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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  7536 of 1997 Appeal (civil)  7537 of 1997

PETITIONER: Balram Kumawat                                                   

RESPONDENT: Vs. Union of India & Ors.                                   .

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/08/2003

BENCH: CJI, S.B. Sinha & Arun Kumar.

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

S.B. SINHA, J :

QUESTION :

        Whether ’mammoth ivory’ imported in India answers the description  of the words  ’ivory imported in India’ contained in Wild Life  (Protection) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ’the said Act’) as  amended by Act No. 44 of 1991 is the question involved in these appeals  which arise out of a common judgment and order dated 20.3.1997 passed  by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.    FACTUAL BACKGROUND :

The appellants M/s Unigems had imported mammoth fossil said to be  of an extinct species in the year 1987.  The stock of mammoth fossil  held by the appellants is said to be periodically checked by the  statutory authorities.  The appellant in the other case Balram Kumawat  is a carver.    

Mammoth is said to be pre-historic animal which disappeared due  to climatic conditions prevailing in Alaska and Siberia.   According to  the appellants the distinction between mammoth and elephant ivory is  that whereas mammoth belongs to an extinct species, the ivory of  elephant is of an extant living animal.  The appellants state that  mammoth ivory is distinguishable by visual and non-destructive means  vis-Ã -vis elephant ivory and even in Convention on International Trade  in Endangered Species (CITES) their distinguishing features have been  pointed out.   

SUBMISSIONS :

Mr. Sanghi and Mr. Parikh, the learned counsel would contend that  trade in mammoth fossil ivory is not banned either under the said Act  or under the CITES and, thus, the impugned judgment of the High Court  cannot be sustained.   

The learned counsel would take us through the history of CITES as  mentioned in the impugned judgment of the High Court and would urge  that the purport and object of the Act cannot be sub-served by placing  a ban on trade in mammoth ivory.  Taking us to the provisions of the  said Act, the learned counsel would argue that as mammoth ivory does  not answer the description of ’wild animal’, the provisions contained  in Chapter VA of the said Act would not be attracted.  

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As Mammoth is an extinct species and as what is being used for  carving is its fossil which is called ivory because it has white and  hard dentine substance which is also available in other animals,  namely, Whale, Walrus, Hippos and Warthog; it was urged, they cannot be  included in the term ’ivory’ within the meaning of the provisions of  the said Act.    

       It was contended that the High Court committed a manifest error  in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into  consideration that mammoth ivory being deceptively similar to elephant  ivory to the naked eye, the impugned Act would be applicable in  relation thereto also.  The learned counsel would contend that if this  is taken to its logical conclusion, then even trade in plastic articles  which would be deceptively similar to elephant ivory may also be held  to have been banned.  It was argued that the intention of the  Legislature cannot be to ban any article irrespective of the purport  and object it seeks to achieve only on the ground that the same is  deceptively similar to the banned item.   There exists scientific  procedure, it was urged, whereby and whereunder mammoth ivory can be  distinguished from elephant ivory and with a view to buttress the said  argument, a large number of literature had been placed before us.

The preamble of the Act as also the ’Headings’, the learned  counsel would contend,  should be taken into consideration for the  purpose interpreting the provisions of the said Act.

FINDINGS :          In the connected matter in Indian Handicrafts Emporium & Ors.         Vs. Union of India & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 7533 of 1997)  disposed of this date, this Court upheld the constitutional validity of  the provisions of the said Act.  This Court held that in terms of Sub- Section (7) of Section 49-C of the Act all persons in general and  traders in particular have become disentitled from keeping in their  control any animal article including ivory imported in India.

       This Court further held that as a logical corollary to the said  finding, the statutory authorities would be entitled to take possession  of such ivory in terms thereof;  the purport and object of the Act  being to impose a complete ban on trade in ivory.  A complete  prohibition has been imposed in the trade of ivory (whether imported in  India or extracted by killing Indian elephants) for the purpose of  protecting the endangered species.  Trade in ivory imported in India  has been prohibited further with a view to give effect to the  provisions contained in Article 48A as also Article 51A(g) of the  Constitution of India.

       Why despite passage of time the trade in stock could not be  disposed of within a period of four years has not been disclosed by the  appellants.  It is not in dispute that even in terms of Act 44 of 1991,  six months’ time was granted for disposing the stock of ivory.

       For the reasons stated hereinafter, it may not be necessary for  us to go into the question as to whether scientifically mammoth ivory  can be deciphered from elephant ivory.  

What has been banned is ivory.  There is complete prohibition of  trade in ivory.  Such a complete prohibition is a reasonable  restriction within the meaning of Clause (6) of Article 19 of the  Constitution of India.  The impugned Act being not unreasonable does  not also attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

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       For the purpose of determination of the question, we need to  consider only the dictionary meaning of the term ’ivory’.  Commercial  meaning or technical meaning of an object or article is required to be  taken recourse to when the same is necessary for the purpose of meeting  the requirements of law.  The law in no uncertain terms says that no  person shall trade in ivory.  It does not say that what is prohibited  is trade in elephant ivory or other types of ivory.  The purport and  object of the Act, as noticed in the judgment in Indian Handicrafts  Emporium (supra), is that nobody can carry on business activity in  imported ivory so that while doing so, trade in ivory procured by way  of poaching of elephants may be facilitated.  The Parliament,  therefore, advisedly used the word ’ivory’ instead of elephant ivory.   The intention of the Parliament in this behalf, in our opinion, is  absolutely clear and unambiguous.  We cannot assume that the Parliament  was not aware of existence of different types of ivory.  If the  intention of the Parliament was to confine the subject matter of ban  under Act  44 of 1991 to elephant ivory, it would have said so  explicitly.

As noticed hereinbefore, the object of the Parliament was not  only to ban trade in imported elephant ivory but ivory of every  description so that poaching of elephant can be effectively restricted.   An article made of plastic would by no means resemble ivory.   

       In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the meaning of ’ivory’ is  stated as under:

(i)     The hard, white, elastic and fine grain substance (being  dentine of exceptional hardness) composing the main part of  the tusks of the elephant, mammoth (fossil)... (ii)    A substance resembling ivory or made in imitation of it.

       In Collins English Dictionary, ’ivory’ has been defined as:

(i)     A hard smooth creamy white variety of dentine that makes up a  major part of the tusks of elephants, walruses, and similar  animals. (ii)    A tusk made of ivory. (iii)   A yellowish-white colour; cream (iv)    A substance resembling elephant tusk.

(Emphasis supplied)

’Ivory’, therefore, even as per dictionary meaning is not  confined to elephant ivory.

       At this stage, we are not concerned with a criminal trial.  The  appellants are not being proceeded against in a criminal case.  Their  civil rights, if any, are only required to be dealt with.  The  appellants in these matters complain of civil injuries only.

Contextual reading is a well-known proposition of interpretation  of statute.  The clauses of a statute should be construed with  reference to the context vis-Ã -vis the other provisions so as to make a  consistent enactment of the whole statute relating to the subject- matter.  The rule of ’ex visceribus actus’ should be resorted to in a  situation of this nature.

In State of West Bengal vs. Union of India [AIR 1963 SC 1241 at  p. 1265], the learned Chief Justice stated the law thus :

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"The Court must ascertain the intention of the  Legislature by directing its attention not merely to  the clauses to be construed but to the entire  statute; it must compare the clause with the other  parts of the law, and the setting in which the clause  to be interpreted occurs."

The said principle has been reiterated in R.S. Raghunath vs.  State of Karnataka and another [AIR 1992 SC 81 at p. 89].

Furthermore, even in relation to a penal statute any narrow and  pedantic, literal and lexical construction may not always be given  effect to.  The law would have to be interpreted having regard to the  subject matter of the offence and the object of the law it seeks to  achieve.  The purpose of the law is not to allow the offender to sneak  out of the meshes of law.  Criminal Jurisprudence does not say so.   

G.P. Singh in his celebrated treatise ’Principles of Statutory  Interpretation’ distinguished between  strict construction of penal  statutes which deals with crimes of aggravated nature vis-Ã -vis the  nature of the activities of the accused which can be checked under the  ordinary criminal law stating :

"In Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras  v. YMA, Madras, SHAH, J. observed : "In a  criminal trial or a quasi-criminal proceeding,  the court is entitled to consider the substance  of the transaction and determine the liability  of the offender.  But in a taxing statute the  strict legal position as disclosed by the form  and not the substance of the transaction is  determinative of its taxability."  With great  respect the distinction drawn by SHAH, J. does  not exist in law.  Even in construing and  applying criminal statutes any reasoning based  on the substance of the transaction is  discarded.

But the application of the rule does not  permit the court in restraining comprehensive  language used by the Legislature, the wide  meaning of which is in accord with the object  of the statute.  The principle was neatly  formulated by LORD JUSTICE JAMES who speaking  for the Privy Council stated : "No doubt all  penal statutes are to be construed strictly,  that is to say, the court must see that the  thing charged as an offence is within the plain  meaning of the words used, and must not strain  the words on any notion that there has been a  slip; that there has been a casus omissus; that  the thing is so clearly within the mischief  that it must have been included if thought of.  On the other hand, the person charged has a  right to say that the thing charged although  within the words, is not within the spirit of  the enactment.  But where the thing is brought  within the words, and within the  spirit, there  a penal enactment is to be construed, like any  other instrument, according to fair commonsense  meaning of the language used, and the court is  not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity in  the language of a penal statute, where such

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doubt or ambiguity would clearly not be found  or made in the same language in any other  enactment."  The above formulation has been  cited with approval by the House of Lords and  the Supreme Court.  In the last-mentioned case,  SUBBARAO, J., referring to the Prevention of  Corruption Act, 1947, observed : "The Act was  brought in to purify public administration.   When the Legislature used comprehensive  terminology - to achieve the said purpose, it  would be appropriate not to limit the content  by construction when particularly the spirit of  the statute is in accord with the words used  there."  Similarly, the Supreme Court has  deprecated a narrow and pedantic construction  of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,  1954 likely to leave loopholes for the  adulterator to escape.  And on the same  principle the court has disapproved of a narrow  construction of section 135 of the Customs Act,  1962, Section 489A of the Penal Code, Section  12(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,  1947, section 630(1)(b) of the Companies Act,  1956, section 52A of the Copy Right Act, 1957,  and section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments  Act, 1881. So, language permitting a penal  statute may also be construed to avoid a lacuna  and to suppress the mischief and advance the  remedy in the light of the rule in Heydon’s  case.  Further, a commonsense approach for  solving a question of applicability of a penal  enactment is not ruled out by the rule of  strict construction.  In State of Andhra  Pradesh v. Bathu Prakasa Rao, rice and broken  rice were distinguished by applying the  commonsense test that at least 50% must be  broken in order to constitute what could pass  off as marketable ’broken rice’ and any grain  less than 3/4th of the whole length is to be  taken as broken.

The rule of strict construction does not  also prevent the court in interpreting a  statute according to its current meaning and  applying the language to cover developments in  science and technology not known at the time of  passing of the statute.  Thus psychiatric  injury caused by silent telephone calls was  held to amount to ’assault’ and ’bodily harm’  under sections 20 and 47 of the Offence Against  the Person Act, 1861 in the light of the  current scientific appreciation of the link  between the body and psychiatric injury."                 

(See also Lalita Jalan & Anr. Vs. Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. & Ors.  reported in 2003 (4) SCALE 52).

A statute must be construed as a workable instrument.  Ut res  magis valeat quam pereat is a well-known principle of law.   In  Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. vs. State of Assam [AIR 1990 SC  123], this Court stated the law thus :

"The courts strongly lean against any

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construction which tends to reduce a statute to  a futility. The provision of a statute must be  so construed as to make it effective and  operative, on the principle "ut res magis  valeat quam pereat". It is, no doubt, true that  if a statute is absolutely vague and its  language wholly intractable and absolutely  meaningless, the statute could be declared void  for vagueness. This is not in judicial review  by testing the law for arbitrariness or  unreasonableness under Article 14; but what a  court of construction, dealing with the  language of a statute, does in order to  ascertain from, and accord to, the statute the  meaning and purpose which the legislature  intended for it. In Manchester Ship Canal Co.  v. Manchester Racecourse Co. ((1900) 2 Ch 352,   Farwell J. said : (pp. 360-61)  "Unless the words were so absolutely  senseless that I could do nothing at all  with them, I should be bound to find some  meaning and not to declare them void for  uncertainty."  In Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham County  Council ((1960) 3 All ER 503) Lord Denning  approving the dictum of Farwell, J. said :  "But when a Statute has some meaning,  even though it is obscure, or several  meanings, even though it is little to  choose between them, the courts have to  say what meaning the statute to bear  rather than reject it as a nullity."  It is, therefore, the court’s duty to  make what it can of the statute, knowing that  the statutes are meant to be operative and not  inept and that nothing short of impossibility  should allow a court to declare a statute  unworkable. In Whitney v. Inland Revenue  Commissioners (1926 AC 37) Lord Dunedin said :  "A statute is designed to be workable,  and the interpretation thereof by a court  should be to secure that object, unless  crucial omission or clear direction makes  that end unattainable."  

The Courts will therefore reject that construction which will  defeat the plain intention of the Legislature even though there may be  some inexactitude in the language used. [See Salmon vs. Duncombe  [(1886) 11 AC 627 at 634].  Reducing the legislation futility shall be  avoided and in a case where the intention of the Legislature cannot be  given effect to, the Courts would accept the bolder construction for  the purpose of bringing about an effective result.  The Courts, when  rule of purposive construction is gaining momentum, should be very  reluctant to hold that the Parliament has achieved nothing by the  language it used when it is tolerably plain what it seeks to achieve.  (See BBC Enterprises Vs. Hi-Tech Xtravision Ltd., (1990) 2 All ER 118  at 122-3)

In Mohan Kumar Singhania and Others  vs. Union of India and  Others  [AIR 1992 SC 1], the law is stated thus :’

"We think, it is not necessary to proliferate  this judgment by citing all the judgments and  extracting the textual passages from the  various textbooks on the principles of

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Interpretation of Statutes. However, it will  suffice to say that while interpreting a  statute the consideration of inconvenience and  hardships should be avoided and that when the  language is clear and explicit and the words  used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to  construe them in their ordinary sense with  reference to other clauses of the Act or Rules  as the case may be, so far as possible, to make  a consistent enactment of the whole statute or  series of statutes/rules/regulations relating  to the subject matter. Added to this, in  construing a statute, the Court has to  ascertain the intention of the law making  authority in the backdrop of the dominant  purpose and the underlying intendment of the  said statute and that every statute is to be  interpreted without any violence to its  language and applied as far as its explicit  language admits consistent with the established  rule of interpretation."  

       In Murlidhar Meghraj Loya Vs. State of Maharashtra [(1976) 3 SCC  684] while dealing with the provisions of Food Adulteration Act it was  stated :

"5. It is trite that the social mission of food  laws should inform the interpretative process  so that the legal blow may fall on every  adulterator. Any narrow and pedantic, literal  and lexical construction likely to leave  loopholes for this dangerous criminal tribe to  sneak out of the meshes of the law should be  discouraged. For the new criminal jurisprudence  must depart from the old canons, which make  indulgent presumptions and favoured  constructions benefiting accused persons and  defeating criminal statutes calculated to  protect the public health and the nation’s  wealth."

In State of U.P. vs. Chandrika [(1999) 8 SCC 638], this Court  held that in matters involving economic crime, food offence and other  cases, the doctrine of plea bargaining should not be applied.  While  holding so it referred with approval Madanlal Ramchandra Daga vs. State  of Maharashtra [AIR 1968 SC 1267 = (1968) 3 SCR 34],  Murlidhar Meghraj  Loya (supra), Ganeshmal Jashraj vs. Government of Gujarat [(1980) 1 SCC  363], Thippaswamy vs. State of Karnataka [(1983) 1 SCC 194] and  Kasambhai Abdulrehmanbhai Sheikh vs. State of Gujarat [(1980) 3 SCC  120].

       Yet again in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs to  Govt. of West Bengal Vs. Abani Maity [AIR 1979 SC 1029: (1979) 4 SCC  85] the law is stated in the following terms:

"19. Exposition ex visceribus actus is a long  recognised rule of construction. Words in a  statute often take their meaning from the  context of the statute as a whole. They are  therefore, not to be construed in isolation.

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For instance, the use of the word "may" would  normally indicate that the provision was not  mandatory. But in the context of a particular  statute, this word may connote a legislative  imperative, particularly when its construction  in a permissive sense would relegate it to the  unenviable position, as it were, "of an  ineffectual angel beating its wings in a  luminous void in vain". "If the choice is  between two interpretations", said Viscount  Simon L. C. in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated  Collieries, Ltd. ((1940) AC 1014, 1022) "the  narrower of which would fail to achieve the  manifest purpose of the legislation, we should  avoid a construction which would reduce the  legislation to futility and should rather  accept the bolder construction based on the  view that Parliament would legislate only for  the purpose of bringing about an effective  result."  

This decision was followed  in State of Karnataka and Others vs.  Saveen Kumar Shetty [(2002) 3 SCC 426].   

In State of  Himachal Pradesh vs. Pirthi Chand and Another  [(1996) 2 SCC 37], this Court while dealing with a case of contraband  article  following amongst others in Abani Maity (supra) stated  :

       "It would be seen that the organised  traffic in contraband generates deleterious  effect on the national economy affecting the  vitals of the economic life of the community.  It is settled law that illegality committed in  investigation does not render the evidence  obtained during that investigation  inadmissible. In spite of illegal search  property seized, on the basis of said search,  it still would form basis for further  investigation and prosecution against the  accused. The manner in which the contraband is  discovered may affect the factum of discovery  but if the factum of discovery is otherwise  proved then the manner becomes immaterial."    The said principle has been reiterated in Khet Singh vs. Union of  India [(2002) 4 SCC 380] stating :

"Law on the point is very clear that even if there is  any sort of procedural illegality in conducting the  search and seizure, the evidence collected thereby  will not become inadmissible and the court would  consider all the circumstances and find out whether  any serious prejudice had been caused to the  accused."

       In State of Maharashtra Vs. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni [AIR 1980  SC 593: (1980) 4 SCC 669] this Court was concerned with search and  seizure of gold under the Customs Act and the Defence of India Rules.   The Court was dealing with smuggling of gold into India affecting the  public economy and financial stability of the country and in that  context the Court applied the Mischief Rule.  While interpreting the  words ’acquires possession’ or  ’keeping’ in Clause (b) of Section  135(1) of the Customs Act, this Court observed that they are not to be

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restricted to ’possession’ or ’keeping’ acquired as  an  owner or a  purchaser of the goods  observing :

"Such a narrow construction - which has been  erroneously adopted by the High Court - in our  opinion, would defeat the object of these  provisions and undermine their efficacy as  instruments for suppression of the mischief  which the legislature had in view. Construed in  consonance with the scheme of the statute, the  purpose of these provisions and the context,  the expression "acquires possession" is of very  wide amplitude and will certainly include the  acquisition of possession by a person in a  capacity other than as owner or purchaser. This  expression takes its colour from the succeeding  phrase commencing with the word "or", which is  so widely worded that even the temporary  control or custody of a carrier, remover,  depositor, harbourer, keeper or dealer of any  goods which he knows or has reason to believe  to be smuggled goods or prohibited goods  (liable to confiscation under Section 111),  cannot escape the tentacles of clause (b). The  expressions "keeping" and "concealing in the  second phrase of clause (b) also cover the  present case."         This Court while setting aside a judgment of acquittal passed in  favour of the Respondents therein on the basis of the interpretation of  the Customs Rules observed:

"The High Court has held that those rules do  not apply because the accused-respondent had  not acquired possession of these gold biscuits  by purchase or otherwise within the meaning of  these rules. Such a narrow construction of this  expression, in our opinion, will emasculate  these provisions and render them ineffective as  a weapon for combating gold smuggling. As was  pointed out by this Court in Balkrishna  Chhaganlal v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1974 SC  120), Rule 126-P(2)(ii) penalises a person who  has in his possession or under his control any  quantity of gold in contravention of any  provision of this Part, and the court cannot  cut back on the width of the language used,  bearing in mind the purpose of plenary control  the State wanted to impose on gold, and exempt  smuggled gold from the expression "any quantity  of gold" in that sub-rule. These provisions  have, therefore, to be specially construed in a  manner which will suppress the mischief and  advance the object which the legislature had in  view. The High Court was in error in adopting  too narrow a construction which tends to  stultify the law. The second charge thus had  been fully established against the respondent."

       These decisions are authorities for the proposition that the rule  of strict construction of a regulatory/penal statute may not be adhered  to, if thereby the plain intention of the Parliament to combat crimes  of special nature would be defeated.

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       We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that potential public  mischief cannot be a ground to invoke the court’s interpretative role  to make a new offence. Making of legislation is not the job of the  judiciary. Making of a penal legislation by the Judiciary is strictly  out of its bound.  However, when the law working in the field is clear  then what is necessary for it is to find out as to whether any offence  has been created or not.  Once it is held that the subject matter comes  within the purview of the law, the Court may not go further and say by  interpretive reasonings that the same is not so created.

We do not think that in a case of this nature where the  principles of law as enunciated hereinbefore as also the doctrine of  purposive construction, which have been discussed in details in Indian  Handicraft Emporium (supra), any useful purpose would be served by  referring to a large number of decisions relied upon by Mr. Parikh as  regards efficacy of referring to the preamble of a statute or its  heading, in view of the well-settled principles of law that where plain  and dictionary meaning can be given, reference to preamble or a heading  may not be of much use.  The submission of Mr. Parikh that in a case of  this nature a restrictive meaning should be attributed to the word  ’ivory’ cannot be acceded to inasmuch as, in our opinion,  the  dictionary meaning should be  adhered to for the purpose of giving  effect to the purport and object of the Act.  It is no doubt true that normally a technical meaning should be  attributed rather than a common meaning to a word if the same relates  to a particular trade, business or profession, art or science or words  having a special meaning as has been held in Union of India vs. Garware  Nylons Ltd. [AIR 1996 SC 3509 and  Unwin vs. Hanson [1891 (2) QB 115].   But we are not dealing with an ordinary/taxing statute.  We are dealing  with a law which has been enacted in larger public interest and in  consonance with Articles 48A and 51A(g) of the Constitution of India as  also International Treaties and Conventions.

As pointed out hereinbefore, the Parliament has enacted the  Amending  Acts of 1986, 1991 and 2003 not only for the purpose of  banning a trade in elephant ivory but with a view to create a blockade  of the activities of poachers and others so that a complete prohibition  in trade in ivory is achieved.  By reason of the Amending Acts, the  Parliament was anxious to plug the loop-holes and impose a ban on trade  in ivory so that while purporting to trade in imported ivory and  carvings therefrom, poaching of Indian elephants and  resultant illegal  trade by extracting their tusks may not continue.

The submission of Mr. Parikh that the doctrine of proportionality  should be applied in a case of this nature cannot also be acceded to.   

In Om Kumar and Others vs. Union of India [(2001) 2 SCC 386], to  which a pointed reference has been made, this Court made a distinction  between the primary and secondary review of administrative orders.  As  indicated in Indian Handicraft Emporium (supra), this Court while  construing the provisions of the Act vis-Ã -vis restrictions imposed in  terms of clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India has come  to the conclusion that the provisions of the Amending Acts satisfy even  the strict scrutiny test.  In Om Kumar (supra), this Court pointed out  that the area of discretion of administrator would vary in different  situations stating :

"While the courts’ level of scrutiny will be  more in case of restrictions on fundamental  freedoms, the courts give a large amount of  discretion to the administrator in matters of  high-level economic and social policy and may

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be reluctant to interfere : (R. v. Secy of  State for the Environment, ex p Nottinghamshire  County Council (1986 AC 240 : (1986) 1 All ER  199 : (1986) 2 WLR 1 (HL)); R. v. Secy. of  State for Environment, ex p Hammersmith and  Fulham London Borough Council ((1991) 1 AC 521  : (1990) 3 All ER 589 : (1990) 3 WLR 898) (AC  at p. 597). Smith speaks of "variable margin of  appreciation". The new Rule 1 of the Civil  Procedure Rules, 1999 permits the courts to  apply "proportionality" but taking into account  the financial issues, complexities of the  matter and the special facts of the case."

In Papanasam Labour Union vs. Madura Coats [(1995) 1 SCC 501]  whereupon Mr. Parikh has placed reliance, this Court held that while a  power has been conferred upon a higher authority, a presumption can be  raised that he would be conscious of its duties and obligations and so  would act promptly and reasonably.   

There is also no quarrel on the proposition of law laid down  therein for the purpose of judging the constitutionality of the  statutory provisions in the light of Article 19 of the Constitution of  India.    The impugned acts fulfill the said criteria.    

        For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the  impugned judgment cannot be faulted.  Accordingly, the appeals are  dismissed but without any order as to costs.