes mentioned there.      At the  trial of a complaint, opportunities to be heard must be  given to  the Advocate  General and to the Advocate who is  tried by  it. This  has to be done because there are disputes and  conflicting interests  and points  of view  on which the  Disciplinary Committee has to give its decisions. Tho Advocate General can appear either personally or through an  Advocate  representing  him.  He  presumably  represents public interest  as well  as  the  interests  of  the  legal profession of  which he  is the formal head in the State. It is true  that there is no provision in Section 35 of the Act for impleading the State Bar Council which, on its executive side, initiates  the proceedings  by sending the case to its Disciplinary Committee.  But,  if  the  Bar  Council  has  a separable  interest,   as  a  guardian  of  the  rights  and privileges of  the members of the Bar specifically mentioned by Section  6(1)(d) of  the Act,  there is  no reason  why I right to  represent this interest before its on Disciplinary Committee well  as before  the Bar  Council of  India, on an appeal under  Section 37  of the  Act, or,  on  the  further appeal to  this Court under Section 38 of the Act, should be denied to  it. Neither  Section 37 nor Section 38 of the Act mention  the   State  Bar  Council  as  a  separate  entity. Nevertheless if,  as we  are holding,  it can have the locus standi and  rights of  "person aggrieved",  affected by  the results of  such proceedings,  I see no reason why we should not say  that in  tho position  of a  party to  a "lis" or a dispute between itself and the allegedly delinquent Advocate towards the decision of which the proceedings are directed.      The term  "lis" is  not confined to litigation by means of a suit in a Court of law. In Butler v. Mountgarret it was held that  a "suit  is not  necessary to constitute lis". It was pointed  out there  that "a family ..controversy capable of being  litigated is  a lis  mota’. In  B. Johnson  &  Co. (Builders) v. Minister of Health(2), Lord Greene, M.R. said: ‘"Lis implies  the conception of an issue joined between two parties, The  decision of  a lis..  is the  decision of that issue".      If the State Bar Council, acting through its through it Executive Committee, has found a prima facie case to be send and tried  by its  Disciplinary Committee,  it performs  the functions  of  a  prosecuting  agency.  lt  does  so  i  the discharge of  its duty to safeguard ’‘the rights, privileges and interests’ of advocates as a whole on its roll which are affected by  the  misconduct  of  an  advocate.  There  arc, therefore, triable  issues between it and the; (, individual Advocate accused of misconduct. lt seems to mc that we could and should,  therefore, hold  that the State Bar Council, in its executive  capacity, act  as the  prosecutor through its Executive  Committee   There  is   no  incongruity   in  its Disciplinary  Committee,   representing  is  judicial  want" functioning as  an  impartial  Judge  whose  decisions  ar.. binding upon the State Bar Council. If are were holding that Bar  Council,   dissatisfied  with   a   decision   of   its Disciplinary Committee,  can appeal against it, we her to, I think, as its logical corollary, also hold that it is (1) 7 H. L. Ca. 641.      (2) [1947] 2 All.E. R. 39; At 399. 319 a party  to a  "lis". Our‘  opinion that  it  is  a  ’person aggrieved", within the meaning of that expression as used in Sections 37 and 38 of the Act, necessarily implies that.      The  point   of  view   stated  above  rests  upon  the distinction between  the two  different  capacities  of  the State Bar  Council; an  executive capacity, in which it acts

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as the  prosecutor through  its Executive  Committee, and  a quasi-judicial  function,   which  it   performs  through  s Disciplinary Committee.  If we can make this distinction, as I think  we can,  there is  no merger between the prosecutor and the  Judge here.  If one  may  illustrate  from  another sphere, when  the State  itself gets  through  it  executive agencies to  prosecute and  then though its judicial wing to decide a  case there  is no  breach of  a  rule  of  natural justice. The  prosecutor and  the Judge could not be said to have the  some personality  or approach just because both of them represents  different aspects  or functions of the same State.      For the reasons given above, I do not see any objection to a  participation of  State Bar  Council in  its executive capacity, in  a disciplinary  proceeding against an Advocate on its  roll, either at the initial or the appellate stages. Before it can become a person aggrieved" by an order against which it  could appeal,  there must  have been  a "lis" or a dispute  to  be  decided  which  gives  rise  to  the  order complained of. To such a "lis" the State Bar Council, in its executive capacity must be deemed to be a party. Apparently, its interests are presumed to be sufficiently represented by the Advocate General. Hence, it was not considered necessary to provide  for its  separate representation by  a notice to be given  by its  Disciplinary Committee; is provided for in the case  of the  Advocate General But, their seems to me to be  no   legal  obstacle   in  the   way  of   its  separate representation, if.  it so  desires,  even  before  its  own Disciplinary Committee.  It certainly  has notice  of  every complaint whenever it send it to its Disciplinary Committee. Its right  to appeal  in any event, as a "person aggrieved", seems squarely  covered by the provisions of Sections 37 and 38 of the Act. It may be mentioned here that the respondents themselves treated  the Bar Council as a party interested in a "list",  so that  it could become a "person" aggrieved" by the setting  aside of  the orders  against respondents, when they impleaded  the State  Bar Council  as a  respondent  in their appeals  to the Bar Council India. Its statutory right to appeal  to this Court under Section 38 is not affected by the mere  fact that  it did not put in appearance before the Bar Council of India. KRISHNA IYER,  J.- My concurrence the opinion which has been handed down  by the  learned  Chief  Justice  is  ordinarily dissuasive of  a separated  long note,  save  when  a  fresh perspective is  to be  presented or  new frontiers are to be drawn by  doing so.  Partially, my  supplementary  has  this apology. The tow-day long arguments in this case have been devoted to a construction of two simple words in common use forming the 320 expression ’person  aggrieved’. Precedential  erudition  and traditional approaches  not withstanding,  the  key  to  tho meaning of  the expression in question lies in plain English plus the social fell of the Status and the public commitment of the  legal profession,  the regulation  on which has been achieved by  the Advocates  Act, 1961  (for short,  the Act) wherein the  above words  occur. Legal  scholarship,  to  be fruitful, must  focus on  the life-style  of the law without getting lost in mere logomachy.      The short  question is  as to  whether  the  State  Bar Council is  a person  aggrieved’ within the meaning of s. 38 so that  it has locus standi to appeal to this Court against a decision  of the  Disciplinary Tribunal of the Bar Council of India which, it claims, is  embarrassingly erroneous and, if left  unchallenged, may  frustrate the high obligation of

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maintaining standards  of probity  and purity  and canons of correct professional conduct among the members of the Bar on its rolls.      I skip  the facts  as they  have  been  5  out  in  the judgment of the armed Chief Justice, except to state. that a number of advocates, who are ranged as respondents, had been found guilty  by the  Disciplinary Tribunal of the State Bar Council  of   unseemly  soliciting   but,.  On  appeal.  the disciplinary body  of the  National Bar  Council, exonerated them  on   certain  view  of  ’professional  conduct’  which disturbed the  State Bar  Council and even the All-India Bar Council, with  the result  that the  former came  upto  this Court in  appeal and.  the latter  activity  supported  this stand.      The hackneyed  phrase, ’person  aggrieved is not merely of  frequent   occurrence  m   statutes  and   in  the  writ jurisdiction but  has come  up for judicial consideration in Anglo American  and India  courts in a variety of situations and  legislative   settings.  Notwithstanding  the  slippery semantics of such legalese, the Indian legislative draftsmen have continued  to use them, out of linguistic allegiance to the British  art, and  Indian Judges  have frequently sought interpretative light  from English  authorities  of  ancient vintage.  These   ’borrowed’  drafting   and  interpretative exercises arc  sometimes inept  when time and country change and the  context and text of the statute vary. I stress this aspect since  much of  the time  of the  Courts in  India is consumed by  massive, and  sometimes mechanical, reliance on exotic constructions  and default  in  evolving  legislative simplicity and avoiding interpretative complexity. At a time when our  Courts are  on trial  for  delayed  disposals  and mystifying processes,  this desideratum becomes all the more urgent. Otherwise,  why should decoding a single expression- ’person aggrieved’ take two days of learned length ?      Even.  in   England,  so   well-known  a  Parliamentary draftsman as  Francis Bennion  has recently  pleaded in  the Manchester Guardian  against incomprensible  law  forgetting ’that it  is fundamentally  important in a free society that the law  should  be  readily  ascertainable  and  reasonably clear, and that otherwise it is oppressive and deprives 321 the citizen  of  one  of  his  basic  rights’.  It  is  also needlessly  expensive  and  wasteful.  Reed  Dickerson,  the famous American Draftsman. said: ’lt cost the Government and the public  many millions  of dollars  annually’. The Renton Committee, in  England, has  reported on drafting reform but it is  unfortunate that India is unaware of this problem and in  a  post-Independence  statute  like  the  Advocates  Act legislators should  still get  entangled in  these  drafting mystiques and  judges forced  lo play a linguistic game when the country  has an illiterate laity as consumers of law and the rule of law is basic to our constitutional order.      Back to  the issue.  Is the State Bar Council a ’person aggrieved’? No  narrow. pedantic,  technical or  centenarian construction can  be blindly  applied. On  the other hand, a spacious construction,  functionally informed  by the social conscience and  the salutary  purpose of  the enactment must illumine the  judicial effort.  So viewed, the ample. import and breath of meaning of the words ’person aggrieved’ will . embrace the  State Bar  Council,for reasons  which  1  shall presently set out.      Each statute  has a personality and a message. Judicial interpretation is  not bloodless  and  sterile  exercise  in spinning subtle  webs sometimes  cobwebs, out  of words  and phrases otherwise  simples. but  to unfold the scheme of the

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Legislation insightfully,  sense its social setting and read the plain intendment. This living approach can do justice to law, We  arc here  concerned with a legislative outfit for a national  Bar,  organising  and  prescribing  its  statutory autonomy, elective  structure,  public  functions,  internal regulation and  ultimate appeal  to the  Supreme Court where canons of  good conduct  have  been  allegedly  breached  by delinquent lawyers. This conspectus will show what a vibrant and responsible  role the  Bar Council  has to  play at  the State and  national levels and any interpretation which will detract from this supervisory status of the Bar Council will be   incongruous with the founding creed of the institution. The paramount concern of the Bar Councils is the lawyer, the public and  professional responsibility. Anything that hurts the health  of this  system is  a  social  trauma,  a  legal grievance, a  special injury,  for them. After all, ’lawyer- power’ lasts  not through peak incomes of a few and security of statutory monopoly, but by the high comport and ethics of the many, screening and weeding deviants and delinquents.      Let us  get a  glimpse of  the great expectations about The legal  profession in  society. Long  ago, De  Toqueville trenchantly remarked that the profession of law.           "is the  only aristrocratic  element which  can be      amalgamated without  violence with  natural elements of      democracy.... I  cannot believe  that a  Republic could      subsist if  the influence of lawyers in public business      did not  increase in  proportion to  the power  of  the      people. " He  rightly stressed that ’lawyers belong to the people by birth an.  interest, to the aristocracy by habit and taste’. Thus the profession is 322 the  connecting   link  between   the  community   and   the Administration given  an  enlightened,  goal-oriented  group outgrowing  its  elitist  mores  indeed  today  lawyers  are recruited also  from the  lower  brackets.  India  has  huge number of  law men  who can  be a force. What Prof. Brabanti observed about  the Pakistan Bar has some, only some though, relevance to India, and I quote:           "The sheer  size of  the legal community, strongly      organised into bar associations and closely allied with      equally strong  courts has not only been a major source      for the  diffusion and regeneration of norms generally,      but by  weight of  numbers has  enabled the  courts  to      remain  strong   and  has   prevented   the   rise   of      administrative lawlessness.  There is s curious anomaly      here. The  legal community, while often antagonistic to      government  and   constraining  executive   action,  is      nevertheless   closely   identified   normatively   and      culturally   with    the   bureaucratic   elite.   This      identification curiously coupled with health antagonism      actually enhances  the strength of the legal community.      It  derives   popular  support   from  its   ostensible      opposition to  Government and  at the same time elicits      bureaucratic support  in the community at large. It has      a net  work of  relationships in  rural areas  and  the      cities.. In  short, the  legal community  is a force to      be, reckoned  with. It  has  challenged  the  executive      during and after martial law, it has defined efforts to      restrict   court   jurisdiction,   it   has   compelled      justiciability of  fundamental rights,  it  has  forced      abrogation of  several restrictive  enactments. Is this      law as  an impendiment  to political  development ?  Is      this misallocation  of scarce  resources in the system?      Is this  unproductive use of non productive man-power ?

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    On the  contrary, it  seems to us that this is the Very      genius of political development." Michael Hager,  after quoting  Prof. Brabanti,  comments (in his article in the American Bar Association Journal, January 1972, Vol.  58,  on  .The  Role  of  Lawyers  in  Developing Countries’)      "The legal  profession  has  a  unique  opportunity  to      effect change from within the political elite, to exert      pressure from  without and  to  win  over  the  general      public to  development  policies.  And  as  Mihaly  and      Nelson observed  with respect  to legal education, ’law      graduates usually  fan out not only into legal practice      but  also   into  responsible  positions  in  business,      government and politics’."      The Bar  is not  a private guild, like that of ’barbers butchers and  candlestick-makers’ but,  by bold  contrast, a public institution  committed to public justice and pro bono publico service.  The grant  of monoply  licence to practice law is based on three assumptions There is a socially useful function for  The lawyer  to perform.  (2) The  lawyer is  a professional person  who will perform that function, and (3) His performance  as a  professional person  is regulated  by himself and more normally, by the profession as a whole. The central function 323 That the  legal profession must perform is nothing less than the administration  of justice  (’The Practice  of Law is, a Public Utility’  ‘The Lawyer,  The Public  and  Professional Responsibility’ by  F. Raymond  Marks et al-Chicago American Bar Foundation,  1972, p.288-289). A glance at The functions of the  Bar Council,  and it will be apparent that a rainbow of public  utility duties,  including legal aid to the pour, is cast  on these  bodies in  the  national  hope  that  the members of  this monopoly  will serve  society and  keep  to canons  of   ethics  befitting   an  honourable   order.  If pathological  cases   of  member  misbehaviour  occur,   the reputation and  credibility of  the Bar  suffer a mayhem and who, out  the  Bar  Council,  is  more  concerned  with  and sensitive to  this potential  disrepute The  few black sheep bring about?  The  official  heads  of  the  Bar  i.e.,  the Attorney  General   and  the   Advocates-General   too   are distressed if  a lawyer  ’stoops to  conquer’ by  resort  to soliciting, touting and other corrupt practices.      I may  now refer  to A.  P. Gandhi v. H. M. Seervai (1) where diver  gent opinions  were delivered but all concurred in treating  the Bar  Council as  an ’aggrieved person’. The earlier  decision   in  Bhataraju  (2)  strikes  a  note  in consonance with  this view.  No hesitancy  inhibits me  from hazarding the  opinion that the social canvas must be spread wide when  making out  the profile  of a  statute  like  the Advocates Act  for the  good reason that the Bar has a share in being  the sentinel  on the qui vive when the legal dykes of Right  and justice  are breached  by authoritarianism  or citizen-wrong- doing.  Nor do I conceal my halfhorror at any professional tribunal  glossing over  ’snatching briefs’ and ’dragging clients’-provided  they are  proved-as  less  than gross misconduct.  If the  salt lose their savour, wherewith shall they  be salted  ? However, I hasten to make it plain, to avoid  prejudice to  the parties.  that I  totally desist from pronouncing on the merits of tho evidence in this case.      One more  point. A  case of  professional misconduct is not a lis in the British sense nor a case and controversy in the American  meaning. It  is a  public investigation  about misconduct by one belonging to public profession where every member of  the Bar with a reputation to lose has a stake and

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every one  concerned  with  the  justice  administration  is interested. Traditionally  used to  the adversary system, we search for  individual persons aggrieved. But a new class of litigation public  interest litigation-where  a  section  or whole of  the community  is  involved  (such  as  consumers’ organisations or  NAACP-National Association for Advancement of Coloured  People-in America),  emerges. In  a  developing country  like   ours,  this   pattern   of   public-oriented litigation better  fulfils the  rule of  law if it is to run close to  the rule  of life.  The Bar  Council clearly comes within this  category of  organisations  When  a  lawyer  is involved.      I derive  support for  this philosophy of approach from academic and  judicial opinion  in England  and  America.  A question arose  whether a  railroad company-BAR  (Bangor and Aroostook  Railroad)-could   bring  an  action  against  the stockholders for having drained BAR      (1) [197] I S C. R. 863.          (2) [1955] 1 S. C. R.                                                   1055,1064. 324 improperly. Although  an academic  critic took the view that the District  Court was  incorrect in  its view that BAR was the ’sole  beneficiary’,  he  went  on  to  state  that  the public’s interest  in the financial health of BAR provided a separate interest in bringing the action. The learned author wrote:      "It would  seem to be incontestable that the public has      a very  n real  interest in  rail roads. Railroads have      been found  vital to  a healthy  national economy;  any      such  factor   must.  a  priori,  be  deemed  a  potent      component of the public welfare. As such, it is evident      that a  financially healthy  railroad is of concern not      only to  its stockholders,  but to  the public  as well      Finding  that   the  management   of  a   railroad  has      obligations running  to the public as well as fiduciary      duties owing  to the  corporation’s  stockholders,  the      Court concluded  that, of  these two  responsibilities,      tho  public   interest  is   paramount.  "It   must  be      remembered," the  Court cautioned,  "that railways  are      public    corporations     organized     for     public      purposes....They all primarily owe duties to the public      of a  higher nature  even than  that of  earning  large      dividends for their shareholders."      (Review by  James 1;.  Simon of Bangor & Aroostook R. R      v. Bangor  Punta operations,  Inc (Bangor & Aroostook),      482 F.2d  865 (Ist  Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S.Ct.      863 (1974) Columbia Law Review Vol. 74 No. 3, April 197      p. 528 at pp. 531-532).      Similarly, the  American Supreme Court relaxed from the restrictive attitude  towards ’standing’ in public action in Baker v.  Carr (369  U.S.  186  (1962),  vide  Maryland  Law Review, Vol. XXXIII 1973 p.506:      "In  Baker,   voters  challenged  the  failure  of  the      Tennessee legislature to reapportion itself since 1901;      the plaintiffs  lived l.  in countries which had become      under-represented under  the old law. The Supreme Court      held that  these voters  had the  requisite standing to      challenge the  inaction of  the legislature  The  Court      expanded the  notion cf  direct injury  to include mere      ’debasement’  of   a  vote,   rather  than   the  total      deprivation which had previously been required."      American jurisprudence  has recognised,  for  instance, the expanding  importance  of  consumer  protection  in  the economic system  and  permitted  consumer  organisations  to initiate or  intervene in  actions, although  by the  narrow

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rule of  ’locus standi’,  such a  course could not have been justified (see  p. 807-New  York University Law Review. Vol. 46. 1971). In fact, citizen organisations have recently been Campaigning  for  using  legal  actions  for  protection  of community interest,  broadening the  scope of  ’standing’ in legal proceedings  (see p.403-Boston  University Law Review, Vol. 51, 1971). 325      In the  well-known  case  of  Attorney,General  of  the Gambia v.  Pierr sarr N.’Jie(l), Lord Denning observed about the Attorney-General’s standing thus:           "...The  words  ’person  aggrieved’  are  of  wide      import and  should not  be subjected  to a  restrictive      interpretation. They  do not include, of course, a mere      busy body  who is  interfering. in  things which do not      concern him;  but they  do include  a person  who has a      genuine grievance  because an order has been made which      prejudicially affects  his interests. Has the Attorney-      General a sufficient interest for this purpose ?  Their      Lordships think  that he has. The Attorney General in a      colony represents  the Crown  as the  guardian  of  the      public interest.  It is  his duty  to bring  before the      judge any mis conduct of a barrister or solicitor which      is  of   sufficient  gravity  to  warrant  disciplinary      action." Ray, J  (as he  then was)  crystallised this  ratio in  A.P. Gandhi (supra) thus:      "The Judicial  Committee construed  the  words  ’person      aggrieved’ to include the Attorney General of Gambia as      representing the public interest."                                                      (p.927)      "The profession  touches the public on the one hand and      the courts  on the  other. On  no other basis could the      presence of J., the Advocate General be explained."                                                      (p.928)      Although  not  strictly  confined  to  ’standing’  with reference to  suits jurists  have thrown  some light on this subject. Professor S.A de Smith has observed:      "All developed  legal systems  have  had  to  face  the      problem of  adjusting conflicts  between two aspects of      the public  interest-the  desirability  of  encouraging      individual citizens  to  participate  actively  in  the      enforcement of  the  law,  and  the  undesirability  of      encouraging   the   professional   litigant   and   the      meddlesome interloper to invoke the jurisdiction of the      courts in matters that do not concern him."      (Quoted  ill   ’Standing  Justifiability’   by  V.   S.      Deshpande- Journal  of the  Indian Law Institute-April-      June 1971- Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 174) Professor H.W.R. Wade has observed:      "In other words, certiorari is not confined by a narrow      conception of  locus standi.  It contains an element of      the actio      (1) [1961] A, C. 617. 326      popularis.This is  because it looks beyond the personal      rights A  of tho  applicant; it is designed to keep the      machinery  of   justice  in  proper  working  order  by      presenting inferior  tribunals and  public  authorities      from abusing their powers."      (Standing and Justiciability bid, p. 175) The possible  apprehension that widening legal standing With a public connotation may unloose a flood of litigation which may overwhelm  the judges is misplaced because public resort to court  to suppress  public mischief  is a  tribute to the

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justice system.  In this very case, to grant an exclusionary windfall on the respondents is to cripple the Bar Council in its search for justice and insistence on standards.      I have  been long  on a short point, but brevity, where there is  some thing  to speak, is not the soul of wit but a sign of something different. P.B.R. 327