22 October 1973
Supreme Court
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BALKRISHNA CHHAGANLAL SONI Vs STATE OF WEST BENGAL

Case number: Appeal (crl.) 73 of 1970


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PETITIONER: BALKRISHNA CHHAGANLAL SONI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/10/1973

BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1974 AIR  120            1974 SCR  (2) 107  1974 SCC  (3) 567  CITATOR INFO :  R          1980 SC 593  (26)

ACT: Customs Act 1878 (8 of 1878)-S. 107-"any persons"’ and  "any place" meaning of-Section whether applies to examination  of accused only. Defence of India Rules 1962-r. 126 P. (2) (ii) if applies to smuggled gold.

HEADNOTE: The appellant was prosecuted for possession of gold bars  of foreign  origin  in his shop and a gold  bar  of  indigenous origin in his residence.  He was charged under r-. 126 I(10) read with r. 126 P(2)(ii), and r. 126 I(i) and r. 126P(1)(i) of   the  Defence  of  India  Rules,  1962.    The   Customs authorities  head recorded a statement of the  appellant  in which  he  said  that  the gold  recovered  from  his  house represented  ornaments  given  to his wife  by  his  mother, melted  by her into a bar and kept without his knowledge  in the almirah, the key of which was with him. The  appellant was convicted by the trial court.  On  appeal he  was  acquitted  on  one  charge  but  the  sentence  was sustained on other charges. It was contended in this Court that (i), r.126P(2)(ii) could not  apply to smuggled gold consistently with the view  that declaration  of  non-ornament gold. did not  cover  smuggled gold, and (ii) that s. 107 of the Customs Act did not  apply to examination of the accused but only to other witnesses to be  questioned  and hence his statement (Ex.  9)  should  be excluded. Dismissing the appeal, and confirming the sentence. HELD : (Per Krishna Iyer and Sarkaria JJ) Rule 126P  (2)(ii) penalises  a person who had in his possession or  under  his control  any  quantity  of  gold  in  contravention  of  any provision of Part XII-A of the Rul S. It is not possible  to cut back on the width of the language used bearing in  "mind the purpose of plenary control the State wanted to impose on gold  and  exempt  smuggled gold from  the  expression  "any quantity  of  gold" in that  sub-rule.   That  construction, would stultify the law.  There was no doubt that the accused was  in  control of the indigenous gold recovered  from  his

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residence and there was no case that a declaration had been made  regarding  it.  It is clear  from  r.126P(2)(ii)  that domestic gold was also subject to the declaration under this rule.  Its possession was clearly an offence. [113B-C] Section  107 of the Customs Act is wide in its terms and  is clearly designed to facilitate the investigatory process  by examination  without restriction on person, place  or  time. "Any person" in the section covers every person, including a suspect  and potential accused.  These words of the  statute have  to  be  interpreted in the light  of  the  policy  and purpose  of  the law.  The object of 8. 1O7  indicates  that while the normal process 0enquiry  is’  facilitated   by s.108, investigatory emergencies are taken care of107. Situations may arise where the failure to question a witness quicklymay mean irretrievable loss of a valuable material and s. 107 meets this need.  "he context in which the  words ,,any  person"  occur, the object of the provision  and  the policy  underlying  ch.  XIV  assume  relevance  and  become material  in  the construction of the text.   Nor  does  the section  exclude  the  customs House as  a  venue  for  such examination.  "Any place" in the section obviously means any place  and a contrary view is untenable.  This provision  is plain  that  an authorised customs official is  entitled  to examine  any person at any time, at any place in the  course of enquiry. [113D-G] Social  and economic offenses stand on a graver  footing  in respect of punishment.  The new horizons in Venal  treatment with  hopeful  hues  of correction  and  rehabilitation  are statutorily embodied in India in some special enactments;- 108 but   crimes   professionally   committed   by   deceptively respectable  members of the community by  inflicting  severe trauma  on  the  health and wealth of  the  nation--and  the members  of this neo-criminal tribe are rapidly  escalating- form   a   -deterrent  exemption  to  humane   softness   in sentencing. [114B; D] The penal strategy must be informed by social circumstances, individual   factors  and  the  character  of   the   crime. Smugglers,  hoarders, adulterators and others of their  ilk have  been busy in their underworld because the legal  hard- ware  has  not  been able to  halt  the  invisible  economic aggressor inside.  While penal treatment should be  tailored to the individual, in the extreme, category of  professional economic offenders, incarceration is peculiarly potent.  The offenses for  which the appellant has been  convicted  are typical of respectable racketeers who, tempted by the  heavy pay-off, face the perils of the law and hope that they could smuggle  on  a large scale and even if struck by  the  court they could .get away with a light blow. [114-EF] To the extent to which gold smugglers and other  anti-social operators  in  the field of crime can be  given  an  unhappy holiday  in  jail,  the  courts must  help  the  process  on conviction if judicial institutions are not to be  cynically viewed by the community. [115B] Per Khanna J : There is nothing in the language of S. 107 to indicate  that the  words "any person" do  not  include  a person  who is subsequently arraigned ;as an  accused.   The examination  contemplated  by cl. (b) is of  a  per-son  ac- quainted with the facts and circumstances of a case.   Where a  person is found in possession of smuggled gold  he  would obviously  be  a  person  who  can  be  ,considered  to   be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.  In most  of  the cases he would indeed be the  best  person  to throw  light with regard to the smuggled gold found  in  his possession.  No valid reason can be discerned for  excluding

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the examination of such a person from the purview of s.     107 of the Customs Act. [109B-C]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 73  of 1970. Appeal from the judgment and order dated the 10th  December, 1969  of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No.  518 of 1969. D.   Mookherjee and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant. P.   K. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent. The  Judgments of the Court were delivered by Khanna J.  and ’Khanna Iyer J.- KHANNA,  J.-The facts of the case have been set out  in  the judgment of my learned brother Krishna Iyer J. and need  not be repeated. Two principal contentions have been raised on behalf of  the appellant.   It  is  urged in the first  instance  that  the finding  that  the appellant was in possession of  the  gold bars  with foreign markings recovered from his shop and  of indigenous  gold  recovered from  his  residential  premises cannot  be sustained.  In this respect  find that the  trial court   and the High Court on consideration of the  evidence brought  on record have arrived at the conclusion  that  the appellant was in possession of the gold bars and  indigenous gold  in question.  Nothing cogent has been brought  to  our notice  as  may justify- interference with  this  concurrent finding  of  fact based upon appreciation  of  evidence.  1, there fore reject the first contention. 109 Equally  devoid of force is the second contention  that  the Customs.   Officer cannot under section 107 of the,  Customs Act, 1962 examine, any person who is subsequently  arraigned as  an  accused in respect of the.  possession  of  smuggled gold.   According to clause (b) of section 107, any  officer of  customs empowered in this behalf by general  or  special order of the Collector of Customs may, during the course  of any  enquiry in connection with the smuggling of any  goods, examine.   any   person  acquainted  with  the   facts   and circumstances  of the case, There s nothing in the  language of  section 107 to indicate that the, words any  person"  do not  include a person who is subsequently arraigned  ’as  an accused.    The  language  of  section  107  is  clear   and unambiguous  and I find it difficult to place  a  restricted meaning on the ,Words "any person" and to exclude from their ambit persons who may subsequently be put up for trial.  The examination  contemplated  by,  clause (b) is  of  a  person acquainted  with  the facts and circumstances.  of  a  case. Where  a person is found in possession of Smuggled  gold  he would  obviously  be a person who can be  considered  to  be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.  In most  of  the cases he would indeed be the  best  person  to throw  light with regard to the smuggled. gold found  in  Ms possession.   I  have  not been able to  discern  any  valid reason for excluding them examination of such a person  from the purview of section 107 of the Customs Act. There  is  no sufficient ground for  interference  with  the sentence.  The appeal fails and is dismissed. KRISHNA IYER, J.-A white collar crime committed and detected in  January  1965  took a  demoralisingly  leisurely  course spread  over  3 years in the trial court  although  only  21 witnesses  were  examined  and  the  case  was  simple   and supported  by  a  nearly clinching  statement  of  the  only

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accused recorded fresh after the detection, the very day. An important component of fair trial is speedy hearing,  and the  deterrence  of judicial punishment is  diluted  to  the prejudice  of public justice if, through  dilatory  hearings and  ineffectual revisions, unfortunate delays, such as  mar this  case, corrode the system and put the courts  on  trial before the community. The  criminal story here is short and the  evidence  adduced straight’    The  findings of fact are  concurrent  and  the points  of  law fragile.  The case has reached  the  Supreme Court on a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court. One Shri Soni, the appellant herein was engagged in  bullion business, perhaps of a dubious character, because he appears to have attracted the attention of the customs  authorities, who,  undaunted by   failure in one raid kept, track of  the dealer.  Several months beforethe episode which materialised in  the present case a fruitless search of the flat of  Shri Soni had been made.  But on May 10, 1965 better luck  smiled on  P.W. 1, a preventive officer of the  Department,  thanks to, 110 timely  and. accurate,. intelligence received,  pursuant  to which  the officer,  to  the  due  accompaniment  of   the formalities  of the law, moved into 59, Manohar Das  Street, Calcutta,  where  the  jewellery shop  of  the  accused  was located.   Armed with the authorization for search, P.W.  11 surprised the accused who was ,reciving on a pillow, laid on a  mattress,  underneath  which slope  two  gold  bars  with foreign markings.  P.W. 1, with unerring precision asked the accused  to rise in his seat .and the truth was out  because the  guilty gold bars, baried beneath the  innocent  pillows and  mattress, revealed themselves and were promptly  seized in the presence of independent. witnesses, according to  the prescriptions of the law.  The search list (Ex. 2) sets  out the  transaction  of recovery.  There is’ evidence  to  show that  the shop was of the accused.  The search  and  seizure the presence of the accused in the premises, the preparation of  the  search mahazar and the foreign origin of  the  gold bars  as  betrayed  by  the tell-tale  9990  mark,  are  not disputed before us. The   next  target  of  the  customs  authorities  was   the residential  flat  of  the accused.  P.W.  3,  a  preventive officer  of  Calcutta  Customs, with the  usual  retinue  of search  witnesses,  entered the house of  the  .accused  and there  met  Mrs.  Soni, who contacted  her  husband  on  the telephone.  Thereupon, the, accused arrived, handed over the key  of  the  almirah from which a gold  bar  of  indigenous origin  (Mat.  Ex.  11) was recovered.  These  circumstances also  are  virtually Admitted.  Later in the day,  the  same afternoon,  the accused was taken to the Customs  House  for interrogation.   What that examination yielded was  recorded in  Ex.  7.  Close upon the search and  caught  almost  red- handed,  the accused, with little opportunity to invent  and left  to  fall back upon his unnerved imagination,  made  a’ clumsy   escapist   statement   which   contains    damaging implications. The  complaint based on these facts led to a  charge,  under Rule 126 I(1O) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 read with Rule  126 P(2)(ii) of the said Rules as also one under  Rule 126 I(1) read with Rule 126 P(1)(i).  Since a  contravention of s. 135(b) of the Customs Act, 1962, was also  prima-facie made out a charge thereunder was framed.  The case ended  in conviction  before the Magistrate, but in appeal  there  was acquited  on one charge, but the sentence was  sustained  on the other charges, the net benefit to the accused being  the

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elimination  of a fleabite fine of Rs. 1000/-.   The  courts below concurrently relied upon the statement under s. 107 of ’the  Customs  Act  recorded from the accused  (Ex.  9)  and considerable argument turned on it in this Court. Finding  Ex.  9  a  fatuous  exercise  in  exculpation   but containing  some  vital  facts  of  incrimination,  Shri  D. Mukheriea, learned counsel for the appellant, inevitably but ineenuously staked a long argument on the unrealiability  of material elicited under environs of testimonial pressure and personal duress and the inqdmissiblity of quasi-colifessions elicited  from de facto detainees by investigating  officers who  exercised  powers substantially similar  to  thosee  of police  officers from Customs House,  premises.   Confronted by, the direct rulings on the point 111 by  the  Privy  Council  and  this  Court,  counsel  frankly conceded that Ex. 9 was not strictly speaking’ ’a confession within the meaning of ss. 24 and 25. of the Indian  Evidence Act.   He further agreed, quite fairly, that  while  customs officials  possess almost all the investigatory  powers  and similar interest as police officers, still since this  Court has  ruled that they are not police officers, the  statement (Ex.,  9) could not be blacked out under the  Evidence  Act. Moreover  learned  counsel readily pointed out that  at  the time  Ex.  9 was recorded the appellant was not  an  accused person within the meaning of art. 20(3) of the  Constitution or  the provisions of the Evidence Act.  But  he  forcefully pressed before us thatwhile the expressions ’accused’, ’con- fession’ and ’Police officer’ had been judicially  annotated and  carried  a technical import not  necessarily  congruent with realism and therefore Ex. 9 was relevant, the weight to be  attached to it was virtually nit and his client was  not shown by other good testimony, to be guilty. Superficially viewed, a customs officer, when  investigating a  crime,  is more or less in the same relationship  to  the delin quent  as  a  police  officer.  In  a  sense  the  man proceeded  against departmentally by the customs officer  is similarly   situated  as  an  accused   person.    Likewise, inculpatory statements, which fall short of total  admission of   guilt,  are  substantially  as  injurious  as  a   full confession.  Functionally speaking, these anomalies, if they are  such, are for Parliament to correct, not for the  Court to streamline. The  forensic  scales  are  weighted  heavily  against   the appellant’s  submissions.  Two courts have considered  these questions of fact and, right or wrong, have chosen to  place credence on Ex. 9 and the rest of the prosecution  evidence. The Supreme Court, acting under arts. 134 or 136,  exercises jurisdiction in factual issues only exceptionally when grave miscarriage  of  justice arising from  gross  perversity  in appreciation of evidence has fouled the finding concurrently reached.   Having  heard  arguments on both  sides,  we  are satisfied that no such invalidatory vice exists here and  we are  clear  that  frequent interference by  this  Court,  on speculative   invitation   to  reappraise   evidence,   will unwittingly weaken the judicial authority of the High  Court which, in our set-up is ordinarily the final court of  fact. The forensic quest for truth on facts, in the, usual run  of cases,  reaches the journey’s end after one appeal,  in  any pragmatic   system  of  justice,.  Apart  from   all   these considerations, in the present case an elderly gentleman  of average  intelligence  and affluence and engaged  in  shrewd business   had   given  a  connected  set  of   answers   an unconvincing  alibi  of innocent acquisition of  gold  bars, which  hardly stood the test of astute scrutiny.   That  the

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two  gold  bars with foreign markings were brought  by  this bullion  merchant a little while before; the search  of  his business place from an unknown broker has to be dismissed as a desperate plea.  More incredible is the version regarding, the  gold  recovered  from the  house  that  it  represented ornaments  given  to his wife by his mother, melted  by  her into a bar, and kept without his knowledge in the almirah of which he held the, key.  And the incriminating admissions in the  rather naive Ex. 9 have been; rightly relied on by  the courts  below and are obviously crushing in their  probative impact.  The rejection of the wholly improbable portions  of the statement was permissible 112 and  has been properly done.  There is other  evidence  also which  justifies the conclusions of facts arrived at in  the judgment under appeal.  The shop from where the gold was got belongs to the accused’s business and there is evidence  for it.   The  bars themselves bear on their bosom  evidence  of smuggled  source,  in the shape, of foreign  markings.   The circumstances   of  the  recovery  not  merely  deepen   the suspicion but clinch the conclusion.  The guiltless  pillows on  which the appellant confidently sat, hid  the  offending gold  and the preknowing officers uncovered  the  contraband with  a sure instinct and these facts overpower the case  of licit  possession feigned by the accused.   The  disingenous explanation regarding the domestic discovery of gold also is hardly plausible.  We affirm the findings of fact. Appellant’s  counsel put forward two legal points before  he wound up  with  the  submission  for  a  merciful  sentence. According to him s. 107 of the Customs Act does not apply to examination  of the delinquent but only to  other  witnesses emergently  to be questioned.  This, if valid, will  exclude Ex. 9 statement, he argue Substantively, he contends that r. 126  P(2)(ii)  of the Defence of India Rules,  1962,  cannot apply  to smuggled gold, consistently with the High  Court’s view that Rule 1261 relating to declaration of  non-ornament gold does not cover smuggled gold.  To appreciate this  part of  the argument, we must have a broad understanding of  the scheme  of Chapter 14-A of the Defence of India Rules  which in  1965, when the alleged offence was committed,  regulated the  possession, use and sale of gold. (Now these  functions are  performed  by the Gold Control  Act).   The  procedural provisions  of the Customs Act also come into play  in  this case and the contention regarding s. 107 of that Act,  under which Ex. 9 statement was recorded, needs some attention  in the  background  of Chapter 13 of the  Customs  Act  itself. Since  after careful consideration we find no  substance  in any of these points, our survey of the  statutory  schemes need not be elaborate. For  long  years the national economy has been  under  great stress and strain and gold racket on any considerable  scale particularly  during  the dangerous years around  1965,  was fraught with crippling consequences.  And so the Defence  of India  Rules,  in  Part XII A,  insisted  on  severe  ’gold’ discipline.   Rule  126  I direct  everyone,  other  than  a licensed refiner and licensed or licensable dealer, to  make a  declaration of all non-ornament gold owned by him.   Such persons  shall not in future acquire any such  gold  without permit  or  save as provided in sub-rule  (3).   Many  other restraints  on acquisition and possession exist.  There  are many  regulations  and prohibitions with which  we  are  not concerned  here..  Dealers have to make returns of  gold  in their  possession  to the concerned authority  (Rule  126F). They  have also to keep account of gold bought and  sold  (R 126G).   Except  as  laid  down in  Rule  126H  dealers  are

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prohibited from being in possession of gold.  Indeed even  a person,  other than a dealer, shall not acquire  non-omament gold  except  as  indicated in Rule  126  H(2)(d).   Certain rebuttable  presumptions also are statutorily  raised  (vide Rule  126  I(11) ) and large powers of  search  and  seizure vested in officers to make this restriction effective  (Rule 126L).. Rule 126P 113 creates penalities for many acts and ommissions, inter  alia for  failure to make a declaration as laid down in Rule  126 1. The High Court has taken the view that the obligation  to declare  does  not cover smuggled gold.  Even so,  Rule  126 P(2)  (ii)  penahses a person who has in his  possession  or under  his control any quantity of gold in contravention  of any provision of this Part.  We cannot cut back on the width of  the  language  used, bearing in  mind  the,  purpose  of plenary  control  the State wanted to impose on  gold,.  and exempt  smuggled gold from the expression ’any quantity.  of gold’ in that sub-rule.  That construction will stultify the law.   There is no manner of doubt that the accused  was  in control of the indigenous gold recovered from his  residence and  there  is  no case that a  declaration  has  been  made regarding it. That at least this domestic. gold was  subject to  the declaration of Rule 126 P(2) (ii) can be  spelt  out without  straining language.  Its possession is  clearly  an offence, as held by the courts below. But  proof of this depends in good measure on the  statement given by the appellant to the Customs Officers the same  day under s. 107 of the Customs Act.  This provision is wide  in its  terms  and  is  clearly  designed  to  facilitate   the investigatory  process  examination without  restriction  on person, place or time.  Lest it sould be misused the law  is choosy  and requires the empowerment of customs officers  by general or special order of the Collector to exercise  these larger powers.  Does S. 107 enable the interrogation of even the  potential.  delinquent or must it be confined  only  to witness who throw light on the delinquent’s contravention of the  law ’Any person’ in the section certainly covers  every person  including  a suspect and potential  accused.   These words of the statute have to be interpreted in the light  of the  policy and purpose of the law.  The object of  S.  107, located in the neighbourhood of S. 108, indicates that while the  normal  process of enquiry is facilitated  by  S.  108, investigatory emergencies are taken care of by s. 107.   May be situations arise where the failure to question a  witness quickly  may mean irretrivable loss of a  valuable  material and S. 107 meets this need.  The context in which the  words "any  person"  occur, the object, of the provision  and  the policy  underlying  Ch.   XIII of  the  Customs  Act  assume relevance  and  become material in the construction  of  the text.   Nor are we faced with any difficulty on  account  of art. 20(3) of the Constitution since the examination is  not of  an accused person.  Nor is there any warrant for  saying that  the  section  excludes, as  a  legal  limitation,  the Customs House as a venue for such examination.  ’Any  place’ in the section obviously means any place and a contrary view is  so  untenable that counsel did not  seriously  urge  it. Indeed, often times it is more convenient for all  condemned to  move  to  the quiet and convenience  of  an  office  for recording   statements.   A  businessman  may  be   wantonly humiliated  if  he is arrested and kept in  the  bazaar  and interrogated  at length in the presence of a crowd which  is sure to collect.  The provision is plain that an  authorised Customs  official is entitled to examine any person  at  any time,- fit any place, in the course of an enquiry.   Whether

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the  statement  was  extracted by threat of  harm,  hope  of advantage  or improper inducement does not concern us as  no such  case  is made out.  Ex. 9 has been found by  the  High Court to be free from taint.  We are not disposed to differ. 47Sup.CI/74 114 On  the proved facts the gold bar is caught in the  criminal coils of s. 135, read with ss.  Ill and 123, Customs Act, as the  High  Court  has found and little has  been  made out before us to hold to the contrary. Guilt  being  established, the fifth act of the  tragedy  is reached.   Social  and economic offenses stand on  a  graver footing in respect of punishment.  The appellant’s  advocate pleads  in  elimination  of the imprisonment  that  gold  of considerable value has been confiscated, that his client has gone out of business (his licence having been cancelled) and the  possibility of further mischief is absent, seven  years of  criminal proceedings have been a long  ordeal  deterrent enough  to inhibit future anti-social adventures,  and  some jail  term he has already undergone.  Counsel  submits  that his  client: will now turn a now leaf if he is not  returned to prison.  We decline to be moved by this dubious prospect. The  new  horizons in penal treatment with hopeful  hues  of correction  and rehabilitation are statutorily embodied in India  in some special enactments; but crime  professionally committed   by  deceptively  respectable  members   of   the community  by  inflicting severe trauma on  the  health  and wealth  of  the nation d the members  of  this  neo-criminal tribe  are rapidly escalating-from a deterrent exemption  to humane softness in sentencing. The penal strategy must be informed by social circumstances, individual  factors and the character of the  crime.   India has  been facing an economic crisis and gold  smuggling  has had a disastrous impact on the State’s efforts to  stabilize the country’s economy.  Smugglers hoarders, adulterators and others  of  their ilk have been busy  in  their  under-world because  the  legal hardware has not been able to  halt  the invisible economic aggressor inside.  The ineffectiveness of prosecutions  in  arresting the wave of  white-collar  crime must  disturb the judges’ conscience.  While we  agree  that penal treatment should be tailored to the individual, in the extreme   category  of  professional   economic   offenders, incarceration-  is peculiarly potent.  When all is said  and done,  the  offenses for which the appellant has  been  con- victed are typical of respectable racketeers who, tempted by the  heavy pay-off face the perils of the law and hope  that they  could smuggle on a large scale and even if  struck  by the court they could get away with a light blow. Mr.  Justice Abhyankar observed in a Bombay case  (State  v. Drupadi(1) under s. 5, Imports and Exports Control Act :-               A serious view must therefore be taken of such               offenses  which show a  distressingly  growing               tendency.  The argument that the accused comes               from   a  restable  or  high   family   rather               emphasise  the seriousness of the  malady.  if                             members  belonging  to  high  status ’in  life               should show scant regard for the laws of  this               country   which  are  for  public  good,   for               protecting  our  foreign  trade  or   exchange               position of currency               (1)   A.I.R. 1965 Bom. 6, para II.               115               difficulties, the consequential punishment for               the  violation  of such laws must  be  equally

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             deterrent.   The offenses against  Export  and               Import  restrictions  and customs are  of  the               species  of  ’economic, crimes which  must  be               curbed effectively." We  endorse  this approach.  It may not be out of  place  to notice, in this context the observations of the Central  Law Commission(1) against light sentences on the score that; (i) the  case is one of first conviction; (ii) that  the  matter has been already dealt with by severe departmental  penalty; (iii)  that  the convicted person is a young  man.   To  the extent  to  which  gold  smugglers  and  other   anti-social operators  in  the field of crime can be  given  an  unhappy holiday  in  jail,  the  courts must  help  the  process  on conviction, if judicial institutions are not to be cynically viewed  by  the community.  We confirm  the  sentence.   The appeal fails and is dismissed. P.B.R.                         Appeal dismissed. (1)  Forty-seventh  Report on "The Trial and  Punishment  of Social and Economic offenses". 116