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PETITIONER: BALWANT KAUR & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHANAN SINGH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       18/04/2000

BENCH: S.B.Majumdar M.Jagannadha Rao

JUDGMENT:

     S.B.Majmudar, J.

     The  appellants  in  this  appeal,  who  are  original defendant nos.  1 & 2 in civil suit filed by respondent nos. 1 to 4 herein have brought in challenge, on grant of special leave  to  appeal under Article 136 of the  Constitution  of India,  the judgment rendered by learned Single Judge of the High  Court  decreeing  the  respondents/plaintiffs  suit. This  appeal raises a short question as to whether appellant no.1-original defendant no.  1, who is the widowed destitute daughter of testator-Sham Singh, had acquired full ownership of  1/3rd interest in the suit land pursuant to the will  of her father dated 21st August, 1959 or whether she had only a life  interest  therein,  which  did not  mature  into  full ownership  in  her favour under Section 14 (1) of the  Hindu Succession  Act,  1956  (hereinafter   referred  to  as  the Succession  Act).   The Trial Court, in the suit filed  by the  respondents/plaintiffs, took the view that  appellant no.1  had only a life interest which she could not  bequeath in  favour  of  defendant no.2 and, accordingly,  granted  a declaratory decree in favour of the plaintiffs.  The learned District  Judge, as a Court of first appeal, took a contrary view  and dismissed the suit by holding that appellant  no.1 had  acquired full ownership of the suit property, up to her 1/3rd full interest in the suit land and she did not acquire only  life  interest  therein pursuant to the  will  of  the deceased.

     As  noted  earlier, in the second appeal, the  learned Single  Judge of the High Court took a contrary view against the  appellants  and  restored the  decree  of  declaration granted by the Trial Court.

     In  support of this appeal learned senior counsel  for the  appellants vehemently contended that, on the facts  of the  present case, the right which accrued to appellant no.1 under  the will of her father as full owner of the  property was well sustained under Section 14(1) of the Succession Act and  that  the High Court was in error in  applying  Section 14(2)  of the said Act.  He tried to support his  contention on the ground that appellant no.1, being widowed daughter of the  testator, had a pre-existing legal right to succeed  to the  entire  estate of the deceased under Section 8  of  the Succession  Act, if the testator had died intestate.  It  is this  right  of hers which was confirmed to the  extent  of

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1/3rd  by the will in question and, therefore, Section 14(1) of the Succession Act squarely got attracted to the facts of the  present case and consequently the suit was liable to be dismissed.

     On   the   other  hand,   learned  counsel   for   the respondents/plaintiffs  contended that the High Court  had rightly  applied  Section  14(2) of the Succession  Act  for decreeing  the  suit.  That as per the will of the  testator only  life  interest was made available to  appellant  no.1. That  she  had  no pre-existing right in the estate  of  her father  who, admittedly, was the sole owner of his property; that  he  could have gifted or willed away the  property  to anyone  he liked.  Consequently, if the testator conferred a limited  interest  to appellant no.1 in his property as  per his  will,  the said legacy was squarely covered by  Section 14(2)  of  the Succession Act as held by the High Court  and consequently the present appeal deserves to be dismissed.

     Before   considering  the   aforesaid  short  question involved  in  this  appeal  for  our  consideration,  it  is necessary  to  keep  in  view   certain  admitted  and  well established facts on record.

     Factual  background  :   One Sham Singh was  the  sole owner  of  land in dispute measuring 47 Kanals  situated  in village  Dolharon, Tehsil Garhshankar of Hoshiarpur District of  the  State  of Punjab.  Appellant no.1  is  his  widowed daughter  and  was dependent on him for her maintenance  and support.   He  had  no  other issue.  The  said  Sham  Singh executed  a  will dated 21st August, 1959 in favour  of  his daughter-appellant  no.1 on whom he conferred life  interest to  the  extent  of residue 1/3rd of the  suit  land  which, according  to the will on her death had to revert to his two brothers  Teja  Singh  and   Beant  Singh,  predecessors  in interest  of the respondents herein.  His two brothers  were given  the legacies of 1/3rd interest each in the suit  land as  full owners by the very same will.  Thus 2/3rd  interest in  the suit land was sought to be willed away in favour  of testators  two  brothers while 1/3rd interest was given  to appellant  no.1  first mentioned as full owner  thereof  but also next shown as holding life interest therein by the very same  will  and  her 1/3rd interest was to  devolve  on  the testators  aforesaid  two brothers as reversioners  on  her demise.   Appellant no.1 claiming to have become full  owner of  the 1/3rd property bequeathed to her on the death of the testator  on 11th October, 1960 executed her own will on 6th February,  1970 bequeathing her right, title and interest in the  suit  land  to  appellant  no.2/defendant  no.2.   That resulted  in the aforesaid suit for declaration as filed  by the  plaintiffs  claiming  to be reversioners  entitled  to acquire  ownership  in  the  remaining 1/3rd  part  of  suit property.  In the light of the aforesaid factual background, the  short question which is required to be considered is as to  what  is  the  right which  accrued  to  appellant  no.1 pursuant  to the will of her deceased father.  When we  turn to  the  will  in question, we find the  following  relevant recitals:  ..Unfortunately I have no male issue.  Not only this,  Wahuguru  is much angry with me that the daughter  of the  executant namely Musammat Balwant Kaur, having become a widow  is serving me and the real brothers of the  executant Bayant  Singh  and Teja Singh, who for the satisfaction  and welfare of the executant also serve me and gives every help, financial  and otherwise to my daughter aforesaid and  looks after  my daughter Musammat Balwant Kaur aforesaid in  every

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way  and I have full confidence that in future too the above mentioned  3  persons will serve me wholeheartedly  and  the brothers of the executant will maintain proper relations and good  behaviour with the daughter of the executant and shall not  leave any stone unturned in performing the custom after my  death.   Since  in  the absence of male  issue,  in  the present  time there remains dispute in respect of the rights of  heirship  of the female issue, as a result of which  the property  due  to  litigation  is ruined and  the  owner  is dishonoured  in the world and among the relatives.  I do not wish  that after my death the result may be such in  respect of  my  property and myself.  Therefore, I, on my  own  free will  and volition with full senses and good health  execute this will with the following conditions that after the death of  the executant, Teja Singh S/o Gujar Singh, real  brother of  the executant shall be the sole heir and owner and title holder  of  land measuring (illegible) opposite  Shasshan and  Bayant  Singh  S/o  Gujar Singh, real  brother  of  the executant  shall  be  the  heir owner and  title  holder  of land.   Kanals  out  of  5-12   kanals  of  land  situated Dohaldoon,  Khasra  No.248/9.20  and  140/9.7  and  Musammat Balwant  Kaur,  daughter Shyam Singh executant shall be  the heir,  owner  and  title  holder  of  the  entire  remaining moveable  and immoveable property of the executant  situated at  Doohadroon, Thana Mahalpur.  No other person shall  have no  right  in  the heirship of the  executant  But  Musammat Balwant  Kaur  daughter of the executant shall be  benefited from  the property mentioned above during her life time  and on  the death of Musammat Balwant Kaur, the brothers of  the executant  mentioned  above,  shall  be  the  heirs  of  the property  and  if  they  die before the  death  of  Musammat Balwant Kaur, the male issues of the said two brothers shall be the heirs of the property of Musammat Balwant Kaur..

     The  aforesaid relevant recitals in the will show that appellant  no.1-widowed  daughter  of the  testator,  was  a destitute  and  was solely dependant upon the  testator  for maintenance  and the testator himself was also anxious about making  provision for her maintenance even after his  demise and  relied  upon his brothers, the other two legatees,  for looking  after  his destitute daughter after his life  time. It,  therefore,  becomes clear that  appellant  no.1-widowed daughter  of  the testator, was a destitute and had  no  one else  to  fall  back upon for maintaining her  but  for  the testator,  her father.  Under these circumstances, when  the testator  granted  1/3rd  interest  in   the  suit  land  to appellant  no.1  by his will (as a residue  after  deducting 2/3rd  interest  of his brothers), even though he  conferred life interest to her to that extent, can it be said that the said  provision was in lieu of any pre-existing legal  right of maintenance from his estate as available to his destitute widowed  daughter?  If any pre-existing right is culled  out in  her  favour,  at  least on the date on  which  the  will started  operating upon the death of the testator, then  the appellants  case would squarely be covered by Section 14(1) of  the Succession Act but if, on the other hand, it is held that  she had no pre-existing right in the testators estate on  the  date of coming into operation of the will, then  it could  be  said that she got for the first time interest  in testators  property under the will and consequently Section 14(2) would get attracted, as held by the High Court.

     Now,  it must at once be stated that the reasoning  of the  lower appellate Court that the will in question did not create  life  interest  in  favour of  appellant  no.1  only

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because in the earlier part of the will she was described to be  the owner of the residue 1/3rd share of property, cannot be  sustained.  On a conjoint reading of the will, it has to be  held that the testator did not confer full ownership  of 1/3rd  interest  in the suit land to his  daughter-appellant no.1  but only conferred a life interest in the property  to her.  Section 88 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 provides as  follows:   88.   The last of two  inconsistent  clauses prevails.-  Where  two  clauses  of  gifts  in  a  will  are irreconcilable, so that they cannot possibly stand together, the last shall prevail.

     This  is  obviously  on the principle  that  the  last clause  represents the latest intention of the testator.  It is  true that in the earlier part of the will, the  testator has stated that his daughter-Balwant Kaur shall be the heir, owner  and title-holder of his entire remaining moveable and immovable property but in the later part of the same will he has  clearly  stated that on the death of Balwant Kaur,  the brothers of the testator shall be the heirs of the property. This  clearly  shows that the recitals in the later part  of the  will  would  operate  and make appellant  no.1  only  a limited estate holder in the property bequeathed to her.

     However,  this is not the end of the matter.  The moot question  which survives for consideration is as to whether, on  the  date of the operation of the will, namely, on  11th October,  1960,  when  the testator  died,  appellant  no.1- widowed daughter of the testator, had any pre-existing right in the testators estate.  Now it becomes at once clear that the  pre-existing  right must be a right in  the  testators estate  prior  to  the  date  on  which  the  will   started operating.   It must, therefore, be shown by appellant  no.1 that she had any legal right in her fathers estate prior to 11th  October, 1960.  So far as this question is  concerned, learned  senior counsel for the appellants tried to  answer it  by  submitting that appellant no.1- widowed daughter  of the  testator, had a pre-existing legal right to succeed  to his estate under Section 8 of the Succession Act, being heir of  class I.  The said section provides:  8.  General rules of  succession in the case of males.- The property of a male Hindu  dying  intestate  shall   devolve  according  to  the provisions  of  this Chapter:- (a) firstly upon  the  heirs, being  the  relatives specified in class I of the  Schedule; (b)  secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then upon the heirs,  being  the  relatives specified in class II  of  the Schedule;   (c)  thirdly, if there is no heir of any of  the two classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased;  and (d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the deceased.

     When  we turn to the schedule, we find that daughter is  mentioned  as  class I heir of the deceased  male  Hindu dying  intestate while his brothers are mentioned as class II  heirs  in  category  II item (3) of  clause  II  of  the schedule.   However,  this  section could  have  helped  the appellants if it was shown that the deceased-Sham Singh had died intestate and not after executing the will in question. If  Sham  Singh  had died without making a will of  his  own properties,  then appellant no.1 could have become the  full owner  of  the  entire property left by him and  would  have excluded  both his brothers whose interest is claimed by the respondents/plaintiffs.  But that situation never occurred on  the death of the testator.  Appellant no.1 had merely  a right  to  succeed  to  her fathers  property  if  she  had

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survived  her  father and if her father had  died  intestate without   making  any  will.   This   was  merely   a   spes successionis,  a chance to succeed to her fathers  property and not any pre-existing legal right.  It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the appellants for invoking Section 14(1) of the Succession Act  that,  on  the  date  of the  operation  of  the  will, appellant  no.1-widowed  daughter of the testator,  had  any pre-  existing  right in the testators estate at  any  time prior  to  11th  October,  1960,  under  Section  8  of  the Succession Act.

     However,  the appellants claim can be well  sustained under  the  relevant provisions of the Hindu  Adoptions  and Maintenance  Act,  1956 (for short the  Maintenance  Act). Let  us have a look at these provisions.  They are  Sections 18 to 22 of the said Maintenance Act.

     We  shall  first refer to Section 21 (vi) and  Section 22(2)  which deal with the right of maintenance accruing  to the  widowed daughter after the death of her father.   Later on,  we  shall  refer to the right of the  widowed  daughter under  proviso (a) to Section 19(1) for maintenance  against her  father, during his life time, which is a right not only against  the  father personally but against the property  he may  be holding.  When we come to deal with the proviso  (a) to  Section 19(1) lower down, it will be clear as to why  we are  saying  that  the widowed daughter has  a  pre-existing right to maintenance against her father during his life time in  certain circumstances and as against the property he may be holding.

     As  per  Section 21 clause (vi), if the  deceased  has left  behind  him his widowed daughter then provided and  to the extent that she is unable to obtain maintenance from her husbands  estate,  or from her son or daughter, if any,  or his  or her estate;  or from her father-in-law or his father or  the estate of either of them, then such widowed daughter is  to  be  treated as a dependant of  the  deceased.   As enjoined  by  Section 22, she gets the legal right of  being maintained  out of the estate inherited by any of the  heirs of  her deceased father.  Thus the right of being maintained out  of  the estate of the deceased father would  inhere  in appellant  no.1, his widowed daughter and would get attached to  the  entire  suit property if it goes in  the  hands  of testators  other testamentary heirs.  It is not in  dispute between  the  parties  that  she  was  a  destitute  widowed daughter.   That she had no issues.  As the recitals in  the will  clearly  indicate, the testator was worried about  her maintenance and that is why even enjoined his brothers-other legatees  under the will, to look after his daughter,  after his   death.    It   is   also   not   the   case   of   the respondents/plaintiffs   that  appellant   no.1-   widowed daughter  of  the deceased, had any estate of  her  deceased husband or her father-in- law to fall back upon for claiming dependency benefit.  If that was so, she would not have been maintained  by her father in his lifetime.  She, admittedly, was  staying  with him.  Therefore, it has to be  held  that appellant  no.1  was  a destitute widowed  daughter  of  the testator  who had his estate as the only source for  getting maintenance  and dependency benefits.  That statutory  right inhered  in her even during the life time of her father,  as clearly indicated by the will itself.

     In this connection, sub-section 2 of Section 22 of the

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Maintenance Act deserves to be noted.  It provides that :

     Where  a dependent has not obtained, by  testamentary or  intestate succession, any share in the estate of a Hindu dying  after  the  commencement of this Act,  the  dependent shall  be entitled, subject to the provisions of this Act to maintenance from those who take the estate.

     This statutory provision clearly indicates that once a person is found to be dependent of the deceased, then such a dependent has a pre-existing right qua the estate of the deceased  to  get  maintenance  and   that  right,  if   not crystallised by way of grant of definite share in the estate of  the  deceased either on his intestacy or on  the  coming into  operation of his testament in favour of the dependent, then  such  pre-existing right of maintenance  would  remain operative  even  after the death of the Hindu and would  get attached  to  the  estate which may get transmitted  to  his heirs  either  on  his  intestacy  or  on  account  of   the testamentary  disposition in their favour.  Thus, Section 22 sub-section  2 underscores pre-existing right of maintenance in  favour  of the dependent qua the estate of the  Hindu. This  aspect  is  further highlighted by Section 20  of  the Maintenance  Act.   Sub-section  1 thereof provides  that  : Subject to the provisions of this section a Hindu is bound, during  his  or  her  lifetime,  to  maintain  his  or   her legitimate  or illegitimate children and his or her aged  or infirm parents.

     It  cannot be disputed that appellant no.1, who is the widowed  daughter of the testator, was his legitimate child. Therefore,  during  the  lifetime of her father, she  has  a legal  right  to be maintained by him, especially  from  his estate.   Sub-section 3 of Section 20 lays down that :  The obligation of a person to maintain his or her aged or infirm parent  or a daughter who is unmarried extends in so far  as the parent or the unmarried daughter, as the case may be, is unable  to maintain himself or herself out of his or her own earnings or other property.

     Now  it  is  obvious  that  sub-section  3  refers  to unmarried  daughter,  while  appellant no.1  was  a  widowed daughter.   Consequently,  on her marriage, she  would  have been  entitled  to get maintenance from her husband  as  per Section  18 of the Act, if he was alive and the marriage was subsisting.    Obviously,  Section  18   cannot  apply,   as appellant no.1 was already a widow and not a subsisting wife of  her  late  husband.   She   was,  therefore,  a  widowed daughter-in-law of her father-in-law.  For her, the relevant statutory  provision  is Section 19 of the Act, which  deals with  maintenance of widowed daughter-in-law.  Sub-section 1 thereof  lays  down  that:  A Hindu wife,  whether  married before  or  after  the commencement of this  Act,  shall  be entitled  to be maintained after the death of her husband by her  father-in-law.  Provided and to the extent that she  is unable  to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property or, where she has no property of her own, is unable to  obtain maintenance  (a) from the estate of her  husband or her father or mother, or (b) from her son or daughter, if any, or his or her estate.  Xxx xxx xxx

     (Emphasis supplied)

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     Under the proviso to Section 19(1), the words used are (a) from the estate of her husband or her father or mother and  they  mean that she has a right  apart from the  right she has against the estate of her husband  a personal right against  her father or mother during their respective lives. The words the estate of before the words her husband are not to be read into the latter part of the clause as estate of  her father or mother.  What the proviso does here is to create  (i)  a right against the estate of her  husband  and also  (ii)  an  independent and personal right  against  the father  during  his lifetime (or against the mother) if  the daughter  is unable to maintain herself out of her  earnings or other property etc.  That right against the father during his  lifetime  can  be enforced against the property  he  is holding.   The  legislature  has deliberately not  used  the words  estate of her father in the proviso (a) to  section 19(1).   That right of the widowed daughter is covered under Section  21  (vi) read with Section 22(2).  We have  already referred  to that right of maintenance against the estate of her  father  in Section 22(2) read with Section 21(vi).   If indeed  we  read  the  words estate of  before  the  words father  in Section 19(1)(a), then Section 22(2) read  with section 21(vi) would become otiose.  That is why we say that the proviso (a) to Section 19(1) creates a personal right in favour of the widowed daughter against her father during his lifetime.   Any  property given in lieu thereof, during  his life time or to go to her after the fathers life time would certainly  fall under Section 14(1) of the Hindu  Succession Act, 1956, that being in lieu of a pre-existing right during the fathers lifetime.

     On  facts,  it must be held that the widowed  daughter had  a  right  against  her   father,  during  the  latters lifetime,  as  she was a destitute and not taken care of  by her  husband or his estate.  It is in lieu thereof, he  gave her 1/3rd of her property.

     This  provision clearly indicates that if the  widowed daughter-in-law  is destitute and has no earnings of her own or  other property and if she has nothing to fall back  upon for  maintenance  on the estate of her husband or father  or mother  or  from the estate of her son or daughter, if  any, then she can fall back upon the estate of her father-in-law. This  provision  also  indicates that in case of  a  widowed daughter-in-law  of  the family if she has no income of  her own  or  no  estate  of her husband to fall  back  upon  for maintenance,  then  she can legitimately  claim  maintenance from  her  father  or mother.  On the facts of  the  present case,  therefore, it has to be held that appellant no.1, who was a destitute widowed daughter of the testator and who was staying  with  him  and was being maintained by him  in  his lifetime,  had  nothing  to  fall back upon so  far  as  her deceased  husbands  estate  was concerned and  she  had  no estate  of  her own.  Consequently, as per Section  19(1)(a) she  could  claim maintenance from the estate of her  father even  during her fathers lifetime.  This was a pre-existing right  of the widowed daughter qua testators estate in  his own   lifetime  and  this  right   which  was  tried  to  be crystallised in the will in her favour after his demise fell squarely  within  the  provisions of Section  22(2)  of  the Maintenance  Act.  Thus, on a conjoint operation of Sections 19(1)(a)  and  22(2)  read with Section 21(vi) there  is  no escape  from  the  conclusion  that  appellant  no.1  had  a pre-existing  right  of being maintained from the estate  of

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the testator during the testators lifetime and also had got a  subsisting right of maintenance from the said estate even after  the  testators death when the estate would  pass  in favour  of  his  testamentary heirs and the  same  situation would  have occurred even if the testator had died intestate and  if appellant no.1 could have become a Class-I heir.  As we  have  already  seen earlier, if the  testator  had  died intestate, instead of 1/3rd interest she would have got full interest, in the suit land and it is that interest which was curtailed  up to 1/3rd in lieu of her claim for  maintenance against  the estate of the testator pursuant to the will  in question.   It, therefore, cannot be said that the provision in  the will in her favour was not in lieu of a pre-existing right  and  was conferred only for the first time under  the will  so  as to attract Section 14(2) of the Succession  Act as, with respect, wrongly assumed by the High Court.

     The  testator  in  his wisdom with a  view  to  ensure future  claim  of maintenance of appellant no.1 against  his estate,  carved  out  the residuary 1/3rd part  thereof  for being  handed over to appellant no.1 on his demise.  But for that  provision his entire estate would have remained liable to  meet  the claim of future maintenance of appellant  no.1 from that estate and could have been enforced against any of the  heirs of deceased testator who might have succeeded  to his  estate  as  testamentary   heirs  on  the  testamentary succession  getting  opened in their favour.   The  testator wanted  to  free  his  other testamentary  heirs  from  this pre-existing   liability  attached  to   his  estate.    He, therefore,  carved out a parcel of his estate for  enjoyment of  his destitute widowed daughter, though of course as life interest  which Section 14(1) of the Act made a full  estate on  the demise of the testator.  It is in the light of  this pre-   existing  statutory  right  of  appellant  no.1   for maintenance  against  the  estate of the testator  that  the provision  in  the  will,   granting  1/3rd  residuary  life interest  to  appellant no.1, has to be  appreciated.   Once this  legal right of appellant no.1 is visualised, it  would obviously  be  the pre-existing right of maintenance in  her favour  qua the estate of the testator and it is this  right which,  though  circumscribed as life interest in the  will, would  get  matured into full ownership in her favour  under Section  14(1)  of  the Succession Act, on the  coming  into operation of the will.  That would precisely attract Section 14(1)  of the Succession Act and would take the case out  of the  exceptional  provision  of Section 14(2).   Both  these provisions  read as under:  14.  Property of a female Hindu to  be her absolute property.- (1) Any property possessed by a  female  Hindu,  whether  acquired  before  or  after  the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

     Explanation:- In this sub-section, property includes both  movable  and immovable property acquired by  a  female Hindu by inheritance or device, or at a partition or in lieu of  maintenance  or arrears of maintenance, or by gift  from any  person, whether a relative or not, before, at or  after her marriage or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or  by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever,  and also  any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.

     (2)  Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall  apply to  any property acquired by way of gift or under a will  or any  other instrument or under a decree or order of a  civil

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Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other  instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe  a restricted estate in such property.

     In  the case of V.Tulasamma & Ors.  v.  V.Sesha  Reddi (Dead)  by  L.Rs.  [1977] 3 SCR 261, a three-Judge Bench  of this  Court,  speaking through Bhagwati, J.(as he then  was) has  clearly laid down the scope and ambit of Sections 14(1) and (2) of the Succession Act.  The relevant observations at the  bottom of page 268 to beginning of page 270 deserve  to be  extracted in extenso:  Now, sub-section (2) of  section 14  provides that nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply  to  any property acquired by way of gift or  under  a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil  court or under an award where the terms of the  gift, will  or  other  instrument or the decree,  order  or  award prescribe  a  restricted  estate  in  such  property.   This provision is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to sub-section (1) and it was regarded as such by this Court in Badri  Pershad  v.  Smt.  Kanso Devi [(1970) 2 SCR 95].   It excepts  certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female  from  the operation of sub-section (1) and being  in the  nature  of  an  exception  to  a  provision  which   is calculated  to  achieve a social purpose by  bringing  about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society,  it must be construed strictly so as to impinge  as little  as  possible on the broad sweep of the  ameliorative provision  contained  in  sub-section  (1).   It  cannot  be interpreted  in a manner which would rob sub-section (1)  of its  efficacy  and deprive a Hindu female of the  protection sought  to be given to her by sub-section (1).  The language of sub-section (2) is apparently wide to include acquisition of  property  by  a Hindu female under an  instrument  or  a decree or order or award where the instrument, decree, order or  award  prescribes  a restricted estate for  her  in  the property  and  this  would  apparently cover  a  case  where property  is  given to a Hindu female at a partition  or  in lieu  of  maintenance and the instrument, decree,  order  or award  giving such property prescribes limited interest  for her  in  the property.  But that would virtually  emasculate sub-section  (1), for in that event, a large number of cases where  property is given to a Hindu female at a partition or in  lieu of maintenance under an instrument, order or  award would  be  excluded  from the operation  of  the  beneficent provision  enacted in sub-section (1), since in most of such cases,  where property is allotted to the Hindu female prior to  enactment  of  the Act, there would be a  provision,  in consonance  with  the  old   Sastric  law  then  prevailing, prescribing  limited  interest  in the  property  and  where property  is  given  to the Hindu female subsequent  to  the enactment  of the Act, it would be the easiest thing for the dominant  male  to provide that the Hindu female shall  have only  a restricted interest in the property and thus make  a mockery of sub-section (1).  The Explanation to sub- section (1)  which  includes  within the scope of  that  sub-section property  acquired  by a female Hindu at a partition  or  in lieu  of  maintenance  would also be  rendered  meaningless, because  there  would  hardly  be  a  few  cases  where  the instrument,  decree,  order  or award giving property  to  a Hindu  female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance would not contain a provision prescribing restricted estate in the property.  The social purpose of the law would be frustrated and  the  reformist zeal underlying the statutory  provision would  be  chilled.  That surely could never have  been  the intention  of the Legislature in enacting sub- section  (2).

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It  is an elementary rule of construction that no  provision of  a statute should be construed in isolation but it should be  construed with reference to the context and in the light of  other  provisions  of  the  statute so  as,  as  far  as possible,  to  make  a  consistent enactment  of  the  whole statute.   Sub-section  (2) must, therefore, be read in  the context  of sub-section (1) so as to leave as large a  scope for operation as possible to sub-section (1) and so read, it must  be  confined to cases where property is acquired by  a female  Hindu  for  the first time as a  grant  without  any pre-existing  right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order  or  award, the terms of which prescribe a  restricted estate  in the property.  This constructional approach finds support in the decision in Badri Prasads case (supra) where this  Court  observed  that sub-section (2) can  come  into operation  only if acquisition in any of the methods enacted therein  is made for the first time without there being  any pre-existing  right in the female Hindu who is in possession of the property"...

     (Emphasis supplied)

     In   the  light  of   this  settled  legal   position, therefore,  the  relevant  recitals in the will have  to  be construed in the background of admitted and well established facts  referred  to by us earlier.  It is easy to  visualise that  if  the  testator had created a life interest  to  the extent  of  1/3rd  of  his property in favour  of  his  maid servant  or  a female cook who might have served him  during his  life  time,  then such female legatees could  not  have claimed  benefit of Section 14(1) and their claim would have confined  only  to Section 14(2) as they would not have  any pre-existing  legal  right of maintenance or dependency  qua the estate of the deceased employer but appellant no.1, as a destitute  widowed  daughter  of  the  testator,  stands  on entirely  a different footing.  The will in her favour  does not  create for the first time any such right as might  have been  created  in  favour of a maid servant or a  cook.   In fact,  the will itself recognises her pre- existing right in express  terms  and provides that even after his death,  his other legatee brothers have to look after the welfare of his widowed  daughter.  Under these circumstances, Section 14(1) can  legitimately  be pressed in service by  learned  senior counsel  for  the  appellants on the basis of  legal  right flowing  to  her  under  the   relevant  provisions  of  the Maintenance  Act.   Once  that conclusion  is  reached,  the result  becomes  obvious.  The judgment and order passed  by the  High Court cannot be sustained and will have to be  set aside.  Instead, the decree of dismissal of the respondents suit  as passed by the lower appellate Court will have to be confirmed,  though on entirely a different set of reasoning, as  indicated  herein above, and not on the ground that  the earlier part of the recitals in the will would supersede the later part of the recitals.

     The  appeal is accordingly allowed.  The judgment  and order  of  the  High Court are set aside and the  decree  of dismissal  of  respondents  suit as passed by  the  learned District   Judge,  Hoshiarpur  on   16th  August,  1976   is confirmed.

     There  will  be no order as to costs in the facts  and circumstances of the case.

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