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PETITIONER: BALMOKAND KHATRI EDUCATIONAL ANDINDUSTRIAL TRUST, AMRITSAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       14/02/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 1239            1996 SCC  (4) 212  JT 1996 (3)    60        1996 SCALE  (2)577

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Notification  under   Section  4   [1]  of   the   Land Acquisition Act,  1894 [for  short, the "Act"] was published in the  State Gazette  on February 26, 1976. Dispensing with the enquiry  under Section  5-A, declaration under Section 6 was published  on the  same day.  Notice under Section 9 was served on  March 3,  1976. The appellant filed Writ Petition No.1359 of 1976 on March 7, 1976. On March 19,1976, the High Court ordered  stay of  dispossession.  After  the  counter- affidavit was  filed by  the  respondents,  the  High  Court dismissed the  writ  petition  on  April  4,  1976.  In  the meanwhile, award  enquiry was  conducted and the award under Section 11  was made  on March  18, 1976.  Possession of the land was  taken on  April 17,1976.  It would appear that the Land   Acquisition   Officer   [LAO]   had   deposited   the compensation on  May 18, 1976. Record has been placed before us to  show that  the land  was earmarked and distributed to 592 landless  workers on  April 22,  1976. On  December  11, 1979, the  appellant again  filed Writ  Petition No.4460  of 1979 which  came to  be  dismissed  by  the  High  Court  on February 7, 1980. Thus this appeal by special leave. Interim stay granted  on May  8, 1980  was modified  by this  Court, maintaining status quo, by order dated September 13, 1981.      It is clear from these facts that after dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A, immediate action was taken by issuance of the notice under Section 9 and award enquiry was conducted since dispossession was ordered by the High Court. After the  dismissal of  the writ  petition, possession  was taken on April 17, 1976. Thus the process of the requisition was  completed   and  the  acquisition  became  final.  What remained to  be done  was  only  the  determination  of  the compensation in  respect of the acquired land. In this case, the land  acquired is of the extent of 121 canals 10 marlas. Shri P.H Parekh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant with his thorough preparation, has contended that dispensing

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with enquiry  under Section  5 A  is bad in law. However, we find no  force in the contention. The Punjab Legislature has amended the  Central Act  by Amendment  Acts II/1954, XVII/6 and XLVIII/1956  whereunder an explanation has been added to sub-section [1]  of Section  17 of  the Act. Sub-section [2] was also  added in  which  clause  [b]  of  the  sub-section envisages thus:      "(b) whenever in the opinion of the      Collector it  becomes necessary  to      acquire the immediate possession of      any land  for the  purpose  of  any      library or  educational institution      or for  the construction, extension      or improvement  of any  building or      other structure  in any village for      the common  use of  inhabitants  of      such village, or any godown for any      society   registered    under   Co-      operative Societies  Act, 1912,  or      any dwelling house for the poor, or      the construction of labour colonies      or houses  for any  other class  of      people under a Government sponsored      housing scheme,  or any  irrigation      tank,   irrigation    or   drainage      channel, or any well, or any public      road;"      Thus the  Government, by  virtue of  State Amendment is empowered to  exercise the  urgency clause under sub-section [4] of  Section 17  and to  dispense with  the enquiry under Section 5-A  of the Act. Shri Parekh has contended that mere existence of the power is not sufficient. The urgency should be such  as would  not brook  delay of 30 days in conducting the enquiry  contemplated under  Section 5-A.  In this case, allotment of  the house  sites to  the poor  is not  such an urgency  which  cannot  wait  for  conducting  the  enquiry. Therefore, exercising  the power under Section 17 [4] is bad in law.  He seeks  to place reliance on the decision of this Court in Naryan Govind Gavate etc. v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 1  SCR 763]. In a recent decision in Chameli Singh & Ors.etc. v. State of U.P. & Anr. [[(1996) 1 SCALE 101], this Court considered the entire case law and held that providing house sites  to the poor is an urgent necessity and exercise of the  power under  Section 17  [4] to  dispense  with  the enquiry under  Section 5-A would be justified. The reasoning of this  Court in  Gavate’s case  also was considered and it was held  that exercising  the power  under Section  17  [4] cannot be struck down when the Government was of the opinion that it  urgently required  the possession  of the  land for providing house sites to the poor.      It is  seen that  the entire  gamut of  the acquisition proceedings stood  completed by April 17, 1976 by which date possession of the land had been taken. No doubt, Shri Parekh has  contended  that  the  appellant  still  retained  their possession. It is now well-settled legal position that it is difficult to  take physical  possession of  the  land  under compulsory acquisition. The normal mode of taking possession is drafting  the Panchnama  in the  presence of  Panchas and taking possession  and giving  delivery to the beneficiaries is the  accepted mode  of taking  possession  of  the  land. Subsequent  thereto,   the  retention  of  possession  would tantamount only to illegal or unlawful possession.      Under these circumstances, merely because the appellant retained possession  of the  acquired land,  the acquisition cannot be  said to  be bad  in law.  It is then contended by

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Shri Parekh  that the  appellant-Institution is  running  an educational institution  and intends  to establish  a public school  and   that  since  other  land  was  available,  the Government would  have acquired  some other land leaving the acquired land  for the  appellant. In  the counter-affidavit filed in  the High  Court, it was stated that apart from the acquired land, the appellant also owned 482 canals 19 marlas of land.  Thereby, it  is seen  that the  appellant  is  not disabled to proceed with the continuation of the educational institution  which   it  seeks  to  establish.  It  is  then contended that  an opportunity may be given to the appellant to make  a representation  to the  State Government. We find that it  is not  necessary for  us to  give any such liberty since acquisition process has already been completed.      Pursuant to  the directions  issued by  this Court, the Chief  Secretary   himself  has  conducted  an  enquiry  and identified the officer who was responsible for the lapses in omitting to  instruct the  counsel and for not producing the record as  part of  the record  of the  Court. We accept the report submitted by the Chief Secretary. It would be open to him to pursue further action to reach a logical conclusion.      The appeal is dismissed accordingly. No costs.