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PETITIONER: BALESHWAR TEWARI/& ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHEO JATAN & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       20/03/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIR AHMAD

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the judgment of the single judgment of the single judge of the High Court of Patna,  made on  April 27, 1979 made in S.A. No. 326/1978 dismissing the appeal in limine.      The respondent-plaintiff  laid the suit for declaration of title to 3 bighas and six kathas of land bearing Plot No. 235 and  243 in  Khata No.  952 situated  in Mauza Nainijore Pachhim Diara, Police Station Brahmpore, District Bhojpur.      The  admitted  position  is  taht  the  respondent  had purchased the  land on  May 23,  1957 for  a sum of Rs. 82.2 annas from  the Raja  Dumraon Raj. Proceedings under Section 145 or  Cr.P.C. were initiated in which it was held that the appellant was  found in  possession of  the land. Consequent thereto, the  above declaratory suit came to be filed by the respondent. It is the case of the appellant that he has been in possession  of the  land as a leasee since the year 1925. The trial Court accepted his contention and recorded a nding as under:      "These own documents of the Dumraon      Raj clearly show that the defendant      has been  in  possession  over  the      suit land  as a  raiyat since 1925.      The defendant  has also  filed  the      original  Khatiswani  of  the  year      1350 fasli  prepared by Dumraon Raj      Which  also   finds  the   name  of      defendant’s ancestor  over the suit      land.  Ex.   C  is   the  jamabandi      Register of  the Dumraon  Raj Which      also has  the name  of  defendant’s      ancestor over  the suit  Khata  No.      91. Thus,  the above  documents  of      the defendant  clearly  prove  that      the  suit   land  was   never   the      proprietor’s Zeerat  land  and  was      never in Khas possession of Dumraon      Raj. Rather  these  documents  show      that  the  Defendant  has  been  in      possession of  the suit  land as  a

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    raiyat."      On that  basis, the  suit was dismissed. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the entries for the year 1952-69 show that the respondent was in possession of the land and , therefore, Raja  Dumraon Raj  had leased out the land to the appellant on  year to  year basis and thereby in the enquiry under Rule  7 -  E(iii) of  the Bihar  Land Reforms Act [for short, the  "Act"] no  suit could  be brought  in any  civil Court in respect of the order passed thereunder. Thereby, it seen that at page 21, he recorded thus:      "Since the  suit land  was given on      lease  from   year  to  year  being      proprietor’s private  land, it  was      not necessary  to  prove  that  the      Dumraon Raj  was in khas possession      over the suit land. It is important      to add  here that the plaintiff has      been able  to show by production of      Chitha that  Dukhi Tiwari and other      persons were  recorded  in  several      years of  Chitha in  respect of the      suit land. This fact also establish      the fact  that the  suit land  were      given on lease from year to year by      the Dumraon  Raj and  the defendant      or other  person in different years      clearly do  not confer any right of      occupancy of  title over  the  suit      land of  those persons  recorded in      the chitha."      At page  22, it is further recorded      that      "The   possession    of   different      persons of  the suit  land  on  the      basis of  lease does not change the      character of  private land  nor  it      can confer a title to those persons      not  perfect   title   by   adverse      possession."      Thus, he concluded that the respondent had the title of the property.  Accordingly, he  declared that the respondent had valid  title to  the property. It is also evidenced that in 1979,  in execution  of the  decree, the  respondent came into possession of the land.      From  these   facts,  the   question  that  arises  for consideration is:  whether the  respondent’s prodecessor-in- title, Dumraon  Raj was  in Khas  possession of the land and thereby the  respondent acquired title of the property under the sale deed?      Shri Ranjit  Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants, contends that  the finding recorded by the subordinate judge is clearly  incorrect in  view of  the law laid down by this Court. shri B.B. Singh, learned counsel for the respondents, contends ha in view of he provisions of section 6(1) and the order passed  under Rule  7-E(iii), the  land is the private land of  the Dumraon  Raj and the appellant had not acquired any raiyat  right under  the Bihar  Land  Reforms  Act.  The estate was  abolished in 1951. thereafter, the appellant was not recognised  as a  raiyat. Therefore was no evidence that he was  recognised as  owner of  the  land.  Therefore,  the respondent has  proved that he is the owner of the land. The declaration of title is vitiated by error of law.      In view of the respective contentions, the question for consideration is : whether the view taken by the Subordinate Judge is correct in law? Section 6(1) of the Act states that

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on and  from  the  date  of  vesting,  all  lands  used  for agricultural or horticultural purposes, which were in "khas" possession of  an intermediary  on the date of such vesting, including proprietor’s  private lands  let out under a lease for a  term of  years of  under a  lease from  year to year, referred to  in  Section  116  of  the  Bihar  Tenancy  Act, 1885...Shall, subject  to be settled by the State which such intermediary and  he shall  be entitled to retain possession thereof and  hold them  as a  raiyat under  the State having occupancy rights  in respect  of such  lands subject  to the payment of such fair and equitable rent as may be determined by the  Collector in  the prescribed manner. Sub-section (2) postulates that  if the  claim of an intermediary, as to his khas Possession  over the lands referred to sub-section  (1) or as to the extent of such lands, is disputed by any person prior to  the determination  of the rent of such lands under the said  sub-section, the  Collector shall  on application, made such  inquiry into  the matter as he deems fit and pass such order  as may appear to him to be just and proper. Khas Possession has been defined in Section 2(K) of the Act which reads as under:      "2(K)    Khas    possession    with      reference to  the possession  of  a      proprietor or  tenure-holder of any      land  used   for  agricultural   or      horticultural  purposes  means  the      possession of  such  proprietor  or      tenure-holder by  cultivating  such      lands or  carrying on horticultural      operations thereon himself with his      own stock or by his own servants or      by  hired   labour  or  with  hired      stock."      This controversy  relating to  Khas  possession  is  no longer re integra.      This   Court in  Gurcharan Singh Vs. Kamla singh & Ors. [(1976) 2  SCC 152  at 162 in paragraph 20 and 21] had dealt with this aspect and a three judge Bench held as under:      "There is  no case  that  the  sub-      clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section      6(1) apply. Counsel’s contention is      that he  comes within  the ambit of      the main paragraph, being allegedly      in Khas  possession. To  appreciate      the  further   discussion,  it   is      useful  to  recapitulate  that  the      appellant has averred in his plaint      that he  had been  dispossessed  as      early as  1954 by  a brazen  act or      trespass    by    the    contesting      respondents   who    were   holding      adversely to him. Undaunted by this      fatal fact Counsel claimed to be in      possession and  argued  still.  The      focus was  turned  by  him  on  the      concept of  Khas possession defined      in Section  2(K).  He  presented  a      historical     perspective      and      suggested that  the genesis of khas      possession could  be traced  to  be      Bengal Tenancy  Act, 1885. May be ,      the  draftsman  might  have  drawan      upon those earlier land tenure laws      for   facility,    but   we    must      understand right at the outset that

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    the  Constitution   of  India   has      inaugurated a  new jurisprudence as      it were,  guided  by  Part  VI  and      reflected in  Part III.  When there      has been  a determined  break  with      traditional jurisprudence and a big      endeavour has been made to overturn      a feudal land system and substitute      what may be called a transformation      of agrarian  relations,  we  cannot      hark back  to the  bygone  jura  or      hold  a   new  legislation  captive      within the  confiners of  vanishing      tenurial  though.   De   hors   the      historical links - a breakaway from      the past  in the socio-legal system      is not  accomplished by  worship of      the  manes   of  the   law  -  khas      possession means  of the  law- Khas      possession    means     what    the      definition, in plain English, says.      The       definition   clause    is      ordinarily a  statutory dictionary,      and viewed that was, we have in the      early   part   of   this   judgment      explained  how   it  means  actual,      caltivatory  possession  -  nothing      less,  nothing  else.  Off  course,      Section     6(1)  makes  a  special      addition   by   ’including’   other      demised    lands     by     express      enumeration.      Section 6 does not stop with merely      saving lands  in khas possession of      the     intermediary     (erstwhile      proprietor) but proceeds to include      certain   lands    outstanding   on      temporary leases  or mortgages with      other, as  earlier indicated. These      are private  lands as  khown to the      Bihar Tenancy Act, privileged lands      as  known   to  the   Chota  Nagpur      Tenancy Act, lands outstanding with      mortgagees pending  redemption  and      lands  which   are  actually  being      cultivated   by    the   proprietor      himself.   Ordinarily    what    is      outstanding   with    lessees   and      mortgagees may not fail within khas      possession.    The     legislature,      however,  though   that  while  the      permanent tiller’s rights should be      protected  and,  therefore  raiyats      and   under-raiyats   should   have      rights  directly  under  the  State      eliminating       the       private      proprietors,   the    zamindar   or      proprietor also  should be  allowed      to hold under the State, on payment      of fair  rent, such  lands as  have      been in  his cultivatory possession      and other  lands which  were really      enjoyed as  private  or  privileged      lands or  mortgaged with possession      by him.  With  this  end  in  view,

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    Section 6(1)  enlarged its scope by      including the  special  categories.      The  word  "include’  is  generally      used in  interpretation clauses  in      order to enlarge the meaning of the      words or  phrases occurring  in the      body of  the stature. It is obvious      that Section  6(1)  uses  the  word      ’including’ to  permit  enlargement      of the  meaning of  khas possession      for the  limited  purpose  of  that      section, emphasising  thereby that,      put  for   such  enlargement,   the      expression khas possession excludes      lands   outstanding    even    with      temporary lessees.      It is  perfectly  plan,  therefore,      that khas  possession has been used      in the  restricted sense  of actual      possession and  to the small extent      it had  to be  enlarged for  giving      relief to proprietors in respect of      ’private’,     ’Privileged’     and      mortgaged      lands      inclusive      expressions  had  to  be  employed.      Khas    possession     is    actual      possession, that  is a  foothold on      the  land,   an  actual   entry,  a      possession in fact, a standing upon      it, and  occupation  of  it,  as  a      real,   administrative   act   done      Constructive     possession      or      possession  in   law  is   what  is      covered  by   the   sub-clause   of      Section  6(1).   Even  so,   it  is      impossible  to  conceive,  although      Shri Misra  wanted  us  to  accept,      that possession  is so  wide as  to      include a  mere right  to  possess,      when the  actual dominion  over the      property  is   held  by   on  e  in      hostility to the former Possession,      correctly     understood,     means      effective,  physical   control   or      occupation:      The word  possession  is  sometimes      used  inaccurately   as  synonymous      with the  right to  possess. (Words      and  Phrases,  2nd  Edn.,  John  B.      Sounders, p.151).      In the  Dictionary of  English  Law      (Earl  Jowitt)   1959  at  p.  1367      "possession" is defined as follows:      "Possession,      the       visible      possibility or  exercising physical      control over  a thing, coupled with      the intention  of doing  so, either      against all  the world,  or against      all  the   world   except   certain      persons,  there   are,   therefore,      three  requisite   of   possession.      First    three     requisite     of      possession.  First  there  must  be      actual   or    potential   physical      control. Secondly  physical control

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    is    not     possession,    unless      accompanies by intention: hence, if      a thing  is put  into the hand of a      sleeping   person    he   has   not      possession  of   it.  Thirdly,  the      possibility and  intention must  be      visible or  evidenced  by  external      sings, for  if the  thing shows  no      sign of  being under  the shows  no      sings of being under the control of      anyone, it is not possessed;      . . .,"      In the  end of  all,  however,  the      meaning of "possession’ must depend      on the context, (ibid p. 153)      Maybe,   in   certain   situations,      possession  may   cover  right   to      possess. it  is thus  clear that in      Anglo-American jurisprudence  also,      possession is actual possession and      in a  limited  set  of  cases,  may      included  constructive   possession      but when  there is  a bare right to      possess bereft  of any  dominion or      factum or  control, it  will  be  a      owner  is   in  possession   merely      because he  has a  right to possess      when  a  rival,  in  the  teeth  of      owner’s  opposition,   is  actually      holding dominion  and control  over      the land admittedly, in the present      case,   the   possession   of   the      plaintiff  had  ceased  totally  at      least two  years before the vesting      under Section  4 took  place.  This      situation       excludes       khas      possession."      This was  reiterated by a Bench of two Judges in Ramesh Bejoy Sharma vs. Pashupati Rai & Ors. [(1979) 4 SCC 27 at 37 in paragraph 28] held as under:      "The word  used in Section 6 is not      ’possession’ but it is qualified by      the adjective  ’Khas possession its      equivalent      being       ’actual      possession’   as    the   word   is      understood in  contradistinction to      the word ’constructive possession’.      Frankly speaking  the law has still      not provides  clear and unambiguous      definition of  the  jurisprudential      concept of  possession.  Number  of      angular approaches  to the  problem      of possession  can be  referred  to      with  confidence.   Here   we   are      concerned with what is called "Khas      possession’ in  statue for ushering      agrarian  reforms  and,  therefore,      the purpose  and object  behind the      legislation   must    inform    the      interpretation must  till in favour      of  the   actual  cultivator,   the      tiller of  the soil,  Dealing  with      this  expressions   this  Court  in      Gurucharn Singh vs. Kamla Singh has      observed as under :

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    "There   are,    therefore,   three      requisites  of   possession,  First      there must  be actual  or potential      physical control. Secondly physical      control is  not possession,  unless      accompanies by intention; hence, if      a thing  is put  into the hand of a      sleeping   person    he   has   not      possession  of   it.  Thirdly,  the      possibility an  intention  must  be      visible or  evidenced  by  external      signs. Under the control of anyone,      it is not possessed:...."      In the  end of  all,  however,  the      meaning of ’possession’ must depend      on  the     context,   end  of  ll,      however,     the     meaning     of      ’possession’  must  depend  on  the      context, (ibid p. 153)      Maybe,   in   certain   situations,      possession  may   cover  right   to      possess. It  is thus  clear that in      Anglo-American jurisprudence  also,      possession is actual possession and      in  a  limited  st  of  cases,  may      include  constructive  constructive      possession but when there is a bare      right  to  possess  bereft  of  any      dominion or  facturm of control, it      will be a strange legal travesty to      assert  that   an   owner   is   in      possession merely  because he has a      right to  possess when  a rival, in      the teeth of owner’s opposition, is      actually   holding   dominion   and      control over  the  land  adversely,      openly and continuously."      After thus  observing this approved      the  ration   extracted  above   in      Surajnath Ahir  case  as  also  the      ratio in Ram Ran Bijai Singh case."      In Labanya  Bala Devi  (Smt.) vs. State of Bihar, Patna Secretariat, Patna  & Anr.  [(1994) Supp.  3 SCC 725 at 727] after extracting the definition held thus:      "the saving  by Section  6(1)(b) is      only of the lands actually used for      agricultural purposes in a State or      a tenure of a lessee or a temporary      lessee   and    directly   in   his      possession   and    cultivated   by      himself with  his own  stock or  by      his  own  raiyat  rights  has  been      confirmed  statutorily  subject  to      the terms contained therein."      In Brighu  Nath Sahay  Singh &  Ors. vs,  Md.  Khalipur Rahmanh Ors. [(1995) 5 SCC 687] another Bench considered the definition of  "Khas possession" in Section 2(K) and held as under:      "A reading  of  Section  2(K)  read      with Section  4 and  6 of  the  Act      clearly    envisages    that    the      intermediary must,  as on  the date      of vesting, be in possession of the      land used  for agricultural purpose      or  horticulture   purpose   as   a

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    tenure-holder by  cultivating  such      land or  carrying  on  horticulture      operations thereon  by himself with      his  own   stock  or   by  his  own      servants or  by hired labour by his      own servants  or by hired labour or      with hired stock."      Thus, it  could be  seen that  though the definition of "intermediary right"  as used in Section 6(1)(a) of the Act, is inclusive  of the  yearly  caltivation  and  intermediary becomes owner  of such  land  subject  to  payment  of  rent determined, the  intendment of  khas possession is referable to the  intermediary wh  must be in actual possession, i.e., one foot  on the  land, and  the other  on the plough in the filed and  hands in  the soil; although hired labour is also contemplated.  The   emphasis  is  on  the  point  that  the possession is  actual possession  and admits  of no dilution except to the extent specified under Section 6, i.e., itself by an  inclusive  process,  permits  and  the  animation  of retention of  possession always  must be manifested. It must also be  read with Bihar read with Bihar Tenancy Act wherein "Khas possession" has been dealt with.      It is  true that  the inclusive  definition in  Section 6(1)(a) would  also include  yearly lease  but it  indicates that  the  possession  should  always  be  retained  by  the intermediary and  the tenant  must have  no security  of his tenancy right.  But when the tenant remained continuously in possession of  the land  well over years, right from 1925 as found by  the trial  Court admittedly,  the  possession  was taken in  execution of  the decree in 1979 and the necessary animus possidendi was absent.      The question that arises is: whether it will be a "khas possession" and  the respondent  is entitled  to declaration that  the   intermediary  remained  in  possession  as  khas possession. In  view of  the law laid down by this Court, as extracted earlier,  and the factual position, the conclusion would be  that the  tenant remained in possession in his own right  as  a  raiyat  though  he  was  paying  rent  to  the intermediary prior  to the abolition. His possession is only of a  raiyat possession. It is the duty of the respondent to establish by  unequivocal  evidence  that  the  intermediary retained his  intermediary right  in the land and that proof has not  been established  by adducing  any evidence.  It is true that there is a finding y the Subordinate Judge that an enquiry under  Rule 7-E(iii)  was he  held but  there is  no finding recorded  by the  Subordinate Judge that enquiry was conducted after issuing notice to the appellant.      Under these  circumstances, even  if  any  enquiry  was conducted unless  the  appellant  is  given  notice  and  an opportunity to adduce the evidence to establish his right in the enquiry  made, the finding generally does not binds him. Entries in  revenue records  is the  paradise of the patwari and the  tiller of  the soil  is rarely  concerned with  the same. So  long  as  his  possession  and  enjoyment  is  not interdicted by  due process  and course  of law,  he is  not interdicted by  due process  and course  of law, he is least concerned with  entries. It  is common  knowledge  in  rural India that  a raiyat always regards the  land he ploughs, as his dominion  and generally  obeys,  with  moral  fiber  the command of the intermediary so long as his possession is not disturbed. Therefore, creation of records is a camouflage to defeat just  and legal  right of  claim and  interest of the raiyat, the tiller of the soil on whom the Act confers title to the land he tills.      Shri B.B.  Singh,  in  these  circumstances,  seeks  to

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contend that  this question  has no  been canvassed  in  the courts below.  Since the matter requires examination, it may be remanded  to the  High Court  for consideration.  We find that in  view of the above findings recorded, the remittance of the matter would render little assistance.      Under these  circumstance, we  are constrained to allow the appeal  and set aside the judgment of the High Court and also of  the Subordinate  Judge of  confirming the decree of the trial  Court dismissing  the suit.  In consequence,  the respondent is  directed to  restitute the  possession to the appellant within two months from the  date of the receipt of this order.  In case, he fails to do so, the appellant is at liberty to  have it executed with police assistance and take possession. No costs.