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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  971 of 2003

PETITIONER: Bangalore Development Authority & Others

RESPONDENT: R. Hanumaiah & Others                            

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/10/2005

BENCH: ASHOK BHAN & S.B. SINHA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

BHAN, J.  

       This appeal is directed against the judgment of  the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in  Writ Petition No.727 of 1989 wherein and whereunder  the Division Bench while setting aside the judgment  of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition  No.15487 of 1987 issued a direction to the  Bangalore Development Authority (for short "the  BDA"), the appellant herein, to issue possession  certificate to the writ petitioner i.e. the 1st  respondent herein in respect of 6 acres and 20  guntas of land as per its Resolution dated  19.4.1972 and to allot alternative plots/sites of  equal size to the persons who had been allotted  sites carved out of 6 acres and 20 guntas of land

       The City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 was  enacted by the then Government of Mysore.  Under  Section 3 of the said Act a Board of Trustees was  constituted to implement the purposes of the Act.   The Board (commonly known as CITB) was given the  power to draw the improvement scheme and for  undertaking any work for improvement or development  of any area in or around the city of Bangalore.    The Board was also given the power to acquire land  by agreement and was deemed to be a local authority  for the purposes of Section 50(2) of the Mysore  Land Acquisition Act which was in pari materia with  the Land Acquisition Act of 1894.

On 28.1.1960 a preliminary notification dated  26.11.1959 was published in the official Gazette  proposing to acquire the land of the 1st respondent  for formation of a scheme to set up a layout called  the Koramangala Layout.  Final notification was  published on 28.9.1965 and the award was made on  29.11.1966.  The amount of compensation was paid  and in some cases it was deposited in the treasury.   1st respondent sought a reference for enhancement of  the compensation.  In the cases in which a  reference had been sought by the 1st respondent the  amount of compensation was deposited in the Civil  Court.  Immediately after the passing of the award  the possession of the land in question was taken.

On 26.6.1968 a resolution was passed by the

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CITB Bangalore (wrongly typed as 26.6.1969 in the  impugned judgment) to re-convey an extent of 8  acres and 21 guntas of the land out of the total  land acquired to the 1st respondent.  On 19.4.1972  another resolution was passed by the CITB modifying  its earlier resolution and agreeing to re-convey 6  acres, 20 guntas and 44 square yards in favour of  the 1st respondent subject to the following  conditions.

"1. He should arrange to withdraw  immediately the cases pending in the civil  court.

2. He should withdraw the compensation  deposited in the court and State Huzur  Treasury and re-deposit the same to the  CITB funds within 30 days.

The details of compensation deposited are  noted below.  The Additional Special Land  Acquisition Officer (CITB) may be  consulted if any difficulty arises in  withdrawing the amounts in courts or State  Huzur Treasury.

1. S.  No.32/6 Rs.24,845. 17 Civil Judge’s Court 2.  S.  No.32/8 Rs.   2,763.45 Civil Judge’s Court 3.  S.  No.32/9 Rs.   1,265.00 State Huzur Treasury 4.  S.  No.32/11 Rs.   3,004.37 Civil Judge’s Court 5.  S.  No.32/12 Rs.   6,008.75 Civil Judge’s Court 6.  S.  No.32/10 Rs.   1,265.00 State Huzur Treasury

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---------- -- Rs.39,151. 74

Compensation paid in respect of Sy.  No.32/17 amount to Rs. 3,162.50 ps. may  also be credited to the CITB funds,  together with interest at 9% on the  compensation amount drawn upto the date of  repayment. Possession of S.No.26/1 may be handed over  to the Additional Special Land Acquisition  Officer immediately, and informed to take  further action. "

It is suffice to mention that in so far as the  refund of compensation amount was concerned it was  found to be neither feasible nor practicable for  the 1st respondent to withdraw the amount and re- deposit it and he, therefore, gave it in writing to  the authority that these amounts would not be  withdrawn by him or claimed by him whereupon the  amounts in question were ultimately re-claimed by  the authority. He withdrew his reference  applications filed under Section 18 of the Act.    

On 10.7.1974 layout plan was approved by the  CITB in respect of the land which had been acquired  for the development of the area.  In the layout  plan the land to the extent of 6 acres and 20  guntas was shown separately being reserved for re- conveyance.   

In the year 1976, The City of Bangalore  Improvement Act, 1945 was repealed and in its place  Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 was  enacted.  Bangalore Development Authority  constituted under the 1976 Act succeeded to the  City Improvement Trust Board.

The resolution passed by the CITB to re-convey  6 acres and 20 guntas of land was not given effect  to as the High Court of Karnataka in a series of  judgment held that the land acquired for the  development scheme could not be returned or re- conveyed to the owner and that it must be applied  for the purpose for which it was acquired and the  sites formed therein should be distributed  according to the allotment rules.  In view of the  declaration of law made by the High Court the  resolution was not given effect to by the BDA and  sites were formed by the appellant in the said 6  acres and 20 guntas of land and the sites were  allotted sometime in the year 1985-86.

After the formation of sites in said 6 acres  and 20 guntas and their allotment the 1st respondent  approached the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore  seeking a writ of mandamus directing the BDA to re- convey 6 acres and 20 guntas of land as per  resolution of CITB dated 19.4.1972.   A learned  Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ  petition summarily at the admission stage as being

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concluded by the decision of the High Court in B.N.  Sathyanarayana Rao Vs. State of Karnataka , ILR  1987 Karnataka 790.   The writ appeal filed by the  1st respondent was also dismissed summarily at the  initial stage as being covered by the earlier  decisions of the High Court.  1st respondent  thereafter approached this Court in CA.5165 of 1992  and this Court by its order dated 31.1.2001  accepted the appeal and set aside the orders  impugned in the appeal and remitted the case back  to the Division Bench to reconsider the appeal on  merits in view of the contentions raised on behalf  of the 1st respondent that in a later judgment in  Muniyappa Vs. Bangalore Development Authority , ILR  1992 Karnataka 125, the High Court of Karnataka had  taken a view that re-conveyance was permissible.  

The Division Bench after remand considered the  matter afresh and set aside the judgment of the  Single Judge inter alia holding that there was  change in the judicial thinking and in Maniyappa’s  case (supra) the Division Bench taking a wider  perspective of the entire case law had held that it  was permissible to restore or re-allot the land to  the owners.  That in the previous judgments  rendered, the High Court had failed to take into  consideration certain important factors such as  that the State being the acquiring authority and  the BDA being the beneficiary only, the State could  withdraw the acquisition or prune the area of  acquisition.  Drawing support from Section 21 of  the General Clauses Act it was held that the  authority vested with the power to do a thing had a  corresponding right to undo it as well.   Since the  State was the acquiring authority it could withdraw  the acquisition or prune the area of acquisition.   That the BDA was barred by doctrine of promissory  estoppel to withdraw/not act upon the resolution  dated 19.4.1972 specially when the 1st respondent in  pursuance to the resolution passed had acted  prejudicially to his interest.  That the decision  of the CITB was binding on the BDA being a  successor.  It was further held that land which was  the subject matter of the resolution of re- conveyance could not and should not have allotted  at all.  That the acquisition proceedings in the  process of vesting of the land had not reached  finality in respect of 6 acres and 20 guntas of  land as 1st respondent had re-deposited the amount  of compensation as per resolution dated 19.4.1972  and thus had not received the amount of  compensation.  In view of the above findings the  Division Bench held that there was no necessity to  give a direction to re-convey the land but the  proper direction would be to direct the BDA to  issue the possession certificate to 1st respondent  in respect of the land which is the subject matter  of the writ petition.   It was further held that  since the allottees of the sites out of 6 acres and  20 guntas were likely/bound to be affected by the  order a direction was required to be issued to BDA  to allot equivalent sites/plots of land to such  allottees within 4 months of the passing of the  order.

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Learned counsels for the parties have been  heard at length.  

A Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka  in Writ Appeal No.729 of 1983 (Sri. A.V. Lakshman  Vs. B.D.A. & Others) upheld the order of the Single  Judge by observing that the owners of the land did  not have a right in law to seek re-conveyance of  the acquired land.  Another Division Bench in Writ  Appeal No.581 of 1975 (Rachappa & Others Vs.  State  & Others) held that the lands acquired become the  property of the Trust Board and it has to be dealt  with in accordance with the law and owners of the  land in the absence of a statutory provision  entitling them to get the land re-conveyed would  not be entitled to seek relief from the Court under  Article 226 of the Constitution of India.  It was  observed as under:-  

"Assuming for the sake of  argument that the other lands  which have been acquired by the  Trust Board have been re-conveyed  that by itself is not sufficient  to hold that the appellants have  a legal right in their favour for  getting the lands acquired from  them re-conveyed to them.  When  the lands are acquired by the  Trust Board they become the  property of the Trust Board and  the Trust Board has to deal with  its own sites in accordance with  law.  In the absence of a  statutory provision entitling the  appellants to get re-conveyance  they would not be entitled to  seek any relief from this Court  under Article 226 of the  Constitution on the ground that  the Trust Board has in similar  cases re-conveyed lands in favour  of persons from whom they were  acquired.  Hence this prayer  cannot be granted."

       A single Judge in Writ Petition No.8321 of 1984  (H.N. Abdul Rehman Vs.  State & Others) again held  that Bangalore Development Authority had no power  to pass a resolution of re-conveyance.  It was  observed that it was not open to the BDA to pass a  resolution to re-convey the property and create a  right in favour of the owner-writ petitioner. In  B.N. Satyanarayan Rao Vs. State of Karnataka a  learned Single Judge, [which decision was later on  affirmed by the Division Bench] held that there was  no provision in the Act and the Rules framed  thereunder enabling the BDA to re-convey the sites.   Re-conveyance was opposed to the scheme itself.   The scheme was framed for forming of sites and  allotting them as per rules.  The rules did not  provide for re-conveyance and, therefore, it was  not possible to hold that there is any right to  seek re-conveyance.  It was also held that it was

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not possible to apply the rule of promissory  estoppel on the facts of the case as there was no  provision in the Act, or in the Rules framed  thereunder enabling the BDA to allot or re-convey  the sites in the manner proposed to be done by the  Notification.  Therefore, the BDA could not be  directed to allot or re-convey the sites on the  ground that it had promised to allot or re-convey  the sites.  It was observed in para 4:  "Learned Counsel for the  petitioner has not been able to  place reliance on any of the  provisions in the Act or on the  Rules framed thereunder which  enable the B.D.A. to re-convey  the site.  Re-conveyance in a way  is opposed to the scheme itself.   Scheme is formed for the purpose  of forming site for allotting  them as per the Rules.  The rules  do not provide for re-conveyance.   Therefore it is not possible to  hold that the petitioners have a  right to seek re-conveyance."

       Plea of promissory estoppel noticed in para 5  of the order to the effect:          "However, the learned Counsel for  the petitioners has tried to take  refuge under the equitable  doctrine of promissory estoppel  on the basis of the notification  issued by the then Chairman of  the B.D.A. dated 14.7.76 as per  Annexure-B.  The petitioners  claim that as per and in  pursuance of the notification  (Annexure-B) they have filed the  affidavits and have not  challenged the acquisition and  have altered their position to  their disadvantage, therefore, it  is not now open to the B.D.A. to  resile from the notification and  deny allotment of sites to the  petitioners by way of re- conveyance."            The said plea was rejected by observing thus:

"In addition to this it is not  possible to apply the rule of  promissory estoppel in cases  where there is no provision  contained in the Act, or in the  Rules framed thereunder enabling  the B.D.A. to allot or re-convey  the sites in the manner proposed  to be done by the notification.   (Annexure-B).  Therefore I am of  the view that the B.D.A. cannot  be directed to allot or re-convey  a site to each of the petitioners  on the ground that it had

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promised to allot or re-convey a  site to each one of the  petitioners."

         In Writ Petition No.12119 of 1988 (Bangalore  District Co-operative Central Bank Employees Co-op.  Society Ltd.  Vs.  Bangalore Development Authority  and Another), Justice Rama Jois expressed his  agreement with the view taken by Bopanna, J. to the  following effect:-

"If the B.D.A. were to be given  the power to re-convey the land  vested in it by exercising the  power under Section 13 of the  Act, that would be self-defeating  the destructive of the purpose of  constituting a special authority  for the development of the City  of Bangalore."   

In view of the above quoted judgments and some  other judgments of the High Court from 1983 onwards  holding that the acquired land cannot be re- conveyed, the extent of 6 acres and 20 guntas which  was originally earmarked for re-conveyance was also  developed and sites were carved out and allotted.  

In Muniyappa’s case (supra) on which reliance  has been placed in the impugned judgment to come to  the conclusion that there was shift in the judicial  thinking regarding the power of the BDA, to re- convey the land acquired to the owner, the facts  were:-

A Writ Petition No.2495 of 1979 was filed by  the owners of the land seeking issuance of a Writ  of Mandamus directing the BDA to deliver possession  certificate in respect of 1 acre of land in Survey  No.5/3 C of Jadahalli.   The Single Judge held that  BDA had/has no power to re-convey the land acquired  to implement the scheme and negatived the plea of  the writ petitioner.  Aggrieved against the order  passed by the Single Judge the writ petitioner  filed the appeal which was accepted.  It was held  that no material had been placed on record to hold  that the land in question had in fact been acquired  for a scheme or that the allotment of site  contravened the scheme.  The Division Bench  expressed its agreement with the proposition that  BDA which is a statutory body working under the Act  had no power under the Act or the Rules framed  thereunder to re-convey the lands which had been  acquired for implementation of the scheme.  The  agreement was expressed in para 3 of the judgment  in the following words:-

"The learned Single Judge has  pointed out that the B.D.A. had  or has no power to re-convey the  lands acquired to implement a  scheme relying upon the decisions  of this Court in B.N.

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Sathyanarayan Rao Vs.  State of  Karnataka, ILR 87 Kar. 790, and  in         B. Venkataswamy Reddy  Vs. State of Karnataka, ILR 1989  Kar. 75.  This proposition is  absolutely unexceptionable having  regard to the provisions of the  B.D.A. Act as also the Rules of  Allotment of Sites framed under  the said Act."                                          [Emphasis supplied]

       The Bench after going through the pleadings of  the party came to the conclusion that it was not a  case of re-conveyance of the land but allotment of  the site as contemplated under Rule 5 and the word  "re-conveyance" appears to have been used in a  loose sense because the allottee happened to be the  owner of the land prior to its acquisition.  It was  held:-

".. Further, the CITB had the  power to allot site under Rule 5  without following the procedure  prescribed in Rule 3 provided the  other requirements of Rule 5 are  fulfilled.  No serious contention  could be urged on behalf of the  respondent to rebut the  contention urged on behalf of the  appellant that the word  ’reconveyance’ had been used in  the Resolution dated 12.1.1972  and all the subsequent  correspondence in a loose sense  and in fact the said word meant  allotment/grant of site within  the meaning of Rule 5.  As seen  earlier the earliest Resolution  dated 7.8.1963 only spoke of  grant and not re-conveyance.   When that is so, and when in fact  the Resolution coupled with the  correspondence between the  petitioner and the CITB shows  that what was done was an  allotment as contemplated under  Rule 5, the contention the word  ’re-conveyance’ appears to have  been used in a loose sense  because the allottee was the  previous owner of the said land  prior to the acquisition, but in  truth it is a case of allotment  has to be accepted.  If that be  so, it has to be held that there  was a valid allotment of 1 acre  of land in Sy. No.5/3C as per  Resolution No.646 dated 12.1.1972  by the CITB in favour of the  petitioner-appellant.  Further he  had also complied with all other  requirements imposed by the  CITB."  

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       On close scrutiny it has to be held that in  Muniyappa’s case (supra) the Bench did not express  an opinion contrary to the opinion which had been  expressed in the earlier decisions to the effect  that there was no power under the Act or the Rules  with the BDA to re-convey the acquired land, on the  contrary the Bench expressed its agreement with the  view taken in B.N. Sathyanarayana Rao’s case  (supra) and other cases to the effect that the BDA  was not vested with the power under the Act or  Rules to re-convey the land which had been acquired  for a scheme.  On the facts of the case the Bench  came to the conclusion that it was a case of  allotment as contemplated under Rule 5 and not that  of re-conveyance.  The Division Bench in the  impugned judgment has misread and misapplied  Muniyappa’s case  (supra) judgment to come to the  conclusion that there was a shift in the judicial  thinking and that the land acquired could be re- conveyed to the owners.  The findings recorded  which are based on misreading of the Muniyappa’s  case (supra) are unsustainable and therefore set  aside.   

       State of Karnataka amended the Bangalore  Development Authority Act, 1976 by the Bangalore  Development Authorities (3rd Amendment) Act, 1993  (for short "the Amendment Act") which came into  force with effect from 31st March, 1994.  Section 5  of the Amendment Act introduced Section 38-C in the  Act and Section 9 of the Amendment Act validated  the allotments made between 20.12.1973 to 8.5.1986  retrospectively.   

Although the Division Bench in the impugned  judgment held that though the issue regarding  applicability of Section 38-C after its  incorporation in the BDA Act lifting the ban on re- conveyance was irrelevant because the 1st respondent  did not contend that he was entitled to any relief  under this provision but indirectly relying upon it  the Division Bench held that in a given case for  good reasons it would be permissible for the  authority to alter the terms of the acquisition and  restore the lands that had been acquired under the  provisions of the Land Acquisition Act if the facts  and circumstances so justified.  

       Section 38-C and Section 9 of the Amendment Act  are reproduced below:-

"38-C.  Power of Authority to  make allotment in certain cases.  \026 Notwithstanding anything  contained in this Act or in any  other law or any development  scheme sanctioned under this Act,  or City Improvement Trust Board  Act, 1985 where the Authority or  the erstwhile City Improvement  Trust Board, Bangalore has  already passed a resolution in  favour of any persons any site  formed in the land which belong  to them or vested in or acquired

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by them for the purpose of any  development scheme and on the  ground that it is not practicable  to include such site for the  purpose of the development  scheme, the Authority may allot  such site by way of sale or lease  in favour of such persons subject  to the following conditions, -

(a)     the allottee shall be liable  to pay any charges as the  Authority may levy from time  to time; and  (b)     the total extent of the site  allotted under this section  together with the land  already held by the allottee  shall not exceed the ceiling  limit specified under Section  4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling  and Regulation) Act, 1976."

"9. Validation of certain  allotment. \026 Notwithstanding  anything contained in any law or  any judgment, decree or order of  any court where in pursuance of  any resolution passed by the   Authority or the erstwhile City  Improvement Trust Board,  Bangalore to re-convey in favour  of any person any site out of the  land which belonged to them or  vested in or acquired by them for  the purpose of any development  scheme, the Authority has made  allotment of such site by way of  sale, lease or otherwise in  favour of such person after the  twentieth day of December, 1973  and before eight day of May,  1986, such allotment shall be  deemed to have been validly made  and shall have effect for all  purpose as if, it had been \made  under Section 38-C of the  Principle Act as amended by this  Act and accordingly \026 (a)     all acts, proceedings and  things done or allotment made  or action taken by the  authority shall for all  purpose be deemed to be and  to have always been done or  taken in accordance with law; (b)     no suit or other proceedings  shall be instituted,  maintained or continued in  any court for cancellation of  such allotment or for  questioning the validity of  any action or things taken or  done under Section 38-C of  the Principle Act as amended

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by this Act, and no court  shall enforce or recognize  any decree or order declaring  such allotment made or any  action taken or things done  under the Principle Act as  invalid."   Section 38-C commences with non obstante  clause.  It provides that irrespective of anything  contained in any law or any judgment, decree or  order of any Court where in pursuance of any  resolution passed by the authority or the erstwhile  City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore in favour  of any person re-conveying the site formed in the  land which belong to them or vested in or acquired  by them for the purpose of any development scheme  and on the ground that it is not practicable to  include such site for the purpose of any  development scheme, the Authority allot such site  for the purpose of development scheme by way of  sale or lease in favour of such persons subject to  the allottee paying such charges which the  authority may levy from time to time and the extent  of site allotted under this provision together with  the land already held by the allottee shall not  exceed ceiling limit specified under Section 4 of  the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976.  

Section 9 of the Amendment Act speaks of  validation of certain allotment.  It also starts  with the non obstante clause and provides that if a  resolution has been passed by the  Bangalore  Development Authority or the City Improvement Trust  Board to re-convey in favour of any person any site  out of the land which belonged to him or vested or  acquired from him for the purpose of any  development scheme, the Authority has already made  allotment of such site by way of sale, lease or  otherwise in favour of such person after 20th of  December, 1974 and before 8th of May, 1986, then  such allotment shall be deemed to have been validly  made and shall have effect for all purpose as if,  it is \made under Section 38-C of the Principal Act  as amended by Act 17 of 1984.                   On  a conjoint reading of Section 38-C read  with Section 9 of the Amendment Act it would be  seen that Section 38-C gives the authority to make  allotment in certain cases.  It gives the authority  to the BDA to re-convey/allot in favour of any  person any site formed in the land which belonged  to them or vested in or acquired by them for the  purpose of any development scheme and on the ground  that it is not practicable to include such site for  the purpose of development scheme by way of sale or  lease in favour of such person whose land was  acquired subject to his liability to pay any  charges that the authority  may levy from time to  time and that the total extent of site allotted  under this Section together with the land already  held by the allottee would not exceed the ceiling  limit under Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling  and Regulation) Act, 1976.  Section 9 of the  Amendment Act validates the allotment made between

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20th December, 1973 to 8th May, 1986.  Section 38-C  only authorises the BDA to allot a site in a  development scheme to a person whose land had been  acquired.    It does not give any power to the BDA  to re-convey the land or a part of the land by  withdrawing the acquisition itself.  Observations  made by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment  that Section 38-C enabled the BDA to re-convey the  land which had been acquired for a development  scheme for a purpose other than implementing the  scheme are not sustainable.  

       This apart Section 38-C is prospective in its  application except to the extent of the allotment  made between 20th December, 1973 to 8th May, 1986   which are  saved  by Section 9 of the Amendment  Act.   The resolution of CITB of 1972 agreeing to  re-convey the part of the land acquired is not  covered by the provisions of Section 9 of the  Amendment Act.  In the present case, the resolution  of the CITB predecessor-in-interest is dated  19.4.1972 and it would not be deemed to be  validated by the deemed fiction created  by Section  9 of the Amendment Act to bring it within the  provisions of Section    38 -C.  

We may here notice the judgment of this Court  in  H.C. Venkataswamy Vs.  Bangalore Development  Authority ,  2001 (9) SCC 204, on which reliance  has been placed by the counsel for the respondent  to contend that Section 38-C would be applicable to  the present case.  In this case the BDA had  acquired land for the development of the scheme  called "Rajamahal Vilas II Stage."  BDA passed a  Resolution on 26.6.1984 whereunder it was decided  that each of the owners of the land whose land had  been acquired would be given a site measuring 40’ x  60’ free of cost.  BDA did not implement the  decision on the ground that the Resolution was not  approved by the State Government.  The appellants  challenged the decision of the State Government by  way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the  Constitution of India before the Karnataka High  Court.  A Division Bench of the High Court by the  judgment dated 8.2.1991 dismissed the writ  petition.  Aggrieved against the decision of the  High Court appeals were filed in this Court which  were accepted.  Taking note of Section 38-C read  with Section 9 of the Amendment Act it was held  that the provisions  of Section 9 were fully  applicable to the allotments made to the appellants  during the period 1984-85.  It was observed in  later part of para 10 as under:-

"...Even if it is assumed that  the basis for the allotment of  sites to the appellants was not  the same as has been provided by  the Amendment Act under Section   38-C, but that would not  invalidate the allotments because  the deeming fiction crated by  Section 9 of the Amendment Act  would bring the allotments within

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the purview of Section 38-C.  The  effect of the deeming fiction is  that even  though these  allotments may not have been made  under Section 38-C they would be  saved by Section 9 of the  Amendment Act by virtue of the  deeming fiction."   It was further observed in para 11 as under:- "Even otherwise we are of the  view that the resolution of BDA  did substantial justice to the  appellants.  A situation was  created where it may not have  been possible for BDA to  implement the scheme.  The BDA  entered into a settlement with  the farmers and took a conscience  decision to allot plots to them.  It was neither fair nor just on  the part of BDA and the State  Government to have gone back on  their decision which was taken  with an open mind and after  discussion with the farmers.  BDA  by passing the resolution, in a  way, accepted the demand of the  farmers for enhanced  compensation.  The allotment of  plots to them was to further  compensate them for acquiring  their land for the development  scheme."   

This decision is of no  assistance to the 1st  Respondent as it was a case of allotment of a site  formed under the scheme and not of re-conveyance by  withdrawing from the acquisition itself.  Moreover,  Section 9 of the Amendment Act would also be not  applicable as the resolution of CITB does not fall  within the prescribed dates i.e. 20.12.1973 to  8.5.1986.

The Division Bench in the impugned judgment has  taken the view that the correspondence exchanged  between the parties established that the respondent  acting on the representation or the promise held  out to him to his prejudice and altered his  position to his detriment in not pressing his claim  for higher compensation and withdrawing the legal  proceedings.  That the respondent had also not  claimed the compensation that was offered to him,  which was re-deposited by him with the authority.   That the appellant could not be permitted to resile  from the representation or promise made by it to  the respondent as the respondent had acted on the  representation and altered his position to its  prejudice.  Plea taken by the appellant that rule  of promissory estoppel shall not apply to do or  perform an act prohibited by law or not authorised  by law was rejected by observing that Act to re- convey the land was not prohibited as there was a  shift in the judicial thinking in Muniyappa’s case

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(supra).  It was held that the appellant was bound  to re-convey the land to the petitioner as per its  resolution. That the appellant was debarred from  resiling from the promise/representation made  especially in view of the fact that the respondent  acting on the promise made to him had altered his  position to his prejudice.   

The doctrine of promissory estoppel is not  based on the principle of estoppel. It is a  doctrine evolved by equity in order to prevent  injustice.  Where a party by his word or conduct  makes a promise to another person in unequivocal  and clear terms intending to create legal relations  knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by  the party to whom the promise is made and it is so  acted upon by the other party the promise would be  binding on the party making it. It would not be  entitled to go back on the promise made.  This  Court in       M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills  Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1979 (2) SCC  409, after analyzing the doctrine of promissory  estoppel as applied in the Courts  of England and  the United States held that in India the law may be  taken to be settled that principle of promissory  estoppel would be applicable to the Government as  well where it makes a promise knowing or intending  that it would be acted upon by the promisee, and  the promisee in fact acting on the promise alters  his position, then the Government will be held  bound by the promise and such a promise would be  enforceable against the Government at the instance  of the promisee.  That the Government stood on the  same footing as a private individual so far as the  obligation of law is concerned.  The Government   committed as it is, to the rule of law, cannot  claim immunity from the applicability of Rule of  Promissory Estoppel and repudiate a promise made to  it on the ground that such a promise may fetter its  future executive action.  It was pointed out that  since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is  equitable doctrine it must yield when the equity so  requires and if it can be shown by Government that,   having regard to the facts as they have transpired,  it would be inequitable to hold the Government to  the promise made by it, the Court will not raise an  equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the  promise against the Government.  Another exception  carved out was that doctrine of promissory estoppel  cannot be invoked to compel the Government or even  a private party to do an act prohibited by law.  It  was observed in para 28 as under:-

"....It may also be noted that  promissory estoppel cannot be  invoked to compel the Government  or even a private party to do an  act prohibited by law.  There can  also be no promissory estoppel  against the exercise of  legislative power.  The  Legislature can never be  precluded from exercising its  legislative function by resort to  the doctrine of promissory

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estoppel.  Vide State of Kerala   Vs.  Gwalior Rayon Silk  Manufacturing Co. Ltd., 1973 (2)  SCC 713."   In A. P. Pollution Control Board II Vs.   Prof.  M.V. Nayudu (Retd.) , 2001 (2) SCC 62, it was held  that there can be no estoppel against the statute.   Rejecting the plea for applying the principle of  promissory estoppel, it was observed in para 69 as  under:-

"The learned Appellate Authority  erred in thinking that because of  the approval of plan by the  Panchayat, or conversion of land  use by the Collector or grant of  letter of intent by the Central  Government, a case for applying  principle of "promissory  estoppel" applied to the facts of  this case.  There could be no  estoppel against the statute.   The Industry could not therefore  seek an NOC after violating the  policy decision of the  Government.  Point 4 is decided  against the 7th respondent  accordingly."

                                       [Emphasis supplied]

Similarly, in Sharma Transport represented by  D.P. Sharma  Vs.  Government of A.P. , 2002 (2) SCC  188, it was held that the Government as a public  authority cannot be compelled to carry out a  representation or promise which is prohibited by  law or which was devoid of authority or power of  the officer of the Government or the public  authority to make the promise.  It was observed in  para 24 as under:-

"It is equally settled law that  the promissory estoppel cannot be  used to compel the Government or  a public authority to carry out a  representation or promise which  is prohibited by law or which was  devoid of the authority or power  of the officer of the Government  or the public authority to make.   Doctrine of promissory estoppel  being an equitable doctrine, it  must yield place to the equity,  if larger public interest so  requires, and if it can be shown  by the Government or public  authority for having regard to  the facts as they have transpired  that it would be inequitable to  hold the Government or public  authority to the promise or  representation made by it.  The  Court on satisfaction would not,  in those circumstances raise the

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equity in favour of the persons  to whom a promise or  representation is made and  enforce the promise or  representation against the  Government or the public  authority.  These aspects were  highlighted by this Court in  Vasantkumar Radhakisan Vora Vs.  Board of Trustees of the Port of  Bombay, 1991 (1) SCC 761,  STO  Vs. Shree Durga Oil Mills, 1998  (1) SCC 572 and Ashok Kumar  Maheshwari (Dr.) Vs. State of  U.P., 1998 (2) SCC 502,  Above  being the position, the plea  relating to promissory estoppel  has no substance."  

                                       [Emphasis supplied]

In Pune Municipal Corporation and Another Vs.  Promoters and Builders Association and Another,   2004 (10) SCC 796. it was held that it is a settled  preposition of law that there could be no  "promissory estoppel" against the statute.  Relying  upon the earlier decisions of this Court and  overturning the view taken by the High Court in  invoking the principle of promissory estoppel it  was held in para 6 as under:-

"DCR are framed under Section 158  of the Act.  Rules framed under  the provisions of a statute form  part of the statute.  (See  General Officer Commanding-in- Chief Vs.  Dr. Subhash Chandra  Yadav, 1988 (2) SCC35, para 14).   In other words, DCR have  statutory force.  It is also a  settled position of law that  there could be no "promissory  estoppel" against a statute.   (A.P. Pollution Control Board II  Vs. Prof. M.V. Nayudu, 2001 (2)  SCC 62, para 69, STO Vs. Shree  Durga Oil Mills, 1998 (1) SCC  572, paras 21 and 22 and Sharma  Transport Vs. Govt. of A.P., 2002  (2) SCC 188, paras 13 to 24.)   Therefore, the High Court again  went wrong by invoking the  principle of "promissory  estoppel" to allow the petition  filed by the respondents herein."

[Emphasis supplied]

Reliance placed by the counsel for the  respondent on the decision in   State of Punjab Vs.  Nestle India Ltd. , 2004 (6) SCC 465,  to contend  that the principle of promissory estoppel would be  applicable to the present case cannot be accepted.  In the aforesaid case, the State of Punjab had come  up in appeal against the order passed by the High

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Court quashing the demand raised by the State of  Punjab for purchase tax on milk for the period  1996-97. The High Court quashed the demand raised  by the State of Punjab on the principle of  promissory estoppel as the State of Punjab had  promised to abolish the purchase tax on milk for  the period in question and was estopped from  contending to the contrary. The respondent writ  petitioners were the factories producing various  milk products.  As registered dealers under the  Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1958 the respondent  writ petitioners had been paying purchase tax on  milk in terms of Section 4-B of the Act however for  one year i.e. from the period 1.4.1996 to 4.6.1997  none of the respondents paid the purchase tax on  the plea that the Government had decided to abolish  purchase tax on milk for the period in question and  was estopped from contending to the contrary.

It was averred in the writ petition that the  Chief Minister of Punjab on 26.2.1996 while  addressing dairy farmers at the State level  function had announced that the State Government  had abolished purchase tax on milk and milk  products in the State.  Similarly, the Finance  Minister in his Budget Speech echoing the view of  the Chief Minister had stated that the State  Government had abolished the purchase tax on milk.   The Financial Commissioner in its memo dated  26.4.1996 addressed to the Excise and Taxation  Commissioners had written that it has been decided  in principle to abolish purchase tax on milk with  effect from 1.4.1996.  In a meeting held under the  Chairmanship of Chief Minister a decision was taken  to abolish the purchase tax on milk and it was  decided to issue a formal notification in a day or  two.  Later on, the Government resiled from its  promise and issued demand notices raising the  demand of purchase tax for the year 1996-97.   Upholding the decision of the High Court and  noticing and analyzing the entire case law on  promissory estoppel it was held that the State  Government in view of the provisions of the Punjab  General Sales Tax Act, 1948 had the power to exempt  the purchase tax on milk.  Since there was nothing  in law which prohibited it from doing so, the State  Government was held bound to act upon its  representation and exempt the milk from purchase  tax for the relevant period.  It was held that no  representation could be enforced which is  prohibited by law but this principle would not be  applicable to the cases where there is power under  the statute to grant exemption.   Grant of  exemption could not be said to be contrary to the  statute.  Statute did not debar the grant of  exemption rather it envisaged it.  Distinguishing  the judgment in Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd.  Vs. State  of Punjab, 1992 (2) SCC 411, it was observed as  under:-

"Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd.  Vs.  State of Punjab, 1992 (2) SCC  411,  is an example of where  despite the petitioner having  established the ingredients of

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promissory estoppel, the  representation could not be  enforced against the Government  because the Court found that the  Government’s assurance was  incompetent and illegal and "a  fraud on the Constitution and a  breach of faith of the people".   This principle would also not be  applicable in these appeals.  No  one is being asked to act  contrary to the statute.  What is  being sought is a direction on  the Government to grant the  necessary exemption.  The grant  of exemption cannot be said to be  contrary to the statute.  The  statute does not debar the grant.   It envisages it."   There is no provision in the Act and the Rules  framed thereunder enabling the BDA to re-convey the  land acquired to implement a scheme for forming of  sites and their allotment as per rules.  The rules  do not provide for re-conveyane.  In the absence of  any provision in the Act or the Rules framed  thereunder authorizing the BDA to re-convey the  land direction cannot be issued to the BDA to re- convey a part of the land on the ground that it had  promised to do so.  The rule of promissory estoppel  cannot be availed to permit or condone a breach of  law.  It cannot be invoked to compel the Government  to do an act prohibited by law.  It would be going  against the statute.  The principle of promissory  estoppel would under the circumstances be not  applicable to the case in hand.   

It is well-settled that there cannot be any  estoppel against a statute.  In Tata Iron & Steel  Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Jharkhand and Others [(2005)  4 SCC 272], this Court observed:

"53. This is also not a case where  the appellant altered its position  pursuant to or in furtherance of a  promise made to it by the State.  The doctrine of promissory  estoppel, therefore, is not  applicable. It is not even a case  where the doctrine of legitimate  expectation could be invoked. (See  Hira Tikkoo v. Union Territory,  Chandigarh)

54. We, however, are not  oblivious that the doctrine of  promissory estoppel would be  applicable where a representation  has been made by the State in  exercise of its power to exempt or  abolish a commodity as taxable  commodity. Such promise, however,  must be made by the persons who  have the power to implement the  representation."

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       In Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya Vs. State of  Gujarat and Others [(2005) 3 SCC 636], this Court  observed:

"17. In Yamunabai case plea  similar to the one advanced in the  present case that the appellant  was not informed about the  respondent’s earlier marriage when  she married him was held to be of  no avail. The principle of  estoppel cannot be pressed into  service to defeat the provision of  Section 125 of the Code."  

       Recently in Devasahayam (D) BY LRS. Vs. P.  Savithramma & Ors. [2005 (7) SCALE 322], this Court  observed:

       "The doctrine of approbate  and reprobate is a species of  estoppel. However, there cannot be  any estoppel against a statute.   [See MD, Army Welfare Housing  Organisation Vs. Sumangal Services  (P) Ltd. Vs. Sumangal Services (P)  Ltd., (2004) 9 SCC 619]"

Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently  contended that Section 29 of the City of Bangalore  Improvement Act, 1945 was different in content and  scope than Section 38 of the Bangalore Development  Act.  Since the resolution was passed under the  City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945, the  resolution has to be seen and interpreted in the  light of Section 29 of the City of Bangalore  Improvement Act, 1945.  That Section 76(3) of the  BDA Act provides that any right, privilege,  obligation or liability acquired, accrued or  incurred arising under the old Act shall remain  intact.  We do not find any force in the  submission.  

Section 27-A of the City of Bangalore  Improvement Act, 1945 provided that notwithstanding  anything contained in the Act during a period of  fifteen years from the date of commencement of the  Act, the Government may acquire the land under the  Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the purpose  of improvement, expansion or development of the  City of Bangalore or any area to which this Act  extends, and any land so acquired after it has  vested in the Government, stand transferred to the  Board and such land may be dealt  with under the  provisions of Sections 28 and 29, or in such manner  as the Government may direct.  Section 29 of the  said Act reads as under:-

"Section 29.   Power of Board to

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acquire, hold and dispose of  property. \026 (1) The Board shall  for the purposes of this Act,  have power to acquire and hold  movable and immovable property,  whether within or outside City.

(2) Subject to such restrictions,  conditions and limitations as may  be prescribed by rules made by  the Government, the Board shall  have power to lease, sell or  otherwise transfer any movable or  immovable property which belongs  to it, and to appropriate or  apply any land vested in or  acquired by it for the formation  of open spaces or for building  purposes or in any other manner  for the purpose of any  improvement scheme.

(3)   The restrictions,  conditions and limitations  contained in any grant or other  transfer of any immovable  property or any interest therein  made by the Board shall,  notwithstanding anything  contained in the Transfer of  Property Act, 1882 (Central Act 4  of 1882) or any other law, have  effect according to their tenor."           First part of Clause (1) of Section 29 provides  that the Board shall have the power for the purpose  of the Act to acquire and hold movable and  immovable property, whether within or outside the  city.  Clause (2) provides that subject to such  restrictions, conditions and limitations as may be  prescribed by rules made by the Government, (i) the  Board shall have power to lease, sell or otherwise  transfer any movable or immovable property which  belongs to it, and,  (ii) to appropriate or apply  any land vested in or acquired by it for the  formation of open spaces or for building purposes  or in any other manner for the purpose of any  improvement scheme.    The first part deals with  the power of the Board to lease, sell or otherwise  transfer any movable or immovable property which  belongs to it and, second, to appropriate or apply  any land vested in or acquired by it for the  formation of open spaces or for the building  purposes or in any other manner for the purpose of  any improvement scheme.         The present case falls in  the second part which provides that the lands which  have been acquired by it or have been vested in it  for formation of open spaces or for building  purposes shall be utilized for the purpose of the  improvement scheme for which the lands have been  acquired.  It cannot be used for any purpose other  than for which it was acquired which in the present  case was for formation of open spaces or for  building purposes and since the land was acquired  for the purpose of forming sites it could only be

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used for the purpose of forming sites and their  allotment.  There is no power as per this provision  to re-convey the lands which have been acquired  under a scheme  for forming sites.  The power of  the Board to lease or sell or transfer the sites  was made subject to the restrictions, conditions  and limitations which may be prescribed by the  Rules. In the Rules framed there is no provision  for re-conveying the land and, therefore, power  does not vest in the Board to re-convey the lands  which were acquired for formation of sites in an  improvement scheme.   

On comparison and       reading of Section 29 of  the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 and  Section 38 of the Amendment Act we do not find any  material difference between these two sections.  In  fact both these sections are pari materia with each  other.  The arguments raised,  based on Section  76(3) of the BDA Act, therefore, has no force and  hence rejected.  

Notification under Section 4 was issued under  the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which is pari  materia with the Central Act i.e. Land Acquisition  Act.  By the Land Acquisition (Karnataka Extension  & Amendment) Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act No.17 of  1961) the earlier Act of Mysore State was repealed  and the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (Central Act 1  of 1894) was extended to the whole of the State of  Karnataka in its application to the State of  Karnataka.  It was specifically provided that all  amendments made by the Act repealed shall cease to  continue and shall be omitted from the Land  Acquisition Act of 1894 and such of the provisions  thereof as were affected by the repealed Act shall  stand revived to the extent to which they would  have otherwise continued in operation but for the  passing of the repealed Act.   

Preliminary notification under Section 4 dated  26.11.1959 was published under the Karnataka Land  Acquisition Act, 1894 (The Mysore Land Acquisition  Act).  But all proceedings thereafter including the  final notification and the subsequent proceedings  were under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.  The  Division Bench in the impugned order has taken the  view applying the principle laid down in Section 21  of the General Clauses Act which provides that  power to issue the notification, order or rules or  bye-laws would include the power to add, amend,  vary or rescind any notification, order, rule or  bye-law held that where the authority is vested  with the power to do something then it is entrusted  with the power to undo it as well.  Since the State  Government had the power to acquire the land it has  the power to release the land from acquisition as  well.   

In our considered view, the Division Bench has  erred in holding that the State Government could  release the lands in exercise of its power under  Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 from  the acquisition.

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This Court in Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh  Vs.  Sri Avinash Sharma, 1970 (2) SCC 149, has held  in para 6 as under:-

"Power to cancel a notification  for compulsory acquisition is, it  is true, not affected by Section  48 of the Act; by a notification  under Section 21 of the General  Clauses Act, the Government may  cancel or rescind the  notification issued under  Sections 4 and 6 of the Land  Acquisition Act.  But the power  under Section 21 of the General  Clauses Act cannot be exercised  after the land statutorily vests  in the State Government."           It was concluded in para 8 that:- "..It is clearly implicit in the  observations that after  possession has been taken  pursuant to a notification under  Section 17(1) the land is vested  in the Government, and the  notification cannot be cancelled  under Section 21 of the General  Clauses Act, nor can the  notification be withdrawn in  exercise of the powers under  Section 48 of the Land  Acquisition Act.  Any other view  would enable the State Government  to circumvent the specific  provision by relying upon a  general power.  When possession  of the land is taken under  Section 17(1), the land vests in  the Government.  There is no  provision by which land  statutorily vested in the  Government reverts to the  original owner by mere  cancellation of the  notification."    Again in Pratap Vs.  State of Rajasthan,  1996  (3) SCC 1, it was reiterated that once the  possession is taken and the land vests in the  Government then the Government cannot withdraw from  acquisition under Section 48 of the Land  Acquisition Act.   Same view was reiterated by this  Court in Mohan Singh Vs. International Airport  Authority of India , 1997 (9) SCC 132, and in  Printers (Mysore) Ltd.  Vs.  M.A. Rasheed , 2004  (4) SCC 460.  

The possession of the land in question was  taken in the year 1966 after the passing of the  award by the Land Acquisition Officer.  Thereafter,  the land vested in the Government which was then  transferred to CITB, predecessor-in-interest of the  appellant.  After the vesting of the land and  taking possession thereof, the notification for

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acquiring the land could not be withdrawn or  cancelled in exercise of powers under Section 48 of  the Land Acquisition Act.  Power under Section 21  of the General Clauses Act cannot be exercised  after vesting of the land statutorily in the State  Government.  

The High Court also erred in holding that land  acquisition process and the vesting process became  incomplete since the land owners were asked to re- deposit the amount of compensation.  High Court  failed to take notice of Section 31 of the Land  Acquisition Act.  Section 31 contemplates that on  making of an award under Section 11 the Collector  shall tender amount of compensation awarded by him  to the person interested and entitled thereto  according to the award and shall pay to them unless  prevented by any one or more of the contingencies  mentioned in the subsequent clauses.  None of those  contingencies arose in the present case.  Thus,  once the amount was tendered and paid the  acquisition process was complete.   After making  the award under Section 11 the Collector can take  possession of the land under Section 16 which shall  thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free  from all encumbrances.  In the instant case, after  making the payment in terms of the award,  possession was taken.  The acquisition process  stood completed.  The subsequent development will  not alter the fact that the acquisition was  complete.   

This brings us to the last contention raised by  the counsel for the respondent.  Respondent placed  on record copy of the letter No.UDD/260/2005 dated  12.7.2005 addressed by the Principal Secretary to  the Government, Urban Development Department,  Bangalore to the Commissioner, Bangalore  Development Authority, Bangalore.  This letter was  addressed by the Urban Development Department with  reference to Chief Minister’s note No.CM/SCM- 2/49/BDA/05 dated 5.7.2005. The letter reads as  under:-  

"With reference to the above  subject the copy of the note  under reference is enclosed along  with this Letter and the subject  is self explanatory.

               I have been directed to  inform you that  in the light of  the order of the Hon’ble Chief  Minister, an extent of 6 acres 20  guntas of Land should be re- conveyed to Sri. R. Hanumaiah in  accordance with the decision  rendered by the High Court of  Karnataka in Writ Appeal  No.727/1989, dated 9/10.7.2001,  you should take necessary action  immediately and send a report to  the Government regarding the  action taken."

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        The Bangalore Development Authority sent their  reply contending inter alia that the directions  issued by the Chief Minister were contrary to law  and the third party rights had set in and  therefore, not capable of being implemented.   Thereafter, there has been no communication from  the office of the Chief Minister to the BDA.   

The letter was written on behalf of the  Government in purported exercise of its power under  Section 65 of the Act which reads:

"Section 65 : Government’s power  to give directions to the  Authority. \026 The Government may  give such directions to the  authority as in its opinion are  necessary or expedient for  carrying out the purposes of this  Act, and it shall be the duty of  the authority to comply with such  directions."

We do not agree with the contention raised by  the counsel for the respondent that the directions  issued by the Chief Minister through his note were  binding on the BDA or that the BDA was bound in law  to re-convey the land in terms of the directions  issued in the impugned judgment.  It has not been  shown that the Chief Minister was authorised to  issue the directions to the BDA to re-convey the  land.  Under Section 65 the Government can give  such directions to the  authority which in its  opinion are necessary or expedient for carrying out  the purpose of the Act.  It is the duty of the BDA  to comply with such directions.  Contention that  BDA is bound by all directions of the Government  irrespective of the nature and purpose of the  directions cannot be accepted.  Power of the  Government under Section 65 is not unrestricted.   Directions have to be to carry out the objective of  the Act and not contrary to the provisions of the  Act.  The Government can issue directions which in  its opinion are necessary or expedient for  "carrying out the purposes of the Act".    

Directions issued by the Chief Minister in the  present case would not be to carry out the purpose  of the Act rather it would be to destroy the same.   Such a direction would not have  the sanctity of  law.  Directions to release the lands would be  opposed to the statute as the purpose of the Act  and object of constituting the BDA is for the  development of the city and improve the lives of  the persons living therein.  The authority vested  with the power has to act reasonably and rationally  and in accordance with law to carry out the  legislative intent and not to destroy it.   Direction issued by the Chief Minister run counter  to and are destructive of the purpose for which the  BDA was created.  It is opposed to the object of  the Act and therefore, bad in law.  Directions of  the Chief Minister is to re-convey the land in  terms of the decision rendered by the High Court in

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the impugned judgment i.e. Writ Appeal No.727 of  1989.  Since we are setting aside the impugned  judgment, the BDA as per directions issued by the  Chief Minister cannot re-convey the land to the  respondent in terms of the decision rendered by the  High Court in the impugned judgment i.e. Writ  Appeal No.727 of 1989.

       The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is a code by  itself.  It not only deals with acquisition of land  but also deals with payment of compensation as also  release of the acquired lands.   

       Bangalore Development Authority is a creature  of statute.  Its functions and duties are  delineated by Bangalore Development Authority Act,  1976.  Its jurisdiction to re-convey the land  vested in it in exercise of its power.  The said  Act does not confer any power from the said  authority to re-convey the land vested in it.  Upon  acquisition of the land, the same vests in the  State.  The State only in terms of Section 13 of  the said Act can re-convey the said acquired land  of the said authority.

       It is not in dispute that Section 48 of the  Land Acquisition Act would apply to the  acquisitions made under the 1976 Act and in that  view of the matter the State could exercise its  jurisdiction for re-conveyance of the property in  favour of the owner thereof only in the event  possession thereof had not been taken. Once such  possession is taken even the State cannot direct  re-convey the property.  It has been accepted  before us that Section 21 of the General Clauses  Act has no application but reliance has been sought  to be placed on Section 65 of the 1976 Act which  empowers the Government to issue such directions to  the authority as in its opinion are necessary or  expedient for carrying out the purpose of the Act.   The power of the State Government being  circumscribed by the conditions precedent laid down  therein and, thus, the directions can be issued  only when the same are necessary or expedient for  carrying out the purpose of the Act.  In a case of  this nature, the State Government did not have any  such jurisdiction and, thus, the Bangalore  Development Authority has rightly refused to comply  therewith.   

       Recently in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs.  Darius Shapur Chenai & Ors. [2005 (7) SCALE 386],  this Court noticed:

"       In  Commissioner of Police,  Bombay vs. Gordhandas Bhanji [AIR  1952 SC 16], it is stated :

"\005We are clear that public orders,  publicly made, in exercise of a  statutory authority cannot be  construed in the light of  explanations subsequently given by  the officer making the order of

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what he meant, or of what was in  his mind; or what he intended to  do.  Public orders made by public  authorities are meant to have  public effect and are intended to  affect the actings and conduct of  those to whom they are addressed  and must be construed objectively  with reference to the language  used in the order itself."  

       Yet again in Mohinder Singh  Gill (supra), this Court observed   :

"The second equally relevant  matter is that when a statutory  functionary makes an order based  on certain grounds, its validity  must be judged by the reasons so  mentioned and cannot be  supplemented by fresh reasons in  the shape of affidavit or  otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad  in the beginning may, by the time  it comes to court on account of a  challenge, get validated by  additional grounds later brought  out. We may here draw attention to  the observations of Bose, J. in  Gordhandas Bhanji."         Referring to Gordhandas  Bhanji (supra),  it was further  observed : "Orders are not like old wine  becoming better as they grow  older."

       [The said decisions have been  followed by this Court in  Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil Vs.  Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia and Others  [(2004) 2 SCC 65]."

       Equally untenable is the plea of the  Respondents that promise of the CITB to re-convey  is enforceable in law.

Bangalore Development Authority has been  constituted for specific purposes.  It cannot take  any action which would defeat such purpose.  The  State also ordinarily cannot interfere in the day  to day functioning of a statutory authority.  It  can ordinarily exercise its power under Section 65  of the 1976 Act where a policy matter is involved.   It has not been established that the Chief Minister  had the requisite jurisdiction to issue such a  direction.  Section 65 of the 1976 Act contemplates  an order by the State.  Such an order must conform  to the provisions of Article 166 of the  Constitution of India.

Since the 1st respondent has re-deposited the

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amount of compensation received and also withdrew  his reference applications seeking enhancement of  the compensation, the equities have to be balanced.   As per the averments made in para 5.2 of the writ  petition the question of compensation for lands  acquired were  finally decided by the High Court in  MFA No. 217 of 1974 and MFA No. 219 of 1974 decided  on 11th September, 1975 and MFA No. 545 of 1974  decided on 29th September, 1975.  The High Court  enhanced the compensation to Rs. 10,000/- per acre   excluding interest and statutory allowances.  On  adding of interest and statutory allowances the  amount would come approximately to Rs. 19,000/- per  acre.  But for the promise made by the appellant,  the 1st respondent would have been entitled to  compensation at the said rate for the extent of 6  acres 21 guntas 42 square yards as well.

In equity we deem it appropriate to direct the  appellant to pay the amount of compensation which  was determined by the Land Acquisition Officer  along with enhanced compensation which may have  been granted by the High Court in any of the  reference filed either by the 1st respondent or any  other land owner inclusive of statutory benefits  with interest @ 9% per annum with effect from the  date on which it became due till its payment.  As  the 1st respondent has been deprived of the amount  due for quite some time we direct the appellant to  re-deposit the entire amount within three months  from today.  In case the amount is not deposited  within three months then the 1st respondent would be  entitled to interest @ 12% per annum.  On deposit  of the amount the first respondent would be  entitled to withdraw the same.          We accept this appeal and set aside the  judgment of the High Court as well as the  directions issued by the State Government on the  asking of the Chief Minister vide letter dated 12th  July, 2005 to the BDA to re-convey the land  measuring 6 acres, 20 guntas and 42 Sq. Yds.  to  the 1st Respondent.  The judgment under appeal is  set aside and that of the Single Judge is restored.   The writ petition is dismissed except  to the  extent that the 1st respondent would be entitled to  re-claim the amount of compensation along with  interest as indicated in the earlier paragraphs.   Parties shall bear their own costs.