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PETITIONER: BALRAJ KHANNA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MOTI RAM

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/04/1971

BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. RAY, A.N.

CITATION:  1971 AIR 1389            1971 SCR  447  1971 SCC  (3) 399

ACT: Indian  Penal  Code (Act 45 of 1860), s.  499--Necessity  of complainant  stating  actual  words  used  by   accused-When arises. Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), ss. 202 and 203- Jurisdiction of magistrate holding preliminary enquiry-Scope of. Practice and Procedure-Applicability of exceptions to s. 499 to a case--If may be considered at the preliminary stage.

HEADNOTE:  The  respondent  filed a complaint against  the  appellants under  s.  500  I.P.C.  alleging  that  they  made   certain defamatory  allegations against him.  According to  him  the appellants passed a resolution suspending him from municipal service,  that in the course of the discussion  relating  to the passing of the resolution, all the appellants made  wild and  baseless allegations involving moral turpitude  against the  respondent,  and  after  passing  the  resolution   the appellants with the ulterior motive of maligning the respon- dent,  gave  publicity  to  the  resolution  in  the   local newspapers with large circulation.  A report containing  the allegations   which  was  sent  by  the  Secretary  of   the Corporation to the Commissioner was given in evidence.’  The  Magistrate dismissed the complaint under s.  203,  Cr. P.C.  on two grounds, namely, (1) there was no  evidence  on record as to which of the appellants made which  allegations against  the  respondents  and in the  absence  of  such  an important ingredient no prima facie case against any of  the appellants could be said to have been made out, and (2)  the resolution   passed  by  the  Standing  Committee  and   the discussion preceding it were covered by the exceptions to s. 499, I.P.C. The sessions Judge dismissed the revision of the complainant summarily. The  High  Court set aside the order of the  Magistrate  and directed  further inquiry on the grounds that: (1) it  could not be said that there was no evidence as to which member of the   Standing  Committee  made  allegations   against   the respondent,  as the evidence implicated all the  members  of the  Standing  Committee  including the  appellants  in  the charge of making the defamatory allegations contained in the report  and  (2) the appellants were not protected  by  the

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Exceptions to s. 499. In appeal to this Court, HELD:     (1)  While it is desirable that the  actual  words stated  to have ’been used by the accused which are  alleged to be defamatory should be reproduced by the complainant, in cases where the words spoken are too many or the  statements are  too  long,  it will be the height  of  technicality  to insist  that  the  actual words and  the  entire  statements should-be  reproduced  verbatim.  The object of  having  the actual  words before the court is to enable it  to  consider whether  the  words are defamatory.  That  purpose  will  be served  if  the  complainant is able  to  reproduce  in  his complaint  or evidence, in a substantial measure, the  words of imputation alleged to have been uttered.  From the  point of view of the accused also it is 448 necessary  that the matters alleged to be defamatory in  the complaint  must be so stated as to enable them to  know  the nature  of  the  allegations  they  have  to  meet.   But  a complaint  cannot be thrown out on the mere ground that  the actual  words spoken had not been stated in  the  complaint. It is only if the case of a complainant is that each of  the accused made different statements that it would be necessary for  the complainant to specify them actual words spoken  by each of the accused. (457B-F] In the present case, on the averments made in the  complaint which  refers to various matters referred to in the  report, the  complainant had furnished in a substantial measure  the words   of   imputation,  which,  according  to   him   were defamatory.   When the case of the complainant was that  all the  appellants  made  the statements  referred  to  in  the report, an& he was prepared to go to trial on that  footing, the question of the complainant stating the words alleged to have  been  used by the individual accused  did  not  arise. [457G-H; 458B] English decisions dealing with libel, held not applicable on all fours.[457A-B] Sarat  Chandra Das & Anr. v. State, A.I.R. 1952 Orissa  351, Krishnarao v. Firm Radhakisan Ramsahai & Anr., [1956] I.L.R. Nag.  236, Emperor v. Col.  Bholanath, 51 I.L.R.  1929  All. 313, K. S. Namjundaiah v. Setti Chikka Thippanna, (1952] Cr. L.  J. Mysore 1633 and Dhruba Charan Khandal  v.  Dinabandhu Patri, A.I.R. 1966 Orissa 15, referred to. (2)  Under  ss. 202 and 203 Cr.  P.C. the Magistrate has  to see  whether  a  prima facie case is made  out  against  the accused on the materials and’ evidence placed before him  by the  complainant and not whether the evidence is  sufficient to warrant a conviction. [452G-H; 453A-B] In  the  present case, the approach of  the  Magistrate  was fallacious in the face of the allegations by the  respondent that  all the appellants made the statements referred to  in the report. [458F] Chandra  Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, [1964] 1  S.C.R. 639, followed. (3)  It was also unnecessary for the High Court to  consider the  applicability  of the Exceptions to s. 499  I.P.C.,  at this  stage.  All the defence that may be available  to  the appellants  will have to be gone into during, the  trial  of the complaint. [459B-C]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 14  of 1971.

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Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated, August  26,  1970  of  the  Delhi  High  Court  in  Criminal Revision, No. 138 of 1968. C. K. Daphtary and B. P. Moheshwari, for the appellants. The respondent appeared in person. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam  J--This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment and order dated August 26, 1970 of  the Delhi  High  Court  in Criminal Revision  No.  138  of  1968 dismissing under- 449 Section 203 Cr.  P. C. the complaint filed by the respondent under Section 500 I. P. C. The  respondent Moti Ram filed a complaint in the  court  of the  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate,  Delhi  against  the  seven appellants  under  section 500 I. P. C. alleging  that  they made  certain allegations against him which were  defamatory in  character and had also passed a resolution  placing  the respondent under suspension. The  complaint filed by the respondent is a  fairly  lengthy one  and refers to various matters.  But the relevant  facts which  could  be  gathered from the same  appear  to  be  as follows : The  respondent  during  December, 1964  was  serving  as  a Liaison   Officer,   Municipal  Corporation,   Delhi.    The appellants were among the members of the Standing  Committee of the Corporation at that time.  The first appellant Balraj Khanna was bitterly inimical towards the respondent and  was bent  upon  causing harm to him.   He  wielded  considerable influence  over the members of the Standing  Committee.   At his  instance a requisition was given by the members of  the Standing  Committee to its Chairman to summon a  meeting  of the  Committee to enable them to move a resolution  for  the immediate  suspension  of the respondent  from  his  office. Accordingly a meeting of the Standing Committee was held  on December 10, 1964.  The said meeting was attended, not  only by  the Commissioner and other officers of the  Corporation, but also by the press reporters.  In that meeting the appel- lants  made very serious allegations of a defamatory  nature against  the respondent and passed unanimously a  resolution placing  him  under immediate suspension.   The  allegations made  against the respondent and the fact of his  suspension from office were given wide publicity, with the result  that it  brought  down the respondent in the  estimation  of  his friends  causing harm to his reputation.  P. W. 3,  who  was the  Secretary  of  the Corporation, and  who  attended  the meeting of the Standing Committee on December 10, 1964  sent a  report the next day Ex.  P. W. 3 / B to the  Commissioner regarding  the allegations stated to have been made  against the respondent by the appellants.  The allegations  referred to in P. W. 3 1 B are as follows :               "1.   Since   its  inception   in   1958   the               Corporation   has   executed  a   very   heavy               programme   of   works   for   improving   the               sanitation  of  the  Corporation  and  provide               other  civic amenities, but no  publicity  was               given  to these activities and the public  has               remained  more  or less in the dark.   On  the               other   hand  the  Corporation  is   adversely               criticised   even  for  minor  omissions   and               commissions.  The L.O. has, thus not performed               the  duties which are required of the post  he               has been holding and has been deficient in the               performance of his duties.               29-1 S.C. India 171

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             450.               2.    The L O. is not working in harmony  with               the  representatives of the Press  who  attend               the  Corporation office to cover the  meetings               of the Corporation and its Committee, so  much               so  that  these representatives  have  desired               that he be not required to come to their rooms               in the Corporation office.               3.    Instead of applying himself seriously to               his  official work he indulges  in  estranging               one member from the other, one officer for the               other  and one political party for the  other.               He  has  even  been trying  to  sow  seeds  of               estrangement   between  the  Mysore  and   the               Commissioners.               4.    In  the days when he was Chief  Reporter               to   the  Hindustan  Times.  he  resorted   to               undesirable  means  to  achieve,  his  desired               ends.               5.    His  association  with some of  the  non               Official  Presidents  of the  erstwhile  Delhi               Municipal  Committee has brought  nothing  but               slur to their good names.               6.    He  is  known for indulging in  acts  of               moral turpitude and for seducing  unsuspecting               girls and women." In the complaint it is further stated that in October, 1964, all the seven appellants entered into a conspiracy to defame the respondent and remove him from the municipal service and passed  a resolution on December 10, 1964 placing him  under suspension.  It is further stated that apart from the ’seven appellants,  three other members of the  Standing  Committee were  also parties to this resolution In particular,  it  is alleged  in the complaint that in the course  of  discussion relating  to the passing of the resolution-, all  the  seven appellants  made  wild and  baseless  allegations  involving moral  turpitude against the respondent.  After passing  the resolution  the  appellants  with  the  ulterior  motive  of maligning the respondent and lowering him in the  estimation of the  public gave publicity to the resolution in the local newspapers   with large circulation. The allegations  stated to have been made by the appellants are those referred to in Ex.  P. W. 3/B.  The respondent alleged that the  appellants knowingly   and  maliciously  made  false   and   defamatory allegations against him and prayed for taking action against them. Before   the  Magistrate  the  respondent  and  five   other Witnesses  were examine under section 202,Cr.P.C. and  after consideration of the evidence  the Magistrate dismissed the complaint  under  section 203.Cr.P.C.The  dismissal  of  the complaint    by   the   Magistrate   is   rested   on    two ground,namely,(1)there is no evidence on record as to  which of   the  appellants  made  which  allegation  against   the respondent   and  in  the  absence  of  such  an   important ingredient,   no  prima  facie  case  against  any  of   the appellants 451 can  be said to have been made out, and (2)  the  resolution passed   by  the  Standing  Committee  and  the   discussion preceding it are covered by the Exceptions to Section 499 1. P. C. and hence the appellants were well within their rights in  passing  a  resolution recommending  suspension  of  the respondent. The Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, dismissed the revision of  the  respondent summarily stating that the  material  on

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record  was  not sufficient to justify any  direction  being given to the trial Magistrate, to make further inquiry  into the  complaint.  The Sessions Judge has further stated  that the  evidence produced by the respondent is too  general  to make out a case to summon any one of the appellants. The  High Court, after a reference to the material  evidence on  record, as well as the allegations stated to  have  been made  by the appellants, has held that the approach made  by the  Magistrate for dismissing the complaint was  erroneous. In the view of the High Court the evidence on record goes to show that the case of the respondent is that all the members of the Standing Committee including the appellants had  made the  allegations  against  the respondent,  which  had  been reproduced by the Municipal Secretary in Ex.  P. W. 3/B.  On this  reasoning the High Court held that it cannot  be  said that there is no evidence as to which member of the Standing Committee  made  the  allegation  against  the   respondent. According  to  the  High Court the  evidence  as  it  stands implicates  all  the  members  of  the  Standing   Committee including the appellants herein in the charge of making  the defamatory  allegations  against the respondent.   The  High Court  has  further  held  that if at  a  later  stage  when witnesses  are examined, it is found that only some  of  the appellants   made  the  allegations  and  also  what   those allegations are, it will be open to the trial Magistrate  to discharge such of the accused against whom there is no evid- ence  of  having made any defamatory allegation.   The  High Court  is  also  of  the view  that  the  reasoning  of  the Magistrate   that  the  appellants  are  protected  by   the Exceptions  to  Section 499 1. P. C. is  also  not  correct. Ultimately,  the  High  Court set aside  the  order  of  the Magistrate  dismissing the complaint under Section  203  Cr. P.  C.  and  directed further inquiry to be  made  into  the complaint by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Delhi or by  any Magistrate subordinate to him, and to dispose of the same in accordance with law. Mr. C. K. Daphtary, learned counsel for the appellants, con- tended that in cases of defermation it is essential that the actual  words used should be set out in the complaint and  a reproduction  of the gist or substance of the words used  is not enough.  He further contended that a general  allegation that  the  appellants  and other  members  of  the  Standing Committee made defamatory statements referred to in Ex.   P. W. 3 / B is not a sufficient compliance 452 with the requirement of law to enable the Magistrate to take further action.  On the other hand, according to the learned counsel..  the  complainant  must  specifically  aver  which particular  allegation was made by which of the accused,  in which  case  alone  the  individual  accused  will  have  an opportunity  of effectively meeting the imputations  alleged to  have been made by him.  In this connection Mr.  Daphtary referred  us to certain English decisions governing the  law of  Libel  and  he also invited  our  attention  to  certain decisions of the High Courts. On  the other hand, the respondent, who appeared in  person, has  urged  that at this stage the Court is  concerned  only with the question whether he has prima facie made out a case for his complaint being inquired into by the Magistrate  and not whether he will be able to obtain a conviction of all or any  of  the appellants.  That stage, he pointed  out,  will arise only during the course of the trial.  He urged that in his  complaint he has made a categorical statement that  all the  appellants have made the statements referred to in  Ex. P. W. 3 /B.  As to whether the statements have been properly

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recorded by the Municipal Secretary, is again a matter which will  arise only during the course of the trial.   According to him the allegation made by him in the complaint regarding the  statements said to have been made by the appellants  is sufficient  for further action being taken by  the  Crimmnal Court.  He further contended that the statements alleged  to have  been  made by the appellants have  been  substantially reproduced in Ex.  P. W. 3 / B and it has been placed before the  Court  in  the  complaint  and  that  is  a  sufficient compliance with the requirement of law.  He pleaded that the principles laid down by the English Courts regarding the law of  Libel  are  not applicable when considering  a  case  of defamation  under  the  Indian Penal  Code.   He-  has  also referred   us  to  certain  decisions  in  support  of   his contentions. Before  we refer to the decisions cited by Mr. Daphtary  and the  respondent  on  merits, it is necessary  to  clear  the ground  by  appreciating  the  nature  of  the  jurisdiction exercised  by the Magistrate under Sections 202 and 203  Cr. P.  C.  In  Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash  Chandra  Bose  and another (1), it has been held by this Court that the  object of  the  provisions of Section 202 Cr.  P. C. is  to  enable the,  Magistrate  to form an opnion as  to  whether  process should  be issued or not. At that stage what the  Magistrate has  to see is whether there is evidence in support of  the- allegations  made  in  the complaint  and  not  whether  the evidence  is sufficient to  warrant a conviction.   It  been further  pointed  out that the, function of  the  Magistrate holdiug the preliminary inquiry is only to be satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against (1) [1964] 1 S.C.R, 639 453 the  accused  on  the materials placed  before  him  by  the complainant.   Where a prima facie case has been  made  out, even  though much can be said on both sides, the  committing Magistrate is bound to commit the accused for trial and  the accused  does  not  come into the picture at  all  till  the process is issued. The  question  arises whether in an  action  for  defamation under Section 500 I. P. C., it is necessary that the  actual statements containing the words alleged to have been used by the accused must be before the court or whether it is enough that   the  statements  alleged  to  have  been   made   are substantially  reproduced  in the  complaint.   The  further question is whether the complaint in this case is  defective in the sense that the actual statements alleged to have been made  by the individual accused have not been stated in  the complaint. We  will now refer to the decisions cited by  Mr.  Daphtary. He has referred us, in the first instance, to the passage in Halsbury’s  Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 24,  page 90 para 161 that for the statement complained of as being  a libel  or  slander  to be construed or  interpreted,  it  is essential  that  the  actual  words  and  not  merely  their substance  should be set forth verbatim in the statement  of claim  or indictment.  Again he has referred us  to  another passage in the same volume as follows :               "As  it is necessary in actions for  libel  or               slander   to  set  forth  the   actual   words               complained  of in the statement of claim  with               proper innuendoes, so also it is necessary  to               do so in an indictment where words are of  the               essence of the offence." (Page 135 para. 249).               In  Charles Bhedlaugh and Annie Besant v.  The               Queer (1) the Court of Appeal was dealing with

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             an indictment for publishing an obscene  book.               Bramwell, I,.  J., observes as follows :               "In  some  instances, words are  the  subject-               matter  of an indictment; and it follows  from               this  principle, which I have  mentioned  that               wherever the offence consists of words written               or  spoken, those words must be stated in  the               indictment;  if  they  are  not,  it  will  be               defective upon demurrer, in arrest of judgment               or  upon writ of error. In like manner,  there               can  be  no doubt that in  an  indictment  for               defamatory  libel it was necessary to set  out               the  words  complained of, so that  the  Court               might judge whether they were or could  amount               to  a  libel it is manifest that  where  words               constitute the offence, they  must be  stated               in- the, indictment.               (1) 3 Q.B.D. 607               454               In  The Capital and Counties Bank  Limited  v.               George  Henty and sons (1) Lord  Blackburn  in               dealing  with  an action for libel  states  as               follows :               "The  words themselves must have been set  out               in  the  declaration or indictment,  in  order               that the Court might be able to judge  whether               they_-were  a  libel or not.  And  this  still               remains the law."               In  Collins v. Jones (2), Lord Denning  quoted               with   approval  the  observations   of   Lord               Coleridge.   C.  J.  in  Harris  v.  Waree  as               follows :               "In  libel and slander everything may turn  on               the   form  of  words,  and  in   olden   days               plaintiffs  constantly failed from  small  and               even unimportant variance between the words of               the  libel or slander set out in the  declara-               tion and the proof of them....... In libel and               slander  the very words complained of are  the               facts on which the action is grounded.  It  is               not  the  fact of the  defendant  having  used               defamatory  expressions, but the fact  of  his               having   used  those  defamatory   expressions               alleged,  which is the fact on which the  case               depends." It is clear by a reference to the above English Law that  is an  action  for  libel  it  is  essential  that  the   words themselves  must  be  set out in  the  indictment  and  that requirement is insisted to enable the Court to judge whether those words published in writing amount to libel or not. Mr.  Daphtary referred us to certain decisions dealing  with the  nature of proof required in a prosecution for  sedition under  Section  124A  I.  P. C. But  we  do,  not  think  it necessary to refer to those decisions as we are not at  this stage concerned with the proof of the statements  attributed to  the appellants and which, according to  the  respondent, are defamatory. Mr.  Daphtary  also referred us to the  decisions  in  Sarat Chandra  Das and another v.  The State(1) and Krishnarao  v. Firm Radhakisan Ramshai and another In the Orissa High Court decision  two accused were being tried for an offence  under Section  500  I.P.C.  It  is no doubt  stated  in  the  said decision that in a trial for defamation it is essential that the words alleged (1)7 Appeal Cases 741 (2) [1955].2 All England Reports 145

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(3) [1879] 4 C.P.D. 125 (4) A.I.R. 1952 Orissa 351 (5)  1956 I.L.R. Nagpur 236 455 to  be defamatory in character should be precisely  set  out and the accused should be individually given notice of  what he is charged with, as thewords   so   set   out    will constitute the foundation for defamation. It  is  further laid  down  that  it is also essential  that  the  words  in question should be proved.  A perusal of this decision  will show that two accused were being prosecuted for  defamation. In  the complaint in that case it was stated that  both  the accused  were alleged to have made certain statements.   How ever, in the swornstatement  the complainant had  given  a slightly different version. In  his  evidence  before  the court the complainant attributedto the different  accused different  statements.  It was, under  those  circumstances, that  the  court  laid  down  the  proposition  referred  to earlier.   Understood  in  that context, it  is  clear  that according  to the High Court when different  statements  are attributed  to different accused, the statements alleged  to have been made by each of the accused must be set out as the individual   accused  must  have  noticed  as  to  what   is specifically alleged against him.               In  the  second case, the  Nagpur  High  Court               dealing   with   a  claim  for   damages   for               defamation observed as follows               "We  may point out that in a suit for  damages               for  defamation  the  law  requires  that  the               plaint ought to allege the publication of  the               dafamtory statement, set out the actual  words               used  and also state that they were  published               or  spoken  to  some  named  individuals   and               specify the time and place when and where they               were published."               On the other hand, the respondent has  invited               our  attention  to the decisions  reported  in               Emperor   v.  Col.   Bholanath  (1),   K.   S.               Namjundaiah  v. Setti Chikka Tippanna (2)  and               Dhruba Charan Khandal v. Dinabandhu Patri (3).               In  the first decision of the  Allahabad  High               Court, Mukherji, J. observed :               "While  I  am not prepared to lay down,  as  a               universal  proposition, that in no case  where               the  actual words used have not been proved  a               conviction  for  defamation by word  of  mouth               cannot be maintained, it must be conceded that               in  the  majority of cases it  should  be  so.               Defamation  is defined as  follows:---"Whoever               by   words......   makes  or   publishes   any               imputation  concerning any person intended  to               harm, or knowing or having reason to               (1)   51  I.L.R.  1929.   All.  313  (2)  1952               Criminal Law Journal Mysore 1633               (3) A.I.R. 1966 Orissa 15.               456.               believe  that such imputation will  harm,  the               reputation.....  is  said.........  to  defame               that person".  When the question arises as  to               whether  the words used were intended to  harm               or  had the effect of harming the  reputation,               the  court must be put in possession not  only               of the words used, but also of the context  in               which  they were used..." King J.,  the  other               learned Judge of the bench observes :               "I  may here remark that in my opinion  it  is

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             unnecessary  to prove the exact words used  by               the  accused, for the purpose of supporting  a               conviction   for  oral  defamation.    It   is               sufficient  to prove the purport or  substance               of  the  defamatory  imputations.   No  honest               witness  would profess to remember  the  exact               words  used by a person who has been  speaking               for  even  15  minutes.  At the  most  he  may               remember  some striking phrase or  expression.               But  a witnesse’s failure to recall the  exact               words used or the exact context in which  they               were  spoken is immaterial, provided  that  he               can  give a sufficiently clear account of  the               purport  of the defamatory remarks.   Although               the  learned counsel for the appellant  argued               that  no conviction could be sustained  unless               the exact words were proved, he was unable  to               quote any authority for his proposition, and I               am not prepared to accept it.  English rulings               on  the English Law of libel seem  beside  the               point when the task before us is to apply  the               provisions of section 499 of the Indian  Penal               Code to a case of alleged defamation by spoken               words." In the second case the Mysore High Court has laid down  that it is sufficient for the purpose of Sections 499 and 500  I. P. C. that if witnesses are agreed in a substantial  measure on the words of imputation uttered as it is hardly  possible or necessary to reproduce every word or expression used. In  the last decision, the Orissa High Court has  laid  down that for the purpose of an offence under Section 500  I.P.C. it  is enough if the witnesses are agreed in  a  substantial measure  on the words of imputation uttered, for it  is  not possible  even for a most honest witness to reproduce  every such   word   or  expression.   This   decision   has   also distinguished the earlier decision in Sarat Chandra Das  and another v. The State (1) on the ground that the observations contained  in that judgment that the precise  words  uttered against  the complainant should find a place in  the  charge were  made  in  the context of the court  dealing  with  two accused,  each  of whom was alleged to have  made  different statements. (1)  A. I. R. 1952 Orissa 351 457. After  a consideration of the various decisions referred  to above, we are of the opinion that the propositions laid down in  English  decisions dealing with libel  that  the  actual words  alleged to be used must be stated in  the  indictment cannot  be applied on all fours when dealing with the  cases of defamation by spoken words under Section 499 I. P. C.  it will be highly desirable no doubt if the actual words stated to have been used by an accused and which are alleged to  be defamatory  are reproduced by the complainant.   The  actual words used or the statements made may be reproduced verbatim by the complainant if the words are few and the statement is very  brief.   But in cases where the words spoken  are  too many or the statements made are too long, in our opinion, it will be the height of technicality to insist that the actual words  and  the  entire  statements  should  be   reproduced verbatim.   The  object of having, if possible,  the  actual words or the statements before the court is to enable it  to consider   whether  those  words  or  the   statements   are defamatory in nature.  That purpose or object will be served if the complainant is able to reproduce in his complaint  or evidence  in a substantial measure the words  of  imputation

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alleged  to  have been uttered.  If the  statements  or  the words placed before the court by the complainant are held to be  not defamatory, it will mean that the  complainant  will have  to  lose.  Therefore it is to his interest  to  get  a proper adjudication from, the court that as far as  possible the  words spoken or the statements actually made and  which he  alleges  to be defamatory are before the court.   But  a complaint  cannot be thrown out on the mere ground that  the actual  words  spoken or the statements made have  not  been stated in the complaint.  From the point of view of  accused also  it  is  necessary  that  the  matters  alleged  to  be defamatory  in the complaint must be so stated as to  enable them to know the nature of the allegations that they have to meet. In  this case we have already referred to Ex.  P. W.  3  /B. which, according to the complainant, contains the statements made  by  the  appellants  during  the  discussion  of   the resolution  leading to his suspension on December 11,  1964. The  High  Court,  in this connection, has  averted  to  the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 3 and 4 on this aspect.  As to how far the  evidence  of those witnesses is to be  accepted,  is  a matter  which  will  arise  only during  the  trial  of  the complaint.  From the averments made in the complaint,  which refers  to various matters referred to in Ex.  P.W., 3 /  B, we  are of the opinion, that the complainant has.  furnished in  a  substantial measure the words of  imputation,  which, according to him, are defamatory.  Therefore, the contention of Mr. Daphtary that the complaint is defective inasmuch  as it  does not contain the actual words alleged to  have  been spoken by the appellants has to be rejected. 458 The  further question is whether the complaint is  defective for  the reason that the actual statements alleged  to  have been  made  by the individual accused have not  been  stated therein.  So far as this aspect is concerned, if the case of the  complainant  is  that,  each  of  the  appellants  made different  statements  or spoke different words,  which  are defamatory,  then  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that   the complaint  must specify the words spoken or  the  statements made  by  each  of  the appellants.  But  that  is  not  the allegation  in the complaint.  We have already  referred  to the  fact  that it is specifically stated in  the  complaint that during the course of the discussion of the  resolution, all the seven appellants made a wild and baseless allegation against   the   complainant   involving   moral   turpitude. According to him those statements are contained in Ex. P. W. 3/B.  The  evidentiary value of Ex.  P.- W. 3 / B  does  not arise   for  consideration  at  this  stage.   The   further question. whether the complainant will be able to prove  his allegation that all the seven appellants made all or any  of the  statements  contained in Ex.  P. W. 3 / B, is  again  a matter which does not arise for consideration at this stage. We  are only concerned to find out what are the  allegations made  by  the  respondent  in  his  complaint  against   the appellants.   When the case of the complainant is  that  the seven appellants made the statements referred to in Ex.   P. W. 3 / B and he is prepared to go to trial on that  footing, the  question  of the complainant being made  to  state  the statements  alleged  to  have been made  by  the  individual accused does not at all arise.  Such a situation will  arise only  when  the case of the complainant  is  that  different statements  were made by different accused, who  are  before the court. The  Magistrate dismissed the complaint on the  ground  that there is no evidence on record as to which of the  appellant

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made  which  allegation against the respondent  and  in  the absence of such an important ingredient, no prima facie case against any of the appellants can be said to have been  made out.  This, in our opinion, is a fallacious approach made by the  Magistrate  in the face of the allegation made  by  the respondent that all the seven appellants made the statements referred  to  in Ex.  P. W. 3/B.  In our opinion,  the  High Court  has  made a correct approach when it  held  that  the evidence,  as  it stands implicates all the members  of  the Standing  Committee, including the appellants in the  charge of  making  the  statements alleged  to  be  defamatory  and contained  in Ex.  PI W. 3 / B. We are in, entire  agreement with the reasoning of the High Court on this aspect. Before concluding, the discussion, it is, to be stated  that the  trial  Magistrate has given an  additional  reason  for dismissing the complaint That, reason is that the resolution passed  by the Standing Committee an December 11.  1964  and the  discussion preceding it by the members of the  Standing Committee including the,- 459 appellants is covered by the Exceptions to Section 499 I. P. C. Unfortunately, the High Court also has touched upon  this aspect  and made certain observations.  In our opinion,  the question  of, the application of the Exceptions  to  Section 499 I. P. C. does not arise at this stage.  Rejection of the complaint  by the Magistrate on the second ground  mentioned above cannot be sustained.  It was also unnecessary for  the High Court to have considered this aspect and differed  from the  trial  Magistrate.  It is needless to  state  that  the question  of applicability of the Exceptions to Section  499 I. P. C. as well as all other defences that may be available to the appellants will have to be gone into during the trial of the complaint. To  conclude  we are satisfied that the High  Court’s  order setting  aside  the order of the Magistrate  dismissing  the complaint under Section 203 Cr.  P. C. and directing further inquiry  to  be made in the complaint of the  respondent  is correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed. V.P.S.                      Appeal dismissed. 460