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PETITIONER: BALWINDER KAUR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HARDEEP SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       18/11/1997

BENCH: SUJATA V. MANOHAR, D.P. WADHWA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T D.P. Wadhwa, J.      Leave granted.      Appellant-wife is  in appeal against the judgment dated September 27,  1996 of  the Division  Bench  of  Punjab  and Haryana High  Court summarily  dismissing her  appeal  filed under Section  28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short ‘the Act’).  Appellant had  filed this  appeal  against  the judgment and  decree dated  December 4,  1995 passed  by the District Judge, Patiala in her own petition under Section 13 of the  Act seeking  divorce from her husband the respondent herein, on  the grounds  of cruelty and desertion. Appellant had alleged  that fraud  was perpetrated  upon  her  by  her husband in  filing the  petition for  divorce which she said she never intended to file and never sought divorce from her husband.  In   the  proceeding  before  the  District  Judge appellant appeared  to have  examined herself  and also  one Dalip Singh  who claimed  to be her material uncle which the appellant has  denied. An  ex-parte decree  of  divorce  was granted by  the District  Judge, Patiala  on the petition of the appellant.  Appellant says  when she became aware of the decree of  divorce she  moved the High Court in appeal which appeal, as  noted above,  was  dismissed  by  the  following order:      "Neither any  ground for  condoning      the delay  of 263  days is made out      nor  there   i  any  merit  in  the      appeal.  It   is   the   applicant-      appellant who  filed a petition for      divorce under  Section  13  of  the      Hindu Marriage  Act. If  any  fraud      has   been    practised   on    the      applicant, the  present  appeal  is      not  the  appropriate  remedy.  The      remedy lies with the Civil Court.      The  application  as  well  as  the      appeal is dismissed."      The  marriage   between  the   parties  was  solemnised according to  Sikh rites  on February  18, 1991  at Sangrur, tehsil and  District Patiala  in the  State of Punjab. After

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sometime it  appears differences  arose between the parties. Appellant on May 22, 1995 lodged a complaint with the Senior Superintendent of  Police  complaining  harrassment  by  the respondent in  connivance with  his parties.  She  said  her husband was  having illicit  relations with  the wife of his elder brother  and that  her parents-in-law and brothers-in- law were  hatching a  conspiracy to kill her in order to get her husband  married for  a second time. She complained that for the  last six  months she  was living  with her  parents because of  the ill-treatment  meted out to her and that all the persons  named in  the complaint were not permitting her to live  in peace.  There is  an entry in the Police Station City Rajpura,  District Patiala  dated July  10, 1995  where compromise between  the parties has been recorded. Reporting of the compromise was made by the respondent himself who was accompanied with various respectable persons whose names are recorded as under:      "Sh. Diwan Singh S/o Daudagar Singh      R/o  H.No.   920   Gurbax   Colony,      Patiala,   Shri   Mohinder   Singh,      Sarpanch  village  Pillap  Maghali,      Sh. Sukhdev  Singh  Sarpanch  Mando      P.S. Ghanour,  Sharan Singh  Member      Panchayat  village,  Alipur  Raian,      Jarnail Singh  S/o Sh.  Arjan Singh      R/o Rampur,  Bagh  Singh  Nambardar      Village Ghaggar Sarai, Baldev Singh      Nambardar village: Chamaru."      The report further records that the compromise has been accorded between  the parties with the help of the aforesaid persons after  lodging of  the complaint  by  the  appellant against her  husband when  she felt  annoyed.  It  was  also reported that  from that  day onwards both parties will live separately  from  other  members  of  the  family  and  that respondent would not unduly cause hardship to the appellant. Since the  complaint by  the appellant had been addressed to the  Senior  Superintendent  of  Police  her  statement  was separately  recorded   on  July  21,  1995  withdrawing  the complaint when she made the following statement:      "Statement of  Smt. Balwinder  Kaur      w/o Shri  Hardeep  Singh  D/o  Shri      Tirath  Singh  R/o  Kasturba  Road,      Rajpura      Stated that  I am  the resident  of      the  address  given  above.  I  got      married   to   Hardeep   Singh   on      18.2.91. I  had  a  family  problem      with my  husband Hardeep  Singh and      my in-laws  family and  because  of      this problem  I  had  gone  to  the      house of  my mother  and father  at      Samour because of which I gave this      application. Both  the parties with      the aid  and  help  of  respectable      persons  and   the  Panchayat  have      arrived at  a settlement.   I  have      agreed to  this settlement  without      any  fear   or  pressure  from  any      quarter.  I agree to the settlement      got done  by the  Panchayat.  Now I      do  not  want  any  action  on  the      complaints given by me.  Now I live      separately from my in-laws house.                   sd/-             (BALWINDER KAUR)

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        W/o Hardeep Singh d/o               Tirath Singh            R/o Kasturba Road,                 Rajpura                 21.7.95"      On July 4, 1995 respondent had filed a petition against the appellant,  his, wife,  under Section  9 of  the Act for restitution  of   conjugal  rights   in  the  court  of  the Additional Senior  Sub Judge,  Rajpura.   This petition  was withdrawn on February 14, 1996.  The following is the record of proceeding on that day:      "14.2.1996 -  Present:- Counsel for      the plaintiff.           Counsel for  the plaintiff has      made statement  that  he  does  not      want to proceed with this case.  So      in view of the statement of counsel      for the  plaintiff the  suit of the      plaintiff    is     dismissed    as      withdrawn.   File be  consigned  to      the Record Room.      Announced       Sd/-      Dt. 14.2.96     Civil Judge Junior                      Division, Rajpura"      Appellant  submitted   that  service  on  her  in  this petition filed by her husband under Section 9 of the Act was wrongly got  obtained.   However, it is not necessary for us to go into all the details at this stage.      The petition  for divorce filed by the appellant out of which this proceeding has arisen was instituted on September 4, 1995.   We  have gone  through the  petition for divorce. Apart from  the date of the marriage between the parties the petition singularly  lacks in  better particulars though the petition is  based  on  the  alleged  acts  of  cruelty  and desertion.  Respondent did not appear and the proceeding was exparte  against  him.    Statement  of  the  appellant  was recorded on  November 22,  1995 and  that  of  her  solitary witness also  on the  same day.  The judgment of the learned District Judge  allowing the  petition is  dated December 4, 1995.  The judgment merely reproduces what the appellant had stated in  the petition for divorce in general terms and the fact that  she was  an illiterate  person and it proceeds as under:      "Respondent Hardeep  Singh did  not      turn up  to  contest  the  petition      inspire   of    his   service   and      therefore,   he    was    proceeded      exparte.           I have  recorded exparte proof      of the  petitioner.  Balwinder Kaur      petitioner appeared  as AW1 and she      examined Dalip  Singh her  maternal      uncle.           Petitioner while  appearing as      AW 1 supported her allegations made      in the  petition while  Dalip singh      AW2 her maternal uncle corroborated      her.  Both of them have stated that      the respondent  used to  treat  her      with cruelty  during her  stay with      him  and   deserted   her   for   a      continuous period  of more than two      years.           In view  of the  exparte proof      of the  petitioner, I  am satisfied

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    that  the  respondent  treated  the      petitioner   with    cruelty    and      deserted  her   for  a   continuous      period  of   more  than  two  years      before the  filing of the petition.      Resultantly, I accept this petition      and pass  an exparte decree divorce      in favour  of  the  petitioner  and      against the  respondent  dissolving      their   marriage   with   immediate      effect.           No order as to costs.           Pronounced.        Sd/District                               Judge           4.12.1995         Patiala.      Appellant has  alleged fraud  by her husband in getting her signatures on the petition for divorce and then bringing her to  court to  record her statement.  Her case is she was unaware of  what was  happening and she in fact was duped in signing the  petition and  then appearing  in the court as a witness.   She said  she never  wanted divorce.   During the course of  hearing in  this appeal, we enquired from learned counsel for  the respondent if the respondent himself at any time wanted  divorce and  the reply was in the negative. The question then  arises as  to why  the respondent allowed the proceeding to  go ex-parte.  There  is  no  mention  of  the complaint  filed   by  the   appellant  before   the  Senior Superintendent of  Police and  recording of  the  compromise between the  parties and  her own statement in the police on July 21,  1995. If  the matter  had been settled between the parties in  July 1995  one may ask a question as to what was the reason  for the appellant to file a petition for divorce within six  weeks of  the compromise.  The  conduct  of  the respondent in  proceeding with the petition filed by him for restitution of conjugal rights is also not understandable.      A petition for divorce is not like any other commercial suit.  A   divorce  not  only  affects  the  parties,  their children, if  any, and  their families  but the society also feels  its   reverberations.  Stress  should  always  be  on preserving  the   institution  of   marriage.  That  is  the requirement o  law. One may refer to the Objects and Reasons which led  to setting  up of  Family Courts under the Family Courts Act,  1984. For  the purpose  of settlement of family disputes emphasis  is "laid  on conciliation  and  achieving socially desirable  results" and  eliminating  adherence  to rigid rules of procedure and evidence. These further note:      "The Law  Commission  in  its  59th      report  (1974)  had  also  stressed      that  in   dealing  with   disputes      concerning  the  family  the  court      ought   to    adopt   an   approach      radically   different   from   that      adopted    in     ordinary    civil      proceedings and that it should make      reasonable  efforts  at  settlement      before  the   commencement  of  the      trial. The  Code of Civil Procedure      was amended  in 1976 to provide for      a special  procedure to  be adopted      in suits or proceedings relating to      matters  concerning   the   family.      However, not much use has been made      by  the  courts  in  adopting  this      conciliatory  procedure   and   the      courts continue to deal with family

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    disputes  in  the  same  manner  as      other civil  matters and  the  same      advisary approach prevails."      It is now obligatory on the part of the Family Court to endeavour, in  the first instance to effect a reconciliation or settlement  between the  parties to  a Family dispute. It will be  useful to note the qualifications and the method of selection of a Family Court Judge. That will be sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 4 of the Family Courts Act:      "(3)  A   person   shall   not   be      qualified  for   appointment  as  a      Judge unless he-      (a) has  for at  least seven  years      held a  judicial office in India or      the  office   of  a   member  of  a      Tribunal  or  any  post  under  the      Union or  a State requiring special      knowledge of law; or      (b) has  for at  least seven  years      been an advocate of a High Court or      of  two  or  more  such  courts  in      succession; or      (c)    possesses     such     other      qualifications   as   the   Central      Government    may,     with     the      concurrence of the Chief Justice of      India, prescribed.      (4)  In   selecting   persons   for      appointment as Judges,-      (a) every  endeavour shall  be made      to ensure that persons committed to      the need  to protect  and  preserve      the institution  of marriage and to      promote the welfare of children and      qualified  by   reason   of   their      experience and expertise to promote      the  settlement   of  disputes   by      conciliation  and  counselling  are      selected; and      (b) preference  shall be  given  to      women."      Even where  the Family  Courts are not functioning, the objects and  principles underlying the constitution of these courts can  be kept  in view by the civil trying matrimonial causes.      Under Section  21 of  Hindu Marriage  Act provisions of Code of  Civil  Procedure  1908,  as  far  as  may  be,  are applicable but that is subject to other provisions contained in the Act and to such rules the High Court may make in this behalf. Under  Section 28  of Hindu  Marriage Act  decree of divorce is appealable. Section 28 of the Act is as under:      "28.  Appeals   from  decrees   and      orders.-      (1) All  decrees made  by the court      in any  proceeding under  this sub-      section  (3),   be  appealable   as      decrees of  the court  made in  the      exercise  of   its  original  civil      jurisdiction, and every such appeal      shall lie  to the  court  to  which      appeal  ordinarily   lie  from  the      decisions of the court given in the      exercise  of   its  original  civil      jurisdiction.           (2) Orders  made by  the court

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    in any proceeding under Act section      25 or  section 26 shall, subject to      the provisions  of sub-section (3),      be  appealable   if  they  are  not      interim  orders,   and  every  such      appeal shall  lie to  the court  to      which appeals  ordinarily lie  from      the decisions of the court given in      exercise  of   its  original  civil      jurisdiction.           (3) There  shall be  no appeal      under this  section on  the subject      of costs only.           (4) Every  appeal  under  this      section shall be preferred within a      period of thirty days from the date      of the decree or order."      This Section  28 may  be contrasted  with Section 96 of the Code  which provides  for appeal  from original  decree, which, in relevant part, is as under:      "96. Appeal  from original decree.-      (1) Save  where otherwise expressly      provided in  the body  of this Code      or by  any other  law for  the time      being in force, an appeal shall lie      from every  decree  passed  by  any      Court      exercising      original      jurisdiction    to     the    Court      authorised to hear appeals from the      decisions of such Court.           (2) An  appeal may lie from an      original decree passed ex parte.           (3) No appeal shall lie from a      decree passed by the Court with the      consent of parties."      Rules of  procedures are meant to subserve the cause of justice and  not to  frustrate it.  In the present case when fraud has  been alleged  by the wife in getting the petition for divorce  filed through  her  when  she  never  wanted  a divorce and  circumstances showed  that what  she  said  was prima facie  probable and  further from  circumstance of the case hereinafter  pointed out, the High Court in our opinion was not justified in rejecting the appeal without satisfying itself that the requirements of law had been satisfied.      Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act mandates the court before granting  decree for divorce, whether defended or not to satisfy  itself (1)  if the  grounds for  claiming relief exist and  the petitioner  is not taking advantage of his or her own  wrong or  disability for the purpose of such relief and (2)  the petitioner has not in any manner been accessory to or connived at or condoned the act or acts complained of, or  where   the  ground  of  the  petition  is  cruelty  the petitioner has  not in  any manner  condoned the  cruelty. A duty is  also cast  on the  court in  the first instance, in every case  where it  is possible so to do consistently with the nature  and circumstances  of the  case, to  make  every endeavour  to  bring  about  a  reconciliation  between  the parties. Under sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act, the court can  even refer  the matter to any person named by the parties for the purpose of reconciliation and to adjourn the matter for  that purpose.  These objectives  and  principles govern all  courts trying  matrimonial matters. The judgment of the  District Judge  is silent  of the learned Judge took into consideration  all what  is mentioned  in Section 23 of the Act.  A question  also arises  can a  party  defeat  the

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provisions of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of Section 23 of  the Act  by  remaining  ex-parte  and  the  court  is helpless in  requiring the presence of that party even if in the circumstances  of the  case so  required. We  are of the opinion that  court can  in such  a  situation  require  the personal presence  of the  parties. Though  the  proceedings were ex-parte  in the  case like  this the court cannot be a silent spectator  and it should itself endeavour to find out the  truth   by  putting  questions  to  the  witnesses  and eliciting answers from them.      In the  circumstances aforesaid,  the High Court should not have  summarily dismissed the appeal. By doing so it has also failed  to exercise  its power of superintendence under Article 227  of the Constitution. The High Court should have been if  the proceedings  before the  District Judge were in accordance with  the procedure prescribed and as per the law applicable. To  direct the appellant to file a separate suit for setting  aside the  decree of  divorce on  the ground of fraud otherwise is hardly a solution to the case.      As to the correctness otherwise of the allegations made by the  appellant or  the stand taken, by the respondent, we do not  wish to  comment as  it might  prejudice the case of either of  the parties  as we  are considering  of remanding matter back  to the  District Judge  for trial  of the  case afresh.      Accordingly,  the   appeal  is  allowed,  the  impugned judgment dated  September 27,  1996 of the High Court and as well as  that of  District Judge  dated December 4, 1995 are set aside.  The matter  will go back to the learned District Judge to  try and  proceed with  the petition  in accordance with law.      A copy  of this  judgment shall be sent to the District Judge, Patiala  immediately and  the parties are directed to appear in that court on December 17, 1977.      The appellant  is entitled  to costs  which we quantify Rs. 2,000/-.