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PETITIONER: BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/12/1983

BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. PATHAK, R.S. SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J)

CITATION:  1984 AIR  802            1984 SCR  (2)  67  1984 SCC  (3) 161        1983 SCALE  (2)1151  CITATOR INFO :  R          1984 SC1099  (3)  RF         1986 SC 847  (30)  RF         1987 SC 990  (16)  R          1987 SC1086  (3,4,5,6,7)  R          1988 SC1863  (3,9,10)  F          1989 SC 549  (15)  RF         1989 SC 653  (12)  F          1990 SC2060  (3)  F          1991 SC 101  (35)  RF         1991 SC 420  (7)  RF         1991 SC1117  (7)  RF         1991 SC1420  (25)  RF         1992 SC  38  (4)  RF         1992 SC1858  (11)

ACT:      Constitution   of    India.-Article    32(1)-Mode    of interpreting Article  32-"Appropriate proceedings",  meaning of-Letter  addressed   by  a  party  on  behalf  of  persons belonging  to  socially  and  economically  weaker  sections complaining violation  of their  rights under various social welfare  legislations-Whether  can  be  treated  as  a  writ petition-Maintainability  of-Public   Interest   Litigation- Nature and scope of.      Constitution of  India, Article  32 (2)-Appointment  of commissions  by  the  Supreme  Court  to  enquire  into  the complaint made  in the  writ petition  and relying  upon the commissioners’ report-Propriety of-Adversarial Procedure-How far binding on the Court-Supreme Court Rules, 1966, O, XXXV, XLVI and XLVII, Rule 6-Code of Civil Procedure, O.XXVI.      Mines Act,  1952-Sections 2  (j), (jj), (kk), 3 (1) (b) proviso 18  Chapters V, VI & VII-Meaning of the word "mine"- Whether stone  quarries are  mines-Whether  workers  of  the stone  quarries   and  crushers  entitled  to  the  benefits accruing under  the Act-Responsibility  of the mine lessees, mine owners,  Central Government  and the  State Governments for ensuring the benefits accruing under the Act, explained- Mines Rules  1955, Rules,  Rules 30-32-Punjab  Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1964.      Inter-State Migrant  Workmen (Regulation  of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979-ss.2 (1) (e), (b), (g), 4,8,12 and Chapter V-Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment  and Conditions  of  Service)  Central  Rules,

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1980-Rules  23,   25-45-Definition  of  inter-state  migrant workmen-Rights and  benefits of  inter-state migrant workmen explained-Thekedars or  Jamadars recruiting workers for mine lessees/owners from  outside the  State  are  "contractors"- Contract Labour  (Regulation and  Abolition) Act, 1970-ss. 2 (1) (a), (b), (c) (g), 16 to 21.      Bonded Labour  System (Abolition)  Act, 1976-ss.2  (f), (g), 4,  5, 10-15-Existence  of Forced Labour-Whether bonded labour-Burden of  proof lies  upon  the  employer  that  the labourer is not a bonded labourer-Court will be justified in presuming that  the labourer is a bonded labourer unless the presumption is rebutted by producing satisfactory material.      Minimum Wages  Act, Workmen’s  Compensation Act,  1983, Payment  of   Wages  Act,  Employees  State  Insurance  Act, Employees Provident  fund and  Miscellaneous Provisions Act, Maternity Benefits  Act, 1957-Benefits  accruing under these Acts-Whether available to mine workers.

HEADNOTE:      The petitioner,  an organisation dedicated to the cause of release  of bonded  labourers in the country, addressed a letter to Hon’ble Bhagwati, J. alleging: (1) that there were a large  number of  labourers from  different parts  of  the country who  were working  in some  of  the  stone  quarries situate in district Faridabad, State of 68 Haryana under  "inhuman and intolerable conditions; (2) that a large  number of  them were bonded labourers; (3) that the provisions of  the Constitution  and various  social welfare laws passed  for the  benefit of  the said  workmen were not being  implemented   in  regard   to  these  labourers.  The petitioner also  mentioned in  the letter  the names  of the stone quarries and particulars of labourers who were working as bonded  labourers and  prayed that  a writ  be issued for proper implementation  of  the  various  provisions  of  the social welfare legislations, such as, Mines Act, 1952 Inter- State  Migrant   Workmen  (Regulation   of  Employment   and Conditions  of   Service)   Act,   1979,   Contract   Labour (Regulation and  Abolition) Act,  1970, Bonded Labour System (Abolition)  Act,   1976,  Minimum   Wages  Act,   Workmen’s Compensation Act,  Payment of  Wages  Act,  Employees  State Insurance Act,  Maternity Benefits  Act etc.  applicable  to these labourers  working in  the said  stone quarries with a view to  ending the  misery, suffering  and helplessness  of "these victims of the most inhuman exploitation."      The Court  treated the  letter as  a writ  petition and appointed a  commission to inquire into the allegations made by  the  petitioner.  The  commission  while  confirming  he allegations of  the petitioner,  pointed out  in its  report that (i)  the whole atmosphere in the alleged stone quarries was full  of dust  and it  was  difficult  for  any  one  to breathe; (ii)  some of the workmen were not allowed to leave the stone  quarries and  were providing forced labour; (iii) there was  no facility  of providing pure water to drink and the labourers  were compelled  to drink  dirty water  from a nullah; (iv)  the labourers  were not  having proper shelter but were  living in  jhuggies with stones piled one upon the other as  walls and straw covering the top which was too low to stand and which did not afford any protection against sun and rain;  (v) some  of the  labourers were  suffering  from chronic diseases;  (vi) no  compensation was  being paid  to labourers who  were injured  due to accidents arising in the course of  employment; (vii)  there were  no facilities  for

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medical treatment  or schooling.  At the  direction  of  the Court, a  socio-legal investigation was also carried out and it suggested  measures for  improving the  conditions of the mine workers.      The  respondents  contended:  (1)  Article  32  of  the Constitution is  not attracted  to the  instant case  as  no fundamental right  of  the  petitioner  or  of  the  workmen referred to  in the  petition is  infringed;  (2)  A  letter addressed by  a party  to this  Court cannot be treated as a writ petition; (3) In a proceeding under Art. 32, this Court is  not   empowered  to   appoint  any   commission  or   an investigating body  to enquire  into the allegations made in the writ  petition; (4) Reports made by such commissions are based only on ex-parte statements which have not been tested by cross-examination  and therefore they have no evidentiary value; and  (5) there might be forced labourers in the stone quarries and stone crushers in the State of Haryana but they were  not  bonded  labourers  within  the  meaning  of  that expression as  used in  the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976.      Rejecting all  the contentions  and allowing  the  writ petition on merits, the Court ^      HELD:  The  State  Government’s  objection  as  to  the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution by  the petitioners  is reprehensible.  If  any citizen brings  before the  Court a  complaint that  a large number of  peasants or workers are bonded serfs or are being subjected  to   exploitation  by   a  few  mine  lessees  or contractors or employers or are being denied the benefits of 69 social welfare  laws, the  State Government, which is, under our constitutional  scheme,  charged  with  the  mission  of bringing about a new socioeconomic order where there will be social and economic justice for every one equality of status and opportunity  for all,  would welcome  an inquiry  by the court, so  that if it is found that there are in fact bonded labourers or  even if  the workers  are not  bonded  in  the strict sense  of the  term as  defined in  the Bonded Labour System (Abolition)  Act 1976  but they  are made  to provide forced  labour   or  are   consigned  to  a  life  of  utter deprivation and  degradation, such  a situation  can be  set right by  the State Government. Even if the State Government is on  its own  inquiry satisfied  that the  workmen are not bonded and  are not  compelled to  provide forced labour and are living  and working  in decent  conditions with  all the basic necessities  of  life  provided  to  them,  the  State Government should  not baulk  an inquiry by the court when a complaint is  brought by a citizen, but it should be anxious to satisfy  the court  and through  the court, the people of the country,  that  it  is  discharging  its  constitutional obligation fairly  and adequately  and the workmen are being ensured social and economic justice. [102A-D]      2. Moreover,  when a  complaint is  made on  behalf  of workmen that  they are  held in  bondage and are working and living  in   miserable  conditions  without  any  proper  or adequate shelter  over their  heads, without  any protection against sun  and rain,  without two square meals per day and with only  dirty  water  from  a  nullah  to  drink,  it  is difficult how  such a  complaint can  be thrown  out on  the ground that  it is not violative of the fundamental right of the workmen.  It is  the fundamental  right of  every one in this country,  assured under  the  interpretation  given  to Article 21  by this  Court in Francis Mullen’s Case, to live with human  dignity, free  from exploitation.  This right to

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live with  human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath  from the  Directive Principles  of State Policy and particularly  clauses (e)  and (f)  of  Article  39  and Articles 41  and 42  and at  the least,  therefore, it  must include protection  of the  health and  strength of workers, men and  women, and  of the  tender age  of children against abuse, opportunities  and facilities for children to develop in a  healthy  manner  and  in  conditions  of  freedom  and dignity, educational  facilities, just and humane conditions of  work   and  maternity  relief.  These  are  the  minimum requirements which must exist in order to enable a person to live with  human dignity  and no  State neither  the Central Government nor  any State  Government-has the  right to take any action  which will  deprive a person of the enjoyment of these basic  essentials. Since  the Directive  Principles of State Policy contained in clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39, Article 41  and 42 are not enforceable in a court of law, it may not be possible to compel the State through the judicial process  to   make  provision   by  statutory  enactment  or executive fiat  for ensuring these basic essentials which go to make  up a life of human dignity but where legislation is already  enacted   by  the   State  providing   these  basic requirements to  the workmen  and thus investing their right to live  with basic human dignity, with concrete reality and content, the  State can  certainly be  obligated  to  ensure observance of  such legislation  for inaction on the part of the State  in securing  implementation of  such  legislation would amount  to denial  of the  right to  live  with  human dignity enshrined  in Article  21, more so in the context of Article 256 which provides that the executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that State. [103B-H 104A]      3. The  State is  under a  constitutional obligation to see that  there is  no violation of the fundamental right of any person, particularly when he belongs to the 70 weaker sections  of the  community and  is unable  to wage a legal battle  against a  strong and powerful opponent who is exploiting him. The Central Government is therefore bound to ensure observance  of various social welfare and labour laws enacted by  Parliament for  the purpose  of securing  to the workmen a life of basic human dignity in compliance with the Directive Principles of State Policy. It must also follow as a necessary corollary that the State of Haryana in which the stone quarries  are vested  by reason  of  Haryana  Minerals (Vesting of  Rights) Act  1973 and  which is  therefore  the owner of  the mines  cannot while giving its mines for stone quarrying  operations,  permit  workmen  to  be  denied  the benefit of  various social  welfare and  labour laws enacted with a  view to  enabling them  to  live  a  life  of  human dignity. The State of Haryana must therefore ensure that the minelessees or  contractors, to  whom it is giving its mines for  stone  quarrying  operations,  observe  various  social welfare and  labour laws  enacted for  the  benefit  of  the workmen. This  is a  constitutional obligation  which can be enforced against  the Central  Government and  the State  of Haryana  by   a  writ  petition  under  Article  32  of  the Constitution. [104 A-D]      4. While  interpreting Article  32, it must be borne in mind that  our approach  must be guided not by any verbal or formalistic canons  of construction  but  by  the  paramount object and  purpose for  which this Article has been enacted as  a   Fundamental  Right   in  the  Constitution  and  its interpretation must receive illumination from the Trinity of

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provisions  which   permeate   and   energies   the   entire Constitution namely,  the Preamble,  the Fundamental  Rights and the  Directive Principles of State Policy. Clause (1) of Article 32  confers the  right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of  any of  the fundamental  rights, but it does not say  as to who shall have this right to move the Supreme Court nor  does it say by what proceedings the Supreme Court may be  so moved.  There is  no limitation  in the  words of Clause (1) of Article 32 that the fundamental right which is sought to  be enforced by moving the Supreme Court should be one belonging  to the person who moves the Supreme Court nor does it say that the Supreme Court should be moved only by a particular kind  of proceeding.  It is  clear on  the  plain language of  clause (1) of Article 32 that whenever there is a violation  of a  fundamental right,  any one  can move the Supreme Court  for enforcement of such fundamental right. Of course, the  court would not, in exercise of its discretion, intervene at the instance of a meddlesome interloper or busy body and  would ordinarily  insist that  only a person whose fundamental right is violative should be allowed to activise the court,  but there  is no  fetter upon  the power  of the court to  entertain a  proceeding initiated  by  any  person other than  the one  whose fundamental  right  is  violated, though the  court would  not  ordinarily  entertain  such  a proceeding, since  the person  whose  fundamental  right  is violated can  always approach  the court  and if he does not wish to  seek judicial  redress by  moving  the  court,  why should some one else be allowed to do so on his behalf. This reasoning however  breaks down  in the  case of  a person or class of persons whose fundamental right is violated but who cannot have  resort to the court on account of their poverty or disability  or  socially  or  economically  disadvantaged position and  in such  a case,  therefore, the court can and must allow  any member  of the  public acting  bona fide  to espouse the  cause of  such person or class of persons. This does not  violate, in  the slightest measure the language of the  constitutional  provision  enacted  in  clause  (1)  of Article 32. [106 B-H-107A]      5. Clause (1) of Article 32 says that the Supreme Court can be  moved for  enforcement of a fundamental right by any ’appropriate’ proceeding. There 71 is no  limitation  in  regard  to  the  kind  of  proceeding envisaged in  clause (1)  of  Article  32  except  that  the proceeding must  be "appropriate"  and this  requirement  of appropriateness must  be judged  in the light of the purpose for which the proceeding is to be taken, namely, enforcement of a fundamental right. The Constitution makers deliberately did not  lay down  any particular  form  of  proceeding  for enforcement of  a fundamental  right nor  did they stipulate that such  proceeding should conform to any rigid pattern or straight jacket formula as, for example, in England, because they knew  that in  a country  like India, where there is so much of  poverty,  ignorance,  illiteracy,  deprivation  and exploitation,  any   insistence  on   a  rigid   formula  of proceeding for  enforcement of  a  fundamental  right  would become self  defeating because it would place enforcement of fundamental rights  beyond the  reach of  the common man and the entire  remedy for  enforcement  of  fundamental  rights which the  Constitution makers  regarded as  so precious and invaluable  that  they  elevated  it  to  the  status  of  a fundamental right,  would become  a mere rope of sand so far as the  large masses  of the  people  in  this  country  are concerned.  The   Constitution  makers  therefore  advisedly provided in  clause (1) of Article 32 that the Supreme Court

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may be  moved by any ’appropriate’ proceeding, ’appropriate’ not in  terms of  any particular form but ’appropriate’ with reference to the purpose of the proceeding. [107 A-F]      Therefore where a member of the public acting bona fide moves the  Court for  enforcement of  a fundamental right on behalf of  a person  or class  of persons  who on account of poverty  or   disability   or   socially   or   economically disadvantaged position cannot approach the court for relief, such member  of the  public may  move the court even by just writing a  letter, because  it would not be right or fair to expect a  person acting  pro bono  publico to incur expenses out of  his own pocket for going to a lawyer and preparing a regular  writ   petition  for   being  filed  in  court  for enforcement  of  the  fundamental  right  of  the  poor  and deprived sections  of the  community and  in such  a case, a letter addressed  by him  can legitimately be regarded as an "appropriate" proceeding. [107 F-H]      6. Public  Interest litigation  is not in the nature of adversary  litigation   but  it   is  a   challenge  and  an opportunity to the government and its officers to make basic human rights  meaningful  to  the  deprived  and  vulnerable sections of  the community  and to  assure them  social  and economic  justice   which  is  the  signature  tune  of  our Constitution. When  the Court  entertains  public  interest, litigation, it  does not do so in a cavilling spirit or in a confrontational mood  or with a view to tilting at executive authority or  seeking to  unsurp it, but its attempt is only to  ensure   observance  of   social  and   economic  rescue programmes, legislative as well as executive, framed for the benefit of  the have-nots and the handicapped and to protect them against violation of their basic human rights, which is also the  constitutional obligation  of the  executive.  The Court is  thus merely  assisting in  the realisation  of the constitutional objectives. [102 D-E, G-H, 103 A-B]      7. Clause  (2) of  Article 32  conferring power  on the Supreme Court  "to issue  directions, or  orders, or  writs, including writs  in the  nature of  habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo  warranto and certiorari" which ever may be appropriate, for  enforcement  of  any  of  the  fundamental rights, is  in the  widest terms.  It  is  not  confined  to issuing  the   high  prerogative  writs  of  habeas  corpus, mandamus, prohibition,  certiorari, and  quo warranto, which are hedged  in by  strict conditions differing from one writ to another.  But it  is much  wider and  includes within its matrix, power to issue any directions, orders or writs which may be appropriate 72 for enforcement  of the  fundamental right  in question  and this is  made amply  clear by  the  inclusive  clause  which refers  to   in  the  nature  of  habeas  corpus,  mandamus, prohibition, qua  warranto and certiorari. Therefore even if the conditions  for issue  of any  of these high prerogative writs are  not fulfilled, the Supreme Court would have power to issue  any direction,  order or  writ including a writ in the nature  of any  high prerogative  writ.  This  provision conferring  on  the  Supreme  Court  power  to  enforce  the fundamental rights  in the  widest possible  terms shows the anxiety  of   the  Constitution  makers  not  to  allow  any procedural technicalities to stand in the way of enforcement of  fundamental  rights.  The  Constitution  makers  clearly intended that  the Supreme  Court should  have  the  amplest power to  issue whatever  direction, order  or writ  may  be appropriate in a given case for enforcement of a fundamental right. That  is why  the Constitution  is silent  as to what procedure  shall   be  followed  by  the  Supreme  Court  in

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exercising the  power to  issue such  direction or  order or writ  as  in  Article  32  and  advisedly  so,  because  the Constitution makers  never intended to fetter the discretion of the  Supreme Court  to evolve  a procedure appropriate in the circumstances  of  a  given  case  for  the  purpose  of enabling it to exercise its power of enforcing a fundamental right. Neither  clause (2)  of  Article  32  nor  any  other provision of  the Constitution  requires that any particular procedure  shall   be  followed  by  the  Supreme  Court  in exercising its  power to  issue  an  appropriate  direction, order or  writ. The  purpose for which the power to issue an appropriate direction,  order or  writ is  conferred on  the Supreme Court  is to  secure enforcement  of  a  fundamental right  and   obviously  therefore,   whatever  procedure  is necessary  for   fulfillment  of   that  purpose   must   be permissible to the Supreme Court. [108 B-H, 109 A-B]      8. It  is not  at all  obligatory that  an  adversarial procedure, where each party produces his own evidence tested by cross  examination by  the other  side and the judge sits like an  umpire and  decides the  case only  on the basis of such material as may be produced before him by both parties, must be  followed in  a  proceeding  under  Article  32  for enforcement of  a fundamental  right. In  fact, there  is no such constitutional  compulsion enacted  in  clause  (2)  of Article 32  or in  any other part of the Constitution. There is nothing  sacrosanct about  the adversarial procedure with evidence led by either party and tested by cross-exmaination by the other party and the judge playing a positive role has become a  part of our legal system because it is embodied in the Code of Civil procedure and the Indian Evidence Act. But these statutes  obviously have  no application  where a  new jurisdiction is created in the Supreme Court for enforcement of a  fundamental right.  Therefore it  is not  justified to impose any  restriction on  the power  of the  Supreme Court adopt such procedure as it thinks fit in exercise of its new jurisdiction, by  engrafting adversarial  procedure  on  it, when the constitution makers have deliberately chosen not to insist on  any such  requirement and instead left it open to the Supreme  Court to  follow such  procedure as  it  thinks appropriate for  the purpose  of securing  the end for which the power  is conferred namely, enforcement of a fundamental right.[109 B-G]      9. The  strict adherence  to the  adversarial procedure can some  times lead  to injustice,  particularly  when  the parties are  not  evenly  balanced  in  social  or  economic strength. Where  one of  the parties to a litigation belongs to a poor and deprived section of the community and does not possess adequate  social and material resources, he is bound to be  at a  disadvantage as  against a  strong and powerful opponent under  the adversary  system of justice, because of his difficulty in getting competent legal representation and more than anything else, his inability to produce relevant- 73 evidence before  the court.  Therefore, when  the poor  come before the  court, particularly  for  enforcement  of  their fundamental rights,  it is  necessary  to  depart  from  the adversarial procedure  and to  evolve a  new procedure which will make it possible for the poor and the weak to bring the necessary material  before the  court  for  the  purpose  of securing enforcement  of their  fundamental rights.  If  the adversarial procedure  is truly followed in their case, they would never  be able to enforce their fundamental rights and the  result   would  be   nothing  but   a  mockery  of  the Constitution.  Therefore   the  Courts  should  abandon  the laissez faire  approach in the judicial process particularly

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where it  involves a  question of enforcement of fundamental rights and forge new tools, devise new methods and adopt new strategies for  the purpose  of  making  fundamental  rights meaningful for  the large  masses of  people.  And  this  is clearly permissible on the language of clause (2) of Article 32 because  the  Constitution  makers  while  enacting  that clause have  deliberately and  advisedly not  used and words restricting the  power of  the court  to adopt any procedure which it  considers appropriate  in the  circumstances of  a given case for enforcing a fundamental right. [110 B-F]      10. It  is obvious  that the poor and the disadvantaged cannot possibly  produce relevant  material before the Court in support  of their  case and  equally where  an action  is brought on  their  behalf  by  a  citizen  acting  pro  bono publico, it would be almost impossible for him to gather the relevant material  and place  it before the Court. In such a case the  Supreme Court would be failing in discharge of its contiotnal duties  of enforcing  a fundamental  right if  it refuses to  intervene because  the stitupetitioner belonging to the  underprivileged  segment  of  society  or  a  public spirited citizen  espousing his  cause is  unable to produce the relevant material before the court. If the Supreme Court were to adopt a passive approach and decline to intervene in such a  case because relevant material has not been produced before  it  by  the  party  seeking  its  intervention,  the fundamental rights would remain merely a teasing illusion so far as  the poor and disadvantaged sections of the community are concerned.  Therefore the  Supreme Court has evolved the practice  of  appointing  commissions  for  the  purpose  of gathering facts  and data in regard to a complaint of breach of a fundamental right made on behalf of the weaker sections of the society. The Report of the commissioner would furnish prima facie  evidence of  the facts and data gathered by the commissioner and that is why the Supreme Court is careful to appoint a  responsible person  as commissioner  to  make  an inquiry or  investigation into  the facts  relating  to  the complaint. Even  in the past the Supreme Court has appointed sometimes a district magistrate, sometimes a district Judge, sometime  a   professor  of  law,  sometimes  a  journalist, sometimes an  officer of the court and sometimes an advocate practising in  the court, for the purpose of carrying out an enquiry or  investigation and  making report  to  the  court because the  commissioner appointed  by the  Court must be a responsible person  who enjoys  the confidence  of the court and who  is expected to carry out his assignment objectively and impartially  without any predilection or prejudice. Once the report  of the  commissioner is  received, copies  of it would be supplied to the parties so that either party, if it wants to  dispute any  of the  facts or  date stated  in the Report, may  do so by filing an affidavit and the court then consider the  report of  the commissioner and the affidavits which may have been filed and proceed to adjudicate upon the issue arising in the writ petition. It would be entirely for the Court to consider what weight to attach to the facts and data stated  in the  report of  the commissioner and to what extent to  act upon such facts and data. But it would not be correct to  say that  the report  of the commissioner has no evidentiary value at all, since the statements 74 made in  it are  not tested  by cross-examination. To accept this  contention  would  be  to  introduce  the  adversarial procedure in  a proceeding  where in the given situation, it is totally inapposite. [111 B-H, 112, A-B]      11. It  is true  that Order  XLVI of  the Supreme Court Rules 1966 makes the provisions of Order XXVI of the Code of

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Civil Procedure,  except rules  13, 14,  19 20,  21  and  22 applicable to  the Supreme Court and lays down the procedure for an application for issue of a Commission, but Order XXVI is not  exhaustive and  does not  detract from  the inherent power of  the Supreme  Court to appoint a commission, if the appointment of  such commission  is found  necessary for the purpose of  securing enforcement  of a  fundamental right in exercise of  its constitutional  jurisdiction under  Article 32. Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 cannot in any way militate  against the  power of  the Supreme Court under Article 32  and in fact rule 6 of Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 provides that nothing in these Rules "shall be deemed  to limit  or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. [112 C-F]      In the  instant case,  therefore, the court did not act beyond its  power in  appointing  the  commissions  for  the purpose of  making an inquiry into the conditions of workmen employed in  the stone  quarries. The petitioner in the writ petition specifically  alleged violation  of the fundamental rights of  the workmen  employed in the stone quarries under Articles 21  and 23  and it  was therefore necessary for the court to  appoint these  commissioners for  the  purpose  of inquiring into  the facts  related to  this  complaint.  The Reports of  the Commissions  were clearly  documents  having evidentiary value and they furnished prima facie evidence of the facts and data stated in those Reports. Of course, it is for the  court to  consider what  weight it should attach to the facts  and data  contained in these Reports in the light of the various affidavits filed in the proceedings.[112 F-H, 113 A-B]      12. The  position pointed  out  as  the  power  of  the Supreme Court  to appoint  commissioners in  the exercise of its jurisdiction  under Article  32 must  apply  equally  in relation to  the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Article  226 for the latter jurisdiction is also a new constitutional jurisdiction  and it is conferred in the same wide terms as the jurisdiction under Article 32 and the same powers can and must therefore be exercised by the High Court while exercising  jurisdiction under  Article 226.  In fact, the jurisdiction  of the  High Courts  under Article  226 is much wider, because the High Courts are required to exercise this jurisdiction  not only for enforcement of a fundamental right but  also for enforcement of any legal right and there are many  rights conferred on the poor and the disadvantaged which are  the creation  of statute  and  they  need  to  be enforced as  urgently and  vigorously as fundamental rights. [113 B-D]      3: 1.  The Stone  quarries  in  the  instant  case  are "mines" within the meaning of the Section 2 (j) of the Mines Act, 1952  since they  are excavations  where operations for the purpose of searching for or obtaining stone by quarrying are being  carried on  but they  are not  open cast working’ since admittedly  excavations in  the case  of  these  stone quarries extend below superjacent ground. Since the workings in these  stone quarries extend below superjacent ground and they are  not ’open  east workings’  and moreover explosives are admittedly used in connection with 75 the excavation, the conditions set out in the proviso to see 3 (i)  (i) are  not fulfilled and hence the exclusion of the provisions of  the Mines  Act 1952  (other than the excepted sections) is  not attracted  and all  the provisions  of the Mines Act 1952 apply to these stone quarries. The provisions contained in  chapters V,  VI &  VII of the Mines Act confer

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certain rights  and benefits  on the workmen employed in the stone quarries  and stone  crushers  and  these  rights  and benefits intended  to secure  to the  workman just and human conditions of  work ensuring  a decent standard of life with basic human  dignity. Since the stone quarries are not being exploited by  the State of Haryana though it is the owner of the stone  quarries, but  are being  given out  on lease  by auction, the  mine-lessees who are not only lessees but also occupiers of  the stone quarries are the owners of the stone quarries within  the meaning  of that  expression as used in section 2  (1) and  so also are the owners of stone crushers in relation  to their  establishment. The  mine-lessees  and owners  of  stone  crushers  are,  therefore,  liable  under section 18  of the  Mines  Act,  1952  to  carry  out  their operations in  accordance with  the provisions  of the Mines Act, 1952  and the  Mines Rules,  1955 and  other Rules  and Regulations made  under that  Act and  to  ensure  that  the rights  and  benefits  conferred  by  these  provisions  are actually and  concretely made  available to the workmen. The Central Government  is entrusted  under the  Mines Act  1952 with the  responsibility of  securing  compliance  with  the provisions of that Act and of the Mines Rules 1953 and other Rules and  Regulations made  under that  Act and  it is  the primary obligation  of the Central Government to ensure that these provisions  are complied  with by the mine-lessees and stone crusher  owners. The State of Haryana is also under an obligation to  take all  necessary steps  for the purpose of securing compliance  with  these  provisions  by  the  mine- lessees and  owners of  stone crushers. The State of Haryana is therefore,  in any event, bound to take action to enforce the provisions  of the  Mines Act  1952 and  the Mines Rules 1955 and other Rules and Regulations made under that Act for the benefit  of the  workmen. [113  G-H, 114 A, 115 A, E, G, 116 B-F, 117 C-D]      13. The  Inter-state  Migrant  Workmen  (Regulation  of Employment and  conditions of  Service) Act,  by sub-section (4) of  section (1)  applies to every establishment in which five or  more inter-State  Migrant workmen  are employed  or were employed  on any day of the preceding twelve months and so also  it applies  to  every  contractor  who  employs  or employed five or more inter-State migrant workmen on any day of the  preceding twelve months. Section (2) sub-section (1) Clause (b)  of the Act defines contractor, in relation to an establishment, to  mean "a person who undertakes (whether as an independent  contractor, agent, employee or otherwise) to produce a  given result  for the establishment, other than a mere supply  of goods  and articles  of manufacture  to such establishment, by  the employment  of workmen  or to  supply workmen to  the establishment, and includes a subcontractor, khatedar, sardar,  agent or  any other  person, by  whatever name called, who recruits or employs workman." Clause (e) of sub-section (1)  of section  (2) defines "interstate Migrant Workmen" to  mean "any person who is recruited by or through a contractor  in one  State  under  an  agreement  or  other arrangement for  employment in  an establishment  in another State,  whether  with  or  with-out  the  knowledge  of  the principal employer  in relation  to such establishment." The expression "principal  employer" is defined by clause (g) of sub-section (1) of section 2 to mean "in relation to a mine, the owner  or agent  of the mine and where a person has been named as  the manager  of the  mine, the  person so  named." Obviously, therefore,  the mine-lessees  and owners of stone crushers in  the present  case would  be principal employers within the meaning of that expression as used in the Inter- 76

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State  Workmen   Act.  Section  16  lays  a  duty  on  every contractor  employing   inter  State   migrant  workmen   in connection with  the work  of an  establishment  to  provide various other  facilities particulars  of which  are  to  be found in  Rules 36  to 45 of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules.  (These   facilities   include   medical   facilities protective clothing,  drinking water,  latrines, urinals and washing  facilities,   rest  rooms,   canteens,  creche  and residential accommodation).  The obligation to provide these facilities is in relation to the inter-State migrant workmen employed in  an establishment  to which the Act applies. But this liability  is not  confined  only  to  the  contractor, because Section  18 provides  in so  many terms  that if any allowance required  to be  paid under-section 14 or 15 to an inter-State migrant workman is not paid by the contractor or if any  facility specified in Section 16 is not provided for the benefit of such workman, such allowance shall be paid or as the  case may  be, the  facility shall be provided by the principal employer  within such time as may be prescribed by the Rules  and all  the allowances  paid  by  the  principal employer or  all  the  expenses  incurred  by  him  in  this connection may  be recovered  by  him  from  the  contractor either  by   deduction  from   the  amount  payable  to  the contractor or as a debt payable by the contractor. [117 F-H, 119 E-A-120 A]      14. The  thekedar or jamadar who is engaged by the mine lessees or  the stone  crusher owners  to recruit workmen or employ them  on behalf  of the mine lessees or stone crusher owners would clearly be a ’contractor’ within the meaning of that term as defined in Section 2 sub-section (1) clause (b) and the  workmen recruited  by or  through  him  from  other States for  employment  in  the  stone  quarries  and  stone crushers in the State of Haryana would undoubtedly be inter- State migrant  workman .  Even when  the thekedar or jamadar recruits or employs workmen for the stone quarries and stone crushers by  sending  word  through  the  "old  hands",  the workmen  so  recruited  or  employed  would  be  inter-State migrant workmen,  because the  "old hands"  would be  really acting as  agents of the thekedar or jamadar for the purpose of recruiting  or employing workmen crushers in the State of Haryana. [121-E]      15. In  addition to  the rights  and benefits conferred upon him  under the  Inter-State Migrant workmen Act and the inter-State Migrant  Workmen Rules,  an inter-State  migrant workman is  also, by  reason of  Section 21, entitled to the benefit  of   the  provisions  contained  in  the  Workmen’s Compensation Act  1923, The  Payment of  Wages Act 1936, The Employees’  State   Insurance  Act   1948,  The   Employees’ Provident Funds  and Misc.  Provisions Act,  1952,  and  the Maternity Benefit Act 1961. [122 B-C]      The  obligation   to  give  effect  to  the  provisions contained in  these various  laws is  not only  that of  the jamadar or  thekedar and  the minelessees and stone crushers owners (provided  of course  there are 5 or more inter-State Migrant Workmen employed in the establishment) but also that of the  Central Government  because the  Central  Government being the  "appropriate Government"  within the  meaning  of Section 2(1)(a)  is under  an obligation  to take  necessary steps for  the purpose  of securing  compliance  with  these provisions by  the thekedar  or jamadar and mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers. The State of Haryana is also bound to ensure that these provisions are observed by the thekedar or jamadar  and minelessees  and owners  of stone  crushers. [122 D-F]      16. If  the Jamadar  or thekadar  in a  stone quarry or

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stone crusher  is a  contractor’ within  the meaning  of the definition of the term in the Inter-State Migrant 77 Workmen Act,  he would a fortiorari be ’contractor’ also for the purpose  of Contract Labour Act and any workmen hired in or in  connection with  the work  of stone  quarry or  stone crusher by  or through  the jamadar  or  thekedar  would  be workmen entitled  to the  benefit of  the provisions  of the Contract  Labour  Act.  Where  therefore  the  thekedar  for Jamadar is  a Contractor,  and the  workmen are  employed as ’contract labour’ within the meaning of these expressions as used in  the Contract  Labour Act  the Contractor as well as the principal  employer would  be liable  to comply with the provisions of  the Contract  Labour  Act  and  the  Contract Labour Rules  and to  provide to  the contract labour rights and benefits  conferred by  these  provisions.  The  Central Government being  the "appropriate  government"  within  the meaning of  section 2  sub-section (1)  clause (a)  would be responsible for  ensuring compliance  with the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and the Contract Labour Rules by the mine-lessees and  stone crushers  owners and the thekedar or jamadar. So  also, for  reasons discussed while dealing with the applicability  of the Mines Act 1952 and the Inter State Migrant Workmen Act, the State of Haryana. would be under an obligation to  enforce the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and  the Contract  Labour Rules  for the  benefit of the workmen. [123 E-F, H, 124 A-C]      17. There  can be  no doubt  and indeed  this  was  not disputed on  behalf of  the respondents,  that  the  Minimum Wages Act  1948 is  applicable to  workmen employed  in  the stone quarries and stone crushers. Therefore whatever be the mode of  payment followed  by the  mine  lessees  and  stone crusher owners,  the workmen  must get nothing less than the minimum wage  for the job which is being carried out by them and if  they are  required to  carry out additionally any of the functions  pertaining to  another job  or occupation for which a  separate minimum  wage is  prescribed, they must be paid a  proportionate part  of such minimum wage in addition to the  minimum wage  payable to them for the work primarily carried out  by them.  The system  of payment which is being followed in  the stone  quarries and  stone crushers,  under which the  expenses of  the explosives and of drilling holes are to  be borne  by the  workmen out  of their  own  wages, should be  changed and  the explosives required for carrying out blasting  should be  supplied by the mine lessees or the jamadar or  thekedar without any deduction being made out of the wages  of the workmen and the work of drilling holes and shot firing  should be  entrusted only  to  those  who  have received the  requisite training  under the Mines Vocational Training  Rules  1966.  So  far  as  the  complaint  of  the petitioner that  the workmen  employed in the stone quarries and stone  crushers are  not being paid the minimum wage due and payable  for the  work carried out by them is concerned, it is  a matter  which would  have to  be  investigated  and determined. [124C, 125 A-E]      The Bonded  Labour system is intended to strike against the system  of bonded  labour which has been a shameful scar on the  Indian  Social  Scene  for  decades  and  which  has continued to  disfigure the  life of  the nation  even after independence. The Act was brought into force through out the length and  breadth of  the country  with effect  from  25th October 1975, which means that the Act has been in force now for almost  8 years  and if  properly implemented, it should have by  this time  brought about  complete  identification, freeing  and   rehabilitation  of   bonded  labour.  But  as

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official, semi-official  and non-official  reports show,  we have yet to go a long way in wiping out this outrage against humanity. [126 A-C]      18. It  is clear  bonded labour  is a  form  of  forced labour  and   Section  12   of  the   Bonded  Labour  System (Abolition)   Act    1976   recognises   this   self-evident proposition by  laying a  duty on  every District Magistrate and every officer specified 78 by him  to inquire  whether any  bonded labour system or any other form  of forced  labour is  being enforced  by  or  on behalf of  any person and, if so, to take such action as may be necessary  to eradicate  the enforcement  of such  forced labour. The  thrust of the Act is against the continuance of any form  of forced  labour. It  is  of  course  true  that, strictly speaking,  a bonded  labourer means  a labourer who incurs or  has or is presumed to have incurred a bonded debt and a  bonded debt  means an advance obtained or presumed to have  been  obtained  by  a  bonded  labourer  under  or  in pursuance of the bonded labour system and it would therefore appear that  before a  labourer can  be regarded as a bonded labourer, he  must not  only be  forced to provide labour to the employer  but he  must have  also received an advance or other economic  consideration from the employer unless he is made to  provide forced labour in pursuance of any custom or social  obligation   or  by  reason  of  his  birth  in  any particular caste or community. [130 A-D]      19. The  contention of  the State  of Haryana  that the burden of  proof under  the bonded labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976  is upon  the bonded labourers is misconceived. To insist that  the bonded labourers must first prove that they are providing  forced labour  in consideration of an advance or other  economic consideration  received by  them and then only they  would be eligible for the benefits provided under the Act,  is nothing  but asking  them to do a task which is extremely difficult,  if not impossible. The labourers would have no  evidence at all to prove so and since employment of bonded labour is a penal offence under the Act, the employer would immediately without any hesitation disown having given any  advance   or  economic   consideration  to  the  bonded labourers. The insistence of proof from two labourers by the State Government which is constitutionally mandated to bring about  change  in  the  life  conditions  of  the  poor  and downtrodden  and   to  ensure  social  justice  to  them  is reprehensible. [130 F-H, 131 A]      It would  be cruel  to insist  that a  bonded labour in order  to   derive  the  benefits  of  this  social  welfare legislation, should  have to  go through a formal process of trial with  the normal  procedure for recording of evidence. That would be a totally futile process because it is obvious that a  bonded labourers  can never stand up to the regidity and formalism  of the  legal process  due  to  his  poverty, illiteracy and  social and economic backwardness and if such a  procedure   were  required  to  be  followed,  the  State Government might  as  well  obliterate  this  Act  from  the statute book.  It is now statistically established that most of bonded  labourers are  members of  Scheduled  Castes  and Scheduled Tribes  or other  backward  classes  and  ordinary course of  human affairs  would show, indeed judicial notice can be  taken of  it, that  there would be no occasion for a labourer to be placed in a situation where he is required to supply forced labour for no wage or for nominal wage, unless he has received some advance of other economic consideration from the  employer and  under  the  consideration  from  the employer and  under the  pretext of not having returned such

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advance or  other economic  consideration, he is required to render service to the employer or is deprived of his freedom of employment  or of  the right  to move  freely wherever he wants. Therefore,  whenever it  is shown that a labourers is made to  provide forced  labour, the  Court  would  raise  a presumption that he is required to do so in consideration of an advance  or other  economic consideration received by him and he  is therefore a bonded labourer. This presumption may be rebutted by the employer and also by the State Government if it  so chooses but unless and until satisfactory material is produced  for reubutting this presumption, the Court must proceed on  the basis that the labourer is a bonded labourer entitled to  the benefit  of the  provisions of the Act. The State Government cannot 79 be  permitted  to  repudiate  its  obligation  to  identify, release and  rehabilitate the  bonded labourers  on the plea that though  the concerned labourers may be providing forced labour, the  State Government does not owe any obligation to them unless  and until  they show  in an  appropriate  legal proceeding conducted  according to  the rules  of  adversary system of justice, that they are bonded labourers. [131 C-H, 132 A]      20. Though  section 13  provides for  constitution of a Vigilance Committee  in each  District and each sub-division of a District, the Government of Haryana, for some reason or the other,  did not constitute any Vigilance Committee until its attention  was drawn  to this  requirement of the law by this Court.  It may  be that  according to the Government of Haryana there  were not  at any  time any  bonded  labourers within its territories, but even so Vigilance Committees are required  by  Section  13  to  be  constituted  because  the function of  the Vigilance  Committee is  to identify bonded labourers, if  there are  any, and  to free and rehabilitate them and  it would not be right for the State Government not to constitute  vigilance Committees  on the  assumption that there are  no  bonded  labourers  at  all.  In  constituting Vigilance Committee  in each  District and sub-division, the Haryana Government  would do well to include representatives of non-political social action groups operating at the grass root level, for it is only through such social action groups and voluntary  agencies that  the problems of identification of bonded labour can be effectively solved. [128 E-H, 129 A- B]      The magistrates  and  judicial  officers  take  a  very lenient view  of violations  of labour  laws enacted for the benefits of the workmen and let off the defaulting employers with small  fines. There  have also been occasions where the magistrate and  judicial officers have scotched prosecutions and acquitted  or discharged  the  defaulting  employers  on hyper  technicalities.  This  happens  largely  because  the magistrates  and  judicial  officers  are  not  sufficiently sensitised to  the importance  of the  observance of  labour laws with  the result that the labour laws are allowed to be ignored and breached with utter callousness and indifference and the  workmen begin to feel that the defaulting employers can, by  paying a  fine which  hardly touches  their pocket, escape from  the arm  of law  and the labour laws supposdely enacted for  their benefit  are not meant to be observed but are merely  decorative appendages  intended to  assuage  the conscience of  the workmen.  The  Magistrates  and  Judicial Officers should  take a  strict view  of violation of labour laws  and  to  impose  adequate  punishment  on  the  erring employers so  that they  may realise that it does not pay to commit a breach of such laws and to deny the benefit of such

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laws to the workmen. [145 A-D]      21. The  Court issued several directions to the Central Government  and   the  State   Government  and  the  various authorities  for  implementing  the  provisions  enacted  in various social  welfare laws  for the benefit of the workmen employed in  the stone  quarries and  stone crushers  in the state of  Haryana. So  that the  poor  workmen  who  lead  a miserable existence  may one  day be  able to  realise  that freedom is  not only  the monopoly  of a  few but belongs to them all  and that they are also equally entitled along with others  to   participate  in   the  fruits  of  freedom  and development. [132 D, 145 D-F] PER PATHAK, J CONCURRING      (1) Public  Interest Litigation  in  its  present  form constitutes a  new chapter  in our  judicial system.  It has acquired  a   significant  degree   of  importance   in  the jurisprudence practised  by our  courts  and  has  evoked  a lively, if somewhat con- 80 troversial, response  in legal  circles, in  the  media  and among the  general public. In our country, this new class of litigation is  justified by  its protagonists  on the  basis generally of  vast areas in our population of illiteracy and poverty, of  social and  economic backwardness,  and  of  an insufficient awareness  and appreciation  of individual  and collective rights.  These handicaps  have denied millions of our countrymen access to justice. Public interest litigation is said to possess the potential or providing such access in the milieu of a new ethos, in which participating sectors in the administration of justice cooperate in the creation of a system  which   promises  legal  relief  without  cumbersome formality and  heavy expenditure.  In the  result, the legal organisation has  taken on  a radically  new dimension,  and correspondingly  new  perspectives  are  opening  up  before judges and  lawyers and  State Law  agencies  in  the  tasks before them. A crusading zeal is abroad, viewing the present as an opportunity to awaken the political and legal order to the  objectives   of  social   justice  projected   in   our constitutional system.  New slogans  fill the  air, and  new phrases have  entered the legal dictionary, and one hears of the  "justicing  system"  being  galvanised  into  supplying justice to  the socioeconomic disadvantages. These urges are responsible for  the birth of new judicial concepts. and the expanding horizon  calpower.  They  claim  to  represent  an increasing emphasis  on social  welfare  and  a  progressive humanitarianism, To the mind trained in the certainty of the law, of  defined principles,  of binding  precedent, and the common law  doctrine of stare decisis, the future is fraught with confusion  and disorder  in the  legal world and severe strains in  the constitutional  system. At the lowest, there is an  uneasy doubt  about where  we are  going.  If  public interest litigation is to command broad acceptance attention must be paid to certain relevant considerations. The history of human  experience shows  that when  a revolution in ideas and in action enters the life of a nation, the nascent power so  released   possesses  the   potential  of  throwing  the prevailing  social   order  into  disarray.  In  a  changing society, wisdom  dictates that  reform should  emerge in the existing polity  as an  ordered change  produce through  its institution. Moreover,  the  pace  of  change  needs  to  be handled  with  care  lest  the  institutions  themselves  be endangered. [152 F-H; 153 A-C; 153 G; 154 A-B]      1:2  Like   the  Warren   Court’s  affirmative   action programmes for  the benefit of minorities and other socially or economically  disadvantaged interests through the avenues

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of Public Law, the courts in India, are beginning to apply a similar concept  of constitutional  duty.  The  doctrine  of standing has  been  enlarged  in  India  to  provide,  where reasonably possible,  access to  justice to large sectors of people for  whom so  far it had been a matter of despair. It is time  indeed for  the law to do so. In large measure, the traditional  conception   of  adjudication  represented  the socioeconomic vision  prevailing at the turn of the century. In India,  as the  consciousness of  social  justice  spread though our  multi-layered  social  order,  the  constitution began to  come under  increasing pressure from social action groups petitioning  on behalf  of the  under privileged  and deprived sections  of society  for the  fulfillment of their aspirations. Despite  the varying  fortunes of the number of cases of  public interest  litigation which have entered the Supreme Court,  Public Interest Litigation constitutes today a significant  segment of the court’s docket. [154 D: 156 A- C]      2:1. The  provisions of  Article 32 do not specifically indicate who  can move  the  Court.  In  the  absence  of  a confining provision  in that  respect, it  is plain  that  a petitioner may  be anyone  in  whom  the  Law  recognises  a standing to maintain an action of such nature. [156 E] 81      2:2.  As   regards  the  form  of  proceeding  and  its character,  Article  32  speaks  generally  of  "appropriate proceedings."  It   should  be   a  proceeding   which   can appropriately lead  to an adjudication of the claim made for the enforcement of a fundamental right and can result in the grant of  effective relief. Article 32 speaks of the Court’s power "to  issue direction  or  orders  of  writs,  and  the specific reference to "writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,  quo warranto  and certiorari"  is by way of illustration only. They do not exhaust the content of the Court’s power under Article 32. [156 F-G]      3:1. A practice has grown in the public of invoking the jurisdiction of this Court by a simple letter complaining of a legal  injury to  the author  or to  some other  person or group of persons, and the Court has treated such letter as a petition under  Article 32  and entertained  the  proceeding without anything  more. It  is only  comparatively  recently that the Court has begun to call for the filing of a regular petition on  the letter. There is grave danger inherent in a practice where  a mere  letter is  entertained as a petition from a person whose antecedents and status are unknown or so uncertain that  no  sense  of  responsibility  can,  without anything more,  be attributed to the communication. There is good reason  for the  insistence on a document being set out in a  form, or  accompanied by evidence, indicating that the allegations  made   in  it   are  made   with  a   sense  of responsibility by  a person  who  has  taken  due  care  and caution to  verify those  allegations before  making them. A plaint instituting  a suit  is required by the Code of Civil Procedure to  conclude with a clause verifying the pleadings contained in it. A petition or application filed in court is required to  be supported on affidavit. These safeguards are necessary because  the document,  a plaint  or  petition  or application, commences  a course of litigation involving the expenditure of  public time  and public  money,  besides  in appropriate cases  involving the  issue of summons or notice to the  defendant or  respondent to  appear and  contest the proceeding. Men  are busy  conducting the  affairs of  their daily lives,  and no  one occupied with the responsibilities and  pressures  of  present  day  existence  welcomes  being summoned to  a law  court and  involved in  a litigation.  A

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document making  allegations without  any proof  whatever of responsibility can  conceivably constitute  an abuse  of the process of  law. Therefore,  in  special  circumstances  the document  petitioning   the  court   for  relief  should  be supported by  satisfactory verification. This requirement is all the  greater where  petitions are  received by the Court through  the   post.  It   is  never  beyond  the  bound  of possibility  that   an  unverified   communication  received through the post by the court may in fact have been employed mala fide,  as an  instrument of  coercion or  blackmail  or other oblique  motive against  a person  named  therein  who holds a position of honour and respect in society. The Court must be  ever vigilant  against the abuse of its process. It cannot do  that better  in this matter than insisting at the earliest stage, and before issuing notice to the respondent, that an  appropriate  verification  of  the  allegations  be supplied. The  requirement  is  imperative  in  private  law litigation. Having  regard to  its nature and purpose, it is equally attracted  to public interest litigation. While this Court has  readily acted  upon letters  and telegrams in the past,  there  is  need  to  insist  now  on  an  appropriate verification of  the petitioner  other communication  before acting on  it. It  will always  be a matter for the court to decide. on  what petition  will it  require verification and when will it waive the rule. [157 B-H; 158 A-C]      3:2. All  communications  and  petitions  invoking  the jurisdiction of  the Court  must be  addressed to the entire Court, that  is to  say, the Chief Justice and his companion judges, No  such communication  or petition  can properly be addressed 82 to a particular judge. When the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked, it  the jurisdiction  of the  entire  court.  Which Judge or  Judges will  hear the case is exclusively a matter concerning the  internal regulation  of the  business of the Court, interference  with which  by a  litigant or member of the public  constitutes the grossest impropriety. It is well established that  when a  division of  the Court  house  and decides cases  it is  in law  regarded as  a hearing  and  a decision by  the Court  itself. The  judgment pronounced and the decree  or  order  made  are  acts  of  the  Court,  and accordingly  they   are  respected,   obeyed  and   enforced throughout the  land. It  is only right and proper that this should be  known clearly  to the  lay public. Communications and petitions  addressed to  a particular Judge are improper and violate the institutional personality of the Court. They also  embarrass  the  judge  to  whom  they  are  personally addressed. The  fundamental conception  of the Court must be respected, that  is  a  single  indivisible  institution  of united  purpose   and   existing   solely   for   the   high constitutional functions  for which it has been created. The conception of  the Court  as a loose aggregate of individual Judges, to  one or  more of  whom  judicial  access  may  be particularly  had,   undermines  its   very  existence   and endangers its  proper and  effective functioning.  [158 E-H; 159 A]      4:1. In  public interest  litigation, the  role held by the Court  is more  assertive than  in traditional  actions. Viewed from  the Warren  Court’s experience  the role of the Court is creative rather than passive, and it assumes a more positive attitude  in determining  facts.  Not  infrequently public interest litigation affects the rights of persons not before the  Court, and  in shaping the relief the court must invariably take  into account its impact on those interests. Moreover, when  its jurisdiction  is invoked  on behalf of a

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group, it  is as well to remember that differences may exist in content  and emphasis  between the  claims  of  different sections of  the group. For all these reasons the court must exercise the  greatest caution and adopt procedures ensuring sufficient notice  to all  interests likely  to be affected. Moreover, the  nature of  the litigation  sometimes involves the continued  intervention of  the Court  over a  period of time, and the organising of the litigation to a satisfactory conclusion  calls   for  judicial   statemanship,  a   close understanding of  constitutional and  legal  values  in  the context of  contemporary social  forces, and a judicious mix of restraint  and activism  determined by  the  dictates  of existing realities. Importantly, at the same time, the Court must never  forget that  its jurisdiction extends no farther than the legitimate limits of its constitutional powers, and avoid trespassing  into political  territory which under the Constitution has  been appropriated  to other  organs of the State. [159 B; D-G]      4;2. The  procedures adopted  by the  Court in cases of public interest  litigation must  of  course  be  procedures designed and  shaped by  the Court  with a view to resolving the problem  presented before  it on  determining the nature and  extent  of  relief  accessible  in  the  circumstances. Whatever the  procedure adopted  by the  court  it  must  be procedure known  to judicial  tenets and characteristic of a judicial  proceeding.  There  are  methods  and  avenues  of procuring material  available to  executive and  legislative agencies and  often employed  by them  for the efficient and effective discharge  of the tasks before them. Not all those methods and  avenues are  available to  the Court. the Court must ever  remind itself that one of the indicia identifying it as  a Court  is the nature and character of the procedure adopted by  it in  determining a  controversy. It is in that sense limited  in the  evolution of procedures pursued by it in the  process of  an adjudication,  and in  the grant  and execution of  the relief.  Legal jurisprudence  has  in  its historical 83 development identified  certain fundamental principles which form the  essential constituents of judicial procedure. They are employed  in every  judicial proceeding,  and constitute the basic  infrastructure along  whose  chamacts  flows  the power of  the Court  in the process of adjudication. [159 H; 160 A-D]      4:3. What  should be  the  conceivable  frame  work  of procedure in  public interest litigation does not admit of a clear cut  answer. It  is not possible to envisage a defined pattern of  procedure applicable  to all cases. Of necessity the pattern  which the  Court  adopts  will  vary  with  the circumstances of  each case.  But, if  there  is  a  statute prescribing a  judicial procedure  governing the  particular case the Court must follow such procedure. It is not open to the Court  to bypass  the statute  and  evolve  a  different procedure at variance with it. Where, however, the procedure prescribed by statute is incomplete or insufficient, it will be open  to the  Court to  supplement it by evolving its own rules. Nonetheless, the supplementary procedure must conform at all  stages to  the principles  of natural justice. There can be  no deviation  from the principles of natural justice and other well accepted procedural norms characteristic of a judicial proceeding.  They  constitute  an  entire  code  of general  principles  of  procedure,  tried  and  proven  and hallowed by the sanctity of common and consistent acceptance during long  years of the historical development of the law. The general  principles of  law, to which  reference is made

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here, command  the confidence,  not merely  of the judge and the lawyer  and the  parties to  the litigation,  but supply that  basic   credible  to  the  judicial  proceeding  which strengthens public  faith in the Rule of Law. They are rules rooted  in   reason  and   fairplay  and   their  governance guarantees a  just disposition of the case. The Court should be wary  of suggestions  favouring novel procedures in cases where accepted  procedural rules will suffice. [160 E-H; 161 A]      5:1. Article  32 confers  the widest amplitude of power of this Court in the matter of granting relief. It has power to issue  "directions or  orders of  writs", and there is no specific  indication,   no  express  language,  limiting  or circumscribing that  power. Yet, the power is limited by the very nature,  that its  judicial power.  It is  power  which pertains to  the judicial  organ of the State, identified by the very  nature of  the  judicial  institution.  There  are certain fundamental  constitutional concepts which, although elementary, need  to be  recalled at times. The constitution envisages a broad division of the power of the State between the legislature,  the executive  and the judiciary. Although the division  is not  precisely demarcated, there is general acknowledgement of  its limits.  The limits  can be gathered from the  written text of the Constitution, from conventions and constitutional  practice, and  from an  entire array  of judicial decisions.  The constitutional  lawyer  concedes  a certain measure  of overlapping  in functional  action among the three  organs of  the State. But there is no warrant for assuming geometrical  congruence. It  is common  place  that while  the   legislature  enacts   the  law   the  executive implements it  and the court interprets it and, in doing so, adjudicates on  the validity  of executive  action and under our  Constitution,   even  judges   the  validity   of   the legislation itself.  And yet it is well recognised that in a certain sphere  the legislature  is  possessed  of  judicial power, the executive possesses a measure of both legislative and judicial  functions, and  the  court,  in  its  duty  of interpreting the law, accomplished in its perfected action a marginal degree of legislative exercise. Nonetheless, a fine and delicate  balance is  envisaged under  our  Constitution between these  primary institutions  of the  State. In every case the  Court should  determine the  true  limits  of  its jurisdiction and,  having done  so, it  should take  care to remain within  the restraints of its jurisdiction. [161 B-H; 162 A] 84      5:2. This  aspect  of  Court  action  assumes  especial significance in  public interest  litigation. It  bears upon the  legitimacy   of  the  judicial  institution,  and  that legitimacy is  affected as much by the solution presented by the Court  in resolving  a controversy  as by  the manner in which the  solution is  reached.  In  an  area  of  judicial functioning where  judicial activism  finds room  for  play, where constitutional  adjudication can  become an instrument of social  policy forged by the personal political philosphy of the  judge, this is an important consideration to keep in mind. [162 B-C]      5:3. Where the Court embarks upon affirmative action in the attempt  to remedy a constitutional imbalance within the social order, few critics will find fault with it so long as it confines itself to the scope of its legitimate authority. But there  is always  the possibility,  in  public  interest litigation, of succumbing to the temptation of crossing into territory which  properly pertains  to the Legislature or to the Executive Government. For in most cases the jurisdiction

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of the  Court is  invoked when a default occurs in executive administration, and sometimes where a void in community life remains unfilled by legislative action. The resulting public grievance finds  expression through  social  action  groups, which consider  the Court  an appropriate forum for removing the deficiencies.  Indeed, the citizen seems to find it more convenient to  apply to  the Court  for the  vindication  of constitutional  rights  than  appeal  to  the  executive  or legislative  organs   of  the   State.  In  the  process  of correcting executive  error or removing legislative omission the Court  can so  easily find  itself  involved  in  policy making of  a quality  and  to  a  degree  characteristic  of political authority,  and  indeed  run  the  risk  of  being mistaken for one. An excessively political role identifiable with political  governance betrays  the Court into functions alien to its fundamental character, and tends to destroy the delicate balance  envisaged  in  our  constitutional  system between its  three basic  institutions. The Judge, conceived in the true classical mould, is an impartial arbiter, beyond and above political bias and prejudice, functioning silently in  accordance   with  the  Constitution  and  his  judicial conscience. Thus  does he  maintain the  legitimacy  of  the institution he  serves and honour the trust which his office has reposed in him. [162 D-H]      The  affirmative  schemes  framed  in  public  interest litigation  by   the  Court   sometimes   require   detailed administration  under  constant  judicial  supervision  over protected periods.  The lives  of large  sections of  people some of  whom have had no voice in the decisions, are shaped and ordered  by mandatory  Court action  extending into  the future. In  that context  it is  as well  to  remember  that public  approval   and  public   consent   assume   material importance in  its successful  implementation.  In  contrast with policy  making by  legislation, where  a large  body of legislators debate  on a  proposed legislative enactment, no such visual  impact can  be perceived  when judicial decrees are forged and fashioned by a few judicial personages in the confines of  a Court. The mystique of the robe, at the stage of  decision-making,   is  associated   traditionally   with cloistered secrecy  and confidentiality  and the  end-result commonly issues  as a  final definitive act of the Court. It is a serious question whether in every case the same awesome respect and reverence will endure during different stages of affirmative action  seeking to  regulate the  lives of large numbers of  people, some  of whom  never participated in the judicial process. [163 A-D]      5:4. Treating  with public interest litigation requires more than  legal scholar  ship and  a knowledge of text book law. It is of the utmost importance in such 85 cases that  when formulating  a scheme  of action, the Court must have  due regard to the particular circumstances of the case, to  surrounding realities  including the potential for successful implementation,  and the likelihood and degree of response from  the agencies  on whom the implementation will depend. In  most cases  of public interest litigation, there will be neither precedent nor settled practice to add weight and force to the validity of the Court’s action. The example of similar  cases  in  other  countries  can  afford  little support. The  successful implementation of the orders of the Court will  depend upon  the particular social forces in the backdrop  of   local  history,   the   prevailing   economic pressures, the  duration  of  the  stages  involved  in  the implementation, the momentum of success from stage to stage, and the  acceptability of the Court’s action at all times by

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those involved in or affected by it. [163 E-G]      5:5. An  activist Court  spearheading the  movement for the   development    and   extension    of   the   citizen’s constitutional rights,  for  the  protection  of  individual liberty and  for  the  strengthening  of  the  socioeconomic fabric   in    compliance   with   declared   constitutional objectives, will  need to  move with  a degree  of  judicial circumspection. In  the centre  of a  social order  changing with dynamic  pace, the Court needs to balance the authority of the  past with  the urges of the future. In that task the court must  ever be  conscious of  the constitutional truism that it  possesses the sanction of neither the sword nor the pursue and  that  its  strength  lies  basically  in  public confidence and support, and that consequently the legitimacy of its  acts and  decisions must  remain beyond  all  doubt. Therefore, whatever the case before it, whatever the context of facts  and legal rights, whatever the social and economic pressures of  the times, whatever the personal philosophy of the Judge,  let it  not  be  forgotten  that  the  essential identity of the institution, that it is a Court, must remain preserved so  that every  action of the Court is informed by the fundamental norms of law, and by the principles embodied in the  Constitution  and  other  sources  of  law.  If  its contribution to  the Jurisprudential  ethos of society is to advance our  constitutional objectives,  it must function in accord with  only those  principles  which  enter  into  the composition of  judicial action  and give  to its  essential quality. [163 H; 164 A-D]      5:6. There  is a great merit in the Court proceeding to decide an  issue on  the basis of strict legal principle and avoiding carefully the influence of purely emotional appeal. For that  alone gives  the decision of the Court a direction which  is   certain,  and  unfaltering,  and  that  especial permanence in  legal jurisprudence which makes it a base for the next  step forward  in the  further progress of the law. Indeed,  both   certainty  of  substance  and  certainty  of direction are  indispensable requirements in the development of the  law,  and  invest  it  with  the  credibility  which commands public confidence in its legitimacy. [165 A-B]      This warning  is  of  especial  significance  in  these times, during  a phase of judicial history when a few social action groups  tend to  show evidence  of presuming  that in every case  the court  must bend  and mould  its decision to popular notions  of which way a case should be decided. [165 C]      As  new   areas  open  before  the  Court  with  modern developments in  jurisprudence, in a world more sensitive to human  rights   as  well  as  the  impact  of  technological progress, the Court will become increasingly consious of its expanding  jurisdiction.   That  is   inevitable.  But   its responsibilities  are  correspondingly  great,  and  perhaps never greater than now. [165 D] 86      It must  be remembered that there is no higher Court to correct over  the Supreme  Court its  errors, and  that  its Judge wear  the mantle  of infallibility  only because their decisions are  final. That the Judges sit at the apex of the judicial administration  and their  word, by  constitutional mandate, is  the law of the land can induce an unusual sense of power.  It is  a feeling  Judges must  guard  against  by constantly reminding  themselves that every decision must be guided by reason and by judicial principles. [65 E-F]      6:1. Persons in this country obliged to serve as bonded labour  are   entitled  to   invoke  Article   23   of   the Constitution. The  provisions embodied in that clause form a

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vital constituent  of the  Fundamental Rights  set forth  in Part III  of the  Constitution, and their violation attracts properly the  scope of  Article 32 of the Constitution. [165 G]      6:2. It is true that the reports of the court appointed commissions have  not been  tested by cross examination, but then the  record does  not show whether any attempt was made by the  respondents to  call  them  for  cross  examination. Further, whether  the appointment of the commissioners falls within the  term of  order XLVI  of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 is  of technical  significance only  because there  was inherent power in the court, in the particular circumstances of this  case to  take that action, However, the court would do  well   to  issue   notice  to  the  respondents,  before appointing any  Commissioner, in  those cases where there is little apprehension  of the  disappearance of evidence. [166 B-C]      6:3. The present case is one of considerable importance to a   section  of our  people,  who  pressed  by  the  twin misfortunes of  poverty and  illiteracy, are  compelled to a condition of  life which  long since should have passed into history.  The   continued  existence   of  such  pockets  of oppression and  misery do  no justice  to the  promises  and assurances extended  by our  Constitution to  its  citizens. [166 B-E]      PER AMARENDRA NATH SEN, J: (Concurring with Pathak, J.)      1:  1.  Article  32  of  the  Constitution  is  clearly attracted to  the facts  of the case, as in the present case the violation  of the  fundamental right  of liberty  of the workmen who  are said  to be  kept in  wrongful and  illegal detention, employed  in forced  labour, is  alleged.  Forced labour is  constitutionally forbidden  by Article 23 of the, Constitution. [168 D-E]      1:2.  Any   person  who  is  wrongfully  and  illegally employed as a labourer in violation of the provisions of the Bonded Labour  System (Abolition)  Act, 1976  is in  essence deprived of  his liberty.  A bonded labourer truly becomes a slave and  the freedom of a bonded labourer in the matter of his employment and movement is more or less completely taken away and  forced labour  is thrust upon him. When any bonded labourer approached  this Court  the real  grievance that he makes is  that he  should be  freed from this bondage and he prays for  being set  at liberty  and liberty  is no doubt a fundamental right  guaranteed  to  every  person  under  the Constitution. There  cannot be  any manner of doubt that any person who  is wrongfully  and  illegally  detained  and  is deprived of  his  liberty  can  approach  this  Court  under Article 32  of the Constitution for his freedom and wrongful and  illegal  detention,  and  for  being  set  at  liberty. Whenever any  person is wrongfully and illegally deprived of his liberty,  it is open to anybody who is interested in the person  to   move  this   Court  under  Article  32  of  the Constitution for  his release.  It may  not  very  often  be possible for the person who is deprived of his liberty to 87 approach this  Court, as  by  virtue  of  such  illegal  and wrongful detention,  he may not be free and in a position to move the Supreme Court. [167 E-H]      1:3. The  Bonded labourers  working  in  the  far  away places are  generally poor  and  belong  to  the  very  weak section of  the people.  They are also not very literate and they may  not be  conscious of their own rights. Further, as they are  kept in  bondage their  freedom is also restricted and they  may not  be in  a position to approach this Court. Though no fundamental right of the petitioner may be said to

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be infringed,  yet  the  petitioner  who  complains  of  the violation of  the fundamental  right of the workmen who have been wrongfully  and  illegally  denied  their  freedom  and deprived of  their constitutional  right must  be held to be entitled to  approach this  Court on  behalf of  the  bonded labourers  for   removing  them  from  illegal  bondage  and deprivation of liberty. [168 B-C]      S.P. Gupta  v. Union  of India & Another, [1981] Suppl. S.C.C. 87, referred to      2:1. Article  32 or  for that  matter any other article does not  lay down any procedure which has to be followed to move this  Court for  relief against  the violation  of  any fundamental right.  Article 32  (1) only  lays down that the right to  move this  court by  appropriate  proceedings  for enforcement  of   fundamental  rights   is  guaranteed.  The Constitution very  appropriately leaves  the question  as to what will  constitute  an  appropriate  proceeding  for  the purpose  of   enforcement  of   fundamental  rights   to  be determined by  the Court. This Court when sought to be moved under Article  32 by  any party for redressing his grievance against the  violation of-fundamental rights has to consider whether the  procedure followed  by the party is appropriate enough to  entitle the  court to proceed to act on the same. No doubt  this Court has framed rules which are contained in part IV,  Order XXXV  of the  Supreme Court  Rules under the Caption "application  for enforcement of fundamental rights" ("Article 32  of the  Constitution") Generally speaking, any party who  seeks to  move this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution should  conform to  the rules  prescribed.  The rules lay  down  the  procedure  which  is  normally  to  be followed in  the matter  of any application under Article 32 of the  Constitution. These  rules are rules relating to the procedure to  be adopted and the rules are intended to serve as maids  to the Deity of Justice. Procedural law which also forms a part of the law and has to be observed, is, however, subservient to substantive law and the laws of procedure are prescribed for promoting and furthering the ends of justice. There cannot  be any  doubt that  this Court  should usually follow the  procedure laid  down in  O.XXXV of  the Rules of this Court and should normally insist on a petition properly verified by  an affidavit to be filed to enable the Court to take necessary  action on the same. Though this Court should normally insist on the rules of procedure being followed, it cannot be  said, taking  into consideration  the  nature  of right conferred  under Article  32 to  move this Court by an appropriate proceeding and the very wide powers conferred on this Court  for granting  relief in the case of violation of fundamental  rights,   that  this   Court   will   have   no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding which may not be in conformity with  procedure prescribed  by the  Rules of this Court. The Rules undoubtedly lay down the procedure which is normally to  be followed  for making  an  application  under Article 32  of the  Constitution. They,  however, do not and cannot have  the effect of limiting the jurisdiction of this Court of  entertaining a  proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution, if  made, only in the manner prescribed by the rules. [169 F-H; 170 A-D] 88      2:2.  For   effectively  safeguarding  the  fundamental rights  guaranteed   by  the   Constitution,  the  Court  in appropriate cases in the interests of justice will certainly be competent to treat a proceeding, though not in conformity with the procedure prescribed by the Rules of this Court, as an  appropriate   proceeding  under   Article  32   of   the Constitution and  to entertain  the same. Fundamental rights

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guaranteed under  the Constitution  are indeed too sacred to be  ignored   or  trifled  with  merely  on  the  ground  of technicality or  any rule  of procedure. The rules framed by this Court do not also lay down that this Court can be moved under Article 32 of the Constitution only in accordance with the procedure  prescribed by  the Rules and not otherwise. A mere technicality  in the  matter of form or procedure which may not  in any  way affect  the substance of any proceeding should not stand in the way of the exercise of the very wide Jurisdiction  and  powers  conferred  on  this  Court  under Article  32   of  the   Constitution  for   enforcement   of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Taking into consideration  the substance  of  the  matter  and  the nature of  allegations made, it will essentially be a matter for the court to decide whether the procedure adopted can be considered to  be an appropriate proceeding within the ambit of Article 32 of the Constitution. The Court if satisfied on the materials  placed in  the form  of  a  letter  or  other communication addressed  to this  Court, may  take notice of the same in appropriate cases. Experience shows that in many cases it may not be possible for the party concerned to file a regular  writ petition  in conformity  with procedure laid down in the Rules of this Court. The Supreme Court for quite some years  now has  in many  cases proceeded  to act on the basis of  the letters  addressed  to  it.  A  long  standing practice of  the Court  in  the  matter  of  procedure  also acquired sanctity.  Further in  various cases  the Court has refused to  take any  notice of  letters or  other  kind  of communications addressed to Court and in many cases also the Court on  being moved by a letter has directed a formal writ petition to  be filed  before  it  has  decided  to  proceed further in the matter. [170 F-H; 171 A-D]      2:3. It  is however  eminently desirable  that normally the procedure  prescribed in  the rules of this Court should be followed  while entertaining  a petition under Article 32 of  the   Constitution,  though  in  exceptional  cases  and particularly in  the matter of general public interest, this Court may,  taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of  case, proceed to exercise its jurisdiction under Article  32 of  the Constitution  for  enforcement  of fundamental rights  treating the letter or the communication in any other form as an appropriate proceeding under Art. 32 of the  Constitution. Further  any  party  who  addresses  a letter or  any other  communication to  this  Court  seeking intervention of  this Court  on the basis of the said letter and   communication    should   address   this   letter   or communication to  this Court and not to any individual Judge by name. Such communication should be addressed to the Chief Justice of  the Court  and his companion Justices. A private communication by  a party  to any  Learned  Judge  over  any matter is  not proper  and may  create embarrassment for the Court and the Judge concerned. [171 G-H; 172 A]      In the  present case,  the unfortunate  workers who are employed and  bonded labourers at a distant place, could not possibly  in   view  of  their  bondage,  move  this  Court, following the  procedure laid  down-in  the  Rules  of  this Court. The  Petitioner which  claims to  be a social welfare Organization interested  in restoring liberty and dignity to these unfortunate  bonded  labourers  should  be  considered competent  to   move  this   Court  by   a  letter  or  like communication addressed to 89 this Court, to avoid trouble and expenses, as the petitioner is not  moving  this  Court  for  any  personal  or  private benefit.

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    3:1. Whenever,  however,  there  is  an  allegation  of violation   of    fundamental   rights,   it   becomes   the responsibility and  also the  sacred duty  of this  Court to protect  such   fundamental  rights   guaranteed  under  the Constitution provided  that this  Court is  satisfied that a case for  interference by  this Court appears prima facie to have been  made out. Very often the violation of fundamental rights  is   not  admitted   or  accepted.   On   a   proper consideration of  the materials  the Court  has to come to a conclusion  whether   there  has   been  any   violation  of fundamental rights  to enable the court to grant appropriate reliefs in  the matter.  In various  cases, because  of  the peculiar facts  and circumstances  of  the  case  the  party approaching this Court for enforcement of fundamental rights may not  be in  a position to furnish all relevant materials and necessary  particulars. If,  however, on a consideration of the  materials placed,  the Court  is  satisfied  that  a proper probe  into the  matter is  necessary in  the  larger interest of administration of justice and for enforcement of fundamental rights  guaranteed, the  Court, in  view of  the obligations  and   duty  cast  upon  it  of  preserving  and protecting  fundamental   rights,  may  require  better  and further materials  to enable  the Court  to take appropriate action; and  there cannot be anything improper in the proper exercise of  Court’s jurisdiction  under Article  32 of  the Constitution  to  try  to  secure  the  necessary  materials through appropriate  agency. The  commission that  the Court may appoint  or the  investigation that the court may direct is essentially  for  the  Court’s  satisfaction  as  to  the correctness or  otherwise of  the allegation of violation of fundamental rights  to enable the Court to decide the Course to be adopted for doing proper justice to the parties in the matter of  protection of their fundamental rights. It has to be borne  in mind  that in  this land  of  ours,  there  are persons  without   education,  without   means  and  without opportunities and  they also are entitled to full protection of  their  rights  or  privileges  which  the  Constitutions affords.  Living   in  chilled   penury  without   necessary resources and very often not fully conscious of their rights guaranteed under  the Constitution,  a very large section of the people  commonly termed  as the  weaker section  live in this land.  When this  Court is approached on behalf of this class of  people for  enforcement of  fundamental rights  of which they  have been  deprived and  which they  are equally entitled to  enjoy, it becomes the special responsibility of the Court  to see that justice is not denied to them and the disadvantageous position  in which  they are  placed, do not stand in  the way  of their getting justice from this Court. [172 D-H; 173 A-B]      3:3.  The   power  to   appoint  a   commission  or  an investigation  body   for  making   enquiries  in  terms  of directions given  by the  Court must  be  considered  to  be implied and  inherent in  the power that the Court has under Article  32  for  enforcement,  of  the  fundamental  rights guaranteed under  the Constitution. This is a power which is indeed incidental  or ancillary to the power which the Court is called  upon to exercise in a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution. It is entirely in the discretion of the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of any case, to consider  whether any  such power regarding investigation has to  be exercised  or not.  The Commission that the Court appoints or  the investigation  that the Court directs while dealing  with   a  proceeding   under  Article   32  of  the Constitution is  not a  commission or enquiry under the Code of Civil  Procedure. Such  power must necessarily be held to

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be implied  within the  very wide  powers conferred  on this Court  under  Article  32  for  enforcement  of  fundamental rights. 90 For proper  exercise of  its powers  under Article 32 of the Constitution and  for due  discharge of  the obligation  and duty cast  upon this  Court in  the matter of protection and enforcement of  fundamental rights  which  the  Constitution guarantees, this  Court has an inherent power to act in such a manner  as will  enable this Court to discharge its duties and  obligations   under  Article  32  of  the  Constitution properly  and   effectively  in   the  larger   interest  of administration of  justice, and  for  proper  protection  of Constitution safeguards. [173 C-G]      4. The litigation of this type particularly in relation to bonded  labourers is  really not  in nature  an adversary litigation and  it becomes the duty of the State and also of the appropriate authorities to offer its best cooperation to see that  this evil practice which has been declared illegal is ended  at the earliest. The existence of bonded labour in the Court  is an  unfortunate fact.  Whenever  there  is  an allegation  of   the  existence  of  bonded  labour  in  any particular State,  the State  instead of seeking to come out with a  case of  denial of  such existence on the basis of a feeling that the existence of bonded labour in the State may cast a  slur or  stigma  on  its  administrative  machinery, should cause  effective enquiries to be made into the matter and if the matter is pending in this Court, should cooperate with this  Court to  see that death-knell is sounded on this illegal system  which constitutes  a veritable social menace and stands  in the way of healthy development of the nation. [174 A-C] PER CONTRA :      5. The  grievance of denial of other just rights to the workmen and  the reliefs  claimed for giving the workmen the benefits  to  which  they  may  be  entitled  under  various legislations enacted  for their  welfare are more or less in the nature  of consequential  reliefs incidental to the main relief of freedom from bonded and forced labour to which the workmen are  rejected. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it  appears that the provisions of inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979  are not  applicable and therefore do not fall for any adjudication. [174 F-G]

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 2135 of 1982.      Under Article 32 of the Constitution.      Govind Mukhoty,  S.K. Bhattacharya  and N.R.  Chaudhary for the Petitioner.      M.N. Phadke,  K.B. Rohtagi  and S.K.  Dhingra  for  the Respondent Nos. 4,5,7, 8 & 9.      K.B. Rohtagi and S.I. Dhingra for the Respondent No. 13      S.K. Verma for the Respondent No. 6.      Abdul Khadar  Sr. Advocate  and Miss.  A. Subhashni for the respondent. 91      The following Judgments were delivered-      BHAGWATI,  J.   The  petitioner   is  an   organisation dedicated to the cause of release of bonded labourers in the country. The  system of  bonded labour has been prevalent in various parts  of  the  country  since  long  prior  to  the attainment of  political freedom  and it constitutes an ugly

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and shameful feature of our national life. This system based on exploitation  by a few socially and economically powerful persons trading on the misery and suffering of large numbers of men  and holding  them in  bondage is a relic of a feudal hierarchical  society  which  hypocritically  proclaims  the divinity of  men but treats large masses of people belonging to the  lower rungs  of the  social ladder  or  economically impoverished segments  of society  as dirt and chattel. This system under  which one  person can  be  bonded  to  provide labour to  another for years and years until an alleged debt is supposed  to be  wiped out  which never  seems to  happen during the  life time  of the  bonded labourer,  is  totally incompatible with  the new  egalitarian socioeconomic  order which we  have promised  to build  and it  is  not  only  an affront to  basic human  dignity but  also constitutes gross and  revolting   violation  of  constitutional  values.  The appalling conditions  in which bonded labourers live, not as humans but  as serfs, recall to the mind the following lines from "Man  with the  Hoe" which  almost seem  to  have  been written with reference to this neglected and forlorn species of Indian humanity:           "Bowed by the weight of centuries he leans                Upon his hoe and gazes on the ground           The emptiness of ages on his face,                And on his back the burden of the world,      They are  non-beings, exiles  of civilization, living a life worst  than that  of animals,  for the  animals are  at least free  to roam  about as they like and they can plunder or grab  food whenever  they are hungry but these out castes of society  are held in bondage, robbed of their freedom and they are  consigned to  an existence where they have to live either in hovels or under the open sky and be satisfied with whatever little  unwholesome food  they can  manage  to  get inadequate though  it be  to fill their hungry stomachs. Not having any  choice, they  are driven  by poverty  and hunger into a  life of bondage a dark bottomless pit from which, in a  cruel  exploitative  society,  they  cannot  hope  to  be rescued.      This pernicious  practice of  bonded labour  existed in many 92 States and obviously with the ushering in of independence it could not be allowed to continue to blight the national life any longer  and hence,  when we  framed our Constitution, we enacted Article  23  of  the  Constitution  which  prohibits "traffic in  human beings and beggar and other similar forms of forced labour" practised by any one. The system of bonded labour therefore  stood prohibited  by Article  23 and there could have  been no  more solemn  and effective  prohibition than the one enacted in the Constitution in Article 23. But, it appears  that though  the Constitution was enacted as far back as 26th January, 1950 and many years passed since then, no serious  effort was made to give effect to Article 23 and to stamp  out the  shocking practice of to bonded labour. It was only  in 1976  that Parliament enacted the Bonded Labour System (Abolition)  Act, 1976 providing for the abolition of bonded labour  system with a view to preventing the economic and physical  exploitation of  the weaker  sections  of  the people. But,  unfortunately, as subsequent events have shown and that  is borne out also by the Report made by the Centre for Rural  Development Administration,  Indian Institute  of Public Administration  to the  Ministry of Labour Government of India  on "Rehabilitation  of Bonded  Labour  in  Monghyr District, Bihar",  the Report  made by the Public Policy and Planning  Division   of  the   Indian  Institute  of  Public

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Administration to  the Ministry  of  Labour,  Government  of India on  "Evaluation Study  of Bonded Labour Rehabilitation Scheme In  Tehri Garhwal,  U.P.", the  Report of  Laxmi Dhar Misra,  the   Director-General  (Labour   Welfare)  of   the Government of  India based  on On the Spot Studies Regarding Identification,   Release    of   Bonded    Labourers    and Rehabilitation of  Freed Labourers  in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,   Madhya   Pradesh,   Karnataka,   Orissa,   Bihar, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu  and  Kerala  and  the  Report  of  the National Seminar  on "Indentification  and Rehabilitation of Bonded Labour"  held from 7th to 9th February, 1983 that the pernicious practice  of  bonded  labour  has  not  yet  been totally eradicated  from the  national  scene  and  that  it continues to  disfigure the  social and economic life of the country at  certain places.  There are  still  a  number  of bonded   labourers in  various  parts  of  the  country  and significantly, as  pointed out in the Report of the National Seminar on  "Identification  and  Rehabilitation  of  Bonded Labour" a  large number  of them  belong to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled  Tribes account  for the  next largest  number while the few who are not from Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes are  generally landless agricultural labourers. It is absolutely essential we would unhesitatingly declare that it is a  constitutional imperative-that  the  bonded  labourers must be identified and released from the shackles of bondage so that they can assimilate 93 themselves in the main stream of civilised human society and realise   the dignity,  beauty and worth of human existence. The  process   of  identification   and  release  of  bonded labourers is  a process  of discovery  and transformation of non-beings  into   human-beings  and  what  it  involves  is eloquently described in the beautiful lines of Rabindra Nath Tagore in "Kadi and Komal"           Into the mouths of these           Dumb, pale and meak           We have to infuse the language of the soul.           Into the hearts of these           Weary and worn, dry and forlorn           We have to minstrel the language of humanity.’      This Process  of discovery  and transformation  poses a serious problem  since the  social and  economic  milieu  in which it  has to  be accomplished  is dominated  by elements hositle to  it. But this problem has to be solved if we want to emancipate  those who  are living  in bondage and serfdom and make  them equal  participants in  the fruits of freedom and liberty. It is a problem which needs urgent attention of the Government  of India  and the State Governments and when the Directive  Principles of State Policy have obligated the Central and  the State  Governments to  take steps and adopt measures for  the purpose  of ensuring social justice to the have-notes and  the handicapped, it is not right on the part of the  concerned governments  to shut  their  eyes  to  the inhuman exploitation  to  which  the  bonded  labourers  are subjected.  It   is  not   uncommon   to   find   that   the administration in  some States  is not  willing to admit the existence of  bonded labour,  even though it exists in their territory and  there is  incontrovertible evidence  that  it does so  exist. We fail to see why the administration should feel shy  in  admitting  the  existence  of  bonded  labour, because it  is not  the existence of bonded labour that is a slur on  the administration  but its failure to take note of it and  to take  all necessary  steps  for  the  purpose  of putting an  end to  the  bonded  labour  system  by  quickly identifying, releasing and permanently rehabilitating bonded

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labourers. What  is needed  is determination, dynamism and a sense of social commitment of the part of the administration to free  bonded labourers and rehabilitate them and wipe out this ugly  inhuman practice  which is a blot on our national life. What  happened recently in the Ranga Reddy District of Andrha Pradesh  as a  result of the initiative taken by this Court in  Writ Petitions  Nos. 1574  of 1982  and 54 of 1983 shows clearly  that  if  the  political  and  administrative apparatus has  a sense  of commitment  to the constitutional values 94 and is  determined to take action for identifying, releasing and rehabilitating  bonded labourers  despite pressures  and pulls from different quarters, much can be done for securing emancipation and  rehabilitation of  bonded  labourers.  The District Administration  of Ranga  Reddy District  could  in less than six months release over 3000 bonded labourers from the clutches of contractors in stone quarries in Ranga Reddy District and  send them back to their homes with tickets and pocket expenses. It is therefore essential that whichever be the State  Government  it  should,  where  there  is  bonded labour, admit  the existence  of such bonded labour and make all possible  efforts to  eradicate it. By doing so, it will not only  be performing  a humanitarian  function  but  also discharging a  constitutional obligation  and  strengthening the foundations of participatory democracy in the country.      We also  find that  in some cases the State Governments in order  to shirk  their obligation, take shelter under the plea that there may be some forced labour in their State but that is  not bonded  labour. We  shall have occasion to deal with  this  plea  a  little  later  when  we  refer  to  the definition of  ’bonded labour’  given in  the Bonded  Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 which at first blush appears to be a  narrow definition  limited only to a situation where a debtor is  forced to provide labour to a creditor. The State of Haryana  has in  the present  case tried  to quibble with this definition of ’bonded labour’ and its argument has been that these labourers may be providing forced labour but they are not  bonded labourers  within the  meaning of the Bonded Labour System  (Abolition) Act,  1976 and they may therefore be freed  by the  Court if  it so  pleases but  the State of Haryana cannot  be compelled  to rehabilitate  them. We  are constrained to  observe that this argument, quite apart from its invalidity,  ill-behoves a  State  Government  which  is committed to  the  cause  of  socialism  and  claims  to  be striving to ensure social justice to the vulnerable sections of the  community. But  we do  not wish  to  anitcipate  the discussion in  regard to  this argument  and at  the present stage we  content ourselves  by merely  observing that it is unfortunate that  any State  Government should  take up  the plea that  persons who  are forced to provided labour may be forced labourers  but unless  it is  shown by them by proper evidence tested by cross-examination that they are forced to provide labour against a bonded debt, they cannot be said to be bonded  labourers and the State Government cannot be held to be under any obligation to rehabilitate them.      The petitioner  made a  survey of  some  of  the  stone quarries in 95 Faridabad district  near the  city of  Delhi and  found that there were  a large  number of  labourers from  Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan who were working in these  stone  quarries  under  "inhuman  and  intolerable conditions" and  many of  whom were  bonded  labourers.  The petitioner therefore addressed a letter to one of us on 25th

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February, 1982  pointing out  that in the mines of Shri S.L. Sharma, Gurukula  Indra Prastha, Post Amar Nagar, Faridabad, District, a large number of labourers were languishing under abject conditions  of bondage  for last about ten years, and the petitioner  gave the  names of  11 bonded  labourers who were from  village Asarha,  Barmer district  of Rajasthan, 7 bonded labourers  who were  from  village  Bharol,  district Jhansi of  Madhya Pradesh  and 23  bonded labourers who were from  village  Barodia,  Bhanger,  Tehsil  Khurai,  district Sagar, M.P.  The petitioner pointed out that there were "yet another 14  bonded labourers  from Lalitpur  in  U.P.".  The petitioner  also   annexed  to  its  letter,  statements  in original bearing  the thumb  marks or signatures as the case may be  of these bonded labourers referred to in the letter. The petitioner  pointed out in the letter that the labourers working in  these stone  quarries were living under the most inhuman conditions  and their  pitiable lot was described by the petitioner in the following words:           "Besides these  cases of  bonded labour, there are      innumerable cases  of fatal and serious injuries caused      due to  accidents’ while  working in  the mines,  while      dynamiting the  rocks or while crushing the stones. The      stone-dust pollution  near the  stone  crushers  is  so      various that  many a  valuable lives  are lost  due  to      tuberculosis while others are reduced to mere skeletons      because of T.B. and other diseases. The workers are not      provided with  any  medical  care,  what  to  speak  of      compensating the  poor worker  for injury or for death.      No cases  are registered against the mine owners or the      lessees for  violation of safety rules under Mines Act.      We are  enclosing herewith  the statements  of about 75      workers who have suffered or are suffering continuously      due to  non-implementation of  the rules by the Central      Government  or   by  Haryana   Government  or   by  the      employers.           Almost 99% of the workers are migrant from drought      prone  areas   of  Rajasthan,  Madhya  Pradesh,  Andhra      Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra and Bihar. But if there is      any one  place where  the Central  legislation of Inter      State  Migrant   Workmens  Act   1979  is   being  most      flagrantly violated it is 96      here  in   these   mines,   without   any   residential      accommodation, with  the name-not  even a thatched roof      to fend  against the  icy  winds  and  winter  rain  or      against the  scorching heat  in midsummer,  with scanty      clothing, with  very impure and polluted drinking water      accumulated during  rainy season  in the clitches, with      absolutely no  facilities for  schooling or  childcare,      braving all  the hazards  of nature  and pollution  and      ill-treatment, these thousands of sons and daughters of      Mother India epitomise the "Wretched of the Earth".           On top  of all  these forms of exploitation is the      totally illegal  system of  "Thekedars", middlemen  who      extract 30%  of the  poor miner’s  wages as  their  ill      gotten commission  (Rs. 20 out of Rs. 60, wages for per      truck load of stone ballast). The trucks are invariably      oversigned in some cases they doubt the prescribed size      of 150 Sq. feet but payment remains the same. The hills      are dotted with liquor vends-legal and illegal. Murders      and molestation of women is very common."      The petitioner  also set  out the various provisions of the Constitution  and the  statutes  which  were  not  being implemented or  observed in  regard to the labourers working in these  stone quarries.  The petitioner  in the end prayed

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that a  writ be  issued for  proper implementation  of these provisions of  the Constitution  and statutes with a view to ending the  misery, suffering  and  helplessness  of  "these victims of most inhuman exploitation".      The letter  dated 25th  February 1982  addressed by the petitioner was  treated as  a writ  petition and by an order dated 26th  February 1982  this Court  issued notice  on the writ petition  and appointed  two  advocates,  namely,  M/s. Ashok Srivastava  and Ashok  Panda as commissioners to visit the  stone   quarries  of  Shri  S.L.  Sharma  in  Godhokhor (Anangpur)  and  Lakkarpur  in  Faridabad  district  and  to interview each  of the persons whose names were mentioned in the letter  of the petitioner as also a cross section of the other workers  with a  view to  finding out whether they are willingly working  in  these  stone  quarries  and  also  to inquire about the conditions in which they are working. M/s. Ashok Srivastava  and Ashok  Panda were  directed  to  visit these stone,  quarries on 27th and 28th February 1982 and to make a  report to  this Court  on or  before 2nd March 1982. Pursuant to this order made by us, M/s. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda  visited the  stone quarries  of S.L.  Sharma in Godhokhor and  Lakkarpur  and  carried  out  the  assignment entrusted to them and submitted a 97 report to  this Court  on 2nd March 1982. The Report pointed out inter  alia that in the stone quarries of S.L. Sharma at Godhakhpur, "many  stone crushing  machines  were  operating with the  result that  the whole atmosphere was full of dust and it  was difficult  even to  breathe".  The  report  then referred to the statements of various workers interviewed by M/s. Ashok  Srivastava and  Ashok Panda and according to the statements given  by some  of them,  namely, Lalu Ram, Dalla Ram, Thakur  Lal, Budh  Ram, Harda,  Mahadev, Smt.  Shibban, Hardev, Anam,  Punnu, Ghanshyam, Randhir and Mute, they were not allowed  to leave  the stone quarries and were providing forced labour and they did not have even pure water to drink but were compelled in most cases to drink dirty water from a nallah and  were living  in Jhuggies  with stones  piled one upon the other as walls and straw covering at the top, which did not afford any protection against sun and rain and which were so  low that  a person  could hardly stand inside them. The statements  of these  workers showed  that a few of them were suffering from tuberculosis and even when injuries were caused due to accidents arising in the course of employment, no compensation  was being  paid to  them and  there were no facilities for  medical treatment or schooling for children. The Report proceeded to state that M/s. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda  then visited  mine no.  8  in  Godhokhor  stone quarries and  here they  found that  the  condition  of  the jhuggies was  much worse  in such  as the jhuggies were made only of  straw and most of the people living in jhuggies had no clothes to wear and were shivering from cold and even the small  children   were  moving   about  without  any  proper clothing. M/s.  Ashok Srivastava  and Ashok Panda found that none of  the inmates  of the  jhuggies had  any  blanket  or woolen clothes  and they  did not even have any mat on which they could  sleep. The  statements of Phool Chand, Babu Lal, Bhoolu, Karaya,  Ram Bahadur  and Sallu also showed that all these workers  were bonded labourers who were not allowed to leave the  stone quarries  and one of them, namely Sallu was seriously injured  on his  left leg  only a  day before  the visit of  M/s. Ashok  Srivastava and  Ashok Panda but be did not hope  to get  any compensation "because here no one gets any compensation  for  any  injury".  Most  of  the  workers interviewed by  M/s. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda stated

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that they  got very  little by  way of  wages from  the mine lessees or  owners of  stone  crushers  since  they  had  to purchase explosives  with their  own moneys  and they had to incur other  expenses which,  according to  Dr. Patwardhan’s report to  which we  shall refer  hereafter, included 50 per cent  of   the  expenses   of  drilling  holes.  M/s.  Ashok Srivastava and  Ashok Panda  also pointed  out in the Report that the following persons working 98 in the  Godhokhor stone  quarries  claimed  that  they  were bonded labourers:      (1) Chand Bahadur son of Hastbir (2) Lal Bahadur son of Umbar Bahadur (3) Chhotey Lal son of Jarau (4) Harak Bahadur son of Jeet Bahadur (5) Gopal Bahadur son of Jhabu Singh (6) Roop Singh  son of  Govinda (7)  Medh Bahadur son of Aspteir (8) Jiddey  Bahadur son  of Nunbahadur (9) Phool Bahadur son of Ram  Bahadur (10)  Heera Bahadur  son of  Balbahadur (11) Veer Bahadur  son of  Chhalvir (12)  Nain Singh  son of  Lal Bahadur (13) Lal Bahadur son of Gang Bahadur (14) Ganesh son of Gang Bahadur (15) Amber Bahadur son of Sadhu Bahadur (16) Hira Lal  son of  Atbahadur (17)  Kamar Bahadur  (18) Jagadh Bahadur son  of Top  Bahadur (19)  Gajender Bahadur  son  of Shyam Lal (20) Ganga Ram son of Lal Bahadur (21) Nar Bahadur and (22) Sant Bahadur son of Bhag Bahadur.      So far  as  the  workers  working  in  Lakkarpur  stone quarries were concerned, the report of M/s. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok  Panda stated that out of about 250 persons living in straw jhuggies 100 persons hailed from Bilaspur while 150 persons belonged  to Allahabad  and according to the report, 100 persons  coming from  Bilaspur  stated  that  they  were forcibly kept by the contractor and they were not allowed to move out of their place and they were bonded labourers. M/s. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda described in the Report the pitiable condition  in which  these workers  were living  in straw jhuggies  without any  protection against sun and rain and with  drinking water  available only  from  the  barsati nallah.  The   Report  pointed  out  that  wile  M/s.  Ashok Srivastava and  Ashok Panda were interviewing the workers in the Lakkarpur  stone quarry  it started  raining heavily and thereupon they  took shelter  in one  of the  jhuggies  "but inside the  jhuggi it  was not  safe, as  water was  pouring inside" and they were completely drenched inside the jhuggi. The Report  also stated  that, according  to these  workers, there were  no medical  facilities available  and even where workers were  injured they  did not get any medical aid. The Report ended  by cbserving  that these  workmen "presented a picture of helplessness, poverty and extreme exploitation at the hands  of moneyed people" and they were found "leading a most miserable  life and  perhaps beast  and animal could be leading  more   comfortable   life   than   these   helpless labourers".      Thereafter, the  writ petition  came up  for hearing on 5th March 1982 along with another writ petition filed by the present petitioner 99 for release  of some  other bonded labourers and on this day the Court  made an  order directing  that the  copies of the Report of  M/s. Ashok  Srivastava and  Ashok Panda should be supplied to  all the  minelesses and  stone crushers who are respondents to  the writ  petitions so that they may have an opportunity to  file their  reply to  the facts found in the Report. The  Court also  appointed Dr.  Patwardhan of Indian Institute  of   Technology  to   carry  out   a  socio-legal investigation in the following terms:           "It is  necessary that a socio-legal investigation

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    should be  carried out  for the  purpose of determining      what are  the  conditions  prevailing  in  the  various      quarries in  Faridabad District  and whether  there are      any workmen  in those  quarries against  their will  or      without their  consent and  what are  the conditions in      which they are living and whether any of the provisions      of the  Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act and Inter-      State  Migrant  Workmen  (Regulation  of  Employment  &      Conditions of  Service) Act  is being  violated. We may      make it  clear that when we are directing a socio-legal      investigation of these matters it is not in a spirit to      criticise the  State Government  or any of its officers      but with  a view  to find  out the  correctness of  the      state of  affairs so  that the State Government and its      officers could  take necessary  steps for remedying the      situation  if  a  state  of  affairs  exists  which  is      contrary to  the provisions  of law and the basic human      norms. The  Court can take action only after the socio-      legal investigation  is carried out by some responsible      person and  a copy  of the  report of  the  socio-legal      investigation is  made available  to  the  parties.  We      would, therefore,  request Dr.  Patwardhan of I.I.T. to      be good enough to carry out a socio-legal investigation      into the aforesaid matters in the quarries in Faridabad      District a  list of  which  will  be  supplied  by  Mr.      Mukhoty on  behalf of the petitioners to Dr. Patwardhan      within’ ten  days from today after giving a copy to Mr.      K.G. Bhagat,  learned   Counsel appearing for the State      of Haryana.  Dr. Patwardhan  is requested  to carry out      socio-legal  investigation   with  a  view  to  putting      forward a  scheme for  improving the  living conditions      for the workers working in the stone quarries and after      the scheme  is submitted  to us  we propose to hear the      parties on  the scheme  with a view to evolving a final      scheme with  the assistance of the State of Haryana for      the purpose of economic regeneration of these workmen.      The  Court   permitted  Dr.   Patwardhan  to  take  the assistance of 100 any person  other than  the parties  to the writ petition in order to  help him  in his task and at the suggestion of the Court, the  State of  Haryana agreed to deposit a sum of Rs. 1500 to  meet the expenses of Dr. Patwardhan in carrying out the socio-legal  investigation. The  Court also  recorded in its order that when it was pointed out in the Report of M/s. Ashok Srivastava  and Ashok  Panda that  the workers  in the stone quarries did not have any pure drinking water but were using dirty water from the nallah for drinking purposes, Mr. K.G. Bhagat  learned Additional  Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the State of Haryana fairly stated that "though it  may   not  be  strictly  the  obligation  of  the  State Government,  the   State  Government   will  take  necessary measures for providing drinking facilities to the workmen in the stone  quarries".  The  Court  also  directed  that  the workmen whose names were set out in the writ petition and in the Report  of M/s.  Ashok Srivastava  and Ashok  Panda  and particularly in regard to whom a separate statement had been filed in Court on behalf of the petitioner, would be free to go wherever  they liked  and they  should not  be restrained from doing so by any one and "if they go to their respective villages, the  district magistrates having jurisdiction over those villages"  shall "take steps or measures to the extent possible for rehabilitating them."      Pursuant to  this order made by the Court, the State of Haryana deposited  a sum  of Rs.  1500 in  Court to meet the

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expenses of the socio-legal investigation and Dr. Patwardhan embarked upon  his task  with the  assistance of Mr. Krishan Mahajan, the  legal correspondent of the Hindustan Times. It took some time for Dr. Patwardhan to complete his assignment and prepare his report but having regard to the immensity of the task,  the time  within which Dr. Patwardan finished the inquiry and  submitted his  report was  remarkably short. We shall have  occasion to refer to this Report a little latter when we  deal with  the arguments  advanced on behalf of the parties, but  we may point out at this stage that the report of Dr.  Patwardhan a  comprehensive, well  documented socio- legal study  of the  conditions in which the workmen engaged in stone  quarries and  stone crushers  live and work and it has    made    various    constructive    suggestions    and recommendations for  the purpose  of  improving  the  living conditions of  these workmen.  We are indeed grateful to Dr. Patwardhan for  carrying  out  this  massive  assignment  so efficiently and  in such  a short  time. Dr.  Patwardhan has submitted a  statement of  the expenses  incurred by  him in carrying  out   this  socio-legal   investigation  and  this statement shows  that he has incurred a total expense of Rs. 2078 which after withdrawal of the amount of Rs. 101 1500 deposited  by the State of Haryana, leaves a balance of Rs. 578  to be  reimbursed to  Dr. Patwardhan. We are of the view that  Dr.  Patwardhan  should  also  be  paid  a  small honorarium of  Rs. 1000. We would therefore direct the State of Haryana to deposit a sum of Rs. 1578 with the Registry of this Court  within 4  weeks from  today with  liberty to Dr. Patwardhan to withdraw the same.      Though it  was stated  by Shri K.G. Bhagat on behalf of the State  of Haryana  that the  State Government  will take necessary measures  for providing drinking facilities to the workmen in  the stone  quarries  referred  to  in  the  writ petition and  in the  report of  M/s. Ashok  Srivastava  and Ashok Panda,  it appears  that either  no such measures were taken on behalf of the State Government or even if they were taken, they  were short  lived.  The  result  was  that  the workmen working  in most  of these  stone  quarries  had  to remain without  pure drinking water and they had to continue "to quench their thirst by drinking dirty and filthy water". Whether it  is the  obligation of  the State  Government  to provide pure  drinking water  and if so what measures should be directed  to be  taken by  the State  Government in  that behalf are  matters which we shall presently consider. These are matters of some importance because there can be no doubt that pure  drinking water  is absolutely  essential  to  the health and  well-being of the workmen and some authority has to be responsible for providing it.      Before  we  proceed  to  consider  the  merits  of  the controversy between  the parties  in all its various aspects it will  be convenient  at this  stage to  dispose of  a few preliminary objections  urged on  behalf of the respondents. The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the State of Harynana as also Mr. Phadke on behalf of one of the  mine lessees  contended that even if what is alleged by the  petitioner in his letter which has been treated as a writ petition,  is true,  it cannot  support a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, because no fundamental right of  the petitioner  or of  the workmen on whose behalf the writ  petition has  been filed, can be said to have been infringed. This contention is, in our opinion, futile and it is indeed  surprising that  the State Government should have raised it  in answer to the writ petition. We can appreciate the anxiety  of the mine lessees to resist the writ petition

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on any  ground available  to them,  be it hyper-technical or even frivolous,  but we  find it  incomprehensible that  the State Government  should urge  such a  preliminary objection with a view to stifling at the thresh-hold an inquiry by the Court as to whether the workmen are living in bondage 102 and under inhuman conditions. We should have thought that if any citizen brings before the Court a complaint that a large number of  peasants or workers are bonded serfs or are being subjected  to   exploitation  by   a  few  mine  lessees  or contractors or employers or are being denied the benefits of social welfare  laws, the  State Government, which is, under our constitutional  scheme,  charged  with  the  mission  of bringing about a new socioeconomic order where there will be social and  economic justice  for every  one and equality of status and  opportunity for all, would welcome an inquiry by the court,  so that  if it  is found  that there are in fact bonded labourers  or even  if the  workers are not bonded in the strict sense of the term as defined in the Bonded Labour System (Abolition)  Act 1976  but they  are made  to provide forced  labour   or  are   consigned  to  a  life  of  utter deprivation and  degradation such  a situation  can  be  set right by  the State Government. Even if the State Government is on  its own  inquiry satisfied  that the  workmen are not bonded and  are not  compelled to  provide forced labour and are living  and working  in decent  conditions with  all the basic necessities  of  life  provided  to  them,  the  State Government should  not baulk  an inquiry by the court when a complaint is  brought by a citizen, but it should be anxious to satisfy the court and through the court the people of the country,  that   it  is   discharging   its   constitutional obligation fairly  and adequately  and the workmen are being ensured  social  and  economic  justice.  We  have  on  more occasions than  one said  that public interest litigation is not in  the nature  of adversary  litigation  but  it  is  a challenge and  an opportunity  to  the  government  and  its officers to  make  basic  human  rights  meaningful  to  the deprived and  vulnerable sections  of the  community and  to assure  them  social  and  economic  justice  which  is  the signature tune  of our  Constitution. The Government and its officers must welcome public interest litigation, because it would provide  them an  occasion to examine whether the poor and the  down-trodden are  getting their social and economic entitlements  or  whether  they  are  continuing  to  ermine victims of deception and exploitation at the hands of strong and powerful  sections of  the community  and whether social and economic  justice has  become a  meaningful reality  for them or  it has  remained merely  a teasing  illusion and  a promise of unreality, so that in case a the complaint in the public interest  litigation is found to be true, they can in discharge  of   their  constitutional  obligation  root  out exploitation and injustice and ensure to the weaker sections their rights  and entitlements.  When the  Court  entertains public interest litigation, it does not do so in a cavilling spirit or  in a  confrontational mood  or  with  a  view  to tilting at  executive authority  or seeking  to usurp it but its attempt  is only  to ensure  observance  of  social  and economic 103 rescue programmes,  legislative as well as executive, framed for the  benefit of the have-nots and the handicapped and to protect them  against violation of their basic human rights, which  is   also  the   constitutional  obligation   of  the executive.  The  Court  is  thus  merely  assisting  in  the realisation of the constitutional objectives.

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    Moreover, when a complaint is made on behalf of workmen that they  are held in bondage and are working and living in miserable conditions  without any proper or adequate shelter over their  heads, without  any protection  against sun  and rain, without  two square  meals per day and with only dirty water from  a nullah to drink, it is difficult to appreciate how such a complaint can be thrown out on the ground that it is not violative of the fundamental right of the workmen. It is the  fundamental right  of every  one  in  this  Country, assured under the interpretation given to Article 21 by this Court in  Francis Mullen’s case, to live with human dignity, free from  exploitation.  This  right  to  live  with  human dignity, enshrined  in Article  21 derives  its life  breath from  the   Directive  Principles   of  State   Policy   and particularly clauses  (e) and  (f) of Article 39 and Article 41 and  42 and  at the  least, therefore,  it  must  include protection of  the health  and strength  of workers  men and women, and  of the  tender age  of children  against  abuse, opportunities and  facilities for  children  to  develop  in healthy manner  and in  conditions of  freedom and  dignity, educational facilities,  just and  humane conditions of work and maternity  relief. These  are the  minimum  requirements which must  exist in  order to  enable a person to live with human dignity  and no  State neither  the Central Government nor any  State Government-has  the right  to take any action which will  deprive a person of the enjoyment of these basic essentials. Since  the Directive  Principles of State Policy contained in  clauses (e)  and (f) of Article 39, Article 41 and 42  are not enforceable in a court of law, it may not be possible to compel the State through the judicial process to make provision  by statutory enactment or executive fiat for ensuring these  basic essentials  which go to make up a life of human dignity but where legislation is already enacted by the State  providing these basic requirements to the workmen and thus  investing their  right to  live with  basic  human dignity, with  concrete reality  and content,  the State can certainly  be   obligated  to   ensure  observance  of  such legislation for  inaction  on  the  part  of  the  State  in securing implementation  of such legislation would amount to denial of  the right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21,  more so  in the  context of  Article 256  which provides that,  the executive  power of every State shall be so exercised  as to  ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament 104 and any  existing laws  which apply  in that  State. We have already pointed  out in  Asiad Construction  Worker(1)  case that the  State is  under a constitutional obligation to see that there  is no  violation of the fundamental right of any person, particularly  when he belongs to the weaker sections of the  community and  is unable  to  wage  a  legal  battle against a  strong and  powerful opponent  who is  exploiting him. The  Central Government  is therefore  bound to  ensure observance of various social welfare and labour laws enacted by Parliament  for the  purpose of securing to the workmen a life of basic human dignity in compliance with the Directive Principles of  State  Policy.  It  must  also  follow  as  a necessary corollary  that the  State of Haryana in which the stone quarries  are vested  by reason  of  Haryana  Minerals (Vesting of  Rights) Act  1973 and  which is  therefore  the owner of  the mines cannot while giving its  mines for stone quarrying  operations,  permit  workmen  to  be  denied  the benefit of  various social  welfare and  labour laws enacted with a  view to  enabling them  to  live  a  life  of  human dignity. The State of Haryana must therefore ensure that the

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mine-lessees or  contractors, to whom it is giving its mines for  stone  quarrying  operations,  observe  various  social welfare and  labour laws  enacted for  the  benefit  of  the workmen. This  is a  constitutional  obligation which can be enforced against  the Central  Government and  the State  of Haryana  by   a  writ  petition  under  Article  32  of  the Constitution.      The next  preliminary objection  urged by  the  learned Additional Solicitor  General on  behalf  of  the  State  of Haryana and  Mr. Phadke on behalf of one of the mine-lessees was that  the court had no power to appoint either Mr. Ashok Srivastava  and   Mr.  Ashok  Panda  or  Mr.  Patwardhan  as commissioners  and   the  Reports   made  by   them  had  no evidentiary value  since what  was stated in the Reports was based only  on ex-parte statements which had not been tested by  cross-examination.   The  learned  Additional  Solicitor General as  also Mr.  Phadke relied  on Order  XLVI  of  the Supreme Court  Rules 1966 which, as its heading shows, deals with commissions  and contended  that since  the commissions issued by  the court in the present case did not fall within the terms  of any of the provisions of Order XLVI, they were outside the  scope of  the power  of the court and the court was not  entitled to place any reliance on their reports for the purpose  of adjudicating  the issues arising in the writ petition. This  argument, plausible  though it  may seem  at first sight,  is in our opinion not well founded and must be rejected. It is based upon a total misconception of the 105 true  nature  of  a  proceeding  under  Article  32  of  the Constitution. Article  32 is  so frequently  used by lawyers and Judges for enforcement of fundamental rights without any preliminary objection against its invocation being raised on behalf of  the State,  that we  have rarely  any occasion to examine its language and consider how large is the width and amplitude of  its  dimension  and  range.  We  are  so  much accustomed to  the  concepts  of  Anglo-Saxon  jurisprudence which require  every legal proceeding including a proceeding for a  high prerogative  writ to  be  cast  in  a  rigid  or definitive mould  and insist  on observance  of certain well settled rules  of procedure,  that we implicitly assume that the same  sophisticated procedural  rules must also govern a proceeding under  Article 32  and the  Supreme Court  cannot permit itself  to be  freed from the shackles of these rules even if  that be  necessary for enforcement of a fundamental right. It  was on  the basis  of this impression fostered by long   association   which   the   Anglo-Saxon   system   of administration of  justice that  for a  number of years this court had  taken the  view that  it is  only a  person whose fundamental right  is violated  who can approach the Supreme Court for relief under Article 32 or in other words, he must have a  cause of  action for  enforcement of his fundamental right.  It  was  only  in  the  years  1981  in  the  Judges Appointment and  Transfer Case(1)  that this  Court for  the first time  took the  view that  where a  person or class of persons  to  whom  legal  injury  is  caused  by  reason  of violation of  a fundamental  right is unable to approach the court  for   judicial  redress  on  account  of  poverty  or disability  or   socially  or   economically   disadvantaged position, any member of the public acting bona fide can move the court for relief under Article 32 and a fortiorari, also under Article 226, so that the fundamental rights may become meaningful not only for the rich and the well-to-do who have the means  to approach  the court  but also  for  the  large masses  of  people  who  are  living  a  life  of  want  and destitution and  who are  by reason  of lack  of  awareness,

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assertiveness and resources unable to seek judicial redress. This view  which we  took  in  the  Judges  Appointment  and Transfer Case  is clearly  within the terms of Article 32 if only we  look at  the language  of this Article uninfluenced and uninhibited by any pre-conceptions and prejudices or any pre-conceived notions.  Article 32  in so far it is material is in the following terms:           "Art. 32 (1):  The right to move the Supreme Court                          by appropriate  proceedings for the                          enforcement of the rights conferred                          by this Part is guaranteed. 106                     (2): The Supreme  Court shall have power                          to issue  directions or  orders  or                          writs including  writ in the nature                          of   habeas    corpus,    mandamus,                          prohibition,   quo   warranto   and                          certiorari,   whichever    may   be                          appropriate, for the enforcement of                          any of the rights conferred by this                          Part.      While interpreting Article 32, it must be borne in mind that our  approach must  be guided  not  by  any  verbal  or formalistic canons  of construction  but  by  the  paramount object and  purpose for  which this Article has been enacted as  a   Fundamental  Right   in  the  Constitution  and  its interpretation must receive illumination from the trinity of provisions  which   permeate   and   energies   the   entire Constitution namely,  the Preamble,  the Fundamental  Rights and the  Directive Principles of State Policy. Clause (1) of Article 32  confers the  right to move the Supreme Court foe enforcement of  any of  the fundamental  rights, but it does not say  as to who shall have this right to move the Supreme Court nor  does it say by what proceedings the Supreme Court may be  so moved.  There is  no limitation  in the  words of Clause (1) of Article 32 that the fundamental right which is sought to  be enforced by moving the Supreme Court should be one belonging  to the person who moves the Supreme Court nor does it say that the Supreme Court should be moved only by a particular kind  of proceeding.  It is  clear on  the  plain language of  clause (1) of Article 32 that whenever there is a violation  of a  fundamental right  any one  can move  the Supreme Court  for enforcement of such fundamental right. Of course, the  Court would not, in exercise of its discretion, intervene at the instance of a meddlesome interloper or busy body and  would ordinarily  insist that  only a person whose fundamental right  is violated should be allowed to activise the court,  but there  is no  fetter upon  the power  of the court to  entertain a  proceeding initiated  by  any  person other than  the one  whose fundamental  right  is  violated, though the  court would  not  ordinarily  entertain  such  a proceeding, since  the person  whose  fundamental  right  is violated can  always approach  the court  and if he does not wish to  seek judicial  redress by  moving  the  court,  why should some one else be allowed to do so on his behalf. This reasoning however  breaks down  when we  have the  case of a person or  class  of  persons  whose  fundamental  right  is violated but  who cannot have resort to the court on account of their  poverty or  disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position  and in  such a  case, therefore, the court can  and must  allow any  member of  the public acting bona fide to espouse the cause of such 107 person or  class of  persons and move the court for judicial enforcement of the fundamental right of such person or class

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of persons. This does not violate, in the slightest measure, the language  of the  constitutional  provision  enacted  in clause (1) of Article 32.      Then again  clause (1)  of Article  32  says  that  the Supreme Court  can be moved for enforcement of a fundamental right  by   any  ’appropriate’   proceeding.  There   is  no limitation in  regard to the kind of proceeding envisaged in clause (1)  of Article 32 except that the proceeding must be "appropriate" and  this requirement  of appropriateness must be judged  in  the  light  of  the  purpose  for  which  the proceeding  is   to  be  taken,  namely,  enforcement  of  a fundamental right.  The Constitution makers deliberately did not  lay   down  any   particular  form  of  proceeding  for enforcement of  a fundamental  right nor  did they stipulate that such  proceeding should conform to any rigid pattern or straight jacket formula as, for example, in England, because they knew  that in  a country  like India  where there is so much of  poverty,  ignorance,  illiteracy,  deprivation  and exploitation,  any   insistence  on   a  rigid   formula  of proceeding for  enforcement of  a  fundamental  right  would become self-defeating  because it would place enforcement of fundamental rights  beyond the  reach of  the common man and the entire  remedy for  enforcement  of  fundamental  rights which the  Constitution makers  regarded as  so precious and invaluable  that  they  elevated  it  to  the  status  of  a fundamental right,  would become  a mere rope of sand so far as the  large masses  of the  people  in  this  country  are concerned.  The   Constitution  makers  therefore  advisedly provided in  clause (1) of Article 32 that the Supreme Court may be  moved by any ’appropriate’ proceeding, ’appropriate’ not in  terms of  any particular form but ’appropriate’ with reference to  the purpose  of the  proceeding. That  is  the reason  why  it  was  held  by  this  Court  in  the  Judges Appointment and Transfer Case (supra) that where a member of the public  acting bona fide moves the Court for enforcement of a  fundamental right  on behalf  of a  person or class of persons who  on account of poverty or disability or socially or economically  disadvantaged position  cannot approach the court for  relief, such  member of  the public  may move the court even by just writing a letter, because it would not be right or  fair to expect a person acting pro bono publico to incur expenses  out of  his own pocket for going to a lawyer and preparing  a regular  writ petition  for being  filed in court for  enforcement of  the fundamental right of the poor and deprived sections of the community and in such a case, a letter addressed  by him  can legitimately be regarded as an "appropriate" proceeding. 108      But the  question then  arises as  to what is the power which may be exercised by the Supreme Court when it is moved by  an   "appropriate"  proceeding   for  enforcement  of  a fundamental  right.   The  only   provision  made   by   the Constitution makers  in this behalf is to be found in clause (2) of  Article 32  which confers power on the Supreme Court "to issue  directions or  orders or writs including writs in the nature  of habeas  corpus,  mandamus,  prohibition,  quo warranto and  certiorari, which-ever may be appropriate, for enforcement of  any of  the fundamental  rights. It  will be seen that the power conferred by clause (2) of Article 32 is in the  widest terms. It is not confined to issuing the high prerogative writs  of habeas  corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and  quo quarranto, which are hedged in by strict conditions differing  from one  writ to another and which to quote the  words spoken  by Lord  Atkin in  United Australia Limited v.  Barclays Bank  Ltd.  in  another  context  often

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"stand in  the  path  of  justice  Clanking  their  mediavel chains". But  it is  much  wider  and  includes  within  its matrix, power to issue any directions, orders or writs which may be  appropriate for enforcement of the fundamental right in question  and this  is made  amply clear by the inclusive clause which  refers to  in the  nature  of  habeas  corpus, mandamus, prohibition,  quo warranto  and certiorari.  It is not only  the high  prerogative writs  of  mandamus,  habeas corpus, prohibition,  quo warranto  and certiorari which can be issued  by the Supreme Court but also writs in the nature of these  high prerogative  writs and  therefore even if the conditions for  issue of any of these high prerogative writs are  not   fulfilled,  the   Supreme  Court   would  not  be constrained to  fold its  hands in  despair  and  plead  its inability to  help the  citizen who  has come  before it for judicial  redress,   but  would  have  power  to  issue  any direction, order  or writ  including a writ in the nature of any high  prerogative writ. This provision conferring on the Supreme Court power to enforce the fundamental rights in the widest possible  terms shows the anxiety of the Constitution makers not  to allow  any procedural technicalities to stand in  the  way  of  enforcement  of  fundamental  rights.  The Constitution makers  clearly intended that the Supreme Court should have  the amplest  power to issue whatever direction, order or  writ may  be  appropriate  in  a  given  case  for enforcement of a fundamental right. But what procedure shall be followed  by the Supreme Court in exercising the power to issue such  direction, order  or writ  ? That is a matter on which the  Constitution is  silent and advisedly so, because the  Constitution   makers  never  intended  to  fetter  the discretion of  the  Supreme  Court  to  evolve  a  procedure appropriate in the circums- 109 tances of  a given  case for  the purpose  of enabling it to exercise its power of enforcing a fundamental right. Neither clause (2)  of Article  32 nor  any other  provision of  the Constitution requires that any particular procedure shall be followed by  the Supreme  Court in  exercising its  power to issue an  appropriate direction,  order or writ. The purpose for which the power to issue an appropriate direction, order or writ  is conferred  on the  Supreme Court  is  to  secure enforcement of  a fundamental right and obviously therefore, whatever procedure  is  necessary  for  fulfillment  of  the purpose must  be permissible to the Supreme Court. It is not at all  obligatory that an adversarial procedure, where each party produces  his own evidence tested by cross examination by the  other side  and the  judge sits  like an  umpire and decides the  case only  on the basis of such material as may be produced  before him by both parties, must be followed in a  proceeding   under  Article   32  for  enforcement  of  a fundamental right.  In fact, there is no such constitutional compulsion enacted  in clause  (2) of  Article 32  or in any other part  of the  Constitution. It is only because we have been following  the adversarial procedure for over a century owing to  the introduction  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  system  of jurisprudence under  the British  Rule that  it has become a part of our conscious as well as sub-conscious thinking that every judicial  proceeding must  be cast  in  the  mould  of adversarial procedure and that justice cannot be done unless the adversarial  procedure is  adopted. But  it may be noted that there  is  nothing  sacrosanct  about  the  adversarial procedure and  in fact  it is  not followed  in  many  other countries where  the  civil  system  of  law  prevails.  The adversarial procedure  with evidence  led either  party  and tested by cross-examination by the other party and the judge

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playing a passive role has become a part of our legal system because it  is embodied  in the  Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian  Evidence Act.  But these statutes obviously have no application  where a  new jurisdiction  is created in the Supreme Court  for enforcement of a fundamental right. We do not think  we would be justified in imposing any restriction on the power of the Supreme Court to adopt such procedure as it thinks  fit in  exercise  of  its  new  jurisdiction,  by engrafting   adversarial   procedure   on   it.   when   the Constitution makers  have deliberately  chosen not to insist on any  such requirement  and instead,  left it  open to the Supreme  Court   to  follow  such  procedure  as  it  thinks appropriate for  the purpose  of securing  the end for which the power is conferred, namely, enforcement of a fundamental right. The adversarial procedure has, in fact, come in for a lot of criticism even in the country of its origin and there is an  increasing tendency  even in  that country  to depart from its  strict norms.  Lord De lin speaking of the English judicial system said: "If our methods were 110 as antiquated  as our legal methods, we should be a bankrupt country". And  Foster Q.C.  observed :  "I think  the  whole English system  is non-sense.  I would go to the root of it- the civil  case between  two  private  parties  is  a  mimic battle........conducted according  to  rules  of  evidence." There is  a considerable  body of  juristic opinion  in  our country also  which believes  that strict  adherence to  the adversarial procedure  can some  times  lead  to  injustice, particularly where  the parties  are not  evenly balanced in social or  economic strength.  Where one of the parties to a litigation belongs  to a  poor and  deprived section  of the community and  does not possess adequate social and material resources, he  is bound to be at a disadvantage as against a strong and  powerful opponent  under the adversary system of justice, because  of his  difficulty  in  getting  competent legal  representation   and  more  than  anything  els,  his inability to  produce relevant  evidence before  the  court. Therefore, when the poor come before the court, particularly for enforcement of their fundamental rights, it is necessary to depart from the adversarial procedure and to evolve a new procedure which  will make  it possible for the poor and the weak to  bring the  necessary material  before the court for the purpose  of securing  enforcement of  their  fundamental rights. It  must be remembered that the problems of the poor which are  now coming  before the  court  are  qualitatively different from  those which  have  hither  to  occupied  the attention of  the court  and they  need a  different kind of lawyering skill  and a  different kind of judicial approach. If we  blindly follow  the adversarial  procedure  in  their case, they  would never be able to enforce their fundamental rights and  the result would be nothing but a mockery of the Constitution. We have therefore to abandon the laissez faire approach in  the  judicial  process  particularly  where  it involves a question of enforcement of fundamental rights and forge new tools, devise new methods and adopt new strategies for the  purpose of making fundamental rights meaningful for the large  masses of people. And this is clearly permissible on the  language of  clause (2)  of Article  32 because  the Constitution  makers   while  enacting   that  clause   have deliberately and  advisedly not  used any  words restricting the power  of the  court to  adopt any  procedure  which  it considers appropriate  in the  circumstances of a given case for enforcing  a fundamental  right. It  is  true  that  the adoption of  this non-traditional  approach is not likely to find easy  acceptance from the generality of lawyers because

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their minds are conditioned by constant association with the existing system  of  administration  of  justice  which  has become ingrained  in them  as a  result  of  long  years  of familiarity and  experience and  become part of their mental make up  and habit  and they  would therefore always have an unconscious predilection for the prevailing system 111 of administration of justice. But if we want the fundamental rights to  become a  living reality and the Supreme Court to become  a  real  sentinel  on  the  quivive,  we  must  free ourselves  from   the  shackles  of  outdated  and  outmoded assumptions and  bring to  bear on the subject fresh outlook and original unconventional thinking.      Now it  is obvious  that the poor and the disadvantaged cannot possibly  produce relevant  material before the court in support  of their  case and  equally where  an action  is brought on  their  behalf  by  a  citizen  acting  pro  bono publico, it would be almost impossible for him to gather the relevant material and place it before the court. What is the Supreme Court to do in such a case ? Would the Supreme Court not be  failing in  discharge of  its constitutional duty of enforcing a  fundamental right  if it  refuses to  intervene because the  petitioner  belonging  to  the  underprivileged segment of  society or  a public  spirited citizen espousing his cause  is unable to produce the relevant material before the court.  If the  Supreme Court  were to  adopt a  passive approach and  decline to  intervene in  such a  case because relevant material  has not  been produced  before it  by the party seeking its intervention, the fundamental rights would remain merely  a teasing  illusion so  far as  the poor  and disadvantaged sections of the community are concerned. It is for this  reason that  the Supreme  Court  has  evolved  the practice  of  appointing  commissions  for  the  purpose  of gathering facts  and data in regard to a complaint of breach of fundamental  right made  on behalf of the weaker sections of the society. The Report of the commissioner would furnish prima facie  evidence of  the facts and data gathered by the commissioner and that is why the Supreme Court is careful to appoint a  responsible person  as commissioner  to  make  an inquiry or  investigation into  the facts  relating  to  the complaint. It  is interesting  to note  that in the past the Supreme Court has appointed sometimes a district magistrate, sometimes a  district Judge,  sometimes a  professor of law, sometimes a  journalist, sometimes  an officer  of the court and sometimes  an advocate  practising in the court, for the purpose of  carrying out  an inquiry  or  investigation  and making  report   to  the   court  because  the  commissioner appointed by  the Court  must be  a responsible  person  who enjoys the  confidence, of  the court and who is expected to carry out his assignment objectively and impartially without any predilection  or  prejudice.  Once  the  report  of  the Commissioner is  received, copies of it would be supplied to the parties so that either party, if it wants to dispute any of the  facts or  data stated  in the  Report, may  do so by filing an  affidavit and  the court then consider the report of the  commissioner and  the affidavits which may have been filed and proceed to adjudicate upon 112 the issue arising in the writ petition. It would be entirely for the Court to consider what weight to attach to the facts and data  stated in  the report  of the  commissioner and to what extent  to act  upon such  facts and data. But it would not be  correct to  say that  the report of the commissioner has no  evidentiary value  at all, since the statements made in it  are not  tested by  cross-examination. To accept this

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contention would  be to  introduce the adversarial procedure in a  proceeding where in the given situation, it is totally inapposite. The learned Additional Solicitor General and Mr. Phadke relied  on Order  XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure and Order  XLVI of  the Supreme  Court Rules  1966  for  the purpose of  contending that a commission can be appointed by the  Supreme   Court  only  for  the  purpose  of  examining witnesses,  making   legal  investigations   and   examining accounts and  the Supreme  Court has  no power  to appoint a commission for making an inquiry or investigation into facts relating to  a complaint of violation of a fundamental right in a  proceeding under Article 32. Now it is true that Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 makes the provisions of Order XXVI  of the Code of Civil Procedure, except rules 13, 14, 19,  20, 21  and 22  applicable to the Supreme Court and days down  the procedure  for an  application for issue of a commission, but  Order XXVI  is not  exhaustive and does not detract from  the inherent  power of  the Supreme  Court  to appoint a  commission, if the appointment of such commission is found  necessary for  the purpose of securing enforcement of a  fundamental right  in exercise  of its  constitutional jurisdiction under  Article 32.  Order XLVI  of the  Supreme Court Rules  1966 cannot  in any  way militate  against  the power of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and in fact rule 6 of  Order XLVII  of the  Supreme Court Rules 1966 provides that nothing  in those  Rules "shall  be deemed  to limit or otherwise affect  the inherent  powers of  the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice." We cannot therefore  accept the contention of the learned Addl. Solicitor General and Mr. Phadke that the court acted beyond its power  in appointing  M/s. Ashok  Srivastava  and  Ashok Panda  as  commissioners  in  the  first  instance  and  Dr. Patwardhan as  commissioner at  a subsequent  stage for  the purpose of  making an inquiry into the conditions of workmen employed in  the stone  quarries. The petitioner in the writ petition specifically  alleged violation  of the fundamental rights of  the workmen  employed in the stone quarried under Articles 21  and 23  and it  was therefore necessary for the court to  appoint these  commissioners for  the  purpose  of inquiring into  the facts  related to  this  complaint.  The Report of  M/s. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda as also the Report of  Dr.  Patwardhan  were  clearly  documents  having eviden- 113 tiary value  and they  furnished prima facie evidence of the facts and  data stated  in those  Reports. Of  course, as we have stated above, it will be for us to consider what weight we should  attach to  the facts  and data contained in these Reports in  the light of the various affidavits filed in the proceedings.      We may point out that what we have said above in regard to the  exercise of  jurisdiction by the Supreme Court under Article 32 must apply equally in relation to the exercise of jurisdiction by  the High  Courts under Article 226, for the latter   jurisdiction   is   also   a   new   constitutional jurisdiction and  it is  conferred in the same wide terms as the jurisdiction  under Article  32 and  the same powers can and must  therefore be  exercised by  the High  Courts while exercising jurisdiction  under Article  226.  In  fact,  the jurisdiction of  the High  Courts under  Article 226 is much wider, because the High Courts are required to exercise this jurisdiction not only for enforcement of a fundamental right but also  for enforcement  of any  legal right and there are many rights  conferred on  the poor  and  the  disadvantaged which are  the creation  of statute  and  they  need  to  be

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enforced as urgently and vigorously as fundamental rights.      Having disposed  of these  preliminary  objections,  we shall now  proceed to  consider the writ petition on merits. But, before  we turn  to examine  the facts of this case, we may first  consider which  are the laws governing the living and working  conditions of  workmen employed  in  the  stone quarries. The  first statute  to which we must refer in this connection is  the Mines  Act, 1952. This Act extends to the whole of  India and  therefore applies  a fortiorari  in the State of  Haryana. Section  2(j) defines "mine" to mean "any excavation where  any operation for the purpose of searching for or  obtaining minerals  has been  or is being carried on and includes  in clause  (iv) "all  open cast  working". The word "minerals"  has been  given a  very broad meaning under section  2(jj)  and  it  means  "all  substances  which  can obtained  from  the  earth  by  mining,  digging,  drilling, dredging,  hydraulicing,   quarrying   or   by   any   other operation". Section 2(kk) gives the definition of "open cast working" and  according to  this  definition,  it  means  "a quarry, that  is to  say, an  excavation where any operation for the  purpose of  searching for or obtaining minerals has been or  is being  carried on,  not  being  a  shaft  or  an excavation which  extends below  superjacent ground".  There can be  no doubt  that according  to these  definitions, the stone quarries  with which  we are  concerned in  this  writ petition  constitute  "mines"  within  the  meaning  of  the definition of that term in section 2(j). since they are 114 excavations where  operations for  the purpose  of searching for of obtaining stone by quarrying are being carried on but they  are   not  ‘open   cast  working’   since   admittedly excavations in the case of these stone quarries extend below superjacent ground.  But the  question still remains whether the provisions  of the  Mines Act  1952 apply to these stone quarries even  if they  are "mines". Section 3(1) (b) enacts that the  provisions of  the Mines  Act, 1952  except  those contained in sections 7, 8, 9, 44, 45 and 46 shall not apply to any  mine engaged in the extraction inter alia of kankar, murrum, laterite  boulders, gravel, shingle, building stone, road metal  and  earth  and  therefore,  if  this  statutory provision stood  alone without  any qualification,  it would appear that barring the excepted sections, the provisions of Mines Act  1952 would not apply to these stone quarries. But there is  a  proviso  to  section.  3(1)(b)  which  is  very material and it runs as follows :           "3(1) The  provisions of  this Act,  except  those      contained in sections 7, 8, 9, 44, 45 and 46, shall not      apply to-           (b) any  mine engaged in the extraction of kankar,      murrum, laterite,  boulder, gravel,  shingle,  ordinary      sand (excluding  moulding sand,  glass sand  and  other      mineral sands),  ordinary clay (excluding kaolin, china      clay, white  clay or  fire clay),  building stone, road      metal earth, fullers earth and lime stone :           Provided that-           (i)   the workings do not extend below superjacent                ground; or           (ii) where it is an open cast working-                (a)   the depth  of the  excavation  measured                     from its  highest to  its  lowest  point                     nowhere exceeds six metres;                (b)  the number  of persons  employed on  any                     one day does not exceed fifty; and                (c)  explosives are  not used  in  connection                     with the excavation."

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    Since the workings in these stone quarries extend below superjacent ground and they are not ‘open cast workings’ and moreover explosives  are admittedly  used in connection with the excavation, 115 the conditions  set out in the proviso are not fulfilled and hence the  exclusion of the provisions of the Mines Act 1952 (other than  the excepted sections) is not attracted and all the provisions  of the  Mines Act  1952 apply to these stone quarries. It may also be noted that the definition of ‘mine’ in section  2(j) includes in Clause (x) any premises or part thereof in  or adjacent and belonging to a mine on which any process ancillary  to the  getting, dressing  or preparation for sale  of minerals...........is  being carried  on."  Now obviously stone  crushing is  a  process  ancillary  to  the getting, dressing  or preparation for sale of stone quarried from the  stone quarries and therefore if the stone crushing activity is carried on in premises in or adjacent to a stone quarry and it belongs to the same owner as the stone quarry, it would  be subject  to the discipline of the provisions of the Mines  Act 1952  and all  workmen employed in connection with such stone crushers would be entitled to the benefit of the provisions  of that Act. It will, thus, be seen that all the provisions  of the Mines Act, 1952 are applicable to the workmen employed  in the  stone  quarries  as  also  to  the workmen employed  in connection  with stone  crushers, where the stone  crusher is  situate in  or adjoining  to a  stone quarry and  belongs to  the same  owner as the stone quarry. Now the provisions of the Mines Act, 1952 which are material are those  set out  in Chapters  V, VI  and VII,  Chapter  V dealing with provisions as to health and safety, Chapter VI, with hours  and limitation  of employment  and Chapter  VII, with leave  with wages.  The provisions  contained in  these three Chapters  confer certain  rights and  benefits on  the workmen employed  in the  stone quarries  and stone crushers and these  rights and benefits are intended to secure to the workmen just and humane conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of  life with  basic human  dignity. We  shall have occasion to  consider some of these rights and benefits when we deal  with the  specific complaints made on behalf of the petitioner, but we may point out at this stage that the most important rights  and benefits  conferred on the workmen are those relating  to their  health and  safety  which  include provisions as  to drinking  water, conservancy  and injuries arising out  of  accidents,  in  regard  to  which  detailed requirements are  laid down  in Chapters V, VI and IX of the Mines Rules; 1955. We may also point out that the obligation of complying  with these  provisions of  the Mines Act, 1952 and the  Mines Rules,  1955 rests  on the  owner, agent  and manager of  every stone  quarry and  stone crusher,  because section 18  declares that  the owner,  agent and  manager of every mine  shall be responsible that all operations carried on in  connection therewith are conducted in accordance with the provisions  of the Act and of the regulations, rules and by-laws 116 and of any orders made under the Act. The ‘owner’ is defined in section  2(1) of  the Mines Act, 1952 to mean "any person who is the immediate proprietor or lessee or occupier of the mine or  any part  thereof.........but does  not  include  a person who  merely receives a royalty, rent or fine from the mine or is merely the proprietor of the mine, subject to any lease, grant  or licence for the working thereof." Since the stone quarries  in the  present case are not being exploited by the  State of Haryana though it is the owner of the stone

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quarries, but  are being  given out on lease by auction, the mine-lessees who  are not only lessees but also occupiers of the stone  quarries are  the owners  of the  stone  quarries within the  meaning of  that expression  as used  in section 2(1) and  so also  are  the  owners  of  stone  crushers  in relation to their establishment. The mine-lessees and owners of stone  crushers are, therefore liable under section 18 of the Mines  Act,  1952  to  carry  out  their  operations  in accordance with  the provisions  of the  Mines Act, 1952 and the Mines  Rules, 1955  and other Rules and Regulations made under that  Act and  to ensure  that the rights and benefits conferred by  these provisions  are actually  and concretely made available  to the  workmen. The  Central Government  is entrusted under  the Mines  Act 1952 with the responsibility of securing  compliance with  the provisions of that Act and of the Mines Rules 1955 and other Rules and Regulations made under that  Act and  it is  the primary  obligation  of  the Central Government  to  ensure  that  these  provisions  are complied with  by the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners. The State  of Haryana  is also,  for reasons  which we  have already discussed, under an obligation to take all necessary steps for  the purpose  of securing  compliance  with  these provisions by the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers. The State  of Haryana  has in  fact amended the Punjab Minor Mineral Concession  Rules 1964  in their  application to the State  of  Haryana  by  issuing  the  Punjab  Minor  Mineral Concession (Haryana  First  Amendment)  Rules  1982  on  6th December 1982  and substituted  a new clause 16 in Form F, a new clause  13 in  Form L  and a  new clause  10 in  Form  N providing     that     the     lessee/lessees     or     the contractor/contractors, as the case may be,           "shall abide  by the provisions of Mines Act, 1952      Inter State  Migrant Workmen  (Regulation of Employment      and Conditions  of Service) Act, 1979 and the rules and      regulations framed  thereunder and  also the provisions      of other  labour laws  both Central  and State  as  are      applicable to  the workmen  engaged in  the mines,  and      quarries relating  to the provisions of drinking water,      rest shelters, dwelling houses, latrnesi 117      and first  aid and medical facilities in particular and      other safety  and welfare provisions in general, to the      satisfaction of  the competent  authorities  under  the      aforesaid Acts,  rules and  regulations and also to the      satisfaction of  the District  Magistrate concerned. In      the case  of non-compliance of any of the provisions of      the enactments  as aforesaid,  the State  Government or      any  officer  authorised  by  it  in  this  behalf  may      terminate the  contract by  giving one  month’s  notice      with  forfeiture   of  security  deposited  or  in  the      alternative the  State Labour Department may remedy the      breach/breaches by  providing the  welfare  and  safety      measures as provided in the aforesaid enactments at the      expense and  cost of  the  contractor/contractors.  The      amount  thus   spent  shall   be  recovered   from  the      contractor/contractors by the Industries Department and      reimbursed to Labour Department."      The State  of Haryana is therefore, in any event, bound to take  action to  enforce the  provisions of the Mines Act 1952  and   the  Mines   Rules  1955  and  other  Rules  and Regulations made  under that  Act for  the  benefit  of  the workmen.      We may  then turn  to  the  provisions  of  Inter-State Migrant Workmen  (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act,  1979 (hereinafter  referred to  as the Inter-

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State Migrant  Workmen Act). This Act was brought into force in the  State of  Haryana with  effect from 2nd October 1980 and the  authorities and this Act were notified on 21st July 1982. We  may, therefore,  proceed on  the  basis  that  the provisions of  this Act  became enforceable, if not from 2nd October 1980  at least  from 21st July 1982. Now this Act by subsection (4) of Section (1) applies to every establishment in which  five  or  more  inter-State  migrant  workmen  are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months and  so also  it  applies  to  every  contractor  who employs or employed five or more inter-State migrant workmen on any  day of the preceding twelve months. Section (2) sub- section (1)  Clause (b)  of the  Act defines  contractor, in relation  to   an  establishment,  to  mean  "a  person  who undertakes (whether  as an  independent  contractor,  agent, employee or  otherwise) to  produce a  given result  for the establishment,  other  than  a  mere  supply  of  goods  and articles  of  manufacture  of  such  establishment,  by  the employment  of   workmen  or   to  supply   workmen  to  the establishment,  and  includes  a  sub-contractor,  khatedar, sardar, agent  or any other person, by whatever name called, who recruits 118 or employs  workmen."  Clause  (e)  of  sub-section  (1)  of Section (2)  defines "inter-State  migrant workmen" to means "any person  who is  recruited by or through a contractor in one State  under  an  agreement  or  other  arrangement  for employment in  an establishment  in another  State,  whether with or  without the  knowledge of the principal employer in relation to  such establishment." The expression "principal- employer" is  defined by  clause (g)  of sub-section  (1) of Section 2 to mean "in relation to a mine, the owner or agent of the mine and where a person has been named as the manager of the mine, the person so named." Obviously, therefore, the mine-lessees and  owners of  stone crushers  in the  present case would be principal employers within the meaning of that expression as  used in  the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act. Section 4  provides  for  registration  of  every  principal employer of  an establishment  to which  the Act applies and Section  6   enacts  that   no  principal   employer  of  an establishment to which this Act applies, shall employ inter- State  migrant   workmen  in   the  establishment  unless  a certificate of registration in respect of such establishment is issued  under the Act in force. Similarly, Section 8 sub- section (1)  provides that with effect from such date as the appropriate Government  may be  Notification in the Official Gazette appoint  no contractor to whom the Act applies shall recruit any  person in  a State for the purpose of employing him in  any establishment  situated in another State, except under and in accordance with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing officer appointed by the Central Government who has  jurisdiction in  relation to  the area  wherein the recruitment is  made, nor shall be employ as workmen for the execution of  any work  in any  establishment in  any State, persons from  another State  excent under  and in accordance with a  licence issued  in  that  behalf  by  the  licensing officer  appointed  by  the  appropriate  Government  having jurisdiction  in   relation  to   the   area   wherein   the establishment is  situated. Sub-section  (2)  of  Section  8 declares that  a licence  under sub-section  (1) may contain such conditions  including, in  particular,  the  terms  and conditions of the agreement or other arrangement under which the workmen  will be  recruited, the  remuneration  payable, hours  of  work,  fixation  of  wages  and  other  essential amenities in  respect of the inter-State migrant workmen, as

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the  appropriate  Government  may  deem  fit  to  impose  in accordance with  the Rules,  if any,  made under Section 35. Section  12   imposes  certain  duties  and  obligations  on contractors which  include inter  alia the  duty to issue to every inter-State  migrant workman  a  pass-book  containing various particulars  regarding recruitment and employment of the workman  as also  to pay  to the workman the return fare from the place of employment to the place of residence 119 in the  home State when he ceases to be employed. Rule 23 of the Inter-State  Migrant Workmen  (Regulation of  Employment and Conditions  of Service)  Central Rules 1980 (hereinafter referred to  as Inter-State  Migrant Workmen Rules) sets out certain additional particulars which must be included in the pass-book to be issued to every inter-State migrant workmen. Section 13  then  proceeds  to  lay  down  the  wage  rates, holidays, hours  of work  and other conditions of service of an inter-State  migrant workman and provides inter alia that in no  case shall a inter-State migrant workman be paid less than the  wages fixed  under the Minimum Wages Act 1948, and the wages shall be paid to an inter-State migrant workman in cash. The detailed particulars in regard to wages payable to an inter-State  migrant workman are laid down in Rules 25 to 35 of  the Inter-State  Migrant Workmen  Rules. Then follows Section 14  which provides  that there  shall be paid by the contractor to  every inter-State migrant workman at the time of recruitment,  a displacement  allowance and the amount of displacement allowance  shall not be refundable but shall be in addition  to the  wages or  other amounts payable to him. There is  also a provision made in Section 15 for payment to an inter-State  migrant workman  of a journey allowance of a sum not  less than  the fare  from the place of residence in his State  to the place of work in the other State, both for outward and  return journeys  and this  Section also  enacts that the  workman shall  be entitled  to  payment  of  wages during the  period of  such journeys  as if  he was on duty. Section 16  days a duty on every contractor employing inter- State migrant  workmen in  connection with  the work  of  an establishment   to    provide   various   other   facilities particulars of  which are  to be  found in Rules 36 to 45 of the Inter-State  Migrant  Workmen  Rules.  These  facilities include medical  facilities, protective  clothing,  drinking water, latrines, urinals and washing facilities, rest rooms, canteens,  creche   and   residential   accommodation.   The obligation to provide these facilities is in relation to the inter-State Migrant  Workmen employed in an establishment to which the  Act applies.  But this  liability is not confined only to  the contractor,  because Section  18 provides in so many terms  that if any allowance required to be paid under- section 14  or 15  to an  inter-State migrant Workman is not paid by  the contractor  or if  any  facility  specified  in section 16  is not provided for the benefit of such workman, such allowance  shall be  paid or  as the  case may  be, the facility shall  be provided by the principal employer within such time  as may  be prescribed  by the  Rules and  all the allowances  paid  by  the  principal  employer  or  all  the expenses incurred by him in this connection may be recovered by him  from the  contractor either  by deduction  from  the amount payable to the 120 contractor or  as debt payable by the contractor. Section 25 & 26 make it an offence for any one to contravene any of the provisions of  the Inter-Stage Migrant Workmen Act or Inter- State Migrant Workmen Rules and Section 30 gives over-riding effect to  the provisions of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen

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Act over  any other  law or  any agreement  or  contract  of service or  any  standing  orders.  These  are  broadly  the relevant provisions  of the  Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act and the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules which may call for consideration.      But the question arises whether the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act  applies to  the workmen  employed in  the stone quarries and  the stone crushers. Now it was not disputed on behalf of  the State of Haryana and indeed it was clear from the Report  of Dr.  Patwardhan  that  most  of  the  workmen employed in  the stone quarries and stone crushers come from Uttar Pradesh,  Madhya  Pradesh,  Rajasthan,  Tamilnadu  and Andhra Pradesh  and  there  are  only  a  few  workmen  from Haryana. It is only if 5 or more out of these workmen coming from States  other  than  Haryana  are  inter-State  migrant workmen within  the meaning of that expression as defined in Section 2  sub-section (1)  clause (e)  of  the  Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act that the establishment in which they are employed would be covered by the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act. It  would therefore  have to  be determined  in case of each stone quarry and each stone crusher whether there are 5 or  more   inter-State  Migrant   workmen  employed  in  the establishment and if there are, the provisions of the inter- State  Migrant  Workmen  Act  and  the  Inter-State  Migrant Workmen Rules would become applicable to such establishment. The Union  of India  in a  submission filed on its behalf by Miss Subhasini  has taken  up the  stand  that  the  workmen employed in  the one quarries and stone crushers "are coming to join  the service  in the  stone quarries  of  their  own volition and  they are  not recruited by any agent for being migrated from any State" and "as such they do not come under the definition  of the term" inter-State migrant workman. We would have ordinarily been inclined to accept this statement made on  behalf of  the Union  of India,  but we  find that, according  to  the  Report  of  Dr.  Patwardhan,  the  modus operandi that  is followed for the purpose of recruitment of workmen is  "that the  stone crusher  owners or  the lessees holders ask  the thekedar  or jamadar  of the  mine to fetch people from  various States  to work  in the mines" and some times "the  jamadar or  thekedar communicates  the need  for workers to  old hands  at the  quarries so  that they  could bring in people on their return from their villages or their respective States". Now 121 if what  has been  reported by Dr. Patwardhan is true, there can be  no doubt  that the  workmen employed  in  the  stone quarries and  stone crushers  would be  inter-State  migrant workmen. The  thekedar or jamadar who is engaged by the mine lessees or  the stone-crusher  owners to  recruit workmen or employ them  on behalf  of the mine lessees or stone crusher owners would clearly be a ’contractor’ within the meaning of that term as defined in Section 2 sub-section (1) clause (b) and the  workmen recruited  by or  through  him  from  other States for  employment  in  the  stone  quarries  and  stone crushers in the State of Haryana would undoubtedly be inter- State migrant  workmen. Even  when the  thekedar or  jamadar recruits or employs workmen for the stone quarries and stone crushers by  sending  word  through  the  "old  hands",  the workmen  so  recruited  or  employed  would  be  inter-State migrant workmen,  because the  "old hands"  would be  really acting as  agents of the thekedar or jamadar for the purpose of recruiting  or employing workmen. The Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act  being a  piece of  social  welfare  legislation intended to  effectuate the  Directive Principles  of  State Policy and  ensure decent  living and working conditions for

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the workmen  when they  come from  other States and are in a totally  strange   environment  where  by  reason  of  their poverty, ignorance  and illiteracy,  they would  be  totally unorganised and  helpless and  would become  easy victims of exploitation,  it  must  be  given  a  broad  and  expansive interpretation so  as to  prevent the  mischief and  advance they  remedy  and  therefore,  even  when  the  workmen  are recruited  or   employed  by  the  jamadar  or  thekedar  by operating through  the "old hands", they must be regarded as inter-State migrant  workmen entitled  to the benefit of the provisions of  the Inter-State  Migrant Workmen  Act and the Inter-State  Migrant   Workmen  Rules.  The  Report  of  Dr. Patwardhan also  points out  one other aspect of the matter: according to  him, there  is  invariably  "an  understanding between the  jamadar or  thekedar and  the owners  of  stone crushers holding  leases of stone quarries as to the rate of output of stone to be fed through the crushers" and thus the jamadar or  thekedar is  clearly a ’contractor’ of the stone crusher owners  and the workmen recruited or employed by him on behalf  of the  owners of  stone crushers are inter-State migrant workmen.  We  entirely  agree  with  this  view  put forward by Dr. Patwardhan in his Report and we have no doubt that if  there is any agreement or understanding between the jamadar or  thekedar on the one hand and the owners of stone crushers on  the other,  that the  jamadar or  thekedar will ensure a  certain rate  of output  of stone to be fed to the stone  crushers,   the  jamadar   or  thekedar  would  be  a ’contractor’ and the workmen recruited or employed by him on behalf of the stone 122 crusher owners  would be  inter-State migrant  workmen.  But whether in  any particular stone quarry or stone crusher the workmen employed  are inter-State  migrant  workmen  on  the application of this test laid down by us and if so, how many of them  are such  inter-State migrant  workmen, is a matter which would  have to be investigated and determined and that is what must be done if we are to make the provisions of the Inter-State Migrant  Workmen Act and the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules meaningful for these workmen who are recruited from other  States and  who come  to the  stone quarries and stone crushers  in the  State of  Haryana. We  may point out that in  addition to  the rights and benefits conferred upon him under the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act and the Inter- State Migrant  Workmen Rules, an inter-State migrant workman is also, by reason of Section 21, entitled to the benefit of the provisions  contained in  the Workman’s Compensation Act 1923. The  Payment of  Wages Act  1936, The Employees’ State Insurance Act 1948, The Employees’ Provident Funds and Misc. Provisions Act,  1952, and  the Maternity  Benefit Act 1961. The obligation to give effect to the provisions contained in these various  laws is  not only  that  of  the  jamadar  or thekedar and  the  mine-lessees  and  stone  crusher  owners (provided of  course there are 5 or more inter-State migrant workmen employed  in the establishment) but also that of the Central Government  because the Central Government being the appropriate  Government"   within  the  meaning  of  Section 2(1)(a) is  under an  obligation to take necessary steps for the purpose  of securing compliance with these provisions by the thekedar or jamadar and mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers. The  State of  Haryana is also for reasons already discussed above  bound to  ensure that  these provisions are observed by  the thekedar  or jamadar  and mine-lessees  and owners of stone crushers.      We then turn to consider the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation  and  Abolition)  Act  1970  (hereinafter

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referred to as the Contract Labour Act). This Act applies to every establishment in which 20 or more workmen are employed or were  employed on  any day of the preceding twelve months as contract  labour and  to every  contractor who employs or who employed on any day of the preceding twelve months 20 or more workmen.  The expression  "appropriate  government"  is defined in  Section 2  sub-section (1) clause (a) and so far as the  stone quarries and stone crushers are concerned, the Central Government  is the ’appropriate Government’. Section 2 sub-section  (1) clause (b) states that a workman shall be deemed  to  be  employed  as  "contract  labour"  in  or  in connection with  the work  of an  establishment when  he  is hired in  or in connection with the work of an establishment when he is hired in or in connection 123 with such  work by  or through a contractor and "contractor" is defined  in clause  (c) of  that sub-section  to mean, in relation to  an establishment,  "a person  who undertakes to produce a  given result  for the establishment, other than a mere supply  of goods  or articles  of manufacture  to  such establishment,  through  contract  labour  or  who  supplies contract labour  for  any  work  of  the  establishment  and includes  a   sub-contractor".  The   expression  "principal employer" is  defined in  clause (g)  of sub-section  (i) of section 2  and for the purpose of a mine, it means the owner or agent  of the  mine and  therefore, so  far as  the stone quarries and  stone crushers are concerned, the mine lessees and  owners   of  stone  crushers  would  be  the  principal employers. Then  there are provisions in the Contract Labour Act for  registration of  establishment by  every  principal employer and  for licensing  of every contractor to whom the Act applies.  But more importantly, Sections 16 to 19 impose a duty  on every contractor to provide canteens, rest rooms, first aid  facilities and  other facilities  and Section  20 enacts that  if any  amenity required  to be  provided under section 16,  17, 18  or 19  for the  benefit of the contract labour employed  in an  establishment is not provided by the contractor, such  amenity shall be provided by the principal employer and all expenses incurred by the principal employer in providing  such amenity may be recovered by the principal employer from  the  contractor.  Every  contractor  is  made responsible under-section  21 for  payment of  wages to each worker employed by him as contract labour and such wages are to be  disbursed in  the presence  of a  representative duly authorised by  the principal employer. Now if the jamadar or thekedar  in   a  stone   quarry  or   stone  crusher  is  a ’contractor’ within  the meaning  of the  definition of that term in  the Inter-State  Migrant Workmen  Act, he  would  a fortiorari  be  a  ’contractor’  also  for  the  purpose  of Contract  Labour   Act  and  any  workmen  hired  in  or  in connection with  the work of a stone quarry or stone crusher by or  through the  jamadar or  thekedar  would  be  workmen entitled to  the benefit  of the  provisions of the Contract Labour  Act.  There  are  elaborate  Rules  made  under  the Contract Labour  Act called  the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)  Central Rules  1971 (hereinafter referred to as the  Contract Labour Rules) and these Rules not only deal with the procedure for application and grant of registration to a  principal employer  and licence  to a  contractor, but also particularise  the details  of the  various welfare and other facilities  directed to  be provided  to the  contract labour by  Section 16,  17, 18 and 19 of the Contract Labour Act.  Where   therefore  the   thekedar  or   jamadar  is  a ’contractor’  and  the  workmen  are  employed  as  contract labour’ within the meaning of these expres-

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124 sions as  used in the Contract Labour Act, the contractor as well as  the principal  employer would  be liable  to comply with the  provisions of contract Labour Act and the Contract Labour Rules  and to  provide to  the contract labour rights and benefits  conferred by  these  provisions.  The  Central Government being  the "appropriate  government"  within  the meaning of  Section 12  sub-section (1)  clause (a) would be responsible for  ensuring compliance  with the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and the Contract Labour Rules by the mine-lessees and  stone crusher  owners and  the thekedar or jamadar.  So   also,  for  reasons  which  we  have  already discussed while  dealing with the applicability of the Mines Act 1952  and the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act, the State of Haryana  would be  under an  obligation  to  enforce  the provisions of  the Contract  Labour  Act  and  the  Contract Labour Rules for the benefit of the workmen.      Turning to  the provisions  of the  Minimum  Wages  Act 1948, there can be no doubt and indeed this was not disputed on behalf  of the  respondents, that  the Minimum  Wages Act 1948 is applicable to workmen employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers. The minimum wage fixed for miners by the Notification of  the Central  Government dated  2nd December 1981 is Rs. 9.75 per day for those working, above the ground and Rs.  11.25 per  day for  those working below the ground. Moreover the Notification prescribes a separate minimum wage for the  occupation of  a shot  firer, stone  breaker, stone carrier, mud  remover and  water carrier. There is a minimum wage prescribed  in  the  Notification  for  each  of  these occupations. The question is whether the workmen employed in the stone  quarries and stone crushers are paid minimum wage for the  work done  by them.  The Report  of Dr.  Patwardhan alleges that  the mode of payment to the workmen employed in stone quarrying  operations is  such that after deduction of the amounts spent on explosives and drilling of holes, which amount has  to be  borne by  the workmen out of their wages, what is  left to  the workmen is less than the minimum wage. It is  also stated  in the Report of Dr. Patwardhan that the workmen employed  in the  stone quarries not only quarry the stone but  also carry  out the  work of  a shot  firer and a stone breaker,  though the  work of  a shot  firer cannot be done by  them without  proper training  as provided  in  the Mines Vocational  Training Rules 1966 and for this work of a shot firer  and a stone breaker carried cut by them, they do not get  the minimum wage stipulated for the occupation of a shot firer  or a  stone breaker  and moreover since they are piece-rated workers, their output falls because of the other jobs they  are required  to carry  out with  the result that they are deprived of the 125 minimum wage which they should otherwise receive. We are not in a  position at  the present  stage  to  give  a  definite finding that  what is stated in the Report of Dr. Patwardhan is true, but there can be no doubt that whatever be the mode of payment  followed by  the mine  lessees and stone crusher owners, the  workmen must  get nothing less than the minimum wage for  the job  which is being carried out by them and if they are  required to  carry out  additionally  any  of  the functions pertaining  to another job or occupation for which a separate  minimum wage  is prescribed, they must be paid a proportionate part  of such  minimum wage in addition to the minimum wage  payable to them for the work primarily carried out by  them. We  would also  suggest  that  the  system  of payment which  is being  followed in  the stone quarries and stone crushers,  under which  the expenses of the explosives

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and of  drilling holes are to be borne by the workmen out of their own  wages,  should  be  changed  and  the  explosives required for carrying out blasting should be supplied by the mine  lessees   or  the  jamadar  or  thekedar  without  any deduction being made out of the wages of the workmen and the work of  drilling holes  and shot firing should be entrusted only to those who have received the requisite training under the Mines  Vocational Training  Rules 1966.  We would direct the Central  Government and  the State  of Haryana  to  take necessary steps  in this  behalf. So far as the complaint of the petitioner  that  the  workmen  employed  in  the  stone quarries and  stone crushers  are not being paid the minimum was due  and payable  for the  work carried  out by  them is concerned,  it   is  a   matter  which   would  have  to  be investigated and  determined in  the light  of the  law laid down by us.      Lastly, we  must consider  the provisions of the Bonded Labour System  (Abolition) Act 1976. We have already pointed out that  many of  the States  are not prepared to admit the existence of  bonded labour  in their  territories  and  the State of  Haryana is no exception. But in order to determine whether there is any bonded labour in the stone quarries and stone crushers  in  the  Faridabad  area  of  the  State  of Haryana, it  is necessary  to examine  some of  the relevant provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976. This Act was enacted with a view to giving effect to Article 23 of  the Constitution  which prohibits  traffic  in  human beings and  beggar and other similar forms of forced labour. We  have  had  occasion  to  consider  the  true  scope  and dimension of  this Article  of the  Constitution in People’s Union for  Democratic Rights  v. Union  of India(1) commonly known as 126 the Asiad  workers’ case  and it  is not necessary for us to say anything  more about it in the present judgment. Suffice it to  state that this Act is intended to strike against the system of  bonded labour  which has  been a shameful scar on the Indian  social scene for decades and which has continued to disfigure the life of the nation even after independence. The Act  was brought  into force  through out the length and breadth of  the country  with effect from 25th October 1975, which means  that the Act has been in force now for almost 8 years and  if properly  implemented, it  should have by this time brought  about  complete  identification,  freeing  and rehabilitation of  bonded labour.  But  as  official,  semi- official and  non-official reports show, we have yet to go a long way  in wiping  out  this  outrage,  against  humanity. Clause (d)  of Section  2 defines  "bonded debt"  to mean an advance obtained  or presumed  to have  been obtained,  by a bonded labourer, under or in pursuance of, the bonded labour system. The  expression  ’bonded  labourer’  is  defined  in clause (f)  to mean  "a labourer  who incurs,  or has, or is presumed to have incurred a bonded debt". Clause (g) defines "bonded labour system" to mean:           "the system  of forced,  or partly  forced, labour      under which  a debtor enters, or has, or is presumed to      have, entered,  into an  agreement with the creditor to      the effect that,-           (i) in consideration of an advance obtained by him      or by  any of  his  lineal  ascendants  or  descendants      (whether or  not  such  advance  is  evidenced  by  any      document) and in consideration of the interest, if any,      due on such advance, or           (ii) in  pursuance  of  any  customary  or  social      obligation, or

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         (iii) for  any economic  consideration received by      him or  by any of his lineal ascendants or descendants,      or he would-           (1) render,  by himself  or through  any member of      his family,  or any  person dependent on him, labour or      service to  the creditor,  or for  the benefit  of  the      creditor, for  a specified period or for an unspecified      period, either without wages or for nominal wages, or           (2) forfeit  the freedom  of employment  or  other      means of  livelihood for  a specified  period or for an      unspecified period, 127           (3) forfeit  the right  to move  freely throughout      the territory of India, or           (4) forfeit  the right  to appropriate  or sell at      market value  any of  his property  or product  of  his      labour or  the labour  of a member of his family or any      person dependent on him."      The expression "nominal wages" is defined in clause (i) of Section  2 to  mean, in  relation to  any labour,  a wage which is less than-      (a) the  minimum wages  fixed  by  the  Government,  in      relation to  the same  or similar labour, under any law      for the time being in force, and      (b) where  no such  wage has  been fixed in relation to      any form  of labour,  the wages that are normally paid,      for the same or similar labour to the labourers working      in the same locality."      Section 4  is the  material section  which provides for abolition of bonded labour system and it runs as follows:      "4(1) On  the commencement  of  this  Act,  the  bonded      labour system  shall stand  abolished and  every bonded      labourer shall,  on such  commencement, stand freed and      discharged from  any obligation  to render  any  bonded      labour.      (2)   after the  commencement of  this Act,  no  person           shall-           (a)  make any  advance under,  or in pursuance of,                the bonded labour system, or           (b)  compel any person to render any bonded labour                or other form of forced labour.      Section 5  invalidates any  custom or  tradition or any contract agreement  or other  instrument by  virtue of which any person  or any member of the family or dependent of such person is required to do any work or render any service as a bonded labourer.  Section 6  provides inter alia that on the commencement of  the  Act,  every  obligation  of  a  bonded labourer to repay and bonded debt or such part of any bonded debt  as   remains  unsatisfied   immediately  before   such commencement, shall be deemed to have been extinguished. 128 There are  certain other consequential provisions in Section 7 to 9 but it is not necessary to refer to them. Sections 10 to 12  impose a  duty on every District Magistrate and every officer to  whom power  may be  delegated by him, to inquire whether, after  the commencement  of  the  Act,  any  bonded labour system  or any  other form  of forced labour is being enforced by  or on behalf of, any person resident within the local limits of his jurisdiction and if, as a result of such inquiry, any  person is  found to  be enforcing  the  bonded labour system  or any  other system  of forced labour, he is required forthwith to take the necessary action to eradicate the enforcement  of such  forced labour. Section 15 provides for Constitution  of a  Vigilance Committee in each District and each  sub-division of a District and sets out what shall

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be  the   composition  of   each  Vigilance  Committee.  The functions of  the Vigilance Committee are set out in Section 14 and  among other  things, that Section provinces that the Vigilance Committee  shall  be  responsible  inter  alia  to advise the  District Magistrate  as to  the efforts made and action taken,  to ensure  that the  provisions of the Act or any  Rule  made  thereunder  are  properly  implemented,  to provide for  the economic  and social  rehabilitation of the freed bonded  labourers and  to keep an eye on the number of offences of  which cognizance  has been taken under the Act. Then comes Section 15 which lays down that whenever any debt is claimed  by any labourer or a Vigilance Committee to be a bonded debt,  the burden  of proof  that such  debt is not a bonded debt shall lie on the creditor. These are some of the material provisions  of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 which need to be considered.      It is  a  matter  of  regret  that  though  Section  13 provides for  constitution of  a Vigilance Committee in each District and  each subdivision of a District, the Government of Haryana, for some reason or the other, did not constitute any Vigilance  Committee until  its attention  was drawn  to this requirement  of the  law by  this Court. It may be that according to the Government of Haryana there were not at any time any  bonded labourers  within its territories, but even so Vigilance  Committees are  required by  Section 13  to be constituted because  the function of the Vigilance Committee is to  identify bonded  labourers, if  there are any, and to free and rehabilitate them and it would not be right for the State Government  not to  constitute Vigilance Committees on the assumption  that there  are no  bonded labourers at all. But we  are glad  to find that the Government of Haryana has now constituted  a Vigilance  Committee in each District. It does  not   appear  from  the  record  whether  a  Vigilance Committee has  been constituted also in each sub-division of a District but we 129 have no  doubt that  the Government  of Haryana will without any delay  and at  any rate  within  six  weeks  from  today constitute a  Vigilance Committee  in each  sub-division and thus comply  with the  requirement of Section 13 of the Act. We may point out that in constituting Vigilance Committee in each-District and sub-division, the Haryana Government would do well  to include  representatives of non-political social action groups  operating at  the grass root level, for it is only  through   such  social  action  groups  and  voluntary agencies that the problem of identification of bonded labour can be effectively solved.      It was  contended by  the learned  Additional Solicitor General on  behalf of the State of Haryana that in the stone quarries and  stone crushers there might be forced labourers but they  were not  bonded labourers  within the  meaning of that expression  as used  in the Act, since a labourer would be a  bonded labourer  only if he has or is presumed to have incurred a  bonded debt and there was nothing in the present case to show that the workmen employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers had incurred or could be presumed to have incurred any  bonded debt.  It was not enough, contended the learned Additional  Solicitor General  the petitioner merely to show  that the  workmen were  providing forced  labour in that they  were not  allowed to  leave the  premises of  the establishment, but  it was  further necessary  to show  that they were  working  under  the  bonded  labour  system.  The learned Additional  Solicitor General also submitted that in any event,  even if  the workmen  filed  affidavits  to  the effect that they had taken advances from thekedar or jamadar

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and or  mine lessees  and/or stone  crusher owners  and they were not  allowed to leave the premises of the establishment until the  advances were  paid of,  that would not be enough evidence for  the  Court  to  hold  that  they  were  bonded labourers, because the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners had no  opportunity to cross-examine the workmen making such affidavits. This  contention was  seriously pressed  by  the learned Additional  Solicitor General on behalf of the State of Haryana,  but as  we shall  presently show,  there is  no substance in  this contention.  We may point out that in the course of  the arguments  we  did  suggest  to  the  learned Additional Solicitor  General that  even if the workmen were not bonded  labourers in  the strict  sense of  the term but were merely  forced to  provide  labour,  should  the  State Government   not    accept   liability   for   freeing   and rehabilitating them,  particularly in  view of the Directive Principles of State Policy. The State of Haryana was however not prepared  to come  forward with  any  proposal  in  this behalf. 130      Now it  is clear that bonded labour is a form of forced labour  and   Section  12   of  the   Bonded  Labour  System (Abolition)   Act    1976   recognises   this   self-evident proposition by  laying a  duty on  every District Magistrate and every  officer specified  by him  to inquire whether any bonded labour  system or  any other form of forced labour is being enforced  by or on behalf of any person and, if so, to take such  action as  may  be  necessary  to  eradicate  the enforcement of  such forced labour. The thrust of the Act is against the  continuance of any form of forced labour. It is of course  true that,  strictly speaking,  a bonded labourer means a  labourer who  incurs or  has or is presumed to have incurred a  bonded debt  and a  bonded debt means an advance obtained or  presumed to  have been  obtained  by  a  bonded labourer under  or in  pursuance of the bonded labour system and it  would therefore appear that before a labourer can be regarded as a bonded labourer, he must not only be forced to provide labour  to  the  employer  but  he  must  have  also received an advance or other economic consideration from the employer unless  he is  made to  provide  forced  labour  in pursuance of any custom or social obligation or by reason of his birth  in any  particular caste  or community. It was on the basis  of this definitional requirement that the learned Additional Solicitor  General on  behalf  of  the  State  of Haryana put  forward the  argument that  even if the workmen employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers were being compelled to  provide forced  labour, they  were not  bonded labourers,  since  it  as  not  shown  by  them  or  by  the petitioner that  they were  doing so  in consideration of an advance or  other economic  consideration received  from the mine-lessees and  owners of  stone  crushers.  Now  if  this contention of  the learned Additional Solicitor General were well-founded, it  would become  almost impossible to enforce the provisions  of the  Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 because in every case where bonded labourers are sought to  be   identified  for   the  purpose   of   release   and rehabilitation under  the provisions  of the  Act, the State Authorities as also the employer would be entitled to insist that the  bonded labourers  must first  prove that  they are providing forced  labour in  consideration of  an advance or other economic  consideration received by them and then only they would  be eligible  of the  benefits provided under the Act and  this would  make it  extremely  difficult,  if  not impossible, for  the labourers  to establish  that they  are bonded labourers  because they would have no evidence at all

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to prove  that any  advance or  economic  consideration  was provided to  them by  the employer  and since  employment of bonded labourers  is a  penal  offence  under  the  Act  the employer would  immediately, without  any hesitation, disown having given any advance or economic 131 consideration  to   the  bonded   labourers.  It  is  indeed difficult to  understand how  the State  Government which is constitutionally mandated  to bring about change in the life conditions of  the poor  and the  down-trodden and to ensure social justice  to them,  could possibly  take up  the stand that the  labourers must prove that they are made to provide forced labour  in  consideration  of  an  advance  or  other economic consideration  received from  the employer  and are therefore bonded  labourers. It is indeed a matter of regret that the  State Government should have insisted on a formal, rigid and  legalistic approach  in the  matter of  a statute which is  one of  the most  important measures  for ensuring human dignity to these unfortunate specimens of humanity who are exiles  of civilization  and who  are leading  a life of abject misery  and destitution.  It would be cruel to insist that a  bonded labourer  in order  to derive the benefits of this social welfare legislation, should have to go through a formal process  of  trial  with  the  normal  procedure  for recording of  evidence.  That  would  be  a  totally  futile process because  it is  obvious that  a bonded  labourer can never stand  up to  the rigidity  and formalism of the legal process due  to  his  poverty,  illiteracy  and  social  and economic backwardness  and if such a procedure were required to  be   followed,  the   State  Government  might  as  well obliterate this  Act  from  the  statute  book.  It  is  now statistically established  that most of bonded labourers are members of  Scheduled Castes  and Scheduled  Tribes or other backward classes  and ordinary course of human affairs would show, indeed  judicial notice can be taken of it, that there would be  no occasion  for a  labourer to  be  placed  in  a situation where  he is  required to supply forced labour for no wage  or for  nominal wage,  unless he  has received some advance or  other economic  consideration from  the employer and under the pretext of not having returned such advance or other economic  consideration,  he  is  required  to  render service to  the employer  or is  deprived of  his freedom of employment or of the right to move freely wherever he wants. Therefore, whenever  it is  shown that a labourer is made to provide forced  labour, the  Court would raise a presumption that he  is required to do so in consideration of an advance or other  economic consideration  received by  him and he is therefore  a   bonded  labourer.  This  presumption  may  be rebutted by the employer and also by the State Government if it so  chooses but unless and until satisfactory material is produced for  rebutting this  presumption,  the  Court  must proceed on  the basis that the labourer is a bonded labourer entitled to  the benefit  of the  provisions of the Act. The State  Government  cannot  be  permitted  to  repudiate  its obligation to  identify, release and rehabilitate the bonded labourers on the plea that though the 132 concerned labourers  may be  providing  forced  labour,  the State Government  does not owe any obligation to them unless and until  they show  in  an  appropriate  legal  proceeding conducted according  to the  rules of  adversary  system  of justice, that they are bonded labourers.      The  first  question  that  arises  in  regard  to  the implementation of  the Bonded  Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 is  that of  identification of bonded labour. One major

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handicap which  impedes the identification of bonded labour, is  the  reluctance  of  the  administration  to  admit  the existence of  bonded labour,  even where it is prevalent. It is therefore  necessary to  impress upon  the administration that it  does not  help to ostrich-like bury its head in the sand and  ignore the  prevalence of bonded labour, for it is not the  existence of  bonded labour  that is  a slur on the administration but  its failure to eradicate it and moreover not taking the necessary steps for the purpose of wiping out this blot  on the  fair name of the State is a breach of its constitutional obligation.  We would  therefore  direct  the Government of  Haryana and  also suggest  to the other State Governments,  to   take  steps  to  sensitise  the  officers concerned with  the implementation  of the Act to this acute human problems and its socioeconomic parameters. Moreover it may be  noted that  the District  Magistrates have a central role to  play under  the provisions of the Act and the State Governments would therefore do well to instruct the District Magistrates to  take up the work of identification of bonded labour as one of their top priority tasks. There are certain areas of  concentration of bonded labour which can be easily identified on  the basis of various studies and reports made by governmental authorities, social action groups and social scientists from  time to  time. These areas of concentration of bonded  labour are  mostly to be found in stone quarries, brick kilns  and amongst agricultural landless labourers and such areas  must be  mapped out by each State Government and task  forces  should  be  assigned  for  identification  and release of  bonded  labour.  Labour  camps  should  be  held periodically in  these areas  with a  view to  educating the labourers and  for  this  purpose,  the  assistance  of  the National Labour Institute may be taken, because the National Labour Institute  has the requisite expertise and experience of holding  such camps  and it should be associated with the organisation and  conduct of  such camps  and in  each  such camp,  individuals   with   organisational   capability   or potential should  be identified  and given  training in  the work of  identification and  release of  bonded labour. More importantly non-political social action groups and voluntary agencies and  particularly those with a record of honest and competent service for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 133 Tribes, agricultural labourers and other unorganised workmen should be involved in the task of identification and release of bonded labourers, for it is primarily through such social action groups  and voluntary  agencies alone that it will be possible to  eradicate the  bonded  labour  system,  because social action  groups and  voluntary agencies comprising men and women  dedicated to  the cause of emancipation of bonded labour will  be able  to penetrate through the secrecy under which very  often bonded  labourers are required to work and discover the existence of bonded labour and help to identify and release  bonded labourers. We would therefore direct the Vigilance Committees  as also  the District  Magistrates  to take the  assistance of  non-political social  action groups and  voluntary   agencies  for   the  purpose   of  ensuring implementation of the provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976.      The other question arising out of the implementation of the Bonded  Labour System  (Abolition) Act  1976 is  that of rehabilitation of  the released bonded labourers and that is also a  question of  the greatest importance, because if the bonded labourers  who are  identified  and  freed,  are  not rehabilitated, their condition would be much worse than what it was  before during  the period  of their serfdom and they

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would become  more exposed  to exploitation  and slide  back once again into serfdom even in the absence of any coercion. The bonded  labourer who is released would prefer slavery to hunger, a  world of  ’bondage and  (illusory)  security’  as against  a  world  of  freedom  and  starvation.  The  State Governments must  therefore concentrate on rehabilitation of bonded labour  and  evolve  effective  programmes  for  this purpose. Indeed  they are under an obligation to do so under the provisions  of the  Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976.  It   may  be   pointed  out   that  the   concept  of rehabilitation has  the  following  four  main  features  as admirably set  out in  the letter  dated 2nd  September 1982 addressed by  the Secretary.  Ministry of Labour, Government of India to the various States Governments:      (i)   Psychological rehabilitation must go side by side           with physical and economic rehabilitation;      (ii) The  physical and  economic rehabilitation  has 15           major components  namely allotment  of house-sites           and agricultural land, land development, provision           of low cost dwelling units, agriculture, provision           of   credit,   horticulture,   animal   husbandry,           training for acquiring 134           new  skills   and  developing   existing   skills,           promoting traditional  arts and  crafts, provision           of wage  employment  and  enforcement  of  minimum           wages, collection  and processing  of minor forest           produce, health medical care and sanitation supply           of essential commodities, education of children of           bonded labourers and protection civil rights;       (iii) There is scope for bringing about an integration           among the  various central and centrally sponsored           schemes and  the on-going  schemes  of  the  State           Governments for a more qualitative rehabilitation.           The  essence  of  such  integration  is  to  avoid           duplication i.e.  pooling resources from different           sources for the same purpose. It should be ensured           that while  funds are  not  drawn  from  different           sources for  the same purpose drawn from different           sectors   for    different   components   of   the           rehabilitation scheme  are integrated  skillfully;           and      (iv)  While   drawing  up   any   scheme/programme   of           rehabilitation of  freed bonded labour, the latter           must necessarily  be given  the choice between the           various alternatives  for their rehabilitation and           such programme  should  be  finally  selected  for           execution as  would need the total requirements of           the families  of freed  bonded labourers to enable           them to cross the poverty line on the one hand and           to prevent  them from sliding back to debt bondage           on the other.           We  would   therefore  direct  the  Government  of Haryana to  draw up  a scheme on programme for "a better and more  meaningful   rehabilitation  of   the   freed   bonded labourers" in  the light  of the above guidelines set out by the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Labour in his  letter dated  2nd September  1982. The  other  State Governments are  not parties  before us  and hence we cannot give any  direction to them, but we hope and trust that they will also  take suitable  steps for  the purpose of securing identification,  release   and  rehabilitation   of   bonded labourers on the lines indicated by us in this Judgment.      We are  not at  all satisfied  that the  stand taken on behalf of  the State  of Haryana  that there  is  no  bonded

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labour at all in the stone 135 quarries and  stone crushers  is correct.  The Report of M/s Ashok Srivastava  and Ashok  Panda shows  that, according to the statements  given by  some of the workers, they were not allowed to  leave the  stone  quarries  and  were  providing forced labour  and this  Report  also  stated  that  several persons working in the Ghodhokor and Lakarpur stone quarries were forcibly  kept by  the contractors  and they  were  not allowed  to  move  out  of  their  places  and  were  bonded labourers. The  petitioner also  filed the  affidavits of  a large number  of workers  on 24th  August 1982, each of them stating that he is under heavy debt of the thekedar who does not allow  him to  leave the  premises without  settling the account. We  cannot ignore  this  material  which  has  been placed before  us and  unquestioningly accept  the statement made on  behalf of  the State  of Haryana  that there  is no bonded labour  in the stone quarries and stone crushers. But at the same time, we do not think that it would be right for us on  the basis  of this  material to  come to  a  definite finding that  these workers  whose names  are given  in  the Report of  M/s Ashok  Srivastava and Ashok Panda or who have filed affidavits  are providing  forced labour or are bonded labourers. It  is necessary  to direct a further inquiry for the purpose  of ascertaining  whether any  of the  labourers working  in   the  stone  quarries  and  stone  crushers  in Faridabad District  are bonded labourers in the light of the law laid  down by  us in  this judgment.  We would therefore direct  Shri  Laxmi  Dhar  Misra,  Joint  Secretary  in  the Ministry  of   Labour,  Government   of   India,   who   has considerable  experience  of  the  work  of  identification, release and rehabilitation of bonded labourers, to visit the stone quarries  and stone crushers in Faridabad District and ascertain by  enquiring from  the labourers  in  each  stone quarry or stone crusher whether any of them are being forced to provide  labour and  are bonded  laboureres. While making this inquiry,  Shri Laxmi  Dhar Misra  will take care to see that when he interviews the labourers either individually or collectively, neither  the mine-lessees  or owners  of stone crushers nor  the thekedar  of jamadar  nor any  one else is present. Shri  Laxmi Dhar  Misra will  prepare in respect of each stone  quarry or  stone crusher a statement showing the names and particulars of those who, according to the inquiry made by him, are bonded labourers and he will also ascertain from them whether they want to continue to work in the stone quarry or  stone crusher  or they  want to  go back to their homes and  if they  want to go back, the District Magistrate of Faridabad  will on  receipt of  the statement  from  Shri Laxmi Dhar  Misra, make necessary arrangements for releasing them and  provide for  their transportation  back  to  their hromes and  for this purpose the State Government shall make the requisite funds 136 available to  the District Magistrate. Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra will also  enquire from the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers as  also from the thekedar or jamadar whether there are any  advances made  by them  to the labourers working in the stone  quarry or  stone crusher and if so, whether there is any  documentary evidence  in support  of the same and he will also  ascertain what, according to the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers or the jamadar or thekedar, are the amounts of  loans still  remaining outstanding  against such labourers. Shri  Laxmi Dhar  Misra will submit his report to this Court  on or  before 28th February 1984. We may make it clear that  the object  and purpose  of this inquiry by Shri

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Laxmi Dhar  Misra is  not to  fasten any  liability  on  the minelessees and  owners of stone crushers and the jamadar or thekedar on the basis of the Report of Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra but  to   secure  the  release  and  repatriation  of  those labourers who  claim to  be bonded labourers and who want to leave the  employment and  go some  where else. We may point out that  the problem  of bonded  labourers is  a  difficult problem because  unless, on  being freed  from bondage, they are provided  proper and  adequate rehabilitation,  it would not help  to merely  secure their  release. Rather  in  such cases it  would be  more in  their interest to ensure proper working conditions  with full  enjoyment of  the benefits of social welfare  and labour  laws so  that they  can  live  a healthy decent  life. But  of course  this would only be the next best  substitute for  release and  rehabilitation which must receive the highest priority.      So far  as implementation  of  the  provisions  of  the Minimum Wages  Act 1948  is concerned  we would  direct  the Central Government  and State  of Haryana  to take necessary steps for  the purpose  of ensuring  that minimum  wages are paid to the workmen employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers in  accordance with  the principles laid down by us in this  judgment. It may not be a matter of any consequence as to which mode of payment is followed, whether the workmen are paid  on truck  basis or on any other basis, but what is essential is  and that  is what  the Minimum  Wages Act 1948 requires that  the workmen  must not  receive any  wage less than the  minimum wage.  Even if payment of wages is made to the workmen  on truck  basis, a  formula would  have  to  be evolved by  the Central  Government and the State of Haryana to ensure  that the workmen receive no less than the minimum wage and  to facilitate  this formula  it would  have to  be provided that  the expenses on explosives and drilling holes shall be  borne by  the mine-lessees  and or  the jamadar or thekedar and  the work  of drilling  holes and  shot  firing shall be entrusted only 137 to those  who have  received requisite  training  under  the Mines Vocational  Training Rules  1966. We  would direct the Central Government  and the  State of  Haryana to  take  the necessary steps  in this  behalf so that within the shortest possible time  and as  far as possible within six weeks from today the  workmen start actually receiving in their hands a wage not  less than the minimum wage. If payment of wages is continued to  be made  on truck  basis, it is necessary that the appropriate officer of the Central Enforcement Machinery must determine  the measurement of each truck as to how many cubic feet  of stone  it can  contain and  print or inscribe such measurement  on the  truck,  so  that  appropriate  and adequate wage  is received  by the workmen for the work done by them  and they  are not  cheated out  of their legitimate wage. We  would  also  direct  the  inspecting  officers  of Central Enforcement  Machinery to  carry out surprise checks for the  purpose of  ensuring that the trucks are not loaded beyond their true measurement capacity. Such surprise checks shall be  carried out  by the  inspecting  officers  of  the Central Enforcement Machinery at least once in a week and if it is  found that  the trucks  are loaded in excess of their true  measurement  capacity  and  the  workmen  are  thereby deprived of  their legitimate wages, the inspecting officers carrying out such checks will immediately bring this fact to the notice  of the appropriate authorities for initiation of necessary action  against the  defaulting mine owners and/or thekedar or  jamadar.  We  would  also  direct  the  Central Government and  the State  of Haryana to ensure that payment

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of wage  is made directly to the workmen by the mine-lessees and stone-crusher owners or at any rate in the presence of a representative of the mine-lessees and stone crushers owners and the  inspecting officers  of the  Central Government  as also of the State of Haryana shall carry out periodic checks in order  to ensure  that payment  of the stipulated wage is made to  the workmen. Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra will also, while holding an  inquiry pursuant  to this  order, ascertain,  by carrying out  sample check,  whether the workmen employed in any particular stone quarry or stone crusher are actually in receipt of  wage not  less than the minimum wage and whether the  directions   given  by  us  in  this  order  are  being implemented by the authorities.      There are also two other matters in respect of which it is necessary  for us  to give directions. The first is that, apart from  poverty and  helplessness, one additional reason why  the  workmen  employed  in  stone  quarries  and  stone crushers are  deprived of  the rights and benefits conferred upon them  under various  social welfare  laws  enacted  for their benefit and are subjected to deception and 138 exploitation, in  that they  are totally  ignorant of  their rights and  entitlements. It  is this  ignorance which is to some extent  responsible for  the total denial of the rights and benefits  conferred upon them. It is therefore necessary to educate  the workmen employed in stone quarries and stone crushers so that they become aware as to what are the rights and benefits  to which  they are  entitled under the various social welfare  laws. The  knowledge  of  their  rights  and entitlements will  give them  the strength  to fight against their employers  for securing  their legitimate  dues and it will go  a long  way towards  reducing, if  not eliminating, their exploitation.  We have  fortunately in our country the Central Board  of Workers  Education which is entrusted with the function  of  educating  workers  in  their  rights  and entitlements and we would therefore direct the Central Board of Workers  Education to  organise periodic  camps near  the sites of  stone quarries  and stone  crushers  in  Faridabad District for  the purpose  of creating awareness amongst the workmen about the rights and benefits conferred upon them by social welfare  laws. This  educational  campaign  shall  be taken up  by the Central Board of Workers Education as early as possible  and the progress made shall be reported to this Court by the Central Board of Workers Education from time to time, at least once in three months.      The  other  matter  in  regard  to  which  we  find  it necessary to  give  directions  relates  to  the  tremendous pollution of air by dust thrown out as a result of operation of the  stone crushers.  When the  stone crushers  are being operated, they  continually throw  out large  quantities  of dust which  not only  pollute the  air, but  also affect the visibility and  constitute a  serious health  hazard to  the workmen. The entire air in the area where stone crushers are being operated is heavily laden with dust and it is this air which the  workmen breathe  day in  and day out and it is no wonder that  many of  them contract  tuberculosis. We  would therefore direct  the Central  Government and  the State  of Haryana  to  immediately  take  steps  for  the  purpose  of ensuring that  the stone  crushers owners do not continue to foul the  air and  they adopt either of two devices, namely, keeping a  drum of  water above  the stone  crushing machine with arrangement  for continues spraying of water upon it or installation of  dust sucking  machine. This direction shall be carried  out by  the Central  Government and the State of Haryana in  respect of  each stone  crusher in the Faridabad

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District and a compliance report shall be made to this Court on or before 28th February, 1984.      So far as the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and the 139 Inter-State Migrant  Workmen  Act  are  concerned,  we  have already discussed  those provisions  and pointed out in what circumstances  those   provisions  would  be  applicable  in relation to workmen employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers. It  is not  possible for  us on  the  material  on record to  come to a definite finding whether the provisions of the  Contract Labour  Act  and  the  Inter-State  Migrant Workmen Act  are applicable  in the  case of  any particular stone quarry  or stone crusher, because it would be a matter for investigation  and determination,  particularly since it has been  disputed by  the Central Government that there are any inter-State  migrant workmen  at all in any of the stone quarries or  stone crushers.  We would therefore direct Shri Laxmi Dhar  Misra to conduct an inquiry in each of the stone quarries and  stone crushers  in Faridabad  District for the purpose of  ascertaining  whether  there  are  any  contract labourers or  inter-State migrant  workmen in  any of  these stone quarries  or stone  crushers,  in  the  light  of  the interpretation laid down by us in this judgment, and, if so, what is the number of such contract labourers or inter-State migrant workmen  in each  stone quarry  or stone crusher. If Shri Laxmi  Dhar Misra finds as a result of his inquiry that the Contract  Labour  Act  and/or  the  Inter-State  Migrant Workmen Act  is applicable,  he will  make a  report to that effect to  the Court on or before 15th February 1984. We may make it  clear that this inquiry by Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra is not directed  for the  purpose of fastening any liability on the mine-lessees  and stone  crusher owners  or the jamadars and thekedars  proprio vigore  on the  basis of such report, but merely  for the  purpose of  considering whether a prima facie case  exists on  the basis  of  which  action  can  be initiated by  the Central  Government, in  which  the  mine- lessees and  stone crusher  owners and/or  the  jamadars  or thekedars  would  have  an  opportunity  of  contesting  the allegation that  the Contract  Labour Act  and/or the Inter- State Migrant  Workmen Act  applies to their stone quarry or stone crusher and defending such action.      We may  now take  up a few specific complaints urged on behalf of  the workmen.  The first  complaint relates to the failure to  provide pure  drinking water  to the  workmen in most of the stone quarries and stone crushers. The Report of M/s Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda as also the Report made by Dr. Patwardhan shows that pure drinking water is not made available to  the workmen. In Lakarpur mines the workmen are obliged to  take water  "from a shallow rivulet covered with thick algae"  and that too, "after a walk over a dangerously steep incline". The same situation also prevails in the mine in the  Gurukul area  as also  in the  Anangpur mines and in these mines 140 "quite often the upstream and the further down-stream of the rivulet get  blocked due  to mining  of stone  and the water becomes stagnant"  and the  workmen have no other option but to use  this water  for drink king purposes. It is true that in the  lower reaches  of Lakarpur  near the road there is a tube-well from  which the workmen get water but that is only when they  are permitted  to do  so by the persons operating it. The  Report of Dr. Patwardhan also points out that it is the children or women of the workmen who are usually engaged in the  work of  transporting water from distant places like

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the tubewell  but they  are not  paid anything for this work which is  being done  by them.  Neither any  mine-lessee  or stone crusher  owner nor  any jamadar or thekedar regards it as his  duty to  make provision  for drinking  water for the workmen nor does any officer of the Central Government or of the State Government bother to enforce the provisions of law in regard  to supply  of drinking  water. It  is clear that, quite apart  from the  provisions of the Contract Labour Act and the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act, there is a specific prescription in  section 19  of the Mines Act 1952 and Rules 30 to  32 of  the Mines Rules 1955 that the mine-lessees and stone crusher  owners shall  make effective arrangements for providing and  maintaining at  suitable points  conveniently situated a  sufficient supply of cool and wholesome drinking water for  all workmen  employed in  the stone  quarries and stone crushers. The quality of drinking water to be provided by them  has to be on a scale of at least 2 litres for every person employed  at any one time and such drinking water has to be  readily available  at conveniently  accessible points during the  whole of the working time. Rule 31 requires that if drinking  water is  not provided from taps connected with constant water  supply system,  it should  be kept  cool  in suitable vessels  sheltered from  weather and  such  vessels must be  emptied, cleaned  and refilled  every day and steps have to  be taken to preserve the water, the storage vessels and the  vessels  used  for  drinking  water  in  clean  and hygienic condition.  The inspectors  may also  by  order  in writing require the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners to submit with  the least  possible delay  a certificate from a competent health officer or analyst as to the fitness of the water for  human consumption.  This  obligation  has  to  be carried out by the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners and it is  the responsibility  of the Central Government as also of the  State of  Haryana to  ensure that this obligation is immediately  carried  out  by  the  mine-lessees  and  stone crusher  owners.  We  would  therefore  direct  the  Central Government and  the State  of Haryana  to ensure immediately that  the   mine-lessees  and  stone  crusher  owners  start supplying pure  drinking water  to the workmen on a scale of at least 2 litres for every 141 workman by  keeping suitable  vessels in  a shaded  place at conveniently accessible  points  and  appointing  some  one, preferably, amongst the women and/or children of the workmen to look  after these vessels. The Central Government and the State of  Haryana will also take steps for ensuring that the vessels in  which drinking water is kept by the mine-lessees and stone  crusher owners  are kept  in  clea  and  hygienic condition and  are emptied,  cleaned and  refilled every day and they  shall also ensure that minimum wage is paid to the women and/or  children who look after the vessels. The Chief Labour Commissioner,  the Deputy  Chief Labour Commissioner, the Assistant Labour Commissioner and the Labour Enforcement Officers of  the Government of India as also the appropriate inspecting officers  of  the  Government  of  Haryana  shall supervise strictly  the enforcement  of this  obligation and initiate necessary  action if  there  is  any  default.  The Central Government  as also  the State  of Haryana will also immediately direct the mine-lessees and stone-crusher owners to start obtaining drinking water from any unpolluted source or sources  of supply  and to transport it by tankers to the works site  with sufficient  frequency so  as to  be able to keep the  vessels filled  up for  supply of  clean  drinking water to  the workmen.  The Chief  Administrator,  Faridabad Complex is  directed to  set up  the points  from where  the

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mine-lessees and  stone crusher  owners can,  if  necessary, obtain supply of potable water for being carried by tankers. These  directions   given  by   us  shall  be  promptly  and immediately carried  out by  the appropriate authorities and Shri Laxmi  Dhar Misra  will, while  conducting his inquiry, also ascertain  whether these  directions have  been carried out and  pure drinking  water has been made available to the workmen in  accordance with  these directions  and submit  a report in  that behalf  to  the  Court  on  or  before  28th February 1984.      The second  complaint related to the failure to provide conservancy facilities  to the workmen in the stone quarries and stone  crushers.  Section  20  of  the  Mines  Act  1952 requires that  there shall  be provided separately for males and females  a sufficient  number of latrines and urinals of prescribed  types  so  situated  as  to  be  convenient  and accessible to  persons employed  in the  stone quarries  and stone crushers  and all  such latrines  and urinals shall be adequately lighted,  ventilated and  at all times maintained in a clean and sanitary condition. What should be the number of latrines  and urinals to be provided in each stone quarry or  stone  crusher  and  what  should  be  the  standard  of construction to  be complied  with in  erecting the latrines are provided  in Rules  33 to 35 of the Mines Rules 1955 and Rule 36 provides that a sufficient number of water 142 taps conveniently  accessible shall  be provided  in or near such latrines  and if  piped water  supply is not available, then a  sufficient quantity of water shall be hept stored in suitable receptacles  near such  latrines. The Report of Dr. Patwardhan  shows   that  there  is  not  a  trace  of  such conservancy facilities  in any of the stone quarries and the "vast  open   mountain  dug-up   without  a  thought  as  to environment is  used by  men and  women and  children as one huge open  latrine" where  the only privacy is that provided by the  "curtain drawn  by the turned down eyes of women and the turned  away eyes  of men".  This statement  made in the Report of  Dr. Patwardhan  has not been denied in any of the affidavits in  reply filed  on behalf of the respondents. We would therefore  direct the  Central Government  as also the State Government  to ensure  that conservancy  facilities in the shape  of latrines  and urinals  in accordance  with the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Mines Act 1950 and Rules 33  to  36  of  the  Mines  Rules  1955  are  provided immediately by  mine lessees  and owners  of stone crushers. This direction  shall be carried out at the earliest without any delay  and Shri  Laxmi Dhar Misra will, while making his inquiry, ascertain  whether the  mine-lessees and  owners of stone crushers  in each  of the  stone  quarries  and  stone crushers visited  by him  have complied  with this direction and a Report in that behalf shall be submitted by Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra on or before 28th February, 1984.      There was  also one  other complaint  made on behalf of the workmen  and that  related to the absence of any medical or first  aid facilities. The Report of Dr. Patwardhan shows that no such facilities are provided to the workmen employed in the  stone quarries  and stone  crushers and this finding was not  seriously disputed on behalf of the respondents. It is indeed  regrettable that  despite there being a mandatory provision for medical and first aid facilities in Section 21 of the Mines Act 1952 and Rules 40 to 45A of the Mines Rules 1955, no medical or first aid facilities seem to be provided in the stone quarries and stone crushers. We would therefore direct the  Central Government  as also the State Government to take steps to immediately ensure that proper and adequate

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medical and  first aid  facilities as required by Section 21 of the Mines Act 1952 and Rules 40 to 45A of the Mines Rules 1955 are  provided by  the mine-lessees  and owners of stone quarries to  the workmen.  Rule 45  provides that every shot firer  and   blaster  in   a  mine   shall  hold  first  aid qualification specified in Rule 41 and shall carry, while on duty, a  first aid outfit consisting of one large sterilized dressing and an amul of tincture of iodine or other suitable antiseptic. But we find that this requirement is also 143 not observed  by the  mine-lessees and  stone crusher owners and the  workmen are  required to  carry  on  blasting  with explosives without  any first aid qualification or first aid outfit. We  would therefore direct the Central Government as also the  State of  Haryana to ensure that every workman who is required to carry out blasting with explosives should not only be  trained under  the Mines  Vocational Training Rules 1966 but  should also  hold first  aid qualification  and he should carry  a first aid outfit, while on duty, as required by Rule  45. The Central Government and the State Government will also  take steps  to secure  that proper  and  adequate medical treatment is provided by the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers to the workmen employed by them as also to the members  of their  families and  such medical assistance should be  made  available  to  them  without  any  cost  of transportation  or  otherwise  and  the  cost  of  medicines prescribed by  the doctors must be reimbursed to them. Where the workmen  or the  members of their families meet with any serious  accident   involving  fracture  or  possibility  of disability or  suffer from  any serious  illness, the  mine- lessees and  owners of  stone crushers should be required by the Central  Government as also the State Government to make arrangements for  hospitalisation of such workmen or members of their  families at  the cost  of the  mine-lessees and/or owners of  stone crushers.  We would also direct the Central Government and  the State  of Haryana  to  ensure  that  the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, the Maternity Benefit (Mines  and Circus)  Rules 1963 and the Mines Creche Rules,  1966,  where  applicable  in  any  particular  stone quarries or  stone crushers,,  are given  effect to  by  the mine-lessees and  owners of stone crushers. These directions given by  us shall  also be  carried  out  at  the  earliest without any  undue delay  and Shri  Laxmi Dhar  Misra, while conducting  his   inquiry,  will   ascertain  whether  these directions have been complied with and the necessary medical and first aid facilities including hospitalization have been provided to the workmen and the members of their families.      We may point out that the above directions in regard to provision of  health and  welfare facilities have been given by us only with reference to the provisions of the Mines Act 1952  and   the  Mines   Rules  1955  which  are  admittedly applicable in the case of stone quarries and stone crushers. We have  not given  any directions  for enforcement  of  the provisions of  the Contract  Labour Act  and the Inter-State Migrant Workmen  Act because  it has  yet to  be  determined whether these  two statutes are applicable in any particular stone quarry or stone crusher. It is also necessary to point out that whenever any 144 workman suffers  any injury  or contracts any disease in the course of  employment, he  is entitled to compensation under the Workmens’ Compensation Act 1923, but unfortunately he is very often  not in  a position  to approach  the appropriate court or  authority for  enforcing his claim to compensation and even  if he  files such  a claim,  it takes  a long time

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before such  claim is disposed of by the court or authority. We would  therefore direct  that  as  soon  as  any  workman employed in  a stone quarry or stone crusher receives injury or contracts  disease in  the course  of his employment, the concerned  mine-lessee   or  stone   crusher   owner   shall immediately report  this fact  to  the  Chief  Inspector  or Inspecting Officers  of the  Central Government  and/or  the State  Government   and  such   Inspecting  Officers   shall immediately provide  legal assistance  to the workman with a view to enabling him to file a claim for compensation before the appropriate  court or  authority  and  they  shall  also ensure that  such claim is pursued vigorously and the amount of compensation awarded to the workman is secured to him. We would like  to impress  upon the  Court or  Authority before which a  claim for  compensation is filed by or on behalf of the workman  to dispose  of such  claim  without  any  undue delay, since  delay in  the awarding  of compensation to the workman would  only and  to his  misery and helplessness and would be nothing sort of gross denial of justice to him. The Inspecting Officers of the Central Government as also of the State Government  will visit  each  stone  quarry  or  stone crusher at  least once  in a fortnight and ascertain whether there is any workman who is injured or who is suffering from any disease  or illness,  and if  so, they  will immediately take the  necessary  steps  for  the  purpose  of  providing medical and  legal assistance and if they fail to do so, the Central Government and the State Government, as the case may be, shall  take unnecessary  action against  the  defaulting Inspecting Officer or Officers.      We  have   given  these   directions  to   the  Central Government and  the State  of  Haryana  and  we  expect  the Central Government  and the  State of  Haryana  to  strictly comply with  these directions. We need not state that if any of these  directions is  not properly  carried  out  by  the Central Government  or the State of Haryana, we shall take a very serious  view of  the matter, because we firmly believe that it  is no  use having social welfare laws on the statue book if they are not going to be implemented. We must not be content with  the law  in books  but we  must  have  law  in action. If  we want  our democracy  to  be  a  participatory democracy, it  is necessary  that law  must not  only  speak justice but must also deliver justice.      Before parting  with this  case, we  may point out, and this has 145 come to  our notice  not only  through  the  Report  of  Dr. Patwardhan but  also otherwise,  that  the  magistrates  and judicial officers  take a very lenient view of violations of labour laws  enacted for the benefits of the workmen and let off the  defaulting employers  with small  fines. There have also  been  occasions  where  the  magistrate  and  judicial officers  have   scotched  prosecutions   and  acquitted  or discharged the defaulting employers on hyper technicalities. This happens  largely because  the magistrates  and judicial officers are  not sufficiently  sensitised to the importance of observance of labour laws with the result that the labour laws are  allowed to  be ignored  and  breached  with  utter callousness and  indifference and  the workmen begin to feel that the  defaulting employers  can, by  paying a fine which hardly touches  their pocket, escape from the arm of law and the labour laws supposedly enacted for their benefit are not meant to  be observed  but are  merely decorative appendages intended to  assuage the conscience of the workmen. We would therefore strongly impress upon the magistrates and judicial officers to  take a  strict view of violation of labour laws

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and to impose adequate punishment on the erring employers so that they  may realise  that it  does not  pay to  commit  a breach of  such laws and to deny the benefit of such laws to the workmen.      We accordingly  allow this  writ petition and issue the above directions  to the Central Government and the State of Haryana  and   the  various  authorities  mentioned  in  the preceding paragraphs  of this  judgment so  that these  poor unfortunate workmen  who lead a miserable existence in small hovels, exposed  to the  vagaries of  weather, drinking foul water,  breathing   heavily  dust-laden   polluted  air  and breaking and  blasting stone  all their life, may one day be able to  realise that  freedom is not only the monopoly of a few but  belongs to  them all and that they are also equally entitled along  with others  to participate in the fruits of freedom and  development. These directions may be summarized as follows      (1)  The Government  of Haryana will, without any delay           and at  any rate  within  six  weeks  from  today,           constitute  Vigilance   Committee  in   each  sub-           division of  a district  in  compliance  with  the           requirements of  section 13  of the  Bonded Labour           System (Abolition)  Act 1976  keeping in  view the           guidelines given by us in this judgment.      (2)  The  Government   of  Haryana  will  instruct  the           district  magistrates  to  take  up  the  work  of           identification of bonded 146           labour as  one of  their top priority tasks and to           map out  areas of  concentration of  bonded labour           which are mostly to be found in stone quarries and           brick   kilns   and   assign   task   forces   for           identification and  release of  bonded labour  and           periodically hold labour camps in these areas with           a view  to educating the labourers inter alia with           the assistance of the National Labour Institute.      (3)  The  State   Government  as   also  the  Vigilance           Committees and  the district magistrates will take           the  assistance  of  non-political  social  action           groups and  voluntary agencies  for the purpose of           ensuring implementation  of the  provisions of the           Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976.      (4)  The Government  of Haryana  will draw  up within a           period of  three months  from today  a  scheme  or           programme for  rehabilitation of  the freed bonded           labourers in  the light  of the guidelines set out           by the  Secretary  to  the  Government  of  India,           Ministry  of   Labour  in  his  letter  dated  2nd           September  1982   and  implement  such  scheme  or           programme to the extent found necessary.      (5)  The  Central  Government  and  the  Government  of           Haryana will  take all  necessary  steps  for  the           purpose of ensuring that minimum wages are paid to           the workmen  employed in  the stone  quarries  and           stone crushers  in accordance  with the principles           laid down  in this  judgment  and  this  direction           shall be  carried out within the shortest possible           time so  that within  six weeks  from  today,  the           workmen start  actually receiving in their hands a           wage not less than the minimum wage.      (6)  If payment  of wages  is made  on truck basis, the           Central Government  will  direct  the  appropriate           officer of  the Central  Enforcement Machinery  or           any other  appropriate  authority  or  officer  to           determine the  measurement of each truck as to how

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         many cubic  ft. of  stone it can contain and print           or inscribe  such measurement on the truck so that           appropriate and  adequate wage  is received by the           workmen for the work done by them and they are not           cheated out of their legitimate wage.      (7)  The Central  Government will direct the inspecting           officers 147           of the  Central Enforcement Machinery or any other           appropriate  inspecting   officers  to  carry  out           surprise checks  at least  once in  a week for the           purpose of ensuring that the trucks are not loaded           beyond their  true measurement  capacity and if it           is found  that the  trucks are loaded in excess of           the  true  measurement  capacity,  the  inspecting           officers carrying out such checks will immediately           bring this  fact to  the notice of the appropriate           authorities  and   necessary   action   shall   be           initiated  against   the  defaulting  mine  owners           and/or thekedars or jamadars.      (8)  The  Central  Government  and  the  Government  of           Haryana will  ensure that payment of wages is made           directly to  the workmen  by the  mine lessees and           stone  crusher  owners  or  at  any  rate  in  the           presence of  a representative of the mine lesseses           or  stone   crusher  owners   and  the  inspecting           officers of  the Central Government as also of the           Government of  Haryana shall  carry  out  periodic           checks in  order to ensure that the payment of the           stipulated wage is made to the workmen.      (9)  The  Central   Board  of  Workers  Education  will           organise periodic  camps near  the sites  of stone           quarries and  stone crushers in Faridabad district           for the  purpose of  educating the  workmen in the           rights and  benefits conferred upon them by social           welfare and  labour laws  and  the  progress  made           shall be  reported to  this Court  by the  Central           Board of  Workers Education at least once in three           months.      (10) The  Central  Government  and  the  Government  of           Haryana  will   immediately  take  steps  for  the           purpose of  ensuring that the stone crusher owners           do not  continue to  foul the  air and  they adopt           either of  two devices, namely,, keeping a drum of           water  above   the  stone  crushing  machine  with           arrangement for  continuous spraying of water upon           it or  installation of  dust sucking machine and a           compliance report  in  regard  to  this  direction           shall be  made to  this Court  on or  before  28th           February, 1984.      (11) The  Central  Government  and  the  Government  of           Haryana will  immediately  ensure  that  the  mine           lessees and  stone crusher  owners start supplying           pure drinking  water to  the workmen on a scale of           at least 2 litres for every work 148           man by  keeping suitable vessels in a shaded place           at conveniently accessible points and such vessels           shall be  kept in clean and hygienic condition and           shall be  emptied, cleaned  and refilled every day           and the  appropriate authorities  of  the  Central           Government and  the  Government  of  Haryana  will           supervise  strictly   the  enforcement   of   this           direction and  initiate necessary  action if there           is any default.

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    (12) The  Central  Government  and  the  Government  of           Haryana will  ensure that  minimum wage is paid to           the women  and/or  children  who  look  after  the           vessels in  which pure  drinking water is kept for           the workmen.      (13) The  Central  Government  and  the  Government  of           Haryana will  immediately direct  the mine lessees           and  stone   crusher  owners  to  start  obtaining           drinking  water  from  any  unpolluted  source  or           sources of  supply and  to transport it by tankers           to the  work site  with sufficient frequency so as           to be  able to  keep the  vessels  filled  up  for           supply of  clean drinking water to the workmen and           the Chief  Administrator, Faridabad  Complex  will           set up  the points from where the mine lessees and           stone crusher  owners can,  if  necessary,  obtain           supply of  potable  water  for  being  carried  by           tankers.      (14) The Central  Government and  the State  Government           will ensure  that conservancy  facilities  in  the           shape of  latrines and  urinals in accordance with           the provisions  contained in  section  20  of  the           Mines Act,  1950 and  Rules 33  to 36 of the Mines           Rules 1955  are provided  at the  latest  by  15th           February 1984.      (15) The Central  Government and  the State  Government           will  take   steps  to   immediately  ensure  that           appropriate and  adequate medical  and  first  aid           facilities as  required by section 21 of the Mines           Act 1952  and Rules  40 to  45A of the Mines Rules           1955 are  provided to  the workmen  not later than           31st January 1984.      (16) The  Central  Government  and  the  Government  of           Haryana will  ensure that  every  workmen  who  is           required to  carry out blasting with explosives is           not only trained under the 149           Mines Vocational  Training  Rules  1966  but  also           holds first  aid qualification and carries a first           aid outfit while on duty as required by Rule 45 of           the Mines Rules 1955.      (17) The Central  Government and  the State  Government           will immediately  take steps to ensure that proper           and adequate  medical treatment is provided by the           mine lessees  and owners  of stone crushers to the           workmen employed by them as also to the members of           their families  free  of  cost  and  such  medical           assistance shall be made available to them without           any cost  of transportation  or otherwise  and the           doctor’s  fees  as  also  the  cost  of  medicines           prescribed    by     the     doctors     including           hospitalisation charges,  if any,  shall  also  be           reimbursed to them.      (18) The Central  Government and  the State  Government           will ensure  that the  provisions of the Maternity           Benefit Act 1961, the Maternity Benefit (Mines and           Circus) Rules 1963 and the Mines Creche Rules 1966           where applicable in any particular stone quarry or           stone crusher  are given  effect to  by  the  mine           lessees and stone crusher owners.      (19) As soon  as any workman employed in a stone quarry           or stone  crusher  receives  injury  or  contracts           disease in  the  course  of  his  employment,  the           concerned mine lessee or stone crusher owner shall           immediately  report   this  fact   to  the   Chief

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         Inspector or  Inspecting Officers  of the  Central           Government and/or  the State  Government and  such           Inspecting  Officers   shall  immediately  provide           legal assistance.  to the  workman with  a view to           enabling him  to file  a  claim  for  compensation           before the appropriate court or authority and they           shall also  ensure  that  such  claim  is  pursued           vigorously and  the amount of compensation awarded           to the workman is secured to him.      (20) The Inspecting  Officers of the Central Government           as also  of the  State Government  will visit each           stone quarry  or stone  crusher at least once in a           fortnight  and  ascertain  whether  there  is  any           workman who  is injured  or who  is suffering from           any disease  or illness,  and  if  so,  they  will           immediately  take  the  necessary  steps  for  the           purpose of providing medical and legal assistance. 150      (21) If the  Central Government  and the  Government of           Haryana fail  to ensure  performance of any of the           obligations set  out in  clauses 11, 13, 14 and 15           by the  mine  lessees  and  stone  crusher  owners           within the  period specified  in those  respective           clauses, such  obligation or  obligations  to  the           extent to  which they  are not  performed shall be           carried out  by the  Central  Government  and  the           Government of Haryana.      We also  appoint Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra, Joint Secretary in  the  Ministry  of  Labour,  Government  of  India  as  a Commissioner for  the purpose  of carrying out the following assignment.      (a)  He  will   visit  the  stone  quarries  and  stone           crushers in  Faridabad district  and ascertain  by           enquiring from  the labourers in each stone quarry           or stone  crusher in  the manner  set  out  by  us           whether any  of them  are being  forced to provide           labour  and  are  bonded  labourers  and  he  will           prepare in  respect of  each stone quarry or stone           crusher  a   statement  showing   the  names   and           particulars of those who, according to the inquiry           made by him, are bonded labourers and he will also           ascertain from  them whether they want to continue           to work  in the  stone quarry  or stone crusher or           they want  to go  away and  if he  finds that they           want to  go away,  he will  furnish particulars in           regard  to   them  to   the  District  Magistrate,           Faridabad and  the District  Magistrate  will,  on           receipt of  the particulars  from Shri  Laxmi Dhar           Misra, make  necessary arrangements  for releasing           them and  provide for  their transporation back to           their  homes   and  for  this  purpose  the  State           Government will make the requisite funds available           to the District Magistrate.      (b)  He will  also enquire  from the  mine lessees  and           owners  of   stone  crushers   as  also  from  the           thekedars  and  jamadars  whether  there  are  any           advances made  by them to the labourers working in           the stone  quarries or  stone crushers  and if so,           whether  there  is  any  documentary  evidence  in           support of  the same  and he  will also  ascertain           what, according  to the mine lessees and owners of           stone crushers or the Jamadar or Thekedar, are the           amounts  of   loans  still  remaining  outstanding           against such labourers.      (c)  He will  also ascertain  by  carrying  out  sample

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         check  whether   the  workmen   employed  in   any           particular stone quarry 151           or stone  crusher are  actually in receipt of wage           not less  than the  minimum wage  and whether  the           directions  given  in  this  order  in  regard  to           computation and  payment of minimum wage are being           implemented by the authorities.      (d)   He will  conduct an  inquiry in each of the stone           quarries and  stone crushers in Faridabad District           for the  purpose of ascertaining whether there are           any  contract  labourers  or  inter-State  migrant           workmen in  any of  these stone. quarries or stone           crushers and  if he  finds  as  a  result  of  his           inquiry that  the Contract  Labour Act  and/or the           Inter State  Migrant Workmen Act is applicable, he           will make a report to that effect to the Court.      (e)   He will ascertain whether the directions given by           us   in    this   judgment   regarding   effective           arrangement for supply of pure drinking water have           been carried  out by  the mine  lessees and  stone           crusher owners  and pure  drinking water  has been           made available  to the  workmen in accordance with           those directions.      (f)   He will  also ascertain  whether the mine lessees           and owners  of stone crushers in each of the stone           quarries and  stone crushers  visited by  him have           complied with  the directions  given by us in this           judgment  regarding   provision   of   conservancy           facilities.      (g)   He will  also ascertain  whether  the  directions           given  by   us  in  this  judgment  in  regard  to           provision of  first aid  facilities and proper and           adequate     medical      treatment      including           hospitalisation to  the workmen and the members of           their families  are being  carried out by the mine           lessees and stone crusher owners and the necessary           first  aid  facilities  and  proper  and  adequate           medical  services  including  hospitalisation  are           provided to  the workmen  and the members of their           families.      (h)   He will  also enquire  whether the  various other           directions given  by us in this judgment have been           and are  being carried out by the mine lessees and           stone crusher owners.      Shri Laxmi  Dhar Misra  will carry  out this assignment entrusted to  him and  make his  report to  the Court  on or before 28th February 152 1984. It  will be  open to Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra to take the assistance of  such other person or persons as he thinks fit including officers or employees in the Ministry of Labour or in the  Ministry of  Mines, who may be made available by the higher authorities.  If  Shri  Laxmi  Dhar  Misra  finds  it necessary, he  may request  the Court to extend the time for submitting his report by addressing a letter to the Registry of the Court. The State of Haryana will deposit a sum of Rs. 5000 within  two weeks from today for the purpose of meeting the costs  and out  of pocket  expenses of  Shri Laxmi  Dhar Misra.      We have  no doubt  that if these directions given by us are honestly  and sincerely carried out, it will be possible to improve  the life  conditions of these workmen and ensure social justice  to them  so that they may be able to breathe the fresh  air of  social and  economic freedom. The Central

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Government  and  the  State  of  Haryana  will  pay  to  the petitioner’s advocate  a sum of Rs. 5000 by way of costs. We are grateful  to Mr.  Govind Mukhoty  for rendering valuable assistance to us in this case.      PATHAK, J.  I have  read the  judgments prepared  by my brothers Bhagwati  and A.N.  Sen, and while I agree with the directions proposed  by  my  brother  Bhagwati  I  think  it proper, because  of the  importance of  the questions  which arise in such matters, to set forth my own views.      Public  interest   litigation  in   its  present   form constitutes a  new chapter  in our  judicial system.  It has acquired  a   significant  degree   of  importance   in  the jurisprudence practised  by our  courts  and  has  evoked  a lively,  if   somewhat  controversial,   response  in  legal circles, in  the media  and among the general public. In the United States,  it is  the name "given to efforts to provide legal representation  to groups and interests that have been unrepresented or  under-represented in  the  legal  process. These include  not only  the poor  and the disadvantaged but ordinary citizens who, because they cannot afford lawyers to represent them, have lacked access to courts, administrative agencies and  other  legal  forums  in  which  basic  policy decisions affecting their interests are made".(1) In our own country, this  new class  of litigation  is justified by its protagonists on  the basis  generally of  vast areas  in our population of illiteracy and poverty, of social and economic backwardness, and of an insufficient awareness and apprecia- 153 tion of  individual and  collective rights.  These handicaps have denied  millions of  our countrymen  access to justice. Public interest  litigation is said to possess the potential of providing   such  access in the milieu of a new ethos, in which participating sectors in the administration of justice co-operate in  the creation of a system which promises legal relief without  cumbersome formality  and heavy expenditure. In the  result,  the  legal  organisation  has  taken  on  a radically new dimension and correspondingly new perspectives are opening  up before  judges and  lawyers  and  State  Law agencies in  the tasks  before them.  A  crusading  zeal  is abroad, viewing  the present as an opportunity to awaken the political and  legal  order  to  the  objectives  of  social justice projected  in our constitutional system. New slogans fill the  air,  and  new  phrases  have  entered  the  legal dictionary, and  we hear  of the  "justicing  system"  being galvanised  into  supplying  justice  to  the  socioeconomic disadvantaged. These  urges are responsible for the birth of new judicial concepts and the expanding horizon of juridical power. They  claim to  represent an  increasing emphasis  on social welfare and a progressive humanitarianism.      On the  other side,  the attempts  of the judge and the lawyer are  watched with  skeptical concern by those who see interference by  the courts in public interest litigation as a series  of quixotic  forays in  a world  of unyielding and harsh reality,  whose success  in  the  face  of  opposition bolstered by the inertia and apathy of centuries is bound to be limited  in  impact  and  brief  in  duration.  They  see judicial endeavour  frustrated by  the immobility  of public concern and  a traditional resistance to change, and believe that the temporary success gained is doomed to waste away as a mere  ripple  in  the  vastness  of  a  giant  slow-moving society. Even the optimistic sense danger to the credibility and legitimacy  of the  existing judicial  system, a feeling contributed no  doubt by  the apprehension  that the  region into  which  the  judiciary  has  ventured  appears  barren, uncharted and  unpredictable, with  few  guiding  posts  and

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direction  finding   principles,  and   they  fear   that  a traditionally  proven  legal  structure  may  yield  to  the anarchy of  purely emotional impulse. To the mind trained in the certainty  of the law, of defined principles, of binding precedent, and  the common law doctrine of Stare decisis the future is  fraught with  confusion and disorder in the legal world and  severe strains  in the  constitutional system. At the lowest,  there is  an uneasy  doubt about  where we  are going.      Amidst this  welter of agitated controversy, I think it appropriate to  set down  a few considerations which seem to me relevant if public 154 interest litigation  is to  command  broad  acceptance.  The history of  human experience shows that when a revolution in ideas and in action enters the life of a nation, the nascent power so  released possesses  the potential  of throwing the prevailing  social   order  into  disarray.  In  a  changing society, wisdom  dictates that  reform should  emerge in the existing polity  as an  ordered change  produced through its institutions. Moreover,  the pace  of  change  needs  to  be handled  with  care  lest  the  institutions  themselves  be endangered.      In his  Law in  the Modern State, Leon Duguit observed: "Any system  of public law can be vital only so far as it is bused on a given sanction to the following rules: First, the holders of power cannot do certain things; second, there are certain things they must do." (1) Traditional legal remedies have been  preoccupied largely  with the  first rule.  It is recently that  the second  has begun substantially to engage the functional  attention of the judicial administration. In the United  States, the  Warren Court  achieved a remarkable degree of success in decreeing affirmative action programmes for  the   benefit  of  minorities  and  other  socially  or economically disadvantaged  interests through the avenues of public law.  In India,  we are  now  beginning  to  apply  a similar concept of constitutional duty.      Until the arrival of public interest litigation,’ civil litigation was  patterned  exclusively  on  the  traditional model. The traditional conception of adjudication believes a suit to  be a  means for  settling disputes  between private parties concerning  their private rights. In the usual form, the suit  is an  organised proceeding between two individual contestants. It  deals with  a definite  framework of  facts requiring  identification  through  principles  codified  by statute and  on the  basis  of  which  the  right-obligation relations between the parties are determined, culminating in the grant  or denial  of  relief  by  the  Court,  It  is  a proceeding  confined  to  the  parties,  on  whose  volition depends the  fact material  brought on  the record, with the judge sitting  over the  contest as  a mere  passive neutral umpire. Judicial initiative has no significant role.      The rigid  character of civil litigation conceived as a contests between  two individual  parties representing their personal  interests  has  been  allowed  to  expand  into  a representative proceeding  where  a  person  can,  with  the permission of  the Court,  represent others  also having the same interest although not named in the 155 suit. And  the disability,  temporary  or  permanent,  of  a person whose  legal right  is violated,  enables another  to represent his  interest in  a judicial  proceeding. They are cases where  next friends  are permitted by the Court to act for minors  and persons. of unsound mind, where a person may petition  for   the  release   of  an   illegally   detained

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individual, and where a minority shareholder, complaining of an ultra  vires transaction  by the management of a company, can sue  in the name of the company. Interveners are allowed to participate  in a  proceeding involving  the decision  of legal questions affecting their interests. A rate payer of a local authority  has been  held entitled  to  challenge  its illegal action.  A person  conferred by statute the right to participate in  the decision-making  process of  a statutory authority is  entitled to seek relief against such decision. In S.P. Gupta v. Union of India,(1) this Court has laid down that its jurisdiction can be invoked by a third party in the case of  violation of  the constitutional  rights of another person or  determinate class  of persons  who, by  reason of poverty, helplessness,  disability  or  social  or  economic disadvantage is  unable to  move the  Court  personally  for relief. The  Court observed  further that  where the  public injury was  suffered by  an indeterminate  class of  persons from the  breach of a public duty or from the violation of a constitutional provision  of the  law,  any  member  of  the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress  for such  public injury. The principle was qualified by the reservation that such petitioner should act bona fide  and not  for personal gain or private profit, nor be moved  by political  or  other  oblique  motivation.  The doctrine of  standing has thus been enlarged in this country to provide,  where reasonably possible, access to justice to large sections  of people  for whom  so far  it had  been  a matter of despair.      It is  time indeed  for the  law to  do  so.  In  large measure,  the   traditional   conception   of   adjudication represented the  socioeconomic vision prevailing at the turn of the  century. The expansion of governmental activity into the life of individuals through programmes of social welfare and  development   had  not   yet  been   foreshadowed.   An environment permeated  by  the  doctrine  of  laissez  faire shaped the  development of  legal jurisprudence.  But  soon, progressive  social   and  economic  forces  began  to  grow stronger and influence the minds of people, and governments, in response  to the  pressures of egalitarian and socialist- oriented   urges,   began   to   enter   increasingly   upon socioeconomic programmes in which legislation and the courts 156 constituted  the   principal  instruments   of  change.  The movements accelerated  with the  close of  the Second  World War, and  a character  of human  rights was written into the political constitutions  adopted by  most  nations  emerging from colonial rule even as, on another plane, it altered our basic conception  of international  law. In  India,  as  the consciousness of  social justice  spread though  our  multi- layered  social  order,  the  courts  began  to  come  under increasing pressure from social action groups petitioning on behalf of  the  underprivileged  and  deprived  sections  of society for  the fulfillment of their aspirations. It is not necessary to  detail the  number of cases of public interest litigation which  have entered  this Court. It is sufficient to point  out that,  despite the  varying fortune  of  those cases,  public   interest  litigation  constitutes  today  a significant segment of the Court’s docket.      In the  debate  before  us,  questions  of  substantial importance have  been raised  by learned  counsel, questions which go  to the  procedure adopted  by the  Court  and  the manner of the exercise of its constitutional powers.      This petition  invokes the  jurisdiction of  the  Court under Article  32 of  the Constitution,  which  confers  the guaranteed  right   to  move   this  Court   by  appropriate

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proceedings for  the enforcement  of fundamental rights. The right exercised  is a  right to  a constitutional remedy and the jurisdiction  invoked is  a constitutional jurisdiction. Bearing this  in mind,  we must  also take into account that the provisions  of Article  32 do  not specifically indicate who can  move the  Court. In  the  absence  of  a  confining provision in that respect. It is plain that a petitioner may be anyone  in whom the law recognises a standing to maintain an action of such nature.      As  regards   the  form   of  the  proceeding  and  its character, Article  32 speaks  generally of  a  "appropriate proceedings".  It   should  be   a  proceeding   which   can appropriately lead  to an adjudication of the claim made for the enforcement of a fundamental right and can result in the grant of  effective relief. Article 32 speaks of the Court’s power "to  issue directions  or orders  or writs",  and  the specific reference to "writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,  quo warranto  and certiorari"  is by way of  illustration only. They do not exhaus the content of the Court’s power under Article 32.      Entering not  into a  more controversial  area,  it  is appropriate to  consider the  nature of  the procedure which the court may adopt under Article 32 of the Constitution. So far as the traditional private 157 law is concerned, the procedure follows the accepted pattern and traditional  forms associated  with  it.  There  can  be little dispute  there. Does  public interest litigation call for somewhat  different considerations ? Before dealing with this aspect,  however, it  is  necessary  to  touch  on  two fundamental matters.      First, as  to the petition, A practice has grown in the public of  invoking the  jurisdiction of  this  Court  by  a simple letter complaining of a legal injury to the author or to some  other person or group of persons, and the Court has treated such  letter as  a petition  under  Article  32  and entertained the proceeding without anything more. It is only comparatively recently  that the Court has begun to call for the filing  of a regular petition on the letter. I see grave danger inherent  in  a  practice  where  a  mere  letter  is entertained as  a petition  from a  person whose antecedents and status  are unknown  or so  uncertain that  no sense  of responsibility can,  without anything more, be attributed to the communication.  There is  good reason for the insistence on a  document being  set out  in a  form, or accompanied by evidence; indicating  that the  allegations made  in it  are made with  a sense  of responsibility  by a  person who  has taken due  care and  caution  to  verify  those  allegations before making  them. A plaint instituting a suit is required by the  Code of  Civil Procedure  to conclude  with a clause verifying the  pleadings contained  in  it.  A  petition  or application filed  in court  is required  to be supported on affidavit.  These   safeguards  are  necessary  because  the document, a  plaint or  petition or application, commences a course of  litigation involving  the expenditure  of  public time  and   public  money,   besides  in  appropriate  cases involving the issue of summons or notice to the defendant or respondent to  appear and  contest the  proceeding. Men  are busy conducting the affairs of their daily lives, and no one occupied with  the responsibilities and pressures of present day existence  welcomes being  summoned to  a law  court and involved in  a litigation.  A  document  making  allegations without any proof whatever of responsibility can conceivably constitute an  abuse of  the process  of law.  There is good reason, I  think, for  maintaining the  rule that, except in

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special circumstances,  the document  petitioning the  court for relief should be supported by satisfactory verification. This requirement  is all  the greater  where  petitions  are received by  the Court  through the post. It is never beyond the bound  of possibility  that an  unverified communication received through the post by the court may in fact have been employed  mala   fide,  as  an  instrument  of  coercion  or blackmail or  other oblique  motive against  a person  named therein who  holds a  position  of  honour  and  respect  in society. 158      The Court  must be  ever vigilant  against the abuse of its process  It cannot  do that  better in  this matter than insisting at  the earliest  stage, and before issuing notice to the  respondent, that  an appropriate verification of the allegations be  supplied. The  requirement is  imperative in private law  litigation. Having  regard to  its  nature  and purpose,  it   is  equally   attract  to   public   interest litigation. While  this Court has readily acted upon letters and telegrams in the past, there is need to insist now on an appropriate  verification   of   the   petition   or   other communication before  acting  on  it.  As  I  have  observed earlier, there  may be  exceptional circumstances  which may justify a  waiver of  the rule. For example, when the habeas corpus jurisdiction  of the  Court is  invoked. For  in  all cases of  illegal detention there is no doubt that the Court must act with speed and readiness. Or when the authorship of the communication  is so  impeccable and unquestionable that the authority  of its  contents may  reasonably be  accepted prima facie  until rebutted.  It will always be a matter for the Court  to decide,  on  what  petition  will  it  require verification and when will it waive the rule.      Besides this,  there is  another matter which, although on  the   surface  appears   to  be   of  merely   technical significance, merits  more than  passing attention.  I think the time  has come  to state clearly that all communications and petitions invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be addressed to  the entire  Court, that  is to  say, the Chief Justice and  his companion  Judges. No such communication of petition can  properly be  addressed to  a particular Judge. When the  jurisdiction of  the Court  is invoked,  it is the jurisdiction of the entire court. Which Judge or Judges will hear  the  case  is  exclusively  a  matter  concerning  the internal  regulation   of  the   business  of   the   Court, interference with  which by  a litigant  or  member  of  the public constitutes  the grossest  impropriety.  It  is  well established that  when a  division of  the Court  hears  and decides cases  it is  in law  regarded as  a hearing  and  a decision by  the Court  itself. The  judgment pronounced and the decree  or  order  made  are  acts  of  the  Court,  and accordingly  they   are  respected,   obeyed  and   enforced throughout the  land. It  is only right and proper that this should be  known clearly  to the  lay public. Communications and petitions  addressed to  a particular Judge are improper and violate the institutional personality of the Court. They also  embarrass  the  judge  to  whom  they  are  personally addressed. The  fundamental conception  of the Court must be respected, that  it is  a single indivisible institution, of united  purpose   and   existing   solely   for   the   high constitutional functions  for which it has been created. The conception of the Court as a loose 159 aggregate of  individual Judges,  to one  or  more  of  whom judicial access may be particularly had, undermines its very existence   and   endangers   its   proper   and   effective

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functioning.      I shall  now turn to the character and incidents of the procedure open  to the  Court in  public interest litigation and the  nature of  the power  exercised by  it  during  the proceeding. In  public interest litigation, the role held by the Court  is more  assertive than  in traditional  actions. During the  regime of the Warran Court in the United States, it proceeded  to the point where affirmative programmes were envisaged, and the relationship between right and remedy was freed  from   the  rigid   intimacy  which   constitutes   a fundamental  feature   of  private   law  litigation.  While remedial procedure was fashioned according to the demands of the case  and varied  from stage to stage, in the shaping of relief the  court treated with the future and devised a code of regulatory  action. Viewed  in that  context, the role of the Court  is creative  rather than passive and it assumes a more positive attitude in determining facts.      Not infrequently public interest litigation affects the rights of  persons not  before the court, and in shaping the relief the  court must  invariably  take  into  account  its impact on  those interests.  Moreover, when its jurisdiction is invoked  on behalf  of a group, it is as well to remember that differences  may exist  in content and emphasis between the claims of different sections of the group. For all these reasons the  court must  exercise the  greatest caution  and adopt procedures ensuring sufficient notice to all interests likely  to   be  affected.   Moreover,  the  nature  of  the litigation sometimes  involves the continued intervention of the court  over a  period of time, and the organising of the litigation to  a satisfactory  conclusion calls for judicial statesmanship, a  close understanding  of constitutional and legal values  in the  context of contemporary social forces, and a  judicious mix of restraint and activism determined by the dictates of existing realities. Importantly, at the same time, the  Court must  never forget  that  its  jurisdiction extends  no  farther  than  the  legitimate  limits  of  its constitutional powers,  and avoid trespassing into political territory which under the Constitution has been appropriated to other organs of the State. This last aspect of the matter calls  for   more  detailed  consideration,  which  will  be attempted later.      The procedures  adopted by the Court in cases of public interest litigation  must of  course be  procedures designed and shaped by the Court with a view to resolving the problem presented before it and 160 determining the  nature and  extent of  relief accessible in the circumstances.  On the  considerations to  which I  have adverted earlier,  the Court  enjoys a degree of flexibility unknown to  the trial of traditional private law litigation. But I  think it  necessary to  emphasis  that  whatever  the procedure adopted by the court it must be procedure known to judicial tenets and characteristic of a judicial proceeding. There  are   methods  and   avenues  of  procuring  material available to  executive and  legislative agencies, and often employed by  them for  the efficient and effective discharge of the  tasks before them. Not all those methods and avenues are available  to the  Court. The  Court  must  ever  remind itself that  one of the indicia identifying it as a Court is the nature  and character  of the procedure adopted by it in determining a  controversy. It  is in  that sense limited in the evolution  of procedures pursued by it in the process of an adjudication  and in  the  grant  and  execution  of  the relief.  Legal   jurisprudence   has   in   its   historical development identified  certain fundamental principles which

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form the  essential constituents of judicial procedure. They are employed  in every  judicial proceeding,  and constitute the basic  infrastructure along  whose  channels  flows  the power of the Court in the process of adjudication      What should  be the  conceivable framework of procedure in public interest litigation ? This question does not admit of a clear cut answer. As I have observed earlier, it is not possible  to   envisage  a   defined  pattern  of  procedure applicable to  all cases. Of necessity the pattern which the Court adopts  will vary with the circumstances of each case. But it  seems to me that one principle is clear. If there is a statute  prescribing a  judicial procedure  governing  the particular case  the Court must follow such procedure. It is not open  to the  Court to  bypass the  statute and evolve a different procedure at variance with it. Where, however, the procedure   prescribed   by   statute   is   incomplete   or insufficient, it  will be open to the Court to supplement it by evolving  its own  rules, Nonetheless,  the supplementary procedure must  conform at  all stages  to the principles of natural  justice.   There  can  be  no  deviation  from  the principles  of  natural  justice  and  other  well  accepted procedural norms  characteristic of  a judicial  proceeding. They constitute  an entire  code of  general  principles  of procedure, tried  and proven and hallowed by the sanctity of common and  consistent acceptance  during long  years of the historical development of the law. The general principles of law,  to   which  reference   is  made   here,  command  the confidence, not  merely of  the Judge and the lawyer and the parties to the litigation, but supply that basic credibility to the judicial proceeding which strengthens public faith 161 in the  Rule of  Law. They  are rules  rooted in  reason and fairplay, and their governance guarantees a just disposition of the  case.  The  court  should  be  wary  of  suggestions favouring  novel   procedures  in   cases   where   accepted procedural rules will suffice.      Turning now  to the  nature and  extent of  the  relief which can  be contemplated in public interest litigation, we enter into  an area  at  once  delicate  and  sensitive  and fraught with  grave implications.  Article  32  confers  the widest amplitude  of power  on this  Court in  the matter of granting relief. It has power to issue "directions or orders or writs",  and there  is no specific indication, no express language, limiting  or circumscribing  that power.  Yet, the power is  limited by  its very  nature, that  it is judicial power. It  is power  which pertains to the judicial organ of the State,  identified by  the very  nature of  the judicial institution. There  are certain  fundamental  constitutional concepts which,  although elementary, need to be recalled at times. The  Constitution envisages  a broad  division of the power of  the State  between the  legislature, the executive and the   judiciary.  Although the division is not precisely demarcated, there  is general  acknowledgment of its limits. The limits  can be  gathered from  the written  text of  the Constitution, from  conventions and constitutional practice, and  from   an  entire  array  of  judicial  decisions.  The constitutional  lawyer   concedes  a   certain  measure   of overlapping in  functional action  among the three organs of the  State.   But  there   is  no  warrant  for  assuming  a geometrical congruence.  It is  common place  that while the legislature enacts  the law, the executive implements it and the court interprets it and, in doing so, adjudicates on the validity of  executive action  and, under  our Constitution, even judges  the validity of the legislation itself. And yet it  is   well  recognised  that  in  a  certain  sphere  the

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legislature is  possessed of  judicial power,  the executive possesses  a   measure  of   both  legislative  an  judicial functions, and  the court,  in its  duty of interpreting the law, accomplishes  in its perfected action a marginal degree of legislative  exercise. Nonetheless,  a fine  and delicate balance is  envisaged under  our Constitution  between these primary institutions  of the State. In similar Constitutions elsewhere the  courts have  been  anxious  to  maintain  and preserve that  balance. An example is provided by Marbury v. Madisan(1) I  do not  mean to  say  that  the  Court  should hesitate or  falter or  withdraw from  the exercise  of  its jurisdiction. On  the contrary,  it must plainly do its duty under the  Constitution. But I do say that in every case the Court should determine 162 the true  limits of its jurisdiction and, having done so, it should take  care to  remain within  the restraints  of  its jurisdiction.      This  aspect   of   Court   action   assumes   especial significance in  public interest  litigation. It  bears upon the  legitimacy   of  the  judicial  institution,  and  that legitimacy is  affected as much by the solution presented by the Court  in resolving  a controversy  as by  the manner in which the  solution is  reached.  In  an  area  of  judicial functioning where  judicial activism  finds room  for  play, where constitutional  adjudication can  become an instrument of social policy forged by the personal political philosophy of the  judge, this is an important consideration to keep in mind.      Where the  Court embarks upon affirmative action in the attempt to  remedy a  constitutional  imbalance  within  the social order, few critics will find fault with it so long as it confines itself to the scope of its legitimate authority. But there  is always  the possibility,  in  public  interest litigation, of succumbing to the temptation of crossing into territory which  properly pertains  to the Legislature or to the Executive Government. For in most cases the jurisdiction of the  Court is  invoked when a default occurs in executive administration, and sometimes where a void in community life remains unfilled by legislative action. The resulting public grievance finds  expression through  social  action  groups, which consider  the Court  an appropriate forum for removing the deficiencies.  Indeed, the citizen seems to find it more convenient to  apply to  the Court  for the  vindication  of constitutional  rights  than  appeal  to  the  executive  or legislative organs of the State.      In  the   process  of  correcting  executive  error  or removing legislative  omission the  Court can so easily find itself involved  in policy  making of  a quality  and  to  a degree characteristic  of political authority and indeed run the risk of being mistaken for one. An excessively political role identifiable  with  political  governance  betrays  the Court into functions alien to its fundamental character, and tends to  destroy the  delicate  balance  envisaged  in  our constitutional system  between its three basic institutions. The Judge,  conceived in  the true  classical mould,  is  an impartial arbiter,  beyond  and  above  political  bias  and prejudice, functioning  silently in    accordance  with  the Constitution and  his  judicial  conscience.  Thus  does  he maintain the  legitimacy of  the institution  he serves  and honour the trust which his office has reposed in him. 163      The  affirmative  schemes  framed  in  public  interest litigation  by.   the  Court   sometimes  require   detailed administration  under  constant  judicial  supervision  over

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protracted periods.  The lives  of large sections of people, some of  whom have  had no voice in the decision, are shaped and ordered  by mandatory  Court action  extending into  the future. In  that context,  it is  as well  to remember  that public  approval   and  public   consent   assume   material importance in  its successful  implementation.  In  contrast with policy  making by  legislation, where  a large  body of legislators debate  on a  proposed legislative enactment, no such visual  impact can  be perceived  when judicial decrees are forged and fashioned by a few judicial personages in the confines of a Court. The mystique of the robe, at  the stage of  decision-making,   is  associated   traditionally   with cloistered secrecy  and confidentiality  and the  end-result commonly issues  as a  final definitive act of the Court. It is a serious question whether in every case the same awesome respect and reverence will endure during different stages of affirmative action  seeking to  regulate the  lives of large numbers of  people, some  of whom  never participated in the judicial process.      There is  good reason  to suppose  that  treating  with public  interest   litigation  requires   more  than   legal scholarship and  a knowledge  of textbook  law. It is of the utmost importance  in such  cases that  when  formulating  a scheme of  action, the  Court must  have due  regard to  the particular  circumstances   of  the   case,  to  surrounding realities   including    the   potential    for   successful implementation, and  the likelihood  and degree  of response from the agencies on whom the implementation will depend. In most cases  of public  interest litigation,  there  will  be neither precedent  nor settled  practice to  add weight  and force to  the vitality of the Court’s action. The example of similar cases  in other countries can afford little support. The successful  implementation of  the orders  of the  Court will  depend  upon  the  particular  social  forces  in  the backdrop  of   local  history,   the   prevailing   economic pressures, the  duration  of  the  stages  involved  in  the implementation, the momentum of success from stage to stage, and acceptance  of the  Court’s action at all times by those involved in or affected by it.      An activist  Court, spearheading  the movement  for the development and  extension of  the citizen’s  constitutional rights, for the protection of individual liberty and for the strengthening of the socioeconomic fabric in compliance with declared constitutional objectives, will need to move with a degree of judicial circumspection. In the 164 centre of  a social  order changing  with dynamic  pace, the Court needs  to balance  the authority  of the past with the urges of  the future,  As far  back as  1939, Judge  Learned Hand(1) observed  that a  Judge "must preserve his authority by cloaking  himself in  the majesty  of  an  over-shadowing past;  but  he  must  discover  some  composition  with  the dominant needs  of his  times". In  that task the Court must ever be.  conscious of  the constitutional  truism  that  it possesses the  sanction of  neither the  sword nor the purse and that  its strength  lies basically  in public confidence and support,  and that  consequently the  legitimacy of  its acts and  decisions must remain beyond all doubt. Therefore, whatever the  case before  it, whatever the context of facts and legal rights, whatever the social and economic pressures of the times, whatever the personal philosophy of the Judge, let it  not be  forgotten that the essential identity of the institution, that  it is  a Court,  must remain preserved so that  every   action  of   the  Court  is  informed  by  the fundamental norms  of law, and by the principles embodied in

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the  Constitution   and  other   sources  of   law.  If  its contribution to  the jurisprudential  ethos of society is to advance our  constitutional objectives,  it must function in accord with  only those  principles  which  enter  into  the composition of  judicial action and give to it its essential quality. In  his perceptive  Lectures entitled  "The  Warren Court:  Constitutional   Decision  as   an   Instrument   of Reform"(2). Professor Archicald Cox pointedly observes:           "Ability to  rationalise a constitutional judgment      in terms of principles referable to accepted sources of      law is  an essential,  major element  of constitutional      adjudication. It  is one of the ultimate sources of the      power  of  the  Court-  including  the  power  to  gain      acceptance for the occasional great leaps forward which      lack such justification. Constitutional government must      operate by  consent of the governed. Court decrees draw      no authority  from the  participation of  the.  people.      Their power  to command  consent depends upon more than      habit or even the deserved prestige of the justices. It      comes, to  an important  degree,  from  the  continuing      force of the rule of law-from the belief that the major      influence  in   judicial  decisions  is  not  fiat  but      principles  which  bind  the  judges  as  well  as  the      litigants and  which apply  consistently among  all men      today, and also yesterday and tomorrow". 165      There is  great merit in the Court proceeding to decide an issue on the basis of strict legal principle and avoiding carefully the influence of purely emotional appeal. For that alone gives  the decision  of the Court a direction which is certain, and  unfaltering, and that particular permanence in legal jurisprudence  which makes it a base for the next step forward in  the further  progress of  the law.  Indeed, both certainty  of  substance  and  certainty  of  direction  are indispensable requirements  in the  development of  the law, and invest  it with  the credibility  which commands  public confidence in its legitimacy.      This warning  is  of  especial  significance  in  these times, during  a phase of judicial history when a few social action groups  tend to  show evidence  of presuming  that in every case  the court  must bend  and mould  its decision to popular notions of which way a case should be decided.      I have  endeavoured by  these observations  to indicate some of  the areas  in which  the  Court  should  move  with caution and  circumspection when addressing itself to public interest litigation. As new areas open before the Court with modern  developments  in  jurisprudence,  in  a  world  more sensitive  to   human  rights  as  well  as  the  impact  of technological progress,  the Court  will become increasingly conscious of its expanding jurisdiction. That is inevitable. But its  responsibilities  are  correspondingly  great,  and perhaps never  greater than  now. And  we must remember that there is  no higher Court to correct our errors, and that we wear the  mantle of infallibility only because our decisions are  final.  That  we  sit  at  the  apex  of  the  judicial administration and  our word,  by constitutional mandate, is the law of the land can induce an unusual sense of power. It is a  feeling we  must guard against by constantly reminding ourselves that  every decision  must be guided by reason and by judicial principles.      My brothers  have dealt with the preliminary objections raised by  the respondents  to the  maintainability of  this proceeding. On  the considerations  to which I have adverted earlier I  have no hesitation in agreeing with them that the preliminary objections  must be rejected. I have no doubt in

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my mind  that persons  in this  country obliged  to serve as bonded labour  are entitled  to invoke  Article  23  of  the Constitution. The  provisions embodied in that clause form a vital constituent  of the  Fundamental Rights  set forth  in Part III  of the  Constitution, and their violation attracts properly the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution. I also find  difficulty   in  upholding   the  objection   by   the respondents to the admissibility and relevance 166 of  the  material  consisting  of  the  report  of  the  two advocates and  of Dr. Patwardhan appointed as Commissioners. It is  true that  the reports of the said Commissioners have not been  tested by  cross-examination, but  then the record does  not   show  whether   any  attempt  was  made  by  the respondents to  call them for cross-examination. The further question whether  the appointment of the Commissioners falls within the  terms of  order XLVI  of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 is  of technical  significance only,  because there was inherent   power   in   the   Court,   in   the   particular circumstances of  this case,  to take  that action.  I  have already set  forth earlier my views in respect of the nature and forms  of procedure open to the Court in public interest litigation and  I need  not elaborate  them here. I may add, however, that the Court would do well to issue notice to the respondents, before  appointing any  Commissioner, in  those cases  where   there   is   little   apprehension   of   the disappearance of evidence.      On the  merits of  the case  I find myself in agreement with my brother Bhagwati, both in regard to the operation of the various  statutes as  well as the directions proposed by him. The case is one of considerable importance to a section of our  people, who  pressed  by  the  twin  misfortunes  of poverty and illiteracy, are compelled to a condition of life which long  since  should  have  passed  into  history.  The continued existence of such pockets of oppression and misery do no justice to the promises and assurances extended by our Constitution to its citizens.      AMARENDRA NATH  SEN, J.  The relevant  facts have  been fully  set  out  in  the  judgment  of  my  learned  brother Bhagwati, J.  My learned  brother has  also recorded  in his judgment the  various contentions which were urged before us in this writ petition.      A preliminary  objection  was  raised  by  Shri  K.  L. Bhagat. Additional  Solicitor General  of India  and also by Shri Phadke,  learned counsel  appearing on  behalf  of  the respondents,  as  to  the  maintainability  of  the  present petition.  The  objection  to  the  maintainability  of  the present petition  is taken  mainly on  the  following  three grounds:-      1    Art. 32  of the  Constitution is  not attracted to           the instant  case as  no fundamental  right of the           petitioners or  of the  workmen referred to in the           petition are infringed.      2    A letter addressed by a party to this Court cannot           be treated  as a  writ petition and in the absence           of any 167           verified petition  this Court  cannot be  moved to           exercise its writ jurisdiction.      3    In a  proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution           this  Court   is  not  empowered  to  appoint  any           commission or  an investigating  body  to  enquire           into the  allegations made  and make  a report  to           this Court  on the  basis of the enquiry to enable           this Court  to exercise its power and jurisdiction

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         under Art. 32 of the Constitution.      I propose to consider the objections in the order noted above. I  shall first deal with the first objection, namely, that Art.  32 of  the Constitution is not attracted as there is no  violation of  any fundamental right of the petitioner or of the workmen referred to in the petition.      The substance  of the  grievance of  the petitioners in this petition  is  that  the  workmen  referred  to  in  the communication addressed  to this Court are bonded labourers. In 1976,  the Parliament  enacted the  Bonded Labour  System (Abolition) Act, 1976 and by virtue of the provisions of the said Act,  the bonded  labour system has been declared to be illegal in  this country.  Any person  who is wrongfully and illegally  employed  as  a  labourer  in  violation  of  the provisions of  the  Act,  is  in  essence  deprived  of  his liberty. A  bonded labourer  truly becomes  a slave  and the freedom of a bonded labourer in the matter of his employment and movement  is more  or less  completely  taken  away  and forced labour  is thrust  upon him. When any bonded labourer approaches this  Court, the  real grievance that he makes is that he  should be  freed from this bondage and he prays for being set  at liberty  and liberty is no doubt a fundamental right guaranteed  to every  person under  the  Constitution. There cannot  be any  manner of doubt that any person who is wrongfully and  illegally detained  and is  deprived of  his liberty can  approach  this  Court  under  Art.  32  of  the Constitution for  his  freedom  from  wrongful  and  illegal detention, and  for being  set at  liberty. In  my  opinion, whenever any  person is wrongfully and illegally deprived of his liberty,  it is open to anybody who is interested in the person to  move this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for his  release. It  may not very often be possible for the person who  is deprived  of his  liberty  to  approach  this Court, as  by virtue of such illegal and wrongful detention, he may not be free and in a position to move this Court. The Petitioner in  the instant  case claims to be an association interested in the welfare of society and particularly of the weaker section. The Petitioner further 168 states that  the petitioner  seeks to promote the welfare of the labourers  and for  promoting the welfare of labour, the petitioner seeks to move this Court for releasing the bonded labourers from their bondage and for restoring to them their freedom and  other legitimate  rights. The  bonded labourers working in the far away places are generally poor and belong to the  very weak  section of  the people. They are also not very literate  and they  may not  be conscious  of their own rights. Further,  as they  are kept in bondage their freedom is also  restricted and  they may  not be  in a  position to approach this  Court. Though  no fundamental  right  of  the petitioner may  be said  to be infringed, yet the petitioner who complains  of the  violation of the fundamental right of the workmen  who have  been wrongfully  and illegally denied their freedom  and deprived  of their  constitutional  right must be held to be entitled to approach this Court on behalf of the  bonded labourers  for  removing  them  from  illegal bondage and  deprivation of liberty. The locus standi of the petitioner to  move this  Court appear  to  be  conclusively established by  the decision  of this  Court in  the case of S.P. Gupta  v. Union  of India  & Anr.(1)  Forced labour  is constitutionally forbidden  by Art.  23 of the Constitution. As in  the present  case the  violation of  the  fundamental right of  liberty of  the workmen who are said to be kept in wrongful and  illegal detention,  employed in forced labour, is alleged,  Art. 32  of the  Constitution to  my  mind,  is

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clearly attracted.  The first ground raised on behalf of the respondents cannot, therefore, be sustained.      Before I  proceed to  deal with the second ground urged on behalf  of the  respondents, it will be convenient to set out the  provisions of  Art. 32 of the Constitution. Art. 32 read as follows:-      "(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate      proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred      by this Part is guaranteed.      (2)  The  Supreme  Court  shall  have  power  to  issue      directions or  orders or  writs, including writs in the      nature of  habeas corpus,  mandamus,  prohibition,  quo      warrants and  certiorari, whichever may be appropriate,      for the  enforcement of  any of the rights conferred by      this part.      (3) Without  prejudice to  the powers  conferred on the      Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by      law empower 169      any other  Court to exercise within the local limits of      its jurisdiction  all or  any of the powers exercisable      by the Supreme Court under clause (2).      (4) The  right guaranteed  by this article shall not be      suspended except  as otherwise  provided  for  by  this      Constitution."      Art. 32(1)  confers the  right to  move this  Court  by appropriate proceedings  for enforcement  of the fundamental rights guaranteed  under the  Constitution. Art. 32(2) makes provision for  the powers  of this  Court in  the matter  of granting  relief   in  any  proceeding  in  this  Court  for enforcement of  the fundamental  rights  guaranteed  by  the Constitution. Art. 32(3) and 32(4) which I have also set out for the  purpose of complete understanding of the provisions of Art.  32 for proper appreciation of its scope and effect, do not have any material bearing on the question involved in the present proceeding.      The second ground which raises the question whether the letter addressed  by a party to this Court can be treated as a writ  petition and in the absence of any verified petition this court  can be  moved to exercise its writ jurisdiction, is essentially  an objection  to the procedure to be adopted by this  Court in  the matter  of entertaining  a proceeding under Art.  32 for  enforcement of fundamental rights of the parties. Art.  32(1) of  the  Constitution  which  has  been earlier set  out guarantees  the right to move this Court by an  appropriate   proceeding  for  the  enforcement  of  the fundamental rights.  Art. 32(2)  confers wide powers on this Court in the matter of granting relief against any violation of the  fundamental rights.  Art. 32  or for that matter any other article  does not  lay down any procedure which has to be followed  to move  this  Court  for  relief  against  the violation of  any fundamental  right. Art.  32(1) only  lays down that  the right  to  move  this  Court  by  appropriate proceedings  for   enforcement  of   fundamental  rights  is guaranteed. The  Constitution very  appropriately leaves the question  as   to  what   will  constitute   an  appropriate proceeding for  the purpose  of enforcement  of  fundamental rights to  be determined  by the  Court.  This  Court,  when sought to be moved under Art. 32 by any party for redressing his grievance  against the  violation of  fundamental rights has to  consider whether the procedure followed by the party is appropriate enough to entitle the court to proceed to act on the  same. No doubt this Court has framed rules which are contained in  part IV, Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules under  the   Caption   "application   for   enforcement   of

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fundamental 170 rights ("Art.  32 of the Constitution"). Generally speaking, any party  who seeks to move this Court under Act. 32 of the Constitution should  conform to  the rules  prescribed.  The rules lay  down  the  procedure  which  is  normally  to  be followed in  the matter  of any application under Art. 32 of the Constitution.  These rules  are rules  relating  to  the procedure to  be adopted and the rules are intended to serve as maids  to the Deity of Justice. Procedural law which also forms a part of the law and has to be observed, is, however, subservient to substantive law and the laws of procedure are prescribed for promoting and furthering the ends of justice. There cannot  be any  doubt that  this Court  should usually follow the  procedure laid  down in  O.XXXV of  the Rules of this Court and should normally insist on a petition properly verified by  an affidavit to be filed to enable the Court to take necessary  action on the same. Though this Court should normally insist on the rules of procedure being followed, it cannot be  said, taking  into consideration  the  nature  of right conferred  under Art.  32 to  move this  Court  by  an appropriate proceeding and the very wide powers conferred on this Court  for granting  relief in the case of violation of fundamental rights that this Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain  any proceeding  which may not be in conformity with procedure  prescribed by  the Rules  of this Court. The Rules undoubtedly  lay down  the procedure which is normally to be  followed for  making an  application under Art. 32 of the Constitution.  They, however, do not and cannot have the effect  of  limiting  the  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  of entertaining a proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution, if made,  only in  the manner  prescribed by  the rules. For effectively safeguarding  the fundamental  rights guaranteed by the  Constitution, the  Court in appropriate cases in the interests of  justice will certainly be competent to treat a proceeding, though  not in  conformity  with  the  procedure prescribed by  the Rules  of this  Court, as  an appropriate proceeding  under   Art.  32  of  the  Constitution  and  to entertain, the same. Fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution are  indeed too sacred to be ignored or trifled with merely  on the  ground of  technicality or  any rule of procedure. It  may further  be noticed that the rules framed by this  Court do  not also  lay down that this Court can be moved under  Art. 32  of the Constitution only in accordance with  the   procedure  prescribed   by  the  Rules  and  not otherwise. A  mere technicality  in the  matter of  form  or procedure which  may not  in any way affect the substance of any proceeding  should not  stand in the way of the exercise of the  very wide  jurisdiction and powers conferred on this Court under  Art. 32  of the Constitution for enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Taking into 171 consideration the  substance of the matter and the nature of allegations made,  it will  essentially be  a matter for the Court  to  decide  whether  the  procedure  adopted  can  be considered to  be an appropriate proceeding within the ambit of Art.  32 of  the Constitution. The Court, if satisfied on the materials  placed in  the form  of  a  letter  or  other communication addressed  to this  court, may  take notice of the same in appropriate cases. Experience shows that in many cases it may not be possible for the party concerned to file a regular  writ petition  in conformity  with procedure laid down in  the Rules  of this  Court. It  further appears that this Court  for quite  some years  now  has  in  many  cases

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proceeded to  act on  the basis  of the letters addressed to it. A  long standing  practice of the Court in the matter of procedure also acquires sanctity. It may also be pointed out that in  various cases  the Court  has refused  to take  any notice of  letters or other kind of communications addressed to Court  and in many cases also the court on being moved by a letter  has directed  a formal  writ petition  to be filed before it  has decided  to proceed further in the matter. It is,  however,  eminently  desirable,  in  my  opinion,  that normally the procedure prescribed in the rules of this Court should be  followed while entertaining a petition under Art. 32 of  the Constitution,  though in  exceptional  cases  and particularly in  matter of  general  public  interest,  this Court may,  taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances  of   the  case,   proceed  to   exercise  its jurisdiction  under   Art.  32   of  the   constitution  for enforcement of fundamental rights treating the letter or the communication in  any other form as an appropriate preceding under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It is, however, eminently desirable that any party who addresses a letter or any other communication to  this Court  seeking intervention  of  this Court on  the basis  of the  said letter  and  communication should address  this letter  or communication  to this Court and not  to any individual Judge by name. Such communication should be  addressed to  the Chief  Justice of the Court and his companion  Justices. A  private communication by a party to any  Learned Judge  over any matter is not proper and may create embarrassment for the Court and the Judge concerned.      In the  present case,  the unfortunate  workers who are emploced as  bonded labourers at as distant place, could not possibly  in   view  of  their  bondage,  move  this  Court, following the  procedure laid  down in  the  Rules  of  this Court. The  Petitioner which  claims to  be a Social Welfare Organisation interested  in restoring liberty and dignity to these unfortunate  bonded  labourers  should  be  considered competent  to   move  this   Court  by   a  letter  or  like communication addressed to 172 this Court, to avoid trouble and expenses, as the petitioner is not  moving  this  Court  for  any  personal  or  private benefit.      I shall  now consider  the third and the last objection which relates  to the  powers of  this Court  to  direct  an enquiry into  the allegations  made and to call for a report in a  proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution to enable this Court to exercise its power and jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the Constitution.      We have  earlier noted  that the fundamental rights are guaranteed by  the Constitution  and for  the enforcement of the fundamental  rights very wide powers have been conferred on this  Court. Before  this Court  proceeds to exercise its owers under  Art. 32  of the  Constitution for enforcing the fundamental  rights   guaranteed,  this   Court  has  to  be satisfied that there has been a violation of the fundamental rights. The  fundamental rights  may be alleged to have been violated  under   various  circumstances.   The  facts   and circumstances differ  from case  to case. Whenever, however, there is  an allegation  of violation of fundamental rights, it becomes  the responsibility  and also  the sacred duty of this Court  to protect  such fundamental  rights  guaranteed under the Constitution provided that this Court is satisfied that a  case for  interference by  this Court  appears prima facie to  have been  made out.  very often  the violation of fundamental rights  is not admitted or accepted. On a proper consideration of  the materials  the Court  has to come to a

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conclusion  whether   there  has   been  any   violation  of fundamental rights  to enable the Court to grant appropriate reliefs in  the matter.  In various  cases, because  of  the peculiar facts  and circumstances  of  the  case  the  party approaching this Court for enforcement of fundamental rights may not  be in  a position to furnish all relevant materials and necessary  particulars. If,  however, on a consideration of the  materials placed,  the Court  is  satisfied  that  a proper probe  into the  matter is  necessary in  the  larger interest of administration of justice and for enforcement of fundamental rights  guaranteed, the  Court, in  view of  the obligations  and   duty  cast  upon  it  of  preserving  and protecting  fundamental   rights,  may  require  better  and further materials  to enable  the Court  to take appropriate action; and  there cannot be anything improper in the proper exercise of  Court’s  jurisdiction  under  Art.  32  of  the Constitution  to  try  to  secure  the  necessary  materials through appropriate  agency. The  Commission that  the Court may appoint  or the  investigation that the court may direct is essentially  for  the  Court’s  satisfaction  as  to  the correctness or  otherwise of  the allegation of violation of fundamental rights  to enable the Court to decide the course to be adopted for 173 doing proper  justice  to  the  parties  in  the  matter  of protection of  their fundamental  rights. We have to bear in mind that  in this  land of  ours, there are persons without education, without  means and without opportunities and they also are  entitled to  full protection  of their  rights  or privileges which the Constitution affords. Living in chilled penury without  necessary resources and very often not fully conscious of their rights guaranteed under the Constitution, a very  large section  of the  people commonly termed as the weaker section  live  in  this  land.  When  this  Court  is approached on behalf of this class of people for enforcement of fundamental  rights of  which they have been deprived and which they  are equally  entitled to  enjoy, it  becomes the special responsibility  of this Court to see that justice is not denied to them and the disadvantageous position in which they are  placed, do  not stand  in the way of their getting justice from  this Court.  The power to appoint a commission or an  investigating body  for making  enquiries in terms of directions given  by the  Court must  be  considered  to  be implied and  inherent in  the power that the Court has under Art. 32 for enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the  Constitution. This  is a  power which  is  indeed incidental or  ancillary to  the power  which the  Court  is called upon to exercise in a proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It is entirely in the discretion of the Court, depending on  the facts  and circumstances  of any  case, to consider whether  any such power regarding investigation has to be  exercised or  not.  The  Commission  that  the  Court appoints or  the investigation  that the Court directs while dealing with  a proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution is not  a commission  or enquiry  under the  Code  of  Civil Procedure. Such power must necessarily be held to be implied within the  very wide  powers conferred  on this Court under Art. 32 for enforcement of fundamental rights. I am, further of the  opinion that for proper exercise of its powers under Art. 32  of the  Constitution and  for due  discharge of the obligation and  duty cast  upon this  Court in the matter of protection and  enforcement of  fundamental rights which the Constitution guarantees, it must be held that this Court has an inherent  power to  act in  such a  manner as will enable this Court  to discharge  its duties  and obligations  under

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Art. 32  of the Constitution properly and effectively in the larger interest of administration of justice, and for proper protection of constitutional safeguards. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this objection is devoid of any merit.      I may  incidentally observe  that as  a result  of such action on the part of the Court attention of the appropriate authorities  concerned   has  in  a  number  of  cases  been pointedly drawn to the existence of 174 bonded labourers  in various  parts of  the country  and  to their  miserable   plight  and  a  large  number  of  bonded labourers have  been freed  from their  bondage. To my mind, the litigation  of this  type particularly  in  relation  to bonded labourers  is  really  not  in  nature  in  adversary litigation and  it becomes the duty of the State and also of the appropriate  authorities to  offer its best co-operation to see  that this  evil practice  which  has  been  declared illegal is  ended at  the earliest.  The existence of bonded labour in the country is an unfortunate fact. Whenever there is any  allegation of  the existence of bonded labour in any particular State,  the State  instead of seeking to come out with a  case of  denial of  such existence on the basis of a feeling that the existence of bonded labour in the State may cast a  slur or  stigma  on  its  administrative  machinery, should cause  effective enquiries to be made into the matter and if  the matter  is pending  in this  Court,  should  co- operate with  this Court  to see that death-knell is sounded on this  illegal system which constitutes a veritable social menace and  stands in  the way of healthy development of the nation.      For reasons  aforesaid, I  do not find any merit in the preliminary objections  raised and  I agree  with my learned brother that the preliminary objections must be over-ruled.      On the  merits of the case my learned brother Bhagwati, J. has  in his  judgment carefully and elaborately discussed all the  aspects. Apart  from the  principal grievance  made that the  workmen in  the instant case are bonded labourers, various grievances on behalf of the workmen have been voiced and denial  to the  workmen of various other just rights has been alleged.  The grievance  of denial of other just rights to the  workmen and  the  reliefs  claimed  for  giving  the workmen the  benefits to  which they  may be  entitled under various legislations  enacted for  their welfare are more or less in  the nature  of consequential  reliefs incidental to the main  relief of freedom from bonded and forced labour to which the workmen are subjected. I must frankly confess that in the  facts and  circumstances of  this case  I have  some doubts as  to the  applicability of  the provisions of Inter State  Migrant   Workmen  (Regulation   of  Employment   and Conditions of  Service) Act, 1979. The views expressed by my learned brother Bhagwati, J. in his judgment, to my mind, do not  amount   to  any   adjudication  on   the  question  of applicability of the Inter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment  and Conditions  of Service)  Act,  1979.  The observations made by my learned brother Bhagwati, J. and the directions given  by him  on the various aspects with regard to the  merits of  the case  after carefully considering the provisions of 175 all the relevant labour legislations enacted tor the benefit of labourers  and for  improvement and  betterment of  their lot, are for furthering the interests of the workmen and for proper protection  and preservation of their just rights and to enable  the appropriate  authorities  to  take  necessary action in  the matter.  As I  am in agreement with the views

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expressed by  my learned  Brother  Bhagwati,  J.  I  do  not propose to  deal with  these aspects  at any  length  and  I content myself  by expressing my agreement with the judgment of my learned brother Bhagwati, J. on these matters. S. R.                                  Petitions allowed and                                        preliminary grounds                                        rejected. 176