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PETITIONER: BALKISHAN A. DEVIDAYAL ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT31/07/1980

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1981 AIR  379            1981 SCR  (1) 175  1980 SCC  (4) 600  CITATOR INFO :  C          1991 SC  45  (18)  RF         1991 SC2176  (12)

ACT:      Railway Protection  Force Act  (XXIII of  1957) Ss. 10, 12, 13,  14. 18,  Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act (XXIX of  1966), Ss.  9, 8, 3, 14-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)  Ss. 173(4),  251A, 252, 162, 4(h), 190(I), (a)(b), 561A-Indian Evidence  Act (I of 1872) Ss. 25, 26, 27-Railway Protection Force  Officer whether "Police Officers" under S. 25 of Evidence Act.      Constitution of  India 1950,  Article 20(3)  &  Railway Property (Unlawful  Possession) Act,  1966 s. 3 and 6-Person arrested by  R.P.F. Officer  for Commission of offence under s. 3-Whether ’Person accused of offence’.      Words &  Phrases-  "Police  Officer"  under  s.  25  of Evidence Act-Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:      On the  allegations that  the appellant in the Criminal Appeal along  with two  other accused  were in possession of railway  property  which  they  had  obtained  under  forged railway receipts,  the Inspector  of the  Railway Protection Force lodged a complaint against the three accused that they were guilty  of offences  under section  3(a) of the Railway Property (Unlawful  15  Possession)  Act,  1966  and  action should be  taken against  them.  In  the  Complaint  it  was mentioned that  accused 2  and 3 were absconding and annexed to the complaint was (I) a list of prosecution witnesses and (2) a list of documents.      The appellant,  who was  accused I  appeared before the Presidency Magistrate  who commenced an enquiry and recorded the statements of four witnesses one on March 2, 1973 and of the other  three on  June 12,  1973. On  June 11,  1973  the appellant moved  an application before the Magistrate making a grievance that although three witnesses had been examined, no copies of the document were furnished to him. On June 25, 1973 he  made a further application requesting for supply of true copies  of all  the documents in the case to enable him to prepare  the defence  and that  he should be permitted to take photostat  copies of  the documents.  The Magistrate on August 9,  1973 rejected  the appellants’ application on the

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ground that  the offence  complained of  against him was not cognizable and that the provisions of section 251 (a) of the Code  of   Criminal  Procedure   were  not   applicable  and consequently, he  had no  right  to  obtain  copies  of  the documents concerned.  On  August  24,  1973  the  Magistrate framed a  charge under  section 3(a) of the Act. The accused pleaded not  guilty and  again made an application repeating his request  for  copies  of  the  statements  of  witnesses recorded by  the Inspector  R.P.F. This application was also rejected by the Magistrate on September 7, 1973. 176      Feeling  aggrieved   by  the   orders  passed   by  the Magistrate on  August 9,  1973 and  September  7,  1973  the appellant invoked  the inherent  jurisdiction  of  the  High Court by  a petition  under section  561A  of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure,  1898 and  prayed  that  the  orders  be quashed.  He   challenged  the  constitutional  validity  of section 9  of the  Act  in  the  petition.  The  High  Court rejected the petition.      In the  appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the  appellant (a)  relying on Raja Ram Jaiswal vs. State of Bihar,  [1964] 2  S.C.R. 752  that the expression "Police officer"  in   section  25  of  the  Evidence  Act  must  be considered in  a wide popular sense, so as to include within its ambit  all officers  of Government  who are in substance invested with  the power  to investigate certain offences in accordance with  the provisions  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure 1898  irrespective  of  the  fact  that  they  are differently labelled  such as  Excise  officers  or  Customs officers or  members of R.P.F., otherwise the very object of s. 25 will be defeated. An Inspector of the R.P.F. making an inquiry under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act 1966 into  an offence  under  section  3  of  that  Act,  in substance, acts  and exercises  almost all  the powers  of a ’Police officer’  making an  investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure  and any  confessional statement recorded by such  Inspector will  be hit  by s.  25 Evidence Act. The case of  State of  U.P. v. Durga Prasad, 1975 (1) S.C.R. 881 was  not   correctly  decided   and  that  its  ratio  needs reconsideration by  a larger Bench because it has overlooked the test  laid down  by the  three Judge  Bench in  Raja Ram Jaiswal’s case.  (b) As  soon as  a person is arrested by an officer of  the Force on a suspicion or charge of committing an offence  punishable under  the 1966 Act, he stands in the character of  a "person  accused  of  an  offence"  and  any confessional or  incriminating  statements  recorded  by  an officer of  the Force  in the  course of  an  inquiry  under section 8(1)  of the 1966 Act, cannot be used as evidence in view of the constitutional ban against "compelled testimony" imposed by Art. 20(3) of the Constitution.      On behalf  of the respondent it was submitted that: (a) an officer  of the  R.P.F. while making an inquiry under the 1966 Act  cannot be  equated with a police officer in charge of a  Police Station making an investigation under the Code. The important difference in their powers is, that the R.P.F. Inspector has  no power to submit a report or a charge-sheet under section 173 of the Code. The decision of this Court in Raja Ram Jaiswal’s case stands on its own peculiar facts and was distinguished  in a  later decision  by  a  Constitution Bench of this Court in Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore, [1966] 3  SCR 698.  The correct test for determining whether or not R.P.F. Officer is a police officer for the purpose of section 25  of  the  Evidence  Act  is  the  one  which  was consistently applied in State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram [1962] 3 SCR  338, &  Romesh Chandra  Mehta v. West Bengal [1969] 2

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SCR 461.  (b) The conditions necessary for the attraction of the ban  in Art.  20(3) do  not exist  in the  instant  case because before the filing of the complaint in the Court, the appellant was  not a "person accused of an offence" and that it  was   nowhere   alleged   that   the   confessional   or incriminating statements were extorted by the R.P.F. Officer under physical duress, threat, inducement or mental torture. 177 on the questions:      (1) whether  an officer of the Railway Protection Force making an  inquiry  under  the  Railway  Property  (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 in respect of an offence under section 3 of that Act of unlawful possession of the railway property is a  police officer  for the  purpose of  section 25 of the Evidence Act  and  section  162  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure 1898  and whether  any confession or incriminatory statement recorded  by him in the course of an inquiry under section 8  of the  Act is  inadmissible in evidence, and (2) whether a  person arrested  by an  officer  of  the  Railway Protection Force  under section 6 of the Act for the alleged commission of  an offence  under section  3 of  the  Act  is "person accused  of an  offence" within  the meaning of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution: ^      HELD: 1. An officer of the R.P.F. conducting an enquiry under section  8(1) of  the 1966  Act has  not been invested with all  the powers  of an  officer- in-charge  of a police station making  an investigation  under Chapter  XIV of  the Code. Particularly,  he has no power to initiate prosecution by filing  a charge-sheet  before the  Magistrate  concerned under section  173 of the Code, which he has been held to be the  clinching   attribute  of   an  investigating   ’police officer’. An  officer of  the R.P.F.  could not therefore be deemed to  be a  "police  officer"  within  the  meaning  of section  25   of  the   Evidence  Act,  and  therefore,  any confessional or  incriminating statement  recorded by him in the course of an inquiry under section 8(1) of the 1966 Act, cannot be  excluded from  evidence under  the said  section. [201C-E]      2. The  term ’police  officer’ has  not been defined in the Evidence  Act The  policy behind  sections 25  and 26 of Evidence Act  is to  make a  substantive rule  of  law  that confessions whenever  and wherever  made to the police shall he presumed  to have  been obtained  under the circumstances mentioned in section ’ 24 and therefore, inadmissible except so far as is provided in section 27 of that Act. [182F, E]      Ariel v. State A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 15, referred to.      3. The  primary  object  of  constituting  the  Railway Protection  Force   is  to  secure  better  "protection  and security of  the railway  property". The restricted power of arrest and  search given  to the  officers or members of the Force is  incidental to  the efficient  discharge  of  their basic duty  to protect  and safeguard  Railway Property.  No general power to investigate all cognizable offence relating to Railway  Property, under  the Criminal Procedure Code has bee. conferred  on any  superior officer  or member  of  the Force by the 1957 Act [185F-G]      4. The  main purpose  of passing  the 1966  Act was  to "invest powers of investigation and prosecution" of offences relating to  railway property in the RPF "in the same manner as in  the Excise  and Customs." Inspite of provision in the Code of  Criminal Procedure  to the contrary, offences under this Act  have been made non-cognizable and, as such, cannot be investigated  by a  police officer  under  the  Code.  It follows that  the initiation  of prosecution  for an offence

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inquired into  under this  Act can only be on the basis of a complaint by  an officer  of RPF  and not on the report of a police  officer   under  section   173(4)  of  the  Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. [187A, 188B]      5. Section  14 makes  clear that  the provisions of the Act shall override all other laws. which means that anything in the 1966 Act which is inconsistent 178 with the  Code, will prevail and the application of the Code pro tanto  will be  excluded. The  scheme of  the 1966  Act, particularly the  provisions in  sections 5, 8, 9(3), (4) is different from that of the Code. The Code, therefore, cannot proprio vigore  apply to  an enquiry conducted under section 8(1) of  the 1966  Act by  an officer  of the  Force. [189G, 190A]      6. An  analysis of  clause (3)  of Art.  20 shows three things: Firstly,  its protection  is  available  only  to  a "person accused of any offence". Secondly, the protection is against  compulsion   "to  be   a  witness".  Thirdly,  this protection avails "against himself". [202F]      7. Only  a person  against whom  a formal accusation of the commission  of an  offence has been made can be a person "accused of  on offence"  within the  meaning of Art. 20(3). Such formal  accusation may be specifically made against him in an  F.I.R. or  a formal  complaint or  any  other  formal document or  notice served  on that person, which ordinarily results in his prosecution in Court. [204F]      In the  instant case no such formal accusation had been made against the appellant when has statement(s) in question were recorded  by the  R.P.F. Officer.  He did  not at  that time, stand  in the  character of  a person  "accused of  an offence" and  as such,  the protection of Article 20(3) will not be available to him. [203F-G]      Kathi Raning  Rawat v.  The State  of Saurashtra [1952] SCR 435, K. Joseph Augusthi & Ors. v. M. A. Narayanan [1964] 3 SCR  137, Mohamed Destagir v. The State of Madras [1960] 3 SCR 116,  Bhagwan Das,  Crl. As. 131-132/61 decided on 20-9- 63, Bhogilal  Shah &  Anr v.  D. K.  Guha & Ors [1973] 3 SCR 438, M.  P. Sharma  v. Satish  Chandra [1954] SCR 1077, Smt. Nandini Satpathy  v. P. L Dani & Anr. AIR 1978 S.C. 1025, In re The  Special Courts  Bill,  AIR.  1979,  S.C.  478,  Raja Narayanlal Bansilal  v. Maneck Phiroz Mistry & Anr. [1961] 1 SCR 417, State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad & Ors. [1962] 3 SCR. 10, ref to.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal Nos. 208 209 of 1974.      Appeals by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and order dated 18/19-1-1974  of the  Bombay High  Court  in  Criminal Revision Application Nos. 821/72 and 305/74.                             AND      SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No 630 OF 1977.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  30-6-1972  of  the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Crl. Rev. No. 81/72.      R. K.  Garg, B. A. Desai. V. J. Francis, and D. K. Garg for the Appellant in Crl. A. Nos. 208-209.      S. K.  Gambhir and Miss Ram Rikhyani for the Petitioner in SLP No. 630/77.      J. L.  Nain and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent in Crl. Nos. 208-209. 179      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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    SARKARIA, J.-These  appeals by  special leave  directed against judgments dated January 17, 1974 and March 29, 1974, of  the  Bombay  High  Court,  raise,  among  others,  three important questions, namely:      (1)  Whether  an  officer  of  the  Railway  Protection           Force,  making   an  inquiry   under  the  Railway           Property   (Unlawful    Possession)   Act,    1966           (hereinafter referred  to  as  the  1966  Act,  in           respect of  an offence under Section 3 of that Act           of unlawful possession of the railway property, is           a Police  officer for  the purposes of Section 25,           Evidence Act  and  Section  162  of  the  Code  of           Criminal  Procedure.   1898;  and   as  such.  any           confession or  incriminating statement recorded by           him in the course of an inquiry under Section 9 of           the Act is inadmissible in evidence.      (2)  Whether a  person arrested  by an  officer of  the           Railway Protection  Force under  Section 6  of the           Act for the alleged commission of an offence under           Section 3  of the  Act, is a "person accused of an           offence" within  the meaning  of Article  20(3) of           the Constitution.      (3)  Whether Section  9 of  the  Act  is  violative  of           Article 14 of the Constitution. E The appeals arise in these circumstances:      The  Inspector,   Central  Intelligence   Bureau,  Head Quarters, Bombay  (Shri P.  A.  Kakade)  filed  a  complaint before  the  Presidency  Magistrate,  35th  Court,  Victoria Terminus,  Bombay,  complaining  of  the  commission  of  an offence by  the appellants, herein, (in Crl. Appeals 208 and 209 of 1974), under Section 3 of the Act. The allegations in the complaint,  as summarised  in the  judgment of  the High Court in  Criminal Revision Application No. 821 of 1973, are as under:      On November  21, 1970,  the Assistant Security officer, Central Railway,  Bhusawal intimated  to the  Chief Security officer, Bombay V.T. that two wagons Nos. ERKC-9447 Ex. HSPG BNDN to  Akola and Wagon No. ERKC 75531 Ex. were unloaded by Unloading Foreman,  one B.  D. Raverkar of Akola Goods Shed. Seventynine M.  S. Plates  (Mild Steel Plates) were unloaded from Wagon  No. ERKC  75531. On  November 14,  1970, one Ram Singh who  was having  R. R. No. 982859 Invoice No. 3 for 78 M.S. Plates  and Invoice  No. 2  RR No.  892857 for  60 M.S. Plates signed  the  RRs.  and  endorsed  the  same  to  M/s. Vallabhaji Brothers, Clearing Agents at Akola Goods Shed for 180 taking the  delivery. Clerk  Onkar of the said firm was sent to take  delivery. He took delivery of 78 plates from one J. Meshram after  paying the  necessary  railway  dues  of  Rs. 1,813.80 P.,  and the  78 Plates  were removed  by the  said party in  lorries. The Delivery of the second consignment of 60 M.S.  Plates was  taken on November 16, 1970 after paying the railway dues of Rs. 2.247.40 P. The said Ram Singh posed as a proprietor of Modern Industries which was found to be a fictitious firm,  which never existed. The Deputy Commercial Superintendent, Bhusawal, on November 19, 1970, informed all concerned that  the delivery  from these wagons was obtained on fraudulent Railway Receipts.      The  inquiry  into  this  case  was  entrusted  to  the Complainant Inspector,  P. A.  Kakade, who  is an officer of the Railway Protection Force. In the course of that inquiry, the  statements   of  certain  persons,  including  that  of Balkishan, appellant  herein,  were  recorded  by  the  said Inspector.      On January  31, 1971, while inquiring into another case

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of  Wadi   Bunder  in  which  Balkishan  was  involved,  the Inspector recorded  the confessional statement of Balkishan, appellant, herein. After making that confessional statement, Balkishan is  said to  have led  Inspector  Kakade,  in  the presence  of   Panchas,  to   Tulsiram  Gupta  Mills  Estate Compound, wherefrom  35  M.S.  Plates  were  recovered.  The Inspector further  discovered  that  the  M.S.  Plates  were shifted from  Devi Dayal’s compound to Nittal Estate, Kurla- Andheri Road,  Marol Naka  and they  were  transported  from there for Devi Dayal’s Estates. He recorded the statement of Tukaram, the  owner of one of these motor-trucks on February 7, 1971.  Tukaram stated  that  his  lorry  was  engaged  on November 1, 1971, by the appellant.      In the  meantime, investigation  regarding the offences of forgery  and cheating  was being  done at  Akola  by  the concerned Police  Sub Inspector, who was directed to suspend his inquiry till further orders were received by him.      In the  complaint, Inspector Kakade stated that accused 2 and  3 are  absconding Annexed to the complaint was a list of prosecution witnesses numbering, in all, 40 and a list of documents numbering 62.      The  appellant   (accused  1)   appeared   before   the Presidency Magistrate.  He was  then supplied  the  list  of prosecution witnesses and the list of documents to be relied upon by  the prosecution. The list of documents included the list of  statements  of  various  persons  recorded  by  the Inspector of  the Railway  Protection Force.  The Presidency Magistrate commenced an inquiry and recorded the 181 statements of four witnesses, of one on March 2, 1973 and of the other three on June 12, 1973.      On June  11, 1973,  an application  was  filed  by  the appellant  to   the  Magistrate,  making  a  grievance  that although three witnesses had been examined, no copies of the documents were  furnished to him by the prosecution. On June 25, 1973,  the appellant  made a  further application to the Magistrate, requesting  for supply of true copies of all the documents in  the case to enable him to prepare his defence. He  further  prayed  that  he  should  be  allowed  to  take photostats of all the documents in the presence of the court officer. The  Magistrate on  August 3, 1973, passed an order rejecting the accused’s application, dated June 11, 1973, on the ground  that the  offence complained  of against him was non-cognizable and  the provisions  of Section  251A of  the Code  of   Criminal  Procedure   were  not  applicable,  and consequently. he  (accused 1)  had no right to obtain copies of the documents concerned. The Magistrate further passed an order on  August 3,  1973. declining to allow the accused to take photostats of all the documents, on the ground that the documents could  not be  allowed to  be  taken  outside  the court. He, however, added that "if any request to secure the photostat copies in the Court comes, it will be considered".      On August  24, 1973,  the Magistrate  framed  a  charge under Section  3(a) of  the Act  to the  effect? that  on or after November  14, 1970 the accused was found in possession of M.S.  Plates numbering  about 110, which were the Railway property unlawfully  possessed by  him. The  accused pleaded ’not guilty’  and again  made an  application repeating  his request for  copies of  the statements of witnesses recorded by Inspector  Kakade. He  also prayed  that he be allowed to inspect all  the statements  recorded by the prosecution and take  copies   thereof.   The   Magistrate   rejected   this application, also, by an order on September 7, 1973.      Feeling  aggrieved   by  the   orders  passed   by  the Magistrate on  August 9. 1973 and September 7, 1973, and the

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framing of the charge against him, the appellant invoked the inherent jurisdiction  of the High Court by a petition under Section 561A  of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure, 1898, and prayed that the said orders be quashed. In this petition, he challenged the  constitutional validity  of Section 9 of the Act. The  petition was heard by a Bench consisting of Vaidya and  Gandhi,   JJ.  The  learned  Judges  answered  all  the questions, posed  above, in  the negative. But, on the other aspects of  the  case,  the  Assistant  Government  Pleader, appearing on  behalf of  the State,  stated before  the High Court that the prosecution did not desire to keep back 182 any material  from the  accused and  that they would produce copies of  statements of all the witnesses and the documents on which  the prosecution  intends  to  rely  or  which  the accused wanted  to examine. In view of this statement of the Government Pleader,  the High  Court set aside the orders of the Magistrate  and directed  the complainant  under Section 165 of  the Evidence  Act to  produce in the trial court the true copies  of  the  statement  of  the  witnesses  already examined and to be examined hereafter By the complainant and of the documents on which the complainant desired to depend. The High  Court further  declared that  the accused  and his counsel shall  be entitled  to inspect  those documents  and take copies  thereof, if necessary, in the court. If further declared that  Section 9  of the Act, is not ultra vires the Constitution.      Hence, these appeals by the accused persons. Question No. 1      The first  question for  consideration is.  whether  an Inspector of  the Railway Protection Force, (for short, RPF) is  a  "police  officer",  and  therefore  any  confessional statement made  to  him  comes  within  the  prohibition  of Section 25. Evidence Act. Section 25 reads thus:           "No confession  made to  a police officer shall be      proved as against a person accused of any offence."      As explained by this Court in Ariel v. State the policy behind Sections  25 and  26.  Evidence  Act  is  to  make  a substantive  rule  of  law  that  confessions  whenever  and wherever made  to the  police shall be presumed to have been obtained under  the circumstances  mentioned in p Section 24 and, therefore, inadmissible except so far as is provided in Section 27,  of that  Act. The term "Police officer" has not been defined in the Evidence Act.      Shri R.  K. Garg,  appearing for the appellant, submits that the expression "police officer" in Section 25, Evidence Act must  be construed  in a  wide popular  sense, so  as to include within its ambit all officers of Government who are, in substance, invested with the power to investigate certain offences in  accordance with  the provisions  of the Code of Criminal  Procedure  1898  (for  short,  called  the  Code). irrespective of  the fact that they are differently labelled such as,  Excise officers  or Customs officers or members of the RPF,  otherwise, the  very object  of Section 25 will be defeated. In support of this contention, the learned counsel has referred to the decision of this Court 183 in Raja  Ram Jaiswal  v. State  of Bihar.  The point pressed into argument  is that  an Inspector  of the  RPF making  an inquiry under  the Railway  Property  (Unlawful  Possession) Act. 1966  into an  offence under  Section 3 of that Act, in substance. acts  and exercises  almost all  the powers  of a ’Police officer’  making an  investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure. If that be the correct position-proceeds the argument  any confessional  statement recorded  by  such

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Inspector will  be hit  by section  25, Evidence Act, and if that statement  falls short of a ’confession’, then also, it will not be admissible in evidence against its maker, at his trial because  of the bar in section 162. Criminal Procedure Code.      As against the above, Shri Nain submits that an officer of the RPF while making an inquiry under the 1966 Act cannot be equated  with a  Police officer  in charge  of  a  Police Station  making   an  investigation   under  the  Code.  One important difference  in  their  powers  is,  that  the  RPF Inspector has  no power  to submit  a report  or chargesheet under section 173 of the Code. Shri Nain has further pointed out that  Raja Ram Jaiswal’s case stands on its own peculiar facts, and  was distinguished  in  a  later  decision  by  a Constitution Bench  of this  Court in  Badku Joti  Savant v. State of  Mysore. According  to Shri  Nain, the correct test for determining  whether or  not a  RPF officer is a ’Police officer’ for the purpose of section 25. Evidence Act, is the one which  was consistently  applied in  State of  Punjab v. Barkat Ram;  Badku Joti  Savant (ibid); Romesh Chandra Mehta v. West  Bengal. To  top  it  all,  it  is  maintained,  the question is now no longer res integra and has been concluded by the  recent judgment  of this  Court in  State of U.P. v. Durga Prasad.      In reply, Shri R.K. Garg has tried to distinguish Durga Prasad’s  case,  ibid,  on  the  ground,  that  therein  the question whether  or not  an officer  of the RPF is a Police officer within  the  contemplation  of  section  25  of  the Evidence Act,  was not  directly in  issue. It is maintained that the  only question  for  decision  in  that  case  was. Whether an  enquiry conducted under section 8(1) of the 1966 Act can  be deemed to be an investigation for the purpose of section 162  of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure.  and  this question was  answered in  the negative. In the alternative, it is  urged that  Durga Prasad’s  case  was  not  correctly decided and  its ratio  needs reconsideration  by  a  larger Bench because  it has  overlooked the  test laid down by the 3-Judge Bench in Raja Ram laiswal’s case. 184      Although Durga  Prasad’s case  very largely  appears to conclude this  question,  yet,  in  deference  to  the  last argument of  Shri Garg,  we propose  to deal  with the other decisions of  this Court.  also. which have been referred to by counsel on both sides.      At the  outset, for  the sake  of perspective,  we  may notice the  relevant provisions  of the  1966  Act  and  the Railway Protection Force Act ]957 (for short called the 1957 Act). First we will notice the relevant features of the 1957 Act whereunder  the RPF was constituted. The preamble of the 1957 Act  states that  its object  is  to  provide  for  the constitution and  regulation of  a Force  called the Railway Protection Force  for the  better protection and security of railway property.  The various clauses in Section 2 contains definitions. The  definition of "railway property" in clause (e) "includes  any goods,  money or  valuable  security,  or animal, belonging  to, or  in the charge or possession of. a railway administration."  "Member of  The  Force"  means  "a person appointed  to the  Force under  this Act other than a superior officer".  Clause (c)  "superior officer" means any of the  officers appointed  under section 4. Clause (g) says that the  words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and  defined in the Indian Railways Act 1890, shall have the meanings  respectively assigned  to them under that Act. Section  3   gives  powers  to  the  Central  Government  to constitute and  maintain the Force. Section 5 enumerates the

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classes of  officers; Inspector/Sub-Inspector/Assistant Sub- Inspector. Section  10 says that the officers and members of the Force  shall be  deemed to  be ’railway servants’ within the meaning  of the Indian Railways Act. 1890. Section 11 is important. It  enumerates That,  the duty  of every superior officer and member of the Force shall be-      (a)  promptly to  execute all orders lawfully issued to           him by his superior authority;      (b)  to protect and safeguard railway property;      (c)   to remove  any obstruction  in  the  movement  of           railway property; and      (d)  to do  any  other  act  conducive  to  the  better           protection and security of railway property. Section 12  enables any  superior officer  or member  of the Force to  arrest, without  an order  from a  Magistrate  and without a warrant-           "(a) any  person who  has  been  concerned  in  an      offence relating  to railway  property punishable  with      imprisonment  for  a  term  exceeding  six  months,  or      against whom  a  reasonable  suspicion  exists  of  his      having been so concerned; or 185           (b) any person found taking precautions to conceal      his  presence within railway limits under circumstances      which afford  reason to  believe that he is taking such      precautions with  a view  to committing  theft  of,  or      damage to, railway property."      Section 13 provides: "Whenever any superior officer, or any member  of the  Force, not  below the  rank of  a Senior Rakshak, has  reason to  believe that any such offence as is referred to  in section  12 has  been nor is being committed and  that   a  search-warrant  cannot  be  obtained  without affording the  offender an  opportunity of  escaping  or  of concealing evidence  of the  offence, he  may detain him and search his person and belongings forthwith and, if he thinks proper, arrest  any person  whom he has reason to believe to have committed  the  offence.  Under  sub-section  (2),  the provisions of the Code, relating to searches under that Code shall, so  far as  may be,  apply  to  searches  under  this section. Section  14 indicates  the procedure to be followed after arrest.  According to  it,  any  superior  officer  or member of  the Force  making an arrest under this Act, shall without unnecessary  delay. make over the person arrested to a police  officer, or,  in the  absence of a Police officer, take such  person or  cause him  to be  taken to the nearest police station. Section 17 provides penalties for neglect of duty, etc.  Section 20  gives protection  to a member of the Force for  any act  done by  him in  the  discharge  of  his duties. Section 21 gives powers to the Central Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act. Clause (b) of  sub-section (2) of this section says that such rules may provide,  inter alia,  for  regulating  the  powers  and duties  of  superior  officers  and  members  of  the  Force authorised to exercise any functions by or under this Act.      From the above survey, it will be seen that the primary object of  constituting the  Railway Protection  Force is to secure  better  "protection  and  security  of  the  railway property." The  restricted power  of arrest and search given to the officers or members of the Force is incidental to the efficient discharge  of their  basic  duty  to  protect  and safeguard Railway  Property. No general power to investigate all cognizable  offences relating to Railway Property, under the Criminal  Procedure  Code  has  been  conferred  on  any superior officer  or member  of the  Force by  the 1957 Act. Section 14 itself makes it clear that even with regard to an

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offence relating to ’railway property’, the superior officer or member  of the  Force making  an arrest  under section 13 shall forthwith  make over  the person  arrested to a police officer, or  cause his  production  in  the  nearest  police station.      Now, we  will take  up the  1966 Act,  which came  into force  on  September  16,  1966.  As  is  evident  from  its preamble, it  is an  Act to  consolidate and  amend the  law relating to unlawful possession of 186 Railway Property.  The material  part  of  the  objects  and Reasons for  moving the  Bill which  became this  Act, is as under:           "2. At  present, offences against Railway property      are being  dealt with  under Railway  Stores  (Unlawful      Possession) Act,  1955, but this Act has been found, by      experience, to  be ineffective  in  tackling  with  the      enormity of  the problems  of theft  and pilferages  on      Railways. As  it is, this Act makes unlawful possession      of Railway Stores an Defence, but it is only applicable      to unlawful possession of Railway property owned by the      Railways, and  does not  cover the offences relating to      goods and parcels entrusted to Railways for transport.           3.  Further,  the  offences  under  this  Act  are      investigated and  enquired  into  by  local  police  in      accordance with  the provisions of the Code of Criminal      Procedure, 1898.  It has  been observed  that  the  two      Agencies,  i.e.   the  Government  Railway  Police  and      Railway Protection Force, which are at present provided      to  deal   with  crimes  on  railways  find  themselves      handicapped,  for  different  reasons,  in  effectively      dealing with  the problem  of theft  and  pilferage  of      Railway Property.  The Railways  are spread  out over a      large part of the country and property, etc., entrusted      to them  is carried  from one  part to  another usually      crossing   boundaries    of   different   states.   The      jurisdiction of  State Police  being restricted  to the      State boundary  only, it becomes difficult at times for      the Police  to make thorough and fruitful investigation      into offences  relating to  Railway Property.  Besides,      investigation of  cases in  respect of Railway Property      also  requires   a  specialised  knowledge  of  Railway      working. The  Railway Protection  Force, on  the  other      hand, are not at present equipped with requisite powers      of investigation  and prosecution, with the result that      whatever action  they take  in  respect  of  prevention      etc., is  taken just  in aid  of the  State Police  who      conduct investigation  and prosecution etc. Due to this      fact of  two agencies  being responsible  for achieving      the same  object,  the  machinery  has  not  proved  as      effective as it ought to have.           4, It  is,  therefore,  proposed  to  replace  the      Railway Stores  (Unlawful Possession)  Act, 1955,  by a      more comprehensive  Act so  as to  bring with its ambit      the unlawful  possession  of  goods  entrusted  to  the      Railways as  common carriers and to make the punishment      for such  offences more  deterrent. It is also proposed      to invest  powers of  investigation and  prosecution of      offences relating  to Railway  Property in  the Railway      Protection Force  in the  same manner  as in the Excise      and Customs."      (emphasis added) 187      From what  has been  quoted above, it is clear that the main purpose  of passing  the 1966 Act was to "invest powers

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of investigation  and prosecution"  of offences  relating to railway property  in the  RPF "in  the same manner as in the Excise and Customs".      We will  advert to  this point later. Suffice it to say here that  in view  of the  aforesaid object of enacting the 1966 Act.  the decisions of this Court on the question as to whether an  Excise  officer/Customs  officer  is  a  "Police officer", within the purview of section 25, Evidence Act, or section 162,  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  assume  analogical importance for  the purpose of deciding the precise question before us.      The various  clauses of  section 2  of  the  1966  Act, contain definitions.  Clause (c)  defines  "officer  of  the Force" to  mean  "an  officer  of  and  above  the  rank  of Assistant Sub-Inspector  appointed to the Force and includes a superior officer." The definition of "railway property" in clause  (d)  has  been  expanded  so  as  to  include  goods entrusted  to   the  Railway   for  carriage  or  transport, belonging to another person.      Section 3 provides:           "Whoever is  found. Or  is proved to have been, in      possession of any railway property reasonably suspected      of having  been stolen  or unlawfully  obtained  shall,      unless he  proves that  the railway  property came into      his possession lawfully be punishable-(a) for the first      offence with  imprisonment for  a term which may extend      to five  years, or  with fine, or with both and; in the      absence  of  .  special  and  adequate  reasons  to  be      mentioned  in   the  judgment   of  the   Court,   such      imprisonment shall  not be less than two years and such      fine shall  not be  less than  two thousand rupees; and      (b) for  the  second  or  a  subsequent  offence,  with      imprisonment for  a term which may extend to five years      and also  with fine  and in  the absence of special and      adequate reasons to be mentioned in the judgment of the      Court such  imprisonment shall  not be  less  than  two      years and such fine shall not be less than two thousand      rupees".      It will  be seen  that if any person is found or proved to be  in possession  of any  ’railway property’,  which  is reasonably suspected  of having  been stolen  or  unlawfully obtained, the  burden shall shift on to that person to prove his innocence,  that is  to say,  to establish  that he came into possession  of the ’railway property’ lawfully. Section 4 provides  punishment for  persons wilfully conniving at an offence under the provisions of this Act. 188      Section 5  says: "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code  of Criminal Procedure, 1898, an offence under this Act shall not be cognizable".      It may  be noted that in spite of provision in the Code of Criminal  Procedure to  the contrary, offences under this Act have  been made  non cognizable  and, as such, cannot be investigated by  a police officer under the Code. It follows that the  initiation of  prosecution for an offence inquired into under  this Act can only be on the basis of a complaint by an  officer of  RPF and  not on  the report  of a  police officer under section 173(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.      Section 6  gives powers  to  any  superior  officer  or member of  the Force  to arrest  without  an  order  from  a Magistrate and  without a  warrant, any  person who has been concerned in  an  offence  punishable  under  this  Act,  or against whom  a reasonable  suspicion existed  of his having been so concerned.

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    Section 7  of the  Act provides  that the procedure for investigation of  a cognizable offence has to be followed by the officer before whom the accused Person is produced.      Reading section  7 of the 1966 Act with that of section 14 of  the 1957 Act, it is clear that while in the case of a person arrested  under section  12 of  the 1957 Act the only course open  to the  superior officer or member of the Force was to make over the person arrested to a police officer, in the case  of a person arrested for a suspected offence under the 1966  Act, he  is required  to be produced without delay before the nearest officer of the Force, who shall obviously be bound  (in view  of Article 22(1) of the Constitution) to produce him further before the Magistrate concerned.      Section 8  of the  1966 Act  is new. It provides for an inquiry to  be made  against the arrested persons. According to it,  when any  person is  arrested by  an officer  of the Force for  an  offence  punishable  under  this  Act  or  is forwarded to  him under  section  7,  he  shall  proceed  to inquire into  the charge  against such  person. It  is to be noted that  such power  of inquiry, has been conferred on an officer of the Force, although he is not an officer incharge of a  police station as envisaged by section 173 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure,  Sub-section  (2)  of  this  section confers on  the officer  of the  Force "the same powers" for the purpose of the inquiry under sub-section (1) and subject to the  same provisions "as the officer incharge of a police station may  exercise and  is subject  under  the  Code  of. Criminal Procedure,  1898 when  investigating  a  cognizable case." Then there is a proviso which says: 189      "Provided that-           (a) if the officer of the Force is of opinion that      there is  sufficient evidence  or reasonable  ground of      suspicion against  the accused  person, he shall either      admit him  to bail to appear before a Magistrate having      jurisdiction in  the case, or forward him in custody to      such Magistrate;           (b) if it appears to the officer of the Force that      there is  not sufficient  evidence or reasonable ground      of suspicion  against  the  accused  person,  he  shall      release the  accused person  on his  executing a  bond,      with or  without sureties  as the  officer of the Force      may direct,  to appear, if and when so required, before      the Magistrate  having jurisdiction,  and shall  make a      full report  of all  the particulars of the case to his      official superior." Section 9  gives powers to an officer of the Force to summon persons to give evidence and produce documents, or any other thing in  any inquiry  for any  of the purposes of this Act. Sub-sections (3) and (4) provide:           "(3) All  persons, so  summoned, shall be bound to      attend either  in person  or by  an authorised agent as      such officer  may direct;  and all  persons so summoned      shall be  bound to  state the  truth upon  any  subject      respecting which  they are  examined or make statements      and to  produce such  documents and other things as may      be required:                Provided that the exemption under section 132           and 133  of the  Code of  Civil  Procedure,  1908,           shall be applicable to requisitions for attendance           under this section."           "(4) Every  such inquiry  as  aforesaid  shall  be      deemed to be a ’judicial proceeding’ within the meaning      of section  193 and  section 228  of the  Indian  Penal      Code."

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Section 10  enables an  officer of  the Force, having reason for the  requisite belief  to apply  for a search warrant to the  Magistrate.  Section  11  provides  that  searches  and arrests shall  be in  accordance with  the provisions of the Code.      Section 14  makes it  clear that  the provisions of the Act shall  override all other laws. This means that if there is anything  in the  1966 Act which is inconsistent with the Code, then  on that point, the 1966 Act will prevail and the application of the Code pro tanto will be excluded. The most important example  of such exclusion, as already noticed, is to be  found in  section 5  of the  1966 Act  which makes as offence  under   this  Act  non-cognizable,  notwithstanding anything in the Code. This clearly shows that the provisions of the Code cannot 190 proprio vigore  apply to  an enquiry conducted under section 8(1) of  the 1966  Act by  an officer of the Force. Further, section 6  of the  1966 Act empowers an officer or member of the Force  to arrest  without a warrant and without an order of  the  Magistrate  any  person  concerned,  or  reasonably suspected of  being concerned  in an  offence under the 1966 Act. This again is contrary to the scheme and content of the Code which must give way to the 1966 Act in this matter.      The third material aspect in which an inquiry under the 1966 Act,  differs from  investigation under the Code, is to be found  in Section  9(3) whereunder  persons summoned  to, appear in  the inquiry  are expressly  mandated to state the truth. In  contrast with  this, Section 160 of the Code does not expressly bind persons examined in Police investigation, to state  the truth.  The inquiry  under Section 8(1) of the 1966 Act  in view  of Section  9(4) shall  be deemed to be a judicial proceeding  for the purpose of Sections 193 and 228 of the  Penal Code. But a police investigation under Section 160 of  the Code  does not  partake of  the character  of  a judicial proceeding  for any  purpose and a witness examined during such investigation cannot be prosecuted under Section 193, Penal Code.      The fourth important aspect in which the power and duty of an  officer of  the RPF  conducting an  inquiry under the 1966 Act,  differs from  a police  investigation  under  the Code, is  this Sub-section  (3) of  Section 161  of the Code says that  the police  officer may  reduce into  writing any statement made  to  him  in  the  course  of  investigation. Section 162(1),  which is  to be  read  in  continuation  of Section  161   of  the  Code,  prohibits  the  obtaining  of signature of  the person  on his  statement recorded  by the investigating officer.  But no  such prohibition attaches to statements recorded  in the  course of  an inquiry under the 1966 Act;  rather, from  the obligation  to state  the truth under pain  of prosecution enjoined by Section 9(3) and (4), it follows  as a  corollary, that the officer conducting the inquiry may  obtain signature  of the  person who  made  the statement.      Fifthly, under  the provision  to  sub-section  (1)  of Section 162  of the Code, oral or recorded statement made to a police  officer during  investigation may  be used  by the accused, and  with the  permission  of  the  Court,  by  the prosecution to  contradict the statement made by the witness in Court  in the  manner provided  in Section  145, Evidence Act, or  when the  witness’ statement  is so  used in  cross examination, he  may be  reexamined if  any  explanation  is necessary. The  statement of  a witness  made  to  a  police officer during  investigation cannot  be used  for any other purpose, whatever, except of course

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191 when it  falls within Sections 32 or 27 of he Evidence Act. The prohibition  contained in  Section 162  extends  to  all statements,  confessional   or  otherwise  during  a  police investigation made  by any  person whether  accused or  not, whether reduced  to writing  or not, subject to the proviso. In contrast  with the  Code, in  the 1966  Act, there  is no provision analogous  to the proviso to Section 162(1) of the Code, which  restricts or  prohibits the  use of a statement recorded by  an officer  in the  course of  an inquiry under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act.      Sixthly, the primary duty of a member/officer of RPF is to safeguard  and protect railway property. Only such powers of arrest and inquiry have been conferred by the 1966 Act on members of  RPF as  are  necessary  and  incidental  to  the efficient and effective discharge of the basic duty of watch and ward.  Unlike a  police officer  who has a general power under the  Code to  investigate all  cognizable  cases,  the power of  an officer  of the  RPF  to  make  an  inquiry  is restricted to offences under the 1966 Act.      Last but  not the least, under Section 190 of the Code, a Magistrate  is empowered  to take cognizance of an offence only in  three ways, namely, (a) "upon receiving a complaint of facts  which constitute  an offence; (b) upon a report in writing of  such facts  made by  any police officer, and (c) upon information  received from  any  person  other  than  a Police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence  has been committed". The ’report’ mentioned in clause (b),  includes the  report made  by a  police officer under  Section  173  after  completing  investigation  under Chapter XIV  of the  Code. Section  173, in  terms makes  is clear that  the  duty  of  making  a  report  thereunder  on completion of  the investigation  to the Magistrate, is that of the  officer-in-charge of  the  police  station.  Such  a report shall include the opinion of the police officer as to the result  of the  investigation.  The  formation  of  such opinion is  the final  step in  the investigation  and  that final step is to be taken by the police officer in charge of the station  and by  no other  authority (Abhinandan  Jha v. Dinesh Mishra).  An officer  of the  RPF making  an  inquiry under the  1966 Act,  cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be called  an "officer-in-charge of a Police Station" within the meaning of Sections 173 and 190(b) of the Code. The made of initiating  prosecution  by  submitting  a  report  under Section 173  read with clause (b) of Section 190 of the Code is, therefore,  not available  to an  officer of the RPF who has completed an inquiry into an offence under the 1966 Act. The only mode of initiating prosecution of the 192 person  against  whom  he  has  successfully  completed  the inquiry, available  to an officer of the RPF, is by making a complaint  under  Section  190(1)(a)  of  the  Code  to  the Magistrate empowered  to try the offence. That an officer of the Force  conducting an  inquiry under  Section 8(1) cannot initiate proceedings  in court  by a  report under  Sections 173/190(1)(b) of the Code, is also evident from the provisos to sub-section  (2) of  Section 8  of the  1966  Act.  Under proviso (a),  if such  officer is  of opinion  that there is sufficient  evidence   or  reasonable  ground  of  suspicion against the  accused, he  shall  either  direct  him  (after admitting him  to bail)  to  appear  before  the  Magistrate having jurisdiction  or  forward  him  in  custody  to  such Magistrate. Under  proviso (b), if it appears to he officer that there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion against  the accused, he shall release him on bond

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to appear  before the Magistrate concerned "and shall make a full report  of all  the particulars  of  the  case  to  his superior officer".  Provisos (a) and (b) put it beyond doubt that where  after completing  an inquiry, the officer of the Force is  of opinion  that there  is sufficient  evidence or reasonable ground  of suspicion against the accused, he must initiate prosecution  of the  accused by  making a complaint under Section  190(1) (a)  of the  Code  to  the  Magistrate competent to try the case.      From the  comparative study  of the relevant provisions of the 1966 Act and the Code, it is abundantly clear that an officer of  the RPF  making an inquiry under Section 8(1) of the 1966  Act does  not possess several important attributes of an  officer-in-charge of  a police  station conducting an investigation under  Chapter XIV  of the Code. The character of  the   ’inquiry’   is   different   from   that   of   an ’investigation’ under  the Code.  The  official  status  and powers of  an officer  of the Force in the matter of inquiry under the  1966 Act differ in material aspects from those of a police officer conducting an investigation under the Code.      The ground  is now clear for noticing the rulings cited at the  Bar. In  State of  Punjab v.  Barkat Ram (ibid), the question was  whether a Customs officer can be regarded as a ’police officer’ within the purview of Section Evidence Act. This decision  was rendered  by a  Bench  of  three  learned Judges. The  judgment of the Court was delivered by majority (consisting of Raghubar Dayal and J.L. Kapur JJ.). Subba Rao J. (as  he then  was wrote  a dissenting  opinion. The  view taken by the Court Majority was to the effect:           "that the  powers which  the police officers enjoy      are powers  for the  effective prevention and detection      of crime  in order  to maintain law and order. Although      the expression  ’police officer" has to be construed in      a wide and popular sense, yet it has not 193      so wide  a meaning as to include officers interested in      the duty  of detecting  and  preventing  smuggling  and      similar offences  with the  object of  safeguarding the      levying and  recovery of  Customs duties.  He  is  more      concerned with the goods and customs duty than with the      offender. The  duties of customs officers are very much      different from  those  of  police  officers  and  their      possessing certain  powers, which  may have  similarity      with those  of police  officers,  for  the  purpose  of      detecting  the  smuggling  of  goods  and  the  persons      responsible  for   it,  would   not  make  them  police      officers. Merely  because similar  powers in  regard to      the detection  of infraction  of Customs laws have been      conferred on officers of the Police is not a sufficient      ground for  holding them  to be  police officers within      the purview  of Section  25 of  the Evidence  Act.  The      Customs officers,  when they  act under the Sea Customs      Act to  prevent the  smuggling  of  goods  by  imposing      confiscation and  penalties, act judicially. The Police      officers never act judicially. Hence, a Customs officer      either under  the Land  Customs Act. 1924, or under the      Sea Customs  Act, 1878, is not a police officer for the      purpose of Section 25, Evidence Act."      In his  dissenting opinion,  Subba Rao  J.,  held  that Section 25,  Evidence Act  was enacted  to subserve  a  high purpose and  that is  to prevent  the police  from obtaining confession by  force, torture  or inducement.  The  salutary principle underlying  the Section  would  apply  equally  to other officers,  by whatever  designation they may be known, who have  the power  and duty to detect and investigate into

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crimes and  is for  that purpose  in a  position to  extract confessions from  the accused  It is  not the  garb  or  the designation under  which the officer functions that matters, but the nature of the power he exercises or the character of the  function   he  performs,   is  decisive.  The  question therefore, in  each  case  is,  does  the  officer  under  a particular  Act   substantially  exercise   the  powers  and discharge the  duties of  prevention and detection of crime? If he  does, he  will be a police officer. The learned Judge quoted with  approval the  view of  Balakrishna Ayyar, J. in Paramasivam’s case  that if  the officer’s powers and duties are  substantially  those  of  a  police  officer,  but  are confined to  a  particular  extent  of  territory  or  to  a particular subject-matter  he will  be a police officer only in respect of that territory or that subject matter. On this reasoning, Subba  Rao J.  held that  a Customs  officer is a police officer qua his police functions.      The next  case is  Raja Ram Jaiswal (ibid) decided by a three-Judge Bench.  There,  the  question  was,  whether  an Excise officer 194 exercising the  power of  investigation under  the Bihar and Orissa Excise  Act, 1915,  is a  ’police officer’ within the meaning of  Section 25, Evidence Act, Mudholkar, J. speaking for himself and Subba Rao, J., answered this question in the affirmative. What  the majority  held in  that case  may  be summed up as under:      The test  for determining whether a person is a "police officer" for  the purpose  of Section 25, Evidence Act would be  whether  the  powers  of  a  police  officer  which  are conferred on  him or which are exercisable by him because he is deemed  to be  an officer-in-charge  of a  police station establish a  direct or  substantial  relationship  with  the prohibition enacted  by Section  25, Evidence  Act, that is, the recording  of a  confession. In other words, whether the powers conferred  on the  Excise officer  under the  Act are such as  would tend  to facilitate the obtaining by him of a confession from a suspect delinquent. If they do, then it is unnecessary to consider the dominant purpose for which he is appointed or the question as to what other powers he enjoys. It was  further held that unlike the Customs officer on whom are conferred  by the  Sea Customs  Act, 1878,  powers of  a limited character, which are analogous to those conferred on police  officers,   are  not  by  themselves  sufficient  to facilitate the  obtaining by  him of a confession. It is the possession of these powers which enables police officers and those who  are deemed  to be  police officers  to exercise a kind of authority over the persons arrested which facilitate the  obtaining   from   them   statements   which   may   be incriminating to the persons making them. The law allows the police officer  to obtain  such statements  with a  view  to facilitate  the  investigation  of  the  offences.  But,  it renders them inadmissible in evidence for the obvious reason that a  suspicion about  voluntariness would attach to them. It is  the power of investigation which establishes a direct relationship with  the prohibition  enacted in  Section  25. Therefore, where  such a power is conferred upon an officer, the mere  fact that  he possesses  some other  powers  under another law would not make him any the less a police officer for the  purposes of Section 25. Hence, a confession made by an accused  under the  Bihar and  Orissa Act, recorded by an Excise Inspector who is empowered to investigate any offence under the  Act, is inadmissible by reasons of the provisions of Section 25 of the Evidence Act.      Raghubar  Dayal,  J.,  however,  expressed  a  contrary

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opinion. He held that the Excise Inspectors empowered by the State Government  under Section  77(2) of the Bihar Act, are not ’police  officers’ within  the meaning  of Section 25 of the Evidence  Act and  that the aforesaid officers cannot be treated to  he police  officers for  the purposes of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 162 does not 195 confer any  power on a police officer. It deals with the use which can  be made  of the  statements recorded  by a police officer carrying  out investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code. The  investigation which  the aforesaid Excise officer conducts is  not under Chapter XIV of the Code, but is under the provisions  of the  Act and therefore, this is a further reason for  non-applicability of  Section 162 of the Code to any statements  made by a person to an Excise officer during the course of his investigating an offence under the Act.      Although in  Raja  Ram  Jaiswal’s  case,  the  majority judgment distinguished  the earlier decision in Barkat Ram’s case on  the  ground  that  therein,  the  question  whether officers of departments other than the police on whom powers of an  officer-in-charge of a police station under clause 14 of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure are conferred are police officers or not for the purpose of Section 25, Evidence Act, was left  open and undecided, yet the fact remains that some of the criteria adopted by the majority in Barkat Ram’s case in arriving at the decision they did, in a Customs officer’s case was rejected and the test indicated by Subba Rao, J. in his minority judgment was substantially approved.      Be that as it may, on facts, the distinguishing feature of Raja  Ram Jaiswal’s  case was that under the Bihar Excise Act, the  powers of an officer-in-charge of a Police Station were expressly  conferred on the Excise officer concerned in respect of the area to which he was appointed.      The question whether a Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise  was a  ’police officer’  within the  meaning  of Section 25,  Evidence Act,  again came  up for consideration before a  Constitution Bench  in Badku  Joti Savant’s  case, ibid., Wanchoo,  J. who  delivered the  unanimous opinion of the Bench, answered this question (at page 701), thus:           "There has  been difference  of opinion  among the      High Courts  in India  as to  the meaning  of the words      "police officer"  used in  Section 25  of the  Evidence      Act. One  view  has  been  that  those  words  must  be      construed in  a broad way and all officers whether they      are police  officers properly so-called or not would be      police officers  within the  meaning of  those words if      they have  all the  powers of  a  police  officer  with      respect to  investigation of  offences with  which they      are concerned.  The leading case i support of this view      is Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed v. Emperor. This view approved by      Subba Rao  J. in  his minority judgment in Barkat Ram’s      case). The other view which may be called the 196      narrow view  is that  the  words  "police  officer"  in      Section 25  of the  Evidence Act  mean a police officer      properly so-called and do not include officers of other      departments of  government who  may be charged with the      duty to  investigate under  special Acts special crimes      thereunder like  excise offences  or customs  offences,      and so  on. The leading case in support of this view is      Radha Kishun  Marwari v.  King-Emperor. The  other High      Courts  have  followed  one  view  or  the  other,  the      majority being  in favour  of the  view  taken  by  the      Bombay  High   Court......  We  shall  proceed  on  the      assumption that the broad view may be accepted and that

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    requires an  examination of  the various  provisions of      the Act  to which we turn now.... (After examining some      provision of  the Central  Act 1  of 1944, the judgment      proceeded)".           "It is urged that under sub-section (2) of Section      21 a  Central Excise  officer under the Act has all the      powers of  an officer-in  charge of  a  police  station      under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure and      therefore he  must be  deemed to  be a  police  officer      within the  meaning of those words in Section 25 of the      Evidence Act.  It is  true that sub-section (2) confers      on the  Central Excise  officer under  the Act the same      powers as  an officer-in-charge of a police station has      when investigating a cognizable case; but this power is      conferred for  the purpose  of  sub-section  (1)  which      gives power  to a  Central Excise  officer to  whom any      arrested person is forwarded to inquire into the charge      against him.  Thus under  section 21  it is the duty of      the Central  Excise officer  to whom an arrested person      is forwarded  to inquire  into the  charge made against      such person.  Further under  proviso (a) to sub-section      {2) of  section 21  if the Central Excise officer is of      opinion that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable      ground of  suspicion against  the  accused  person,  he      shall either  admit him  to bail  to  appear  before  a      Magistrate having  jurisdiction in the case, or forward      him in  custody to such Magistrate. It does not however      appear that  a Central Excise officer under the Act has      power to submit a charge-sheet under Section 173 of the      Code of  Criminal Procedure.  Under Section  190 of the      Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  a  Magistrate  can  take      cognizance of  any offence  either (a) upon receiving a      complaint of  facts which  constitute such  offence, of      (b) upon  a report in writing of such facts made by any      police officer,  or (c)  upon information received from      any person  other than a police officer or upon his own      knowledge or  suspicion, that  such  offence  has  been      committed. 197      police officer  for purposes of clause (b) above can in      our opinion only be a police officer properly so-called      as the  scheme of  the Code of Criminal Procedure shows      and it  seems therefore  that a  Central Excise officer      will have to make a complaint under clause (a) above if      he wants  the  Magistrate  to  take  cognizance  of  an      offence, for  example, under Section 9 of the Act. Thus      though under  sub-section (2)  of  Section  21  of  the      Central Excise  officer under the Act has the powers of      an  officer-in-charge   of  a   police   station   when      investigating a cognizable case that is for the purpose      of his inquiry under sub-section (1) of Section 21."      The Court  then distinguished  Raja Ram Jaiswal’s case, thus:           "Section 21  (of the  Central Excises and Salt Act      No. 44) is in terms different from Section 78(3) of the      Bihar and  Orissa Excise  Act, 1915,  which came  to be      considered  in  Raja  Ram  Jaiswal’s  case,  and  which      provided in terms that "for the purposes of Section 156      of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure,  1898, the area to      which an  excise officer  empowered under  Section  77,      Sub-section (2),  is appointed  shall be deemed to be a      police station,  and such officer shall be deemed to be      the officer-in-charge  of such station". It, therefore,      cannot be  said that  the provision in Section 21 is on      par with  the provision  in Section  78(3) of the Bihar

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    and Orissa  Excise Act. All that Section 21 provides is      that for  the purpose  his inquiry,  a  Central  Excise      officer shall  have the  powers of an officer-in-charge      of a  police station  when investigating  a  cognizable      case. But  even so  it appears that these powers do not      include  the  power  to  submit  a  charge-sheet  under      Section 173  of the  Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  for      unlike the  Bihar and  Orissa Excise  Act, the  Central      Excise officer is not deemed to be an officer-in-charge      of a police station."      On the  above reasoning, the Court concluded that "mere conferment of powers of investigation into criminal offences under Section  9 of the Act does not make the Central Excise officer a  police officer even in the broader view mentioned above".      Following the  decisions in  Punjab State v. Barkat Ram (ibid), and  Badku Joti  Savant v.  Mysore State  (ibid),  a Constitution Bench of this Court, in Ramesh Chandra v. State of  West   Bengal  (ibid),  reiterated  that  the  test  for determining whether  an officer of customs is to be deemed a police officer is whether he is invested with all the powers of  a  police  officer  qua  investigation  of  an  offence, including the  power to  submit a  report under Section 173, Code of  Criminal Procedure.  Applying this  test, the Court held that  since a  Customs officer exercising power to make an inquiry cannot submit a report under Section 198 173 of  the Code,  he is  not a  police officer  within  the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act.      Again in  Illias v.  Collector of  Customs, this  Court held that  although a  Customs officer under the Customs Act 1962, has  been invested  with many of the powers similar to those exercisable  by a  police officer under Chapter XIV of the Code-which  he did  not have under the old Act-yet he is not empowered to file a chargesheet under Section 173 of the Code and  therefore, he  cannot be  regarded  as  a  "police officer" within the meaning of Section 25, Evidence Act.      Shri Garg  tried to  distinguish  these  cases  on  the ground that  they  relate  to  Customs  officers  or  Excise officers whose  primary duties  are to  collect and  prevent evasion of revenues, and that some of the powers of a police officer are  conferred on  them  merely  for  the  effective discharge  of  their  duties  as  revenue  officers.  It  is submitted that  the members  of  the  RPF  are  not  revenue officers and  their duties are confined to the protection of railway   property,    and   prevention,    detection    and investigation of  crimes  relating  to  ’railway  property’. Relying on  the decision  in Raja  Ram Jaiswal’s case, it is urged that  the real test to be applied for determining this question, is,  whether the  police powers  conferred  on  an officer of  the RPF  are such  as would  tend  to  tempt  or facilitate the  obtaining by  him a confession from a person suspected of  the commission  of an  offence under  the 1966 Act.  It  is  argued  that  since  an  officer  of  the  RPF conducting  an   inquiry  has  been  invested  qua  ’railway property’ with almost all the powers or an officer-in-charge of a  Police Station  making an  investigation under Chapter XIV of  the Code,  this test is amply satisfied to hold that he is a ’police officer’ within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence  Act. At  one stage,  it was  contended by Shri Garg that  it could  be spelled out from Section 8(2) of the 1966 Act  that an  officer of  the Force  had the  power  to present a  charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code, also. In the alternative, it was submitted that the mere fact that an officer  of the  Force could initiate prosecution only by

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filing a  complaint and not by making a report under Section 173  of   the  Code,   was  immaterial   in  regard  to  the satisfaction of This test, if, in fact, he had been invested with all  other powers  of investigation  exercisable  by  a police officer  under the  Code, qua offences under the 1966 Act.      Prima facie  there is much to be said for the reasoning advanced by  the learned counsel for the appellant, but as a matter of  judicial discipline  we cannot  deviate from  the ratio of Punjab State v. Barkat 199 Ram and  Badku Joti  Savant’s case,  and  the  primary  test enunciated therein for determining this question. Indeed, we are bound  by the  decision in State of U.P. v. Durga Prasad (ibid) which,  following the  ratio of  the aforesaid cases, has held  that an  officer of  the RPF conducting an inquiry under Section  8(1) of  the 1966 Act, cannot be equated with an  officer-in-charge   of  a   Police  Station   making  an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code.      It may  be recalled  that the  primary test  evolved in Badku Joti  Savant’s case  by the  Constitution  Bench,  is: Whether the  officer concerned  under the  special Act,  has been invested with all the powers exercisable by an officer- in-charge of a Police Station under Chapter XIV of the Code, qua investigation  of offences under that Act, including the power  to   initiate  prosecution  by  submitting  a  report (chargesheet) under  Section 173  of the  Code. In  order to bring him  within The  purview of a ’police officer’ for the purpose of  Section 25.  Evidence Act,  it is  not enough to show that  he exercises some or even many of the powers of a police officer conducting an investigation under the Code.      Nor  is   the  ratio   of   the   aforesaid   decisions inapplicable  merely  because  they  related  to  a  Customs officer or  an Excise  officer, and not to an officer of the RPF. The  factual premises  on which the ratio of Badku Joti Savant’s rests  were substantially analogous to those of the instant case.  That is to say, the powers of arrest, inquiry and investigation  conferred on  the Central Excise officers under Act  1 of  1944 (which was under consideration in that case) are very similar to those with which an officer of the RPF is invested under the 1966 Act. Under Section 13 of that Act of  1944, any  Central Excise  officer duly empowered by the Central  Government in this behalf can arrest any person whom he  has reason  to believe  to be liable to punishment. ’Section 18  provides that  all searches made under that Act or any  rules  made  thereunder  shall  be  carried  out  in accordance with  the provisions  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure, 1898. Section 19 of that Act lays down that every person arrested  under the  Act shall  be forwarded  without delay to  the nearest  Central Excise  officer empowered  to send person  so arrested to a Magistrate, or, if there is no such Central Excise officer within a reasonable distance, to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station. Section 21 of the Act provides:           "(1) When any person is forwarded under Section 19      to a  Central Excise  officer empowered to send persons      so arrested to a Magistrate, the Central Excise officer      shall proceed to inquire into the charge against him. 200           (2) For  this purpose  the Central  Excise officer      may exercise  the same  powers and  shall be subject to      the same  provisions  as  the  officer-in-charge  of  a      police station may exercise and is subject to under the      Code of  Criminal Procedure, 1898, when investigating a      cognizable case."

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It will be seen that these provisions in Sections 13, 18, 19 and  21   of  the  Central  Act  I  of  1944,  substantially correspond to the provisions in Sections 6, 7, 8 etc. Of the 1966 Act,  which  we  have  already  noticed  It  will  bear repetition that sub-section 12) of section 8, under which an officer of  the Force conducting an inquiry may exercise the same powers  as an  officer-in-charge of  a  police  station investigating a  cognizable case  under the Code, is in pari materia with sub-section (2) of Section 21 of Act 1 of 1944.      It may  be recalled  that in the objects and Reasons of the Bill,  which was enacted as 1966 Act, it was stated that this  measure   invests   "powers   of   investigation   and prosecution of  offences relating to Railway Property in the Railway Protection Force in the same manner as in the Excise and Customs".  The  1966  Act  thus  brings  the  status  of officers of  the RPF in the matter of inquiry, investigation and prosecution  of offences  under the Act substantially at par with  that of  an Excise officer under the Central Act 1 of 1944 and that of a Customs Officer under the Customs Act, 1962. The  ratio  of  all  the  decisions  noticed  earlier, therefore, applies  in full  force to the case of an officer of the  RPF making an inquiry into an offence under the 1966 Act.      In  State   of  U.P.  v.  Durga  Prasad  (ibid),  after carefully examining  and comparing  the  powers  of  arrest, inquiry and  investigation of  an officer of the Force under the 1966  Act with those of a police officer under he Code, it was  pointed out that such an officer of the RPF does not possess all  the attributes  of an  officer-in-charge  of  a police station investigating a case under Chapter XIV of the Code. He possesses but a part of those attributes limited to the purpose  of holding  the inquiry under the Act. On these premises, it  was held  that an officer of the RPF making an inquiry under  the 1966  Act,  cannot  be  equated  with  an investigating police  officer. In  reaching this conclusion, Chandrachud, J.  (as he  then was),  speaking for the Court, appears to  have applied  the same test which was adopted in Badku Joti Savant’s case, when he observed:           "The right and duty of an investigating officer to      file  a   police  report   or  a  charge-sheet  on  the      conclusion of  investigation  is  the  hallmark  of  an      investigation under the Code. Section 173(1)(a) of 201      the Code  provides that as soon as the investigation is      completed the  officer-in-charge of  the police station      shall  forward   to  a  Magistrate  empowered  to  take      cognizance of  the offence on a police report, a report      in the  form prescribed  by the  State Government.  The      officer conducting an inquiry under Section 8(1) cannot      initiate court proceedings by filing a police report." The decision  in Raja Ram Jaiswal’s case, on which Shri Garg relies,  was  distinguished,  as  was  done  in  Badku  Joti Savant’s case,  on the  ground that  Jaiswal’s case involved the interpretation  of Section 78(3) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915.      In the  light of the above discussion, it is clear that an officer  of the  RPF conducting  an enquiry under Section 8(1) of  the 1966  Act has  not been  invested with  all the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station making an investigation under  Chapter XIV  of the Code. Particularly, he has  no power to initiate prosecution by filing a charge- sheet before  the Magistrate  concerned under Section 173 of the Code,  which has been held to be the clinching attribute of an  investigating ’police  officer’. Thus,  judged by the test laid  down in  Badku Jyoti  Savant’s,  which  has  been

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consistently adopted  in the  subsequent  decisions  noticed above, Inspector Kakade of the RPF could not be deemed to be a ’police  officer’ within  the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence   Act,   and   therefore,   any   confessional   or incriminating statement  recorded by him in the course of an inquiry under  Section 8(1)  of  the  1966  Act,  cannot  be excluded from evidence under the said section.      This takes us to the second question.      Question II      The  main   contention  of   Shri  Garg   is  that  any confessional or  incriminating  statements  recorded  by  an officer of  the Force  in the  course of  an  inquiry  under section 8(1)  of the  1966 Act,  cannot be  used as evidence against the  appellant in  view of  the  constitutional  ban against "compelled  testimony" imposed  by Article  20(3) of the Constitution.  The argument  is that as soon as a person is arrested  by an  officer of  the Force  on a suspicion or charge of  committing an  offence punishable  under the 1966 Act, he  stands in  the character of a "person accused of an offence".      That being  the case-proceeds  the argument-a statement made by  such an  accused person  to an  officer of  the RPF making an  inquiry against  him can  never  be  said  to  be voluntary, being subject to a legal compulsion under Section 9(3) of the 1966 Act to state the truth 202 upon any  subject respecting  which he  is examined  even if such state of might incriminate him. On these premises it is maintained that both the conditions necessary for attraction of the ban in Article 20(3) of the Constitution exist in the case of such statements.      In this  connection, Shri  Garg  has  referred  to  the dissenting judgment  of Subba  Rao, J. in Barkat Ram (ibid); Kathi Raning  Rawat v.  The State  of Saurashtra;  K. Joseph Augusthi &  Ors. v.  M.A. Narayanan; Mohamed Dastagir v. The State of  Madras; Bhagwan  Das v.  Union of  India; Ramanlal Bhogilal Shah  & Anr.  v. D.K.  Guha &  Ors.; M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra;  Smt. Nandini  Satpathy v. P.L. Dani & Anr.; and In re The Special Courts Bill.      As against this, Mr. Nain, appearing for the respondent State,  submits   that  the  conditions  necessary  for  the attraction of  the ban  in Article 20(3) do not exist in the instant case,  because before the filing of the complaint in the Court,  the appellant  was not  a "person  accused of an offence".  It   is  further   urged  that   the   compulsion contemplated by  Clause (3) of Article 20 means "physical or mental compulsion"  and not  compulsion of  law to state the truth;  that   freedom  to  tell  lies  is  not  within  the protection of  this clause.  It was nowhere alleged that the confessional or  incriminating statements  in question  were extorted by  the RPF  officer under physical duress, threat, inducement or  mental torture. It is added that in any case, it is  a question of fact to be established by evidence that any such  compulsion was used in obtaining the incriminating statements.      Clause (3)  of Article  20 of  the Constitution  reads, thus:           "No  person   accused  of  any  offence  shall  be      compelled to be a witness against himself." An analysis  of this clause shows three things: Firstly, its protection is  available only  to a  "person accused  of any offence". Secondly, the protection is against compulsion "to be a  witness". Thirdly,  this  protection  avails  "against himself".      It follows  that if  any of  these ingredients does not

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exist, this  clause (3), will not be attracted. Keeping this in mind,  it will be appropriate to concentrate on the first point, as to whether during the inquiry 203 under Section  8 of the 1966 Act when the appellant made the incriminating  statement  in  question,  he  was  a  "person accused of  any offence" within the contemplation of Article 20(3).      In M.  P. Sharma  v. Satish  Chandra (ibid)  which is a decision by  a seven  Judge Bench of this Court, it was held that determination  of this  issue will depend on whether at the  time   when  the  person  made  the  self-incriminatory statement, a  formal accusation  of  the  commission  of  an offence had  been made  against him.  "Formal accusation" is ordinarily brought into existence by lodging of an F.I.R. Or a formal  complaint to  the appropriate  authority or  court against  the   specific  individual,  accusing  him  of  the commission of  a crime  which, in  the normal  course, would result in  his prosecution. It is only on the making of such formal accusation  that clause  (3) of  Article  20  becomes operative  covering  that  individual  with  its  protective umbrella against testimonial compulsion.      The  interpretation  placed  by  the  Court  in  M.  P. Sharma’s case. On the phrase "person accused of any offence" used in Article 20(3) was reiterated in Bhagwan Das v. Union of India  (ibid) was  reaffirmed in Raja Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroz Mistry & Anr.      Again, in  the State  of Bombay  v. Kathi  Kalu Oghad & Ors; one  of the  propositions enunciated  by the Court was, that to  bring a statement within the prohibition of Article 20(3), the  person accused  must have stood in the character of an  accused person  at the time he made the statement. It is not  enough, that  he should  become an accused, any time after the  statement has been made. The same proposition was reiterated by Gajendragadkar C.J. in Joseph Augusthi (ibid), and again  by the Constitution Bench in Ramesh Chand Mehta’s (ibid). In  the instant  case, at  the time when the alleged incriminating statement  was made  before the officer of the RPF, no  formal complaint  in regard to the commission of an offence had  been filed  against him  in Court,  nor had any F.I.R. been  lodged with  the Police,  specifically accusing the appellant  or  the  author  of  that  statement  of  the commission of an offence. It is, therefore, manifest that at the material  time  the  author  of  the  self-incriminatory statements in  question, did  not fulfil  the character of a "person accused of an offence" within the meaning of Article 20(3).      The last  authority to  be noticed  in  regard  to  the interpretation  of   the  phrase   "person  accused  of  any offence", is  Ramanlal  Bhogilal  Shah’s  case  (ibid).  The petitioner Ramanlal Bhogilal Shah was arrested under Section 19B of the Foreign Exchange Act. The grounds 204 purportedly served  on him  under sub-section (1) of Section 19B for the offence under Section 4(2) and Section 22 of the Act,  punishable  under  Section  23,  were  elaborate.  The question arose  whether after  these grounds had been served on the  petitioner, it  could be  said that he was ’a person accused  of   an  offence’   within  Article  20(3)  of  the Constitution.  The   petitioner  was   produced  before  the Magistrate, who  released him  on  bail.  Thereafter,  First Information Report  was recorded under Section 154, Criminal Procedure  Code,   and  an   order  was  obtained  from  the Magistrate, permitting  the investigation  to be  made under Section 155(2),  Criminal Procedure  Code.  The  Enforcement

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Officer had  examined the petitioner and put his conclusions in  the   grounds  of   arrest  which  were  served  on  the petitioner. Under  these circumstances,  the Court held that the petitioner  was  definitely  a  "person  accused  of  an offence"  within   the  meaning  of  Article  20(3)  of  the Constitution and  at any rate, the petitioner was accused of an offence  when the  F.I.R. was recorded and therefore, the summons issued  by  the  Enforcement  Directorate  would  be illegal. At  the same  time, it  was held  that although the petitioner is  a ’person  accused of  an offence’,  the only protection that  Article 20(3) gave him is that he could not be compelled  to be  a witness against himself, but this did not mean that he need not give information regarding matters which do  not tend  to incriminate  him.  Consequently,  the Court did  not set  aside the  summons  and  held  that  the petitioner  was  bound  to  appear  before  the  Enforcement Directorate  and   answer  such   questions  that   did  not incriminate him.      To  sum  up,  only  a  person  against  whom  a  formal accusation of the commission of an offence has been made can be a  person "accused  of an  offence" within the meaning of Article 20(3).  Such formal  accusation may  be specifically made against  him in  an F.I.R. Or a formal complaint or any other formal document or notice served on that person, which ordinarily results  in his  prosecution  in  court.  In  the instant case no such formal accusation had been made against the  appellant   when  his  statement(s)  in  question  were recorded by the RPF Officer.      At the  relevant time  of making the self-incriminatory statements in  question, therefore,  the appellant  did  not stand in  the character  of a  person accused  of an offence and, as  such, the  protection of Article 20(3), will not be available to  him. In  view of this finding, we do not think it necessary  for the  decision of  these appeals to go into the question  whether legal  compulsion to  state the  truth such as  the one  contained in  Section 9(3) of the 1966 Act is, also, a compulsion interdicted by Article 20(3). 205      In the  light of  what has  been said  above, we  would answer the legal proposition (formulated as Question No. II) propounded by  the learned counsel for the appellant, in the negative.      Question No. 3 was not raised or pressed at the time of arguments in  the courts  below. We, therefore, refuse to go into this question and pronounce in regard thereto.      Before we  part with  this judgment,  we may  note here that the  learned counsel  for the respondent-State has very fairly stated  at the  bar, that  the State  shall  have  no objection to  the supply  of  copies  of  all  the  relevant documents and statements on which the prosecution intends to rely, to  the accused-appellants in the trial court. In view of this undertaking we thought it unnecessary to go into the legal aspects  of this  question. We  will however, add that the prosecution  shall also  permit the accused-appellant to inspect the  other material  that may have been collected by the inquiry  officer, relevant  to the  charge  against  the accused-appellant. With  this observation,  we would dismiss these appeals  (Nos. 208-209 of 1974) and send the case back to the  trial court  for further  proceedings in  accordance with law.  Since the  case is  already old,  the proceedings shall be  conducted as  far as  possible, from day-to-day on top-priority basis,  and disposed of preferably within three months of  the date or which the records are received in the trial court.      Since the  legal questions  raised before us in Special

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Leave Petition  (Crl.) No.  630 of  1977 are  the same as in Criminal Appeals  Nos. 208-209  of  1974,  and  the  learned counsel  for   the  petitioners   therein  has  adopted  the arguments of  Shri R.K. Garg, appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeals  Nos. 208-209  of 1974,  that Special Leave Petition, after  granting special leave to appeal, will also stand disposed of by this judgment. N.V.K.    Appeals dismissed. 206