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PETITIONER: BANSIDHAR AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/03/1989

BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) PATHAK, R.S. (CJ) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) MISRA RANGNATH KANIA, M.H.

CITATION:  1989 AIR 1614            1989 SCR  (2) 152  1989 SCC  (2) 557        JT 1989 (2)   518  1989 SCALE  (1)1091  CITATOR INFO :  R          1990 SC 404  (1)

ACT:             Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955: Chapter III-B and ss. 5(6 A)         and  30E--Ceiling area--Determination of--Effect  of  repe al         of--Proceedings  with reference to appointed date under  t he         Act--Whether  can be initiated and continued under  the  r e-         pealed  provisions, even after coming into effect of  Raja s-         than  Imposition  of Ceiling on Agricultural  Holdings  Ac t,         1973--State’s right to excess land and land-owner’s liabil i-         ty to surrender surplus land, on the appointed  day--Wheth er         a right accrued and liability incurred within the meaning of         clause  (c)  and  (e) ors. 6 of  Rajasthan  General  Claus es         Act--Whether affected by repeal--Sec. 6 of Rajasthan Gener al         Clauses Act--Whether attracted--Whether s. 3 of 1973 Act h as         overriding effect as to exclude operation of the 1955 Act.             Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdin gs         Act,  1973:  Sections  3,  4(1),  15(2)  and  40(1)--Ceili ng         area--Determination of--Repeal of Chapter III-B and s. 5(6 A)         of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955--Effect of--Whether cas es         as on notified date should be decided under old law--Wheth er         rights  accrued and liabilities incurred under the  old  l aw

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       affected--Whether new law has overriding effect over the o ld         one.             General  Clauses  Act,  1897/Rajasthan  General  Claus es         Act,  1955:  Section  6---Applicability  of--In  absence of         express reference to the section or of express provisions to         similar effect in the repealing Act-Repeal and  re-enactme nt         on the same subject--Rights accrued and liabilities incurr ed         under repealed law--Whether effaced.             Statutory  Construction: Repeal and  Saving--Rights  a nd         obligations saved in repealing statute--Whether exhaustive .

HEADNOTE:             Chapter  III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act,  1955  pr e-         scribing  a ceiling on holdings of agricultural  lands,  a nd         cl.(6A)  of  s. 5, defining ’ceiling area’  were  introduc ed         into the Act by the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 196 0.         The notified date under the 1955 Act was         153         1.4.1966. Subsequentiy, on 1.1.1973, by the Rajasthan  Imp o-         sition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Ordinance,  197 3,         these  provisions were repealed, except to the extent  ind i-         cated  in the second proviso to s. 4(1) and s. 15(2) of  t he         Ordinance.  Certain transfers made by the landholders,  ev en         during  the  operation of the-old law,  were  recognised as         valid  transfers for the purpose of computation  of  ceili ng         area  under the new dispensation brought about by the  Ord i-         nance.  The  Ordinance  was replaced by the  1973  Act  wi th         retrospective  effect from 1.1.1973. Section 40 of  the  A ct         repealed  both the old law in Chapter III-B of the 1955  A ct         and the earlier Ordinance.             After the 1973 Act came into force on 1.1.1973 cases f or         determination of ’ceiling-areas’ under Chapter III-B of  t he         1955 Act came to be initiated and were sought to be  conti n-         ued under the repealed Chapter III-B against the  appellan ts         including  the  appellants in C.A. No. 1003(N) of  1977  w ho

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       claimed  to have entered into possession and cultivation of         certain  parcels  of land, pursuant to  agreements  to  se ll         dated 28.4.1957, said to have been executed, in their favo ur         by  the then land holder. The sale deeds in this  case  we re         passed  on 22.8.1966, after the notified  date.  Proceedin gs         for  the fixation of ceiling area in the hands of  the  th en         land-holder  were commenced under the repealed Chapter  II IB         of the 1955 Act, and the purchases in question were held to         be  hit by s. 3ODD of the repealed Chapter III-B, as  appe l-         lants  did not possess the residential qualifications,  pr e-         scribed  by the section for the eligibility for  recogniti on         of such transfers.             The  appellants  approached the High  Court,  contendi ng         that after the coming into force of the 1973 Act which by s.         40,  repealed Chapter III-B of the 1955 Act, recourse  cou ld         not be had to the repealed law for purposes of commencemen t,         conduct  and conclusion of any proceedings for  fixation of         ceiling as prescribed under the old law.             Rejecting  the  contention of the appellants,  the  Hi gh         Court held that the new Act of 1973 did not have the  swee p-         ing effect of destroying all the rights accrued and liabil i-         ties incurred under the old Act.             The  correctness  of  the view of the  High  Court,  w as         challenged in the appeals before this Court. Some other wr it         petitions were also filed directly in this Court.             On the questions whether (a) the scheme contemplated by         the  1973 Act and the different criteria and  standards  f or         the  determination of ceiling area envisaged in it  and, in         particular, having regard to the         154         limited scope of the saving-provision of s. 40 which,  qui te         significantly,  omitted  to invoke and attract s. 6  of  t he         Rajasthan General Clauses Act 1955 to .he repeal of s. 5(6 A)         and  Chapter III-B of the ’1955 Act’, must be construed  a nd         held to manifest an intention contrary’ to and  inconsiste nt         with  the keeping alive or saving of the repealed law so

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as         to  be  invoked in relation to and applied for  the  pendi ng         cases which had not been concluded under the old law  befo re         the  repeal; and (b) even if s. 6 of the  Rajasthan  Gener al         Clauses Act 1955 was attracted and the old law was saved f or         the purpose, provisions of the old law could not be  invok ed         as  no  right had been "accrued" in favour of the  State in         relation to the surplus area determinable under the old  l aw         nor any liability incurred by the land-holders under the o ld         law  so as to support the initiation of the proceedings  f or         fixation of ceiling-area under the old law after its repea l.             Dismissing the appeals, Special Leave Petitions and Wr it         Petitions, this Court,             HELD:  1.1 When there is a repeal of a statute  accomp a-         nied  by  re-enactment  of a law on the  same  subject,  t he         provisions of the new enactment would have to be looked in to         not for the purpose of ascertaining whether the consequenc es         envisaged  by s. 6 of the General Clauses Act ensued or  n ot         but  only for the purpose of determining whether the  prov i-         sions  in  the new statute indicate a  different  intentio n.         [164F-G]         State  of Punjab v. Mohan Singh, [1955] 1 SCR  873  referr ed         to.             1.2 Mere absence of an express reference to s. 6 of  t he         General Clauses Act is not conclusive, unless such  omissi on         is attended with the circumstance that the provisions of t he         new-law  evince and make manifest and intention contrary to         what  would, otherwise, follow by the operation of the  Se c-         tion,  the incidents and consequences of s. 6 would  follo w.         [163A-B]         B. Bansgopal v. Emperor, AIR 1933 All 669 referred to.             1.3 The scheme of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on         Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 does not manifest an  inte n-         tion  contrary to, and inconsistent with, the saving of  t he         repealed  provisions  of s. 5(6A) and Chapter III-B  of  t he         Rajasthan  Tenancy  Act, 1955 so far as  pending  cases  a

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re         concerned,  and the rights accrued and liabilities  incurr ed         under the old law are not effaced. The indicia that the  o ld         law  was not effaced are in s. 15(2) and s. 40(1) read  wi th         second proviso to s. 4(1) of the new Act. [167G; 165E]         155             1.4 The High Court was right in holding that the openi ng         words  of  s. 15(2) "without prejudice to any  other  reme dy         that may be available to it under the Rajasthan Tenancy Ac t,         1955"  clearly showed that the pending cases had to be  go v-         erned  by the old law, and if transactions past  and  clos ed         had  to be reopened and decided afresh under the  provisio ns         of the repealed law, and the ceiling area under Chapter  I II         of  the 1955 Act had to be fixed under its  repealed  prov i-         sions,  then it must follow, as a necessary corollary,  th at         the  pending  cases must be decided under the old  law,  a nd         that  the expression "law for the time being in  force"  d id         not take within its sweep a law "deemed to be in force" an d,         therefore,  the opening words of s. 3 of 1973 Act would  n ot         have  an  overriding effect so as to exclude  the  old  la w.         [167A-D]             Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Anr. v. The State of  Vindh ya         Pradesh,  [1953]  SCR 1188 and Chief Inspector of  Mines v.         K.C. Thapar, AIR 1961 SC 838 referred to.             2.  A  saving provision in a repealing  statute  is  n ot         exhaustive  of  the rights and obligations so saved  or  t he         rights that survive the repeal. [167D-E]             1. T. Commissioner U.P. v. Shah Sadiq and Sons, AIR 19 87         SC 1217 @ 1221 referred to.             3.1 For purpose of clauses (c) and (e) of the  Rajasth an         General Clauses Act, 1955, the "right" must be "accrued" a nd         not merely an inchoate one. the distinction between what is         and  what  is not a right preserved by s. 6 of  the  Gener al         ’Clauses  Act is often one of great fineness. What is  una f-         fected  by  the repeal is a right  ’acquired’  or  ’accrue d’         under the repealed statute and not "a mere hope or  expect a-

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       tion" of acquiring a right or liberty to apply for a  righ t.         [168E]             3.2  The right of the State to the excess land  was  n ot         merely  an inchoate right under the Rajasthan  Tenancy  Ac t,         1955, but a right "accrued" within the meaning of s. 6(c) of         the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955. [172D]             The rights and obligations under s. 30E of the 1955  A ct         had had to be determined with reference to the notified da te         i.e.  1.4.1966. The right of the State, to take over  exce ss         land,  vested in It as on the appointed date, and  only  t he         quantification  remained to be worked out. The liability of         the land-owner to surrender the excess land as on         156         1.4.1966 was a liability "incurred" also within the  meani ng         of the said provision. [170E;171H; 172D]             Lalji Raja v. Firm Hansraj, [1971] 3 SCR 815;  Raghuna th         v.  Maharashtra,  [1972]  1 SCR 48 at  57;  Bhikoba  Shank ar         Dhumal  (dead) by LRs & Ors. v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tathed

JUDGMENT:         Ors.,  [1982]  3  SCR 218 at 228; State  of  Maharashtra v.         Annapurnabai and Ors., [1985] Supp. SCC 273 at 275; Direct or         of  Public  Works v. Ho Po Sany, [1961] 2 All E.R.  721  a nd         M.S.  Shivananda v. K.S.R. Corpn., AIR 1980 SC 77 at 81  r e-         ferred to. &             CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal  Nos.  203 7-         2042 of 1977 etc. etc.             From  the  Judgment and Order dated  21.10.1976  of  t he         Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Special appeal Nos. 8, 20,  2 2,         26, 27 and 28 of 1976.             A.K.  Sen, V.M. Tarkunde, Shanti Bhushan,  Sushil  Kum ar         Jain, N.D.B. Raju, Ram Kalyan Sharma,Jagdish Nandware,  K. B.         Rohtagi,  S.K. Dhingra, R.S. Sodhi and Vineet Kumar for  t he         Appellants.             C.M.  Lodha, Badri Dass Sharma, S.D. Khanduja and  Ind ra         Makwana for the Respondents.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             VENKATACHALIAH,  J. These appeals, by Special Leave  a nd

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       Petitions for grant of Special Leave pertaining to  agrari an         reform  legislation in the State of Rajasthan, arise out of         and  are directed against the judgment dated  21st  Octobe r,         1976,  of a full bench of the High Court of Rajasthan,  di s-         missing  a batch of special appeals and affirming the  jud g-         ment dated 2.12.1975 of the learned Single Judge of the Hi gh         Court rejecting appellants contentions against the  legali ty         of certain proceedings for the fixation of ceiling on  agr i-         cultural  holdings initiated and continued under the  Prov i-         sions  of Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act,  195 5.         In  the Writ-petition filed directly in this  Court  relie fs         similar to those sought before the High Court are claimed.             The  principal  controversy  before High  Court  in  t he         proceedings,  shorn of its niceties and embellishments,  w as         whether  the proceedings for fixation of ceiling  area  wi th         reference to the appointed dated i.e. 1.4.1966 under Chapt er         III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955,         157         (’1955  Act’  for short) could be  initiated  and  continu ed         after  the coming into force of the Rajasthan Imposition of         Ceiling  on Agricultural Holdings Act (Act No. 11  of  197 3)         (’1973  Act’ for short) which w.e.f. 1.1.1973 repealed  Se c-         tion  5(6A)  and Chapter III-B of the old Act, i.e.  ’  19 55         Act’.             2. Chapter III-B, pertaining to imposition of ceiling on         agricultural holdings, in the State of Rajasthan, was intr o-         duced  into the ’1955 Act’ by the Rajasthan Tenancy  (Amen d-         ment)  Act,  1960. As a sequential necessity Section  5  w as         amended  by  the  introduction in it of  Clause  (6A)  whi ch         defined  "ceiling-area".  The notified-date,  as  original ly         fixed, was 1.4.1965; but owing to the uncertainties impart ed         to  the implementation of the law by the challenge  made to         the  provisions of Chapter III-B before the High  Court  a nd         the  interim-orders of the High Court staying the  operati on         of the law, Government had had to re-notify 1.4.1966 as  t

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he         fresh notified-date, after the challenge to the validity of         Chapter III-B had been repelled by the High Court.             By  the  time,  the ’1973 Act’ was  brought  into  for ce         disputes touching the determination of the ceiling areas in         33,471  cases had come to be decided in accordance with  t he         provisions of Chapter III-B of the earlier ’1955 Act’. Aft er         the  ’1973  Act’ came into force on 1.1.  1973,  some  8,4 94         cases  for the determination of ’ceiling-areas’ under  III -B         of the ’1955 Act’ came to be initiated and were sought to be         continued  under  said Chapter III-B of the  repealed  ’19 55         Act’  on  the view that the repeal of Chapter III-B  of  t he         1955 Act by the 1973 Act’ did not affect the rights  accru ed         and  liabilities  incurred under the  old  law.  Appellant s’         principal contention is that after the coming into force of         the  1973 Act which, by its 40th Section,  repealed  Chapt er         III-B  of the ’ 1955 Act’, recourse could not be had to  t he         repealed-law  for  purposes  of  commencement,  conduct  a nd         conclusion  of  any proceedings for fixation of  ceiling as         prescribed  under  the  old law. This  contention  has  be en         repelled by the full bench of the High Court in the judgme nt         under  appeal.  The correctness of view of  the  full  ben ch         arises for consideration in these appeals.             3.  The  factual antecedents in  which  the  controver sy         arose before the High Court may be illustrated by the  fac ts         of  one  of the appeals. In CA 1003(N) of 1977,  the  appe l-         lants’ claim to have entered into possession and cultivati on         of certain parcels of land pursuant to alleged agreements to         sell  dated  28.4.1957 said to have been executed  in  the ir         favour  by the then land-holder, a certain Sri  Hari  Sing h.         The  sale  deeds were passed only on  22.8.1966,  after  t he         notified-date. Proceed-         158         ings  for the fixation of ceiling area in the hands  of  S ri         Hari  Singh were commenced under the Repealed Chapter  III -B

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       of the ’1955 Act’. Appellants’ pruchases were held to be h it         by Section 30 DD of the said Chapter III-B, which prescrib ed         certain residential qualifications, which appellants did n ot         possess, for the eligibility for recognition of such  tran s-         fers. Appellants’ contention is that if the new law had be en         applied  to the case of the vendor, the transfers  in  the ir         favour  would  have  been held valid and  that  invoking of         Chapter  III-B of the repealed law was impermissible.  Apa rt         from the facts of individual cases and their particulariti es         the basic question is one of construction-whether the prov i-         sions of the old law are saved and survive to govern pendi ng         cases.             4.  We  have heard Sri A.K. Sen, Sri  Tarkunde  and  S ri         Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Advocates for the  appellan ts         and  Sri  Lodha, learned Senior Advocate for  the  State of         Rajasthan  and  its authorities. The  appellant’s  princip al         contention--which  we  perceive as one  of  construction of         statutes--is that the later law made manifest, expressly a nd         by necessary implication, an intention inconsistent with t he         continuance of the rights and obligations under the repeal ed         law  and  that,  accordingly, after 1.1.1973,  the  date of         coming  into force of the ’1973 Act’, no  proceedings  und er         the old law could be initiated or continued.             5.  The  points  that fall for  consideration  in  the se         appeals are whether:         (a)  the scheme contemplated by and the  different  criter ia         and standards for the determination of "ceiling-area" envi s-         aged in the ’1973 Act’ and, in particular, having regard to         the  limited  scope of the saving-provision  of  Section 40         thereof  which,  quite significantly, omits  to  invoke  a nd         attract Section 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act  19 55         to  the  Repeal of Section 5(6A) and Chapter  III-B  of  t he         ’1955 Act’ must be construed and held to manifest an  inte n-         tion contrary to and inconsistent with the keeping alive or

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       saving  of the repealed law so as to be invoked in  relati on         to  and  applied for the pending cases which  had  not  be en         concluded under the old law before the repeal; and         (b) that, at all events, even if Section 6 of the  Rajasth an         General  Clauses Act 1955 was attracted and the old law  w as         saved  for the purpose, provisions of the old-law could  n ot         be invoked as no right had been ,"accrued" in favour of         159         the State in relation to the surplus-area determinable und er         the old law nor any liability "incurred" by the land-holde rs         under  the  old law so as to support the initiation  of  t he         proceedings for fixation of ’Ceiling-area’ under the old-l aw         after its repeal.         6. Re: Contentions (a)             In  order that this contention, which is presented  wi th         some perspicuity, is apprehended in its proper prospective  a         conspectus  of the essential provisions of the  earlier  l aw         and  later  law  pertaining to prescription  of  ceiling on         agricultural holdings is necessary.             In 1955, The Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 was enacted. By         the  Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, for the first  tim e,         provisions  in Chapter III-B prescribing a ceiling on  hol d-         ings  of  agricultural lands got introduced into  the  ’19 55         Act’. This amending Act of 1960 received Presidential asse nt         on 12th March 1960. The Chapter III-B was, by an appropria te         notification,  brought  into  force with  effect  from  15 th         December, 1963. The notified-date, under the ’1955 Act’, as         stated earlier, was 1.4.1965.         Section 5(6A) of the’ 1955 Act’ defined ’Ceiling-area’.         "      "Ceiling  area"  in relation to  land  held  anywhe re         throughout the State by a person in any capacity whatsoeve r,         shall  mean  the maximum area of land that may be  fixed as         ceiling area under section 30C in relation to such person; "         Section 30B in Chapter III-B provided:         "30. B. Definitions--For the purposes of this Chapter--               (a)  "family"  shall  mean a family  consisting  of  a         husband  and wife, their children and  grand-children  bei ng         dependent  on them and the widowed mother of the husband

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so         dependent, and               (b)  "person"  in  the case of  an  individual,  sha ll         include the family of such individual."         Section 30C providing for the extent of ceiling area said:         160         "30C. Extent of ceiling area--         The  ceiling  area for a family consisting of five  or  le ss         than five members shall be thirty standard acres of land;                  Provided that, where the members of a family exce ed         five,  the  ceiling area in relation thereto  shall  be  i n-         creased  for each additional member by five standard  acre s,         so  however that it does not exceed sixty standard acres of         land.                  Explanation--A ’standard acre’ shall mean the  ar ea         of  land which, with reference to its  productive  capacit y,         situation, soil classification and other prescribed partic u-         lars,  is  found in the prescribed manner to  be  likely to         yield  ten maunds of wheat yearly; and in case of  land  n ot         capable of producing wheat, the other likely produce there of         shall,  for the purpose of calculating a standard  acre, be         determined  according  to the prescribed scale so as  to be         equivalent in terms of money value to ten maunds of wheat:                  Provided  that,  in determining a ceiling  area in         terms  of standard acres. the money value of the produce of         wellirrigated  (chahi) land shall be taken is being  equiv a-         lent  to the money value of the produce of an equal area of         un-irrigated (barani) land."         In exercise of the Rule making powers under the ’1955  Act ’,         the  State Government framed and promulgated  The  Rajasth an         Tenancy  (Fixation  of Ceiling of  Land)  Government  Rule s,         1963,  which  came  into  force  on  and  with  effect  fr om         15.12.1963.  Rule  9 required that in order  to  enable  t he         Sub-Divisional  Officer  to determine the ceiling  area  a p-         plicable to every person under Section 30C of the Act and to         enforce the provisions of Section 30E, every land-holder a nd         tenant in possession of lands, in excess of the ceiling ar ea         applicable  to  him, shall file a  declaration  within  si

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x-         months  from  the notified-date. The law fixed  30  standa rd         acres as the ceiling area. Thereafter, successive amendmen ts         were  made to Chapter III-B of the ’1955 Act’  which,  whi le         maintaining  the  ceiling  at 30  standard  acres,  howeve r,         recognised certain transfers effected after 1958, which we re         not  originally so recognised in fixing the  ceiling.  Aga in         (by  an  amendment)  of the year 1970, Section  30  (1)  w as         deleted.  The 1955 Act itself came to be included in the IX         Schedule  to  the Constitution by a Parliamentary  law.  T he         challenge to         161         said inclusion was repelled by this Court.             7.  On 1.1.1973, the Governor of the State of  Rajasth an         promulgated The Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agrilcu l-         tural  Holdings  Ordinance, 1973 under Article  213  of  t he         Constitution  of  India. The Ordinance repealed  the  corr e-         sponding  provisions  relating to  ceiling  on  agricultur al         holdings contained in Section 5(6A) and Chapter III-B of t he         ’1955  Act’  except to the extent indicated  in  the  Seco nd         proviso to Section 4(1) and Section 15(2) of the said  Ord i-         nance. The Ordinance brought into existence a new concept of         and standards for the "ceilingarea". Certain transfers  ma de         by the land-holders even during the operation of the old l aw         were recognised as valid transfers for purposes of  comput a-         tion  of  ceiling area under the  new  dispensation  broug ht         about  by the Ordinance. This Ordinance was replaced by  t he         1973  Act  which  was made  operative  retrospectively  fr om         1.1.1973  being the date of promulgation of  the  Ordinanc e.         Section 40 of the ’1973 Act’ repealed, as did the  predece s-         sor-Ordinance,  both  the old law in Chapter  III-B  of  t he         ’1955 Act’ and the earlier Ordinance for which it substitu t-         ed.             Section  3, Section 4(1), Second Proviso and Section 40         of the 1973 Act require particular notice.         Section 3 provides:

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       "3. Act to override other laws, contracts, etc.--         The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstandi ng         anything  inconsistent  contained in any other law  for  t he         time  being  in force, on any custom, usage or  contract or         decree or order of a court or other authority."             The  Second Proviso to the Explanation appended to  Se c-         tion 4(1) of the Act says:         "Provided further that if the ceiling area applicable to a ny         person or family in accordance with this section exceeds t he         ceiling  area applicable to such person or family  accordi ng         to  the  provisions of law repealed by section 40,  in  th at         case  the ceiling area applicable to such person  or  fami ly         will  be  the same as was under the provisions of  the  sa id         repealed law."         162         Section 40 provides:         "40.  Repeal and savings--(1) Except as provided  in  seco nd         proviso  to sub-section (1) of section 4 and  in  subsecti on         (2) of Section 15 of this Act, the provisions of clause (6 A)         of section 5 and Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Ac t,         2955 (Rajasthan Act 3 of 2955) are hereby repealed except in         the  Rajasthan  Canal Project area wherein  such  provisio ns         shall  stand  repealed on the date on which this  Act  com es         into force in that area.                  (2) The Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricu l-         tural  Holdings  Ordinance, 1973 (Rajasthan  Ordinance-I of         1973) is hereby repealed.                  (3)  Notwithstanding the repeal of the  said  Ord i-         nance  under  sub-section (2), anything done or  any  acti on         taken  or any rules made under the said Ordinance  shall be         deemed  to have been done, taken or made under this Act  a nd         section  27  of  the Rajasthan  General  Clauses  Act,  29 55         (Rajasthan  Act  8 of 1955) shall apply to such  repeal  a nd         re-enactment. "             Section  41  contains a statutory declaration  that  t he         ’Act’  is for giving effect to the directive  principles of         State  policy towards securing the principles  specified in

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       Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution of India.             8.  Appellants’ learned counsel contend that when  the re         is a repeal of a statute followed by a re-enactment of a n ew         law  on  the same subject, with  or  without  modification s,         Section  6 of the General Clauses Act is not  attracted  a nd         the  question as to the extent to which the repealed law is         saved would be dependent upon the express provisions of  t he         later  statute or what must be held to be its necessary  a nd         completing implications. It was urged that where the  repe al         is accompanied by a afresh Legislation on the same  subjec t,         the  new law alone will determine if, and how far,  the  o ld         law is saved and that in the absence of an express appeal to         Section  6 of the General Clauses Act or of  express  prov i-         sions  to similar effect in the new law itself,  the  prov i-         sions  of  the  old law must be held to  have  been  effac ed         except whatever had been done, or having effect as if  don e.         This  argument has the familiar ring of what  Sulaiman,  C J.         had said on the matter in Rashid Ahmad v. Mt. Anis Fatima &         Ors., AIR 1933 All. 3. But it         163         must now be taken to be settled that the mere absence of an         express reference to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is         not conclusive, unless such omission to invoke Section 6 of         the  General Clauses Act is attended with  the  circumstan ce         that the provisions of the new-law evince and make  manife st         an  intention contrary to what would, otherwise,  follow by         the  operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,  t he         incidents and consequences of Section 6 would follow.             9. Appellants’ learned counsel submitted that the legi s-         lation  in question pertaining, as it did, to the  topic of         agrarian reform was attendant with the difficulties natura l-         ly besetting a task so inextricably intermixed with  compl ex         and  diverse and, indeed, often  conflicting  socio-econom ic         interests  had had to go through stages of empirical  evol u-         tion  and  that  having  regard  to  the  wide-diversity

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of         policy-options  manifest between the earlier and  the  lat er         legislations,  the conclusion becomes inescapable  that  t he         later  legislation, made manifest an intention  inconsiste nt         with  and  contrary  to the continuance of  the  rights  a nd         obligations under the repealed law. It was agreed that  wi th         the experience gained in the implementation of the policy of         agrarian  reforms  embodied  in the repealed  law,  the  n ew         policy-considerations--reflected  in the new  and  basical ly         different  thinking on some of the vital components  of  t he         new-policy--were evolved and incorporated in the new law, so         much so that the repealed and repealing laws represented t wo         entirely  different systems and approaches to the policy of         agrarian  reforms  and the two systems,  with  their  mark ed         differences on basic and essential criteria underlying the ir         policies,  could not co-exist. It was urged that the  stat e-         ment of objects and reasons appended to the 1973 Bill reco g-         nised  that the legislative policy and technique  underlyi ng         the old law were ineffective in removing the great dispari ty         that  persisted in the holdings of agricultural lands or in         diluting  the  concentration of agricultural wealth  in  t he         hands of a few and recognised the necessity "to reduce  su ch         disparity and to re-fix the ceiling area on the agricultur al         holdings  so  that agricultural land may  be  available  f or         distribution to land-less persons". It was pointed out  th at         material  criteria relevant to the effectuation of the  ne w-         policy  made manifest an intention contrary to the  surviv al         of  the  policy under the old law. The wide changes  in  t he         policy of the later law which reflected a new and  basical ly         different approach to the matter, included (i) a fundament al         rethinking on the concept of the "ceilling-area" by reduci ng         the 30 standard acres prescribed in the old law to 18 stan d-         ard  acres;  (ii) the re-definition of the very  concept of

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       ’family’  and ’separate unit’; (iii) the point of time  wi th         reference  to  which  the composition and  strength  of  t he         family would require to be ascertained; (iv) a re-         164         thinking, and a fresh policy as to the recognition of tran s-         fers  made  by land-holders including even  those  transfe rs         made during the period of operation of the old law; (v)  t he         point of time of the vesting of the surplus land in  Gover n-         ment; (vi) the re-defining of the principles and  prioriti es         guiding  the  distribution of the surplus land  to  landle ss         persons, and (vii) the amount to be paid to the land holde rs         for the excess land vesting in the State under the new law .             It  was  submitted that the two laws--the  old  and  t he         new-envisaged  two  totally  different sets  of  values  a nd         policies  and were so disparate in their context and  effe ct         as  to  yield the inevitable inference that the  policy  a nd         scheme  of the later law, by reason alone of the  peculiar i-         ties and distinction of its prescriptions, should be held to         manifest an intention contrary to the saving of the old  l aw         even  respective  pending cases. The ceiling  laws,  it  w as         submitted,  envisage  and provide an integrated  and  inte r-         connected  set of provisions and the marked distinctions in         the  vital provisions in the two sets of laws  rendered  t he         continued  applicability  of the old law to  any  case,  n ot         already  finally concluded thereunder, as  impermissible in         law as unreasonable in its consequences if permitted. It w as         urged that Section 3 of the 1973 Act was a clinching indic a-         tor  in this behalf when it provided that the provisions of         the  later law "shall have effect  notwithstanding  anythi ng         inconsistent  contained in any other law for the time  bei ng         in  force,  or any custom, usage, or contract or  decree or         order of a Court or other authority" (underlining  supplie d)         and that the old Act, even if it was, otherwise, held to be         in  force  in relation to pending cases, was  clearly  ove

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r-         borne by Section 3 of the new law.             When  there is a repeal of a statute accompanied by  r e-         enactment  of a law on the same subject, the  provisions of         the  new enactment would have to be looked into not for  t he         purpose  of ascertaining whether the consequences  envisag ed         by  Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act ensued or not--Sec.  6         would  indeed be attracted unless the new legislation  man i-         fests  a  contrary intention--but only for  the  purpose of         determining whether the provisions in the new statute  ind i-         cate  a different intention. Referring to the way  in  whi ch         such incompatibility with the preservation of old rights a nd         liabilities  is  to be ascertained this Court  in  State of         Punjab v. Mohar Singh, [1955] 1 SCR 893 said:                   "  .......  Such incompatibility would have to be         ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant  prov i-         sions of the new Law and the mere absence of a saving         clause is by itself not material. The provision of Sec. 6 of         165         the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal  ev en         if there is simultaneous enactment unless a contrary  inte n-         tion can be gathered from the new enactment. Of course,  t he         consequences  laid down in Section 6 of the Act  will  app ly         only  when  a statute or regulation having the  force  of  a         statute is actually repealed"  ....             Addressing itself to the question whether, having rega rd         to the particular provisions of the 1973 Act, the  inferen ce         that  the  new law manifests such contrary  intention  cou ld         justifiably be drawn, the High Court observed:                   "We  have, therefore, to examine whether  the  n ew         law  expressly or otherwise manifests an intention  to  wi pe         out  or  sweep away those rights and liabilities  which  h ad         accrued and incurred under the old law  ......  "                   "Having carefully gone through all the authoriti es         cited by the parties as referred to above, we are of opini on         that  the new Act of 1973 does not have the sweeping  effe ct         of  destroying  all the rights accrued and  liabilities  i

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n-         curred under the old law  .......  "             10. One of the indicia that the old law was not  effac ed         is  in  sec. 15(2) of the new Act. It provides that  if  t he         State  Government was satisfied that the  ’ceiling-area’ in         relation  to  a person as fixed under the old-law  had  be en         determined  in  contravention of that law,  a  decided  ca se         could  be re-opened and inquired into it and  the  ’ceilin g-         area’ and the ’surplus area’ determined afresh in accordan ce         with  the provisions of the old law. Another indicium is in         Sec.  40(1)  read with the Second Proviso to Sec.  4(1)  o f’         1973 Act’ which provides that if the ceiling area applicab le         to  a  person or a family in accordance with the  said  Se c.         4(1)  exceeds the ’ceiling-area’ applicable to such  perso ns         or  family,  under  the old law,  then,  the  ’ceiling-are a’         applicable to such person or family would be the same as w as         provided under the provisions of the old law.             The  High Court relied upon and drew sustenance for  i ts         conclusion  from, what it called, the internal  evidence in         the  Act which, according to the High Court, indicated  th at         pending-cases  were governed only by the old law.  The  Hi gh         Court  referred to sec. 15(2) inserted by Act No. 8 of  19 76         and  what,  according to it, necessarily flowed from  it in         support of its conclusion. Sec. 15(2) inserted by Act No.  8         of 1976         166                  "(2) Without prejudice to any other remedy that m ay         be  available  to it under the Rajasthan Tenancy  Act,  19 55         (Rajasthan  Act 3 of 1955), if the State  Government,  aft er         calling  for the record or otherwise, is satisfied that  a ny         final  order passed in any matter arising under  the  prov i-         sions  repealed by Section 40, is in contravention  of  su ch         repealed  provisions and that such order is  prejudicial to         the State Government or that on account of the discovery of         new and important matter or evidence which has since come to

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       its notice, such order is required to be re-opened, it  ma y,         at  any time within five years of the commencement  of  th is         Act,  direct any officer subordinate to it to  re-open  su ch         decided  matter and to decide it afresh in  accordance  wi th         such repealed provisions."         (Emphasis Supplied)             The  High  Court referring to the opening words  of  t he         above provisions observed:         "The opening words of the section ’without prejudice to  a ny         other remedy that may be available to it under the Rajasth an         Tenancy  Act, 1955 (Act No. 3 of 1955)’, clearly  show  th at         the  pending  cases have to be governed by the old  law. If         transactions past and closed have to be reopened and decid ed         afresh  under  the provisions of the repealed law,  and  t he         ceiling area under Chapter III of the Rajasthan Tenancy Ac t,         1955, has to be fixed under its repealed provisions, then it         must follow as a necessary corollary, that the pending cas es         must be decided under the old law."             11.  Sri Lodha, learned counsel for the State of  Raja s-         than submitted that the ’ceiling-area’ had to be fixed  wi th         reference to the notified date i.e. 1.4.1966 by the statut o-         ry standards prescribed under the Chapter III-B of the ’19 55         Act’.  The two legislations are complementary to each  oth er         and constitute two tier provisions. So far as the cases th at         attracted  and fell within Chapter III-B of 1955 Act, as on         1.4.1966,  would continue to be governed by that law as  t he         fights  and  obligations created by the said  Chapter  III -B         amounted to create rights and incur liabilities. Shir  Lod ha         submitted that the view taken by the High Court was unexce p-         tionable.         12..  On a careful consideration of the matter, we  are  i n-         clined to         167         agree  with the view taken by the High Court on  the  poin t.         The  reliance placed by appellants’ learned counsel  on  t he         provisions  of  Sec. 3 of 1973 Act as  detracting  from  t he

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       tenability  of the conclusion reached by the High  Court on         the point is, in our opinion, somewhat tenuous. The  conte n-         tion of the learned counsel is that the expression "notwit h-         standing  anything inconsistent contained in any  other  l aw         for  the time being in force" in Section 3 of the  1973  A ct         would  exclude the operation of Chapter III-B of  the  ’19 55         Act’ which, according to the contention, even if kept  ali ve         would yet be a ’law for the time being in force’ and, ther e-         fore,  be excluded by virtue of Section 3.  This  contenti on         has  been  negatived by the High Court--and in  our  opini on         rightly--by  placing reliance on the pronouncements of  th is         Court  in  Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Anr. v. The  State of         Vindhya  Pradesh,  [1953] SCR 1188 and’ Chief  Inspector of         Mines  v. K.C. Thapar, AIR 1961 SC 838. The High Court  he ld         that  the expression "law for the time being in force"  do es         not take within its sweep a law ’deemed to be in force’  a nd         that,  accordingly, the opening words of Sec. 3 relied  up on         by the Appellants’ learned counsel will not have an overri d-         ing effect so as to exclude the old law.             13.  A  saving provision in a repealing statute  is  n ot         exhaustive  of  the rights and obligations so saved  or  t he         rights that survive the repeal. It is observed by this Cou rt         in 1.T. Commissioner, U.P. v. Shah Sadiq & Sons, AIR 1987 SC         1217 at 1221:                   "   .......   In other words whatever  rights  a re         expressly saved by the ’savings’ provision stand saved. Bu t,         that  does not mean that rights which are not saved  by  t he         ’savings’  provision  are extinguished or stand  ipso  fac to         terminated by the mere fact that a new statute repealing t he         old statute is enacted. Rights which have accrued are  sav ed         unless they are taken away expressly. This is the  princip le         behind Sec. 6(c), General Clauses Act, 1897  ......  "         We agree with the High Court that the scheme of the 1973 A ct         does not manifest an intention contrary to, and inconsiste nt

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       with,  the saving of the repealed provisions of  sec.  5(6 A)         and Chapter III-B of ’1955 Act’ so far as pending cases  a re         concerned  and that the rights accrued and  liabilities  i n-         curred  under the old law are not effaced. Appellant’s  co n-         tention (a) is, in our opinion, insubstantial.         14. Re: Contention(b):         This  takes us to the next question whether in  the  prese nt         cases         168         even  if the provisions of Sec. 6 of the  Rajasthan  Gener al         Clauses Act, 1955, are, attracted, the present cases did n ot         involve any rights "accrued" or obligations "incurred" so as         to  attract  the old law to them to  support  initiation or         continuation  of  the proceedings against  the  land-holde rs         after  the repeal. It was contended that even if the  prov i-         sions  of the old Act were held to have been saved it  cou ld         not  be said that there was any right accrued in  favour of         the  State or any liability incurred by the land holders in         the  matter of determination of the ’ceiling-area’ so as to         attract  to their cases the provisions of the old  law.  T he         point’ emphasised by the learned counsel is that the exces s-         land  would vest in the State only after the  completion of         the  proceedings  and upon the  land-holder  signifying  h is         choice  as  to the identify of the land to  be  surrendere d.         Clauses  (c)  and  (e) of Sec. 6 of  the  Rajashtan  Gener al         Clauses Act, 1955, provide, respectively, that the repeal of         an  enactment  shall not, unless a different  intention  a p-         pears, "affect any right privilege, obligation, or  liabil i-         ty,  acquired, accrued, or incurred under any  enactment so         repealed" or "affect any investigation. legal proceeding or         remedy in respect of any such right, privilege,  obligatio n,         liability,  fine,  penalty,  forfeiture,  or  punishment as         aforesaid."             For  purposes  of  these clauses  the  "right"  must be         "accrued"  and not merely an inchoate one.  The  distincti on

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       between what is and what is not a right preserved by Secti on         6  of the General Clauses Act, it is said, is often  one of         great fineness. What is unaffected by the repeal is a  rig ht         ’acquired’  or ’accrued’ under the repealed statute and  n ot         "a mere hope or expectation" of acquiring a right or liber ty         to apply for a right.             In  Lalji  Raja v. Firm Hansraj, [1971] 3 SCR  815  th is         Court  dealing  with the distinction between  the  "abstra ct         rights" and "specific rights" for the purpose of the  oper a-         tion of Sec. 6 of General Clauses Act said:                  "That  a  provision to preserve the  right  accru ed         under  a  repealed  Act ’was not intended  to  preserve  t he         abstract  rights conferred by the repealed Act   ...... It         only applied to specific rights given to an individual  up on         happening  of  one or the other of the events  specified in         statute’--See Lord Atkin’s observations in Hamilton Gell v.         White,  [1922]  2 K.B. 422. The mere right, existed  at  t he         date  of repealing statute, to take advantage of  provisio ns         of the statute repealed is not a ’right accrued’ within  t he         meaning         169         of the usual saving clause--see Abbot v. Minister for Land s,         [1895] A.C. 425 and G. Ogden Industries pry. Ltd. v.  Luca s,         [1969] 1 All E.R. 121"             15. To ascertain whether these were ’accrued’ rights a nd         ’incurred’  liabilities a reference Section 30E of  the  r e-         pealed law is necessary.         Sec. 30-E of 1955 Act provides:                   "30-E. Maximum land that can be held and  restri c-         tion on future acquisitions:                   (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this A ct         or  in any other law for the time being in force, no  pers on         shaH,  as  from a date notified by the State  Government in         this behalf:--                   (a)  Continue to hold or retain in his  possessi on         in  any  capacity and under any tenure  whatsoever  land in         excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, or                   (b) acquire, by purchase, gift, mortgage,  assig

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n-         ment,  lease,  surrender or otherwise or  by  devolution or         bequest, any land so as to effect an increase in the  exte nt         of his holding over the ceiling area applicable to him;                   Provided  that different dated may be so  notifi ed         for different areas of the State.                   (2) Every person, who, on such date, is in posse s-         sion of land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to h im         or  who  thereafter  comes into possession of  any  land by         acquisition  under  clause (b) of  sub-section  (1),  shal l,         within  six  months of such date or within three  months of         acquisition,  as  the  case may be, make a  report  of  su ch         possession  or  acquisition  to, and  shall  surrender  su ch         excess  land  to the State Government and place  it  at  t he         disposal  of the Tehsildar within the local limits of  who se         jurisdiction such land is situate.         ...........  (Omitted as unnecessary)         170                  (3)  Any  person failing intentionally  to  make  a         report  or to surrender land as required by sub-section  ( 2)         shall,  on conviction, be punishable with a fine  which  m ay         extend to one thousand rupees.                  (4)  Without  prejudice  and in  addition  to  su ch         conviction  and fine the person retaining possession of  a ny         land  in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him  sha ll         be  deemed to be a trespasser liable to ejectment from  su ch         excess land and to pay penalty in accordance with clause ( a)         of sub-section (i) of section 183;                  Provided that the lands, from which a person  sha ll         be so ejected shaH, as for as may be, un-encumbered lands.                  (5)  All  lands coming to the State  Government by         surrender  under sub-section (2) or by ejectment under  su b-         section (4) shall vest in it free from all encumberances.         .........  (Omitted as unnecessary)"             The rights. and obligations under this provision had h ad         to  be determined with reference to the notified  date  i. e.         1.4.1966. Referring to analogous provision of the  Maharas h-         tra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, th is

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       Court  in  Raghunath v. Maharashtra, [1972] 1 SCR 48  at 57         observed:                  "The scheme of the Act seems to be to determine t he         ceiling area of each person (including a family) with refe r-         ence to the appointed day. The policy of the Act appears to         be  that  on and after the appointed day no  person  in  t he         State should be permitted to hold any land in excess of  t he         ceiling  area as determined under the Act and  that  ceili ng         area  would be that which is determined as on the  appoint ed         day..."             16.  Again  in Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal (dead) by  LRs. &         Ors.  v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tathed & Ors., [1982] 3 SCR  2 18         at 228, it was observed:                   "A  close reading of the aforesaid  provisions of         the  Act shows that the determination of the extent of  su r-         plus  land  of a holder has to be made as on  the  appoint ed         day. If         171         any  person has at any time after the fourth day of  Augus t,         1959, but before the appointed day held any land  (includi ng         any  exempted  land)  in excess of the  ceiling  area,  su ch         person  should  file a return within the  prescribed  peri od         from the appointed day furnishing to each of the  Collecto rs         within whose jurisdiction any land in his holding is situa t-         ed, in the form prescribed containing the particulars of a ll         land  held  by him. If any person acquires, holds  or  com es         into  possession of any land including any exempted land in         excess  of the ceiling area on or after the  appointed  da y,         such  person has to furnish a return as stated above  with in         the prescribed period from the date of taking possession of         any land in excess of the ceiling area  ............  "             A contention similar to the one urged for the appellan ts         here  that the title respecting the surplus land would  ve st         in  the Government upon such land being taken possession of         by  Government after the declaration regarding  the  surpl us         was noticed in that case. But, it was held that the liabil

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i-         ty  to  surrender the surplus land would date  back  to  t he         appointed day. This Court said:                   "   ......  Any other construction would make  t he         Act  unworkable and the determination of the extent of  su r-         plus land of a holder ambulatory and indefinite  ......  "         This  was again reiterated in State of Maharashtra v.  Ann a-         purnabai  and Ors., [1985] Supp. SCC 273 at 275. This  Cou rt         said:         "   ....   Section 21 of the Act no doubt  states  that  t he         title of the holder of the surplus land would become  vest ed         in  the State Government only on such land being taken  po s-         session of after a declaration regarding the surplus land is         published in Official Gazette. But the liability to  surre n-         der  the surplus land relates back to the appointed  day in         case of those who held land in excess of the ceiling on  t he         appointed  day.  Therefore, even if the holder  dies  befo re         declaration  of  any part of his land as surplus  land,  t he         surplus  land is liable to be determined with  reference to         his holding on the appointed day  ....  "             17.  It is, therefore, seen that the right of the  Sta te         to  take over excess land vested in it as on  the  appoint ed         day  and only the quantification remained to be worked  ou t.         As observed by Lord Morris, in         172         Director  of Public Works v. Ho Po Sang, [1961] 2 All.  E. R.         721.         "It may be, therefore, that under some repealed enactment,  a         right  has  been  given, but that, in respect  of  it,  so me         investigation or legal proceeding is necessary. The right is         then unaffected and preserved. It will be preserved even if         a  process  of quantification is necessary. But there  is  a         manifest distinction between an investigation in respect of         a right and an investigation which is to decide whether so me         right  should  be or should not be given. On  a  repeal  t he         former is preserved by the Interpretation Act. The latter is         not."

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           The above passage was referred to with approval in  M. S.         Shivananda v. K.S.R.T. Corpn., AIR 1980 SC 77 at 81.             18.  We agree with the High Court that the right of  t he         State  to the excess land was not merely an  inchoate  rig ht         under  the Act, but a right "accrued" within the meaning of         sec.  6 (c) of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955,  a nd         the liability of the land-owner to surrender the excess la nd         as  on 1.4.1986 was a liability "incurred" also  within  t he         meaning  of  the said provision. There is  no  substance in         contention (b) either.             19.  These  Appeals,  Special Leave  Petitions  and  t he         WritPetition,  accordingly, fail and are dismissed.  In  t he         circumstances  of  the case, there will be no  order  as to         costs.         N.P.V.                 Appeals & Petitions dismissed.                                         1 ?173