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PETITIONER: BANARSI DAS AHLUWALIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY, DELHI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/09/1967

BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  497            1968 SCR  (1) 685

ACT: Indian Stamp Act, 1899, s. 57(1) and (2)-Application to  Re- venue  Authority  to  state  a  case  for  opinion  of  High Court--Substantial  question  of law  involved-If  Authority bound  to state a case whether there is a ’pending  case  or not’.

HEADNOTE: The appellant executed a deed of trust on December 20, 1961, in  respect  of certain properties on a stamp paper  of  Rs. 30/-  on  the  footing that the deed was  a  declaration  of trust.   The  SubRegistrar  to whom  it  was  presented  for registration,  impounded  the deed and forwarded it  to  the Collector  for action under see. 38 (2) of the Indian  Stamp Act,  2  of  1899.  The Collector  thereafter  directed  the appellant  to  deposit  additional stamp  duty  and  penalty amounting to Rs. 36,685/- but the Chief Controlling  Revenue Authority,  Delhi,  reduced the amount in  revision  to  Rs. 3,780/-.   The appellant then applied to that  Authority  to state a case to the High Court under section 57(1) but  this application  was rejected and a writ petition filed  by  the appellant  challenging this rejection was dismissed  by  the High Court. In  appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf  of  the appellant that the Authority was, under section 57(1), bound to refer the case to the High Court even though there was no pending  case  before  it and by its refusal to  do  so  the Authority  failed to discharge its statutory duty; that  the High Court was in the circumstances competent to direct  the reference and the summary dismissal of the writ petition  by if was wrong.  On the other hand the respondent’s contention was that section 57(1) postulates the existence of a pending case;  that the word "case" in the sub-section means a  case which   has  not  been  finally  decided  by   the   revenue authorities and which is capable of being disposed of, where a  reference is made to the High Court, in  accordance  with the opinion of the Court as provided by sec. 59(2), Held:     When a reference has been made to the Authority or the case has otherwise come to his notice, if an application is  made  under  s.  57(1) and  it  involves  a  substantial question  of  law, whether the case is pending or  not,  the

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Authority is bound to state the case in compliance with  its obligation. [695 A-B] Section 57 affords a remedy to the citizen to have his  case referred  to  the High Court against an order of  a  revenue authority  imposing stamp duty and/or penalty  provided  the application  involves  a  substantial question  of  law  and imposes a corresponding obligation on the Authority to refer it  to  the High Court for its opinion.  Such  a  right  and obligation cannot be construed to depend upon any subsidiary circumstance  such  as the pendency of the case  before  the Authority. [694 F-G] The  Authority therefore was in error in refusing  to  state the  case  and  the  High Court  was  equally  in  error  in summarily  dismissing  the  writ petition  as  the  question whether  the  document was a declaration of trust or  was  a deed  of settlement was a substantial question of law.  [695 C] 686 Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd., [1950] S.C.R. 536; relied upon and explained. Case law reviewed.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 53 of  1965 Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated April  16, 1963 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit  Bench  at Delhi in Civil Writ No. CW-267-D of 1963. I.   M.  Lall,  E. C. Agrawala and P. C. Agrawala,  for  the appellant. N.   S. Bindra, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the res- pondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J. This appeal by special leave is directed  against the  order  of  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  (Delhi  Bench) dismissing the appellant’s petition for an appropriate  writ directing the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Delhi, to state  the  case to the High Court under sec. 57(1)  of  the Indian Stamp Act, 2 of 1899. The  facts  leading  to the said  petition  may  be  briefly stated: On December 20, 1961 the appellant executed a,  deed of  trust in respect of certain properties on a stamp  paper of  Rs.  30  on  the  footing  that  the  said  deed  was  a declaration  of  trust.   The SubRegistrar to  whom  it  was presented for registration, impounded it and forwarded it to the  Collector for action under sec. 38(2).   The  Collector served a notice on the appellant to show cause why he should not be charged with deficient stamp duty of Rs. 3,365 and  a penalty of Rs. 33,650.  After hearing Counsel the  Collector directed  the appellant to deposit the aggregate  amount  of Rs. 36,685.  The appellant filed a revision before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Delhi, who reduced the amount of  deficit  duty  and  penalty to Rs.  630  and  Rs.  3,150 respectively.  On December 9, 1962 the appellant applied  to the said Authority to state the case to the High Court under section 57(1).  That was rejected and the appellant filed  a writ petition but the High Court dismissed- it in limine. The  appellant’s contention is that the Authority was  under section 57(1) bound to refer the case to the High Court even though  there  was no pending case before it,  that  by  its refusal  to  do  so the Authority failed  to  discharge  its statutory duty, that the High Court was in the circumstances competent  to  direct the reference and therefore  the  High Court’s  summary dismissal of the writ petition  was  wrong.

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The  respondent’s  contention, on the other  hand,  is  that section  57(1) postulates the existence of a  pending  case, that  the word "case" in the sub-section means a case  which has not been finally decided by the revenue authorities  and which  is  capable of being disposed of, if a  reference  is made  and  the  High Court pronounces its  opinion  on  such reference,  in accordance with such opinion as  provided  by see.  59(2).  It is contended that therefore the High  Court cannot direct the Autho- 687 rity  to  state  the case except where  the  case  is  still Depending  before  the  Revenue Authorities.   How  can  the Authority, it was argued, dispose of the case conformably to the  High  Court’s  opinion when there is  no  case  pending before it which it can dispose of? To appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to  read at  this stage the relevant provisions of the Act.   Section 56(1)  provides that the powers exercisable by  a  Collector under  Chapter IV and Chapter V and under clause (a) of  the first proviso to section 26 shall in all cases be subject to the  control  of the Chief  Controlling  Revenue  Authority. Sub-section 2 provides:--               "If  any Collector, acting under  section  31,               section 40 or section 41 feels doubt as to the               amount  of duty with which any  instrument  is               chargeable, he may draw up a statement of  the               case,  and  refer  it, with  his  own  opinion               thereon,   for  the  decision  of  the   Chief               Controlling Revenue Authority."               Section 57(1) provides:               "The  Chief Controlling Revenue Authority  may               state  any case referred to it  under  section               56,  sub-section (2), or otherwise  coming  to               its notice, and refer such case, with its  own               opinion thereon..... Section 59 provides that the High Court upon the hearing  of any  such case, shall decide the questions, raised,  thereby and  shall  deliver  its  judgment  thereon  containing  the grounds  on which such decision is founded.   Section  59(2) provides  that  the  High Court shall send  to  the  Revenue Authority  by  which  the case was stated  a  copy  of  such judgment and the Revenue Authority shall, on receiving  such copy, dispose of the case conformably to such judgment. Some  of the earlier decisions of the High Courts of  Madras and Calcutta took the view that though the words  "otherwise coming  to  its  notice" in sec. 57(1) are  of  Wide  import apparently  enabling  the  Authority to state  a  case  sub- section  1  of that section has to be construed  in  such  a manner as to harmonise with the provisions of section  59(2) so  that  those  provisions can be  worked  out.   Therefore unless  section 57(1) is construed to mean that, it is  only when there is a pending case which  the Authority can  state and  can  dispose of in conformity with the opinion  of  the High  Court  that a reference can be made by it  under  that sub-section.   Thus, in the Reference Under the  Stamp  Act, Section  57(1)  the  High  Court  of  Madras  held  that  an adjudication by a Collector under section 31, of the Act  as to  the  duty with which an instrument is chargeable  is  by section 32 made final and such a case cannot be referred  to the  High Court under section 57.  Two documents  purporting to  be mortgages of crops to secure repayment of  Rs.  2,300 and odd and )Rs. 2 lacs and odd containing also an 688 ancilliary  lien on the estates where the crops were  to  be grown were adjudicated by the Deputy Collector as chargeable

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under  Arts.  40(c)  and 41.  The  Deputy  Collector  levied duties   amounting   to  Rs.  70-12-0   and   Rs.   688-12-0 respectively.   The  duties were accordingly  paid  and  the Deputy Collector certified and endorsed the documents  under section 32. The mortgagees applied to the Board of  Revenue for  a refund of duty stating that Art. 40(c) did not  apply and  thereupon  the Board referred the  case  under  section 57(1).   The  High Court held that on a reading  of  section 57(1) with section 59(2) the word "case meant a matter which had  yet  to  be  disposed of  by  the  revenue  authorities conformably  to the judgment of the High Court and that  the effect  of section 32 was that once the  Collector  endorsed the document the matter was finally determined.  There being no pending case, the Board could not make a reference.   The reason  given  in this decision for  holding  the  reference incompetent  was that the words "dispose of  conformably  to the  judgment of the High Court" in section 59(2)  suggested that  there  must be a pending case before  the  authorities which on a reference to the High Court and on the High Court pronouncing  its judgment can be disposed of  in  conformity with such judgment.  A similar question once again arose, in the Reference Under Stamp Act, Section 57(1) reported in the same  volume  at page 752.  In this case  the  Sub-Registrar impounded the documents under section 33 and forwarded  them to  the  Collector  for action  under  section  38(2).   The Collector certified by his endorsement under section 40 that they were not chargeable with duty.  The matter was referred to  the Board of Revenue which disagreed with the  Collector and  referred the case to the High Court.  The question  was whether  this was a "case" which could be referred?   Arnold White,  C.J. held that it was-, because under section  56(1) powers  exercisable  by  a Collector  were  subject  to  the control  of the Revenue Board, therefore a case  brought  to its notice would be a. "case otherwise coming to the notice" of the Board and a case which has to be disposed of under s. 59(2)  conformably to the judgment which the High Court  may pronounce.  He held that though the words in sec. 56(1)  are powers  "exercisable" by the Collector they would also  mean "exercised" by the Collector.  Bhashyam Ayyangar and  Moore, JJ. disagreed with the Chief Justice and held following  the decision  in  25  Mad.  751,  that  the  reference  was  not competent  and the High Court had no jurisdiction to  decide it.   After  analysing  the  different  sections,   Bhashyam Ayyangar,  J.  held  that though  section  56(1)  gave  wide control  to  the  Revenue  Board  over  the  action  of  the Collector,  it could be exercised only until  the  Collector had,  not yet exercised his power under sec. 40  and  issued his  certificate.  Once the certificate was issued  and  the document  with his endorsement was returned to the party  as one either properly stamped or exempt from duty there was no power in the Board to recall the document from the party and to  levy  duty where the Collector had certified  it  to  be exempt and hence the Board had no power to refer such a 689 case under sec. 57(1).  The effect of this decision is  that the  Collector  by exercising his power and  certifying  the document exhausts the Board’s power of control under section 56(1).   The case having been concluded there would also  be no  pending  case which the Board could refer  to  the  High Court.   He also disagreed with the Chief Justice  that  the word   "exercisable"  in  section  56(1)  could   not   mean "exercised"   as   the  legislature  had   used   the   word "exercisable" deliberately to mean that once such power  was exercised,  the  Board’s  control  over  such  a  case   was exhausted.   Following  this decision,  the  Allahabad  High

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Court  in a Stamp Reference by the Board of Revenue(1)  held that  once the Collector had taken action under  sec.  40(1) and, had received the deficient duty and penalty imposed  by him and certified the document the jurisdiction of the Chief Controlling  Revenue Authority to refer such a case  to  the High  Court  was  ousted,  In that  case  a  sale  deed  was forwarded to the Collector under sea. 38(2) who held that it was  insufficiently stamped; the deficit according  to  him, amounted  to Rs. 4/- and he levied penalty of Rs. 5/-.   The deficit  and  the  penalty  were  paid  and  presumably  the Collector  endorsed  the document.  Under s.  40(a)  such  a certificate   is  conclusive.   The  High  Court  in   these circumstances held that the case before the Collector having been   concluded  and  there  being  no  pending  case   the controlling power of the Revenue Board was exhausted and  it had no power to refer such a case under s. 57(1).  The  case In  re.  Cooke and Kalvay(2) was a case falling  under  sec. 56(2), i.e., a case "otherwise coming to the notice" of  the Board of Revenue.  Rankin C.J. held in this case that though those words were wide, they could be given effect to only in cases  where  the concluding words of s. 59  could  also  be given effect to.  He held, therefore, that if the  Collector had in that case impounded the document which he had not but only decided the duty payable on it, the Board could  inter- fere  and  refer  the  case under  s.  57(1)  provided  such interference  was  made before the Collector  completed  the case.   In the Board of Revenue v.  Lakshmipat  Singhania(3) certain  share transfer deeds were filed in the Court.   The Court  impounded  them and forwarded them to  the  Collector under sec. 38(2).  The Collector passed an order determining the  duty payable.  Both the duty and penalty as decided  by the  Collector  were paid and the  Collector  certified  and endorsed the deeds.  The matter having come to the notice of the  Revenue Board, it made the reference.  The  High  Court held  that the purpose of section 57(1) was a practical  one and  that  that section could not apply unless there  was  a case  pending  before the Authority whether it  was  a  case referred  to it under section 56(2) or otherwise  coming  to its notice and in respect of which that Authority could give effect to the advisory opinion of the High Court.  Therefore the Collector having certified, the case (1)  [1913] I.L.R. 40 All. 128. (2) I.L.R. (1932) 59 Cal. 1171, (3)  I.L.R. (1958) 2 All. 246. 690 before him was concluded and there remained nothing, pending in  respect  of which a, reference could  be  competent.   A similar view has also been taken by the Mysore High Court in Shri  Rama  Krishna  Theatre v.  Chief  Revenue  Controlling Authority.(1) The  view first expressed in I.L.R. 25 Mad. 752  appears  to have  prevailed until the question arose whether sec.  57(1) confers  a  discretion on the authority whether to  state  a case  or  not  or whether it casts  an  obligation  on  that Authority to state the case when a subject calls upon it  to do  so  in a case involving a substantial question  of  law. Such a question was mooted in the Chief Controlling  Revenue Authority v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd. (2).  In that case the  Mills  executed  on  March 22,  1945  the  document  in question  in  favour  of  the  Central  Bank  of  India  for borrowing  a certain amount and stamped it with a  stamp  of Rs.   16-8-0   ’on  the  basis  that  it  was  a   deed   of hypothecation.   It was sent to the Registrar  of  Companies and  the Registrar sent it to the Superintendent of  Stamps. On  April  4, 1945, the Assistant Superintendent  of  Stamps

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informed  the  Mills that the document was a  mortgage  with possession  and  hence was not duly stamped.   On  July  19, 1945,  that officer informed the Mills of his decision  that the document being a mortgage with possession was chargeable with  a duty of Rs. 56,250 and called upon the Mills to  pay the deficit of Rs. 56,238/8/- and Rs. 5,000 as penalty.  The Mills  paid up the amounts and on that the Assistant  Supdt. of  Stamps  informed the Mills that the  document  would  be certified and returned to the Registrar.The Mills thereafter filed a suit for rectification of the document.  On December 9,  1945  the Assistant Supdt. informed the Mills  that  the Collector  had  been requested to recover the  said  deficit duty  and  penalty  and on January 11,  1946  the  Collector demanded  the said amounts.  On January 25, 1946,  the  High Court  passed  a decree rectifying the  said  document.   On February   1,  1946  the  Mills  requested   the   Assistant Superintendent  to  refer the case to  the  Authority  under section  56(2).   The  Mills applied  to  the  Authority  on February  5,  1946  that the said  order  should  either  be rescinded or a case should be stated to the High Court under section  57(1).  On July 4, 1945 the Authority rejected  the application.   The Mills applied to the High  Court  against the  Authority  for a direction that he should be  asked  to state the case.  The Trial Judge granted relief under s.  45 of  the  Specific Relief Act calling upon the  Authority  to state the case on the ground that a substantial question  of law  as to the effect of rectification had arisen.   In  the Letters Patent Appeal by the Authority the Division Bench of the  High Court confirmed the said decree and held that  the words "otherwise (1)  I.L.R. [1962] Mys. 396. (2)  A.I.R, 1948 Bom. 254.                             691 comes to his notice" in section 57(1) were very wide and did not cover only the cases which the Revenue Authority wanted, to move the High Court at its own instance but also  covered cases where an application was made to it in that behalf  by the  citizen.  The High Court observed that looking  to  the scheme and the object of the Act, the one solitary safeguard which the citizen had was to get his liability to pay  stamp duty  determined by the High Court in cases where  important and   substantial   questions   of   law   were    involved. Consequently,  where a serious question of law was  involved there was a duty cast on the Authority to state the case and the  citizen had a right to have such a case  determined  by the  High  Court.  There would be a breach of  duty  if  the Authority  failed  to appreciate that there  was  a  serious point  of  law  involved and such breach of  duty  could  be enforced  by an order under sec. 45 of the  Specific  Relief Act. It will be noticed that when the Assistant Supdt. of  Stamps decided  on July 19, 1945 that the document was  a  mortgage chargeable with the duty of Rs. 56,250 and ordered the Mills to pay the deficit and the penalty, the case before him  was concluded.  In fact he wrote to the Registrar  of  Companies returning the document that it would be certified by him  on payment  of the said amounts.  The Collector thereafter  was requested  to recover the two amounts and a demand was  also made  on the Mills.  It is true that the application of  the Mills  dated  February 1, 1945 to the Collector  under  sec. 56(2)  was  not decided when the Mills on February  5,  1946 asked  the Authority to state the case.  But unlike  section 57(1) the Collector under sec. 56(2) may refer the case,  if he  is in doubt.  The duty of the Collector not being  obli- gatory,  the  case  was concluded  long  before  the  Mills’

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application  dated  February 5, 1946.  In any event  as  the Collector  did  not refer the case under sec. 56(2)  to  the Authority it cannot be said that there was any pending  case either  before him or the Authority and yet the  High  Court ordered  the  Authority to state the  case.   The  Authority appealed to this Court and as reported in Chief  Controlling Revenue  Authority v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd.(1)  urged three  points:  (i)  whether  under  sec.  57  there  is  an obligation  on the Authority to state a case;  (ii)  whether having regard to s. 226 of the Government of India Act, 1935 the  High Court had jurisdiction to order a  reference,  the matter being one of revenue and (iii) that the matter having proceeded beyond the stage of assessment and having  reached the  stage  of recovery the High Court could  not  direct  a reference of the case-, in other words, there being no  case pending before the Authority a reference by it would not  be competent  and  the  High  Court  therefore  would  have  no jurisdiction  either to direct or to decide  such  reference even  if made.  This Court after referring with approval  to the decision of the Privy Council in Alcock Ashdown v. Chief Revenue  Authority,  Bombay(2)  and to  section  51  of  the Income-tax  Act, 1918 which contained provisions similar  to section 59 of the Stamp (1) [1950] S.C.R. 536          (2)  50 I.A. 227, L/P(N)7SCI-5 692 Act  held  that though sec. 57(1) used the  word  "may"  the Power  to  state the case was coupled with the duty  of  the Authority  as  a public officer to do the  right  thing  and therefore the word "may." as held by the Privy Council  must mean "shall".  Though the case had gone beyond the stage  of assessment  and even steps for recovery were  already  taken and  the case was therefore concluded this Court upheld  the High  Court’s decision to issue the mandamus.  The  decision thus  establishes that the fact that the case  is  concluded and is no longer pending cannot make a reference incompetent or  disable  the High Court from pronouncing  its  judgment thereon.   This  decision has since then  been  followed  in Appalanarasimhalu v. Board of Revenue,(1) Shanmugha Mudaliar v.  Board of Revenue,(2) Saradambal v. Board of  Revenue,(3) and Sarup Singh v. Union of India(4). Two  decisions  to which our attention was drawn  need  con- sideration.  In Nanak Chand v. Board of Revenue, U.P.(5) the High Court of Allahabad held that a reference under sec.  57 can  be  made only when a case is pending and in  which  the question  about  the  amount  of stamp duty  is  yet  to  be decided.   It also held that once the Authority has  decided the  case the fact that proceedings for realisation of  duty remain  pending would not make the case a pending case.   At page  321  of the report the High Court  observed  that  the language of sec. 57, viz., that "the authority may state any case referred to it under section 56(2) or otherwise  coming to  its notice", and "refer such case with its  own  opinion thereon" made it clear that the reference has to be made  at the  stage when the case is still pending before  it.   When the  High  Court’s  attention was &awn to  the  decision  in Maharashtra  Sugar Mills’(6) case and  Appalanarasimhalu  v. Board of Revenue(7) and Shanmugha v. Board of Revenue(8) the High  Court  distinguished the Maharashtra  Sugar  Mills’(6) case  on the ground that the application for reference  made under  s. 56(2) to the Collector had not been  decided  when the  Authority  was asked to state the  case  under  section 57(1)  and  that therefore it was possible to say  that  the case was still pending.  As regards the two Madras decisions the  High Court agreed that the reference applied there  was

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after the cases were concluded but observed that the  Madras High  Court had not examined the question whether  reference under  s.  57(1)  was in such cases competent  and  that  it relied  on the decision in Maharashtra Sugar Mills’(6)  case without noticing that in that case reference was applied for while the application asking the (1) A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 811. (2) I.L.R. [1955] Mad. 1037. (3)  A.I.R. 1959 Mad. 1086. (4) I.L.R. [1965] Pun. 140. (5) A.I.R. 1958 All. 320. (6)  [1950] S.C.R. 536. (7)  A.I.R. [1952] Mad. 811. (8)  I.L.R. [1955] Mad. 1037. 693 Collector  to  refer  the case under section  56(2)  to  the Authority  had  not  been  disposed  of.   In  the   Eastern Manganese  and  Minerals  v. State  of  West  Bengal(1)  the Calcutta  High  Court  following In re  Cook  and  Kelvey(2) refused  to  direct  reference on the ground  that  when  an adjudication as to proper stamp has been made under sec.  31 and  the  duty  is paid without  the  document  having  been impounded or when the document is not sent to the  Collector under  sec.  38(2)  there  is no  case  pending  before  the Authority  and the Authority cannot state a case  or  cannot similiarly  be asked to state the case.  With  respect,  the reasons given in these two decisions for distinguishing  the Maharashtra  Sugar Mills(1) do not seem to be  correct.   As aforesaid,  it  is clear from the facts of  that  case  that there was no case pending before the Authority or any  other Revenue Authority and yet mandamus granted by the High Court was  confirmed by this Court.  Therefore that  decision  was binding on both the High Courts. Whatever may have been the view in the past on the scope  of section   57(1),   the  position  after  the   decision   in Maharashtra Sugar Mills’ case(3) is settled that sec.  57(1) imposes  a  duty on the Authority to state a  case  when  it raises a substantial question of law.  As the Privy  Council stated  in  Alcock  Ashdown  v.  Chief  Revenue   Authority, Bombay(4),  "To  argue that if the legislature says  that  a public officer, even a revenue officer, shall do a thing and he without cause or justification refuses to do that  thing, yet  the  Specific Relief Act would not be  applicable,  and there  would be no power in the Court to give relief to  the subject, is to state a proposition to which their  Lordships must  refuse assent." It also must now be taken  as  settled that  that duty is not affected by the question whether  the case is pending before the Authority or not.  The  principle underlying the decision is that sec. 57 affords a remedy  to the  citizen  to have his case referred to  the  High  Court against an order of a revenue authority imposing stamp  duty and/or   penalty   provided  the  application   involves   a substantial  question  of law and  imposes  a  corresponding obligation  on the authority to refer it to the  High  Court for  its  opinion.  Such a right and  obligation  cannot  be construed to depend upon any subsidiary circumstance such as the  pendency  of  the case before the  Authority.   If  the position is as held in I.L.R. 25 Mad. 752 the mere fact that the  Collector has determined the duty and closed  the  case would render nugatoty not only the controlling, jurisdiction of  the Authority but the remedy which sec. 57(1)  gives  to the citizen as also the obligation of the Authority to state the  case.  The difficulty which the learned judges felt  in I. L. R. 25 Mad. 752 and repeated in subsequent decisions is not,  in  our   views,  a real one  because  as  soon  as  a

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reference is made and the (1) A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 340.    (2) I.L.R. [1932] 59 Cal. 1171. (3) [1950] S.C.R. 536.          (4)  50 I.A. 227, 233. L/P(N)7SCI-5 (a) 694 High  Court  pronounces  its judgment the  decision  of  the Authority is it large and the Authority, as required by sec. 59(2)  would have to dispose of the case in conformity  with such  judgment.  The  position therefore  is  that  when  a, reference  has  been made to the Authority or the  case  has otherwise  come  to his notice, if an  application  is  made under  s.  57(1) and it involves a substantial  question  of law,  whether the case is pending or not, the  Authority  is bound  to state the case in compliance with its  obligation. The  Authority  is in a similar position as  the  Income-tax Tribunal under analogous provisions in the Income-tax Act. In our view, the Authority was in error in refusing to state the  case  and  the  High Court  was  equally  in  error  in summarily  dismissing  the  writ petition  as  the  question whether  the  document was a declaration of trust or  was  a deed  of settlement is a substantial question of  law.   The appeal  is therefore allowed and the High Court’s  order  is set   aside.   We  direct  the  Chief  Controlling   Revenue Authority, Delhi, to state the case to the High Court  under sec. 57(1).  There will be no order as to costs. R.K.P.S                   Appeal allowed. 695