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PETITIONER: BALDEO SINGH AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/04/1957

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) IMAM, SYED JAFFER MENON, P. GOVINDA SARKAR, A.K.

CITATION:  1957 AIR  612            1957 SCR  995

ACT: Gram  Cutcherry-Criminal jurisdiction--Concurrent  jurisdic- tion    of   ordinary   criminal    Courts--Enactment,    if discriminatory  in character--Bihar Panchayat Raj Act,  1947 (Bihar  Act  7  of  1948),  ss. 60,  62,  68,  69,  70,  73- Constitution of India, Art.  14.

HEADNOTE: The appellants were convicted of an offence under s. 379  of the Indian penal Code by a full bench of the Gram  Cutcherry constituted under the provisions of the Bihar Panchayat  Raj Act,  1947.   It was contended for the appellants  that  the conviction was bad on the grounds, inter alia, that s. 62 of the Act which provided for the criminal jurisdiction of Gram Cutcherries  gave  concurrent jurisdiction to  the  ordinary criminal Courts and left it open to a party to go either  to the  ordinary  criminal  Courts or to a bench  of  the  Gram Cutcherry,  and  as the procedure followed in  the  ordinary criminal  Courts  was  substantially  different  from   that followed by a Gram Cutcherry, the Act was discriminatory  in nature and as such infringed Art. 14 of the Constitution. Held,  that  the  impugned provisions of  the  Act  are  not discriminatory in nature. The  scheme  of the Act is that a case  or  suit  cognizable under the Act by a Gram Cutcherry should be tried only by it unless the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif concerned chooses to take action under s. 70 or S. 73 of the Act.  The 996 reference to concurrent jurisdiction in s. 62 is explainable by reason of the provisions in ss. 69, 7o and 73, so that on the transfer or withdrawal of a case from the Gram Cutcherry or the cancellation of the jurisdiction of the bench, it may not  be said that the ordinary criminal Courts also have  no jurisdiction to try it.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 145 of

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1955.   Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order  dated July  20,  1954,  of  the  Patna  High  Court  in   Criminal Miscellaneous No. 228 of 1954.     S.    P. Verma, for the appellants.     R.    C. Prasad, for the respondents.    1957.  April 22.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.K. DAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave from    an order of summary dismissal passed by the High     Court   of Patna  on July 20, 1954, on an application under  Arts.  226 and  227 of the Constitution of India.  The  relevant  facts are these.  One Uma Shankar Prasad instituted a case against eight  persons,  including the three appellants  before  us, Baldeo  Singh,  Ramdeo  Singh and  Sheodhar  Singh,  on  the allegation that they had forcibly cut and removed ’urad’ and Kodo  crops from his field in village Darwan on  October  1, 1953,  at about 10 a.m. Uma Shankar said that  he  objected, but  was threatened with assault.  The case  was  instituted before  the  Gram  Cutcherry of Bankat in  the  district  of Champaran,  constituted  under the provisions of  the  Bihar Panchayat  Raj Act, 1947 (Bihar Act 7 of 1948),  hereinafter referred  to  as the Act.  Altogether  four  witnesses  were examined  in the case, two on behalf of the prosecution  and two  for  the accused persons.  The defence of some  of  the accused  persons was that the land on which the crops  stood belonged to one Yogi Sahni, who had sold it to Sunder Singh, accused,  on September, 25, 1953.  On December 28,  1953,  a bench  of  the  Gram Cutcherry  acquitted  all  the  accused persons.   On January 7, 1954, Uma Shankar Prasad  preferred an  appeal under s. 67 of the Act.  The appeal was heard  on June 24, 1954, 997 and  the  full bench by a majority, with  three  dissentient panches,  held  the three appellants guilty of  the  offence under  s.  379,  Indian Penal Code, and  sentenced  them  to imprisonment  for  fifteen days each.  The  appellants  then moved the High Court of Patna under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, with the result stated above.  The  appellants then moved this Court and obtained special leave under  Art. 136 of the Constitution.   Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  has  pressed   the following  contentions  before us.  His first  and  foremost contention is that the Act, by reason of certain  provisions contained  therein, is discriminatory in nature and  offends against  Art. 14 of the Constitution.  It I s  advisable  to set  out first those provisions of the Act which,  according to learned counsel for the appellants, are discriminatory in character.   Section 62 of the Act, which provides  for  the criminal  jurisdiction  of  Gram Cutcherries,  is  in  these terms:    "  Notwithstanding  anything  contained in  the  Code  of Criminal  Procedure, 1898, and subject to the provisions  of this  Act,  a  bench  of  the  Gram  Cutcherry  shall   have jurisdiction  concurrent  with that of  the  Criminal  Court within  the local limits of whose jurisdiction the bench  is situate  for the trial of the following offences as well  as abetment  of  and attempts to commit any  such  offence,  if committed  within  the  local limits  of  its  jurisdiction, namely:   (a)offences  under  the Indian Penal Code,  sections  140, 143, 145, 147, 151, 153, 160, 172, 174, 178, 179, 269,  277, 279, 283, 285, 286, 289, 290, 294, 323, 334, 336, 341,  352, 356, 357, 358, 374, 379, 380, 381, 403, 411, 426, 428,  430, 447, 448, 461, 504, 506, 510;

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 (b)offences under the Bengal Public Gambling Act, 1867;   (c)offences  under  sections  24  and  26  of  the  Cattle Trespass Act, 1871;   (d) except as otherwise provided, offences under this  Act or under any rule or bye-law made thereunder; (e)any other offence under any other enactment, if empowered in this behalf by the Government: 998 Provided  that  the bench shall not take cognizance  of  any offence  under sections 379, 380, 381 or 411 of  the  Indian Penal Code in which the value of the property alleged to  be stolen exceeds fifty rupees or in which the accused- (i)has  been previously convicted of an  offence  punishable under   Chapter   XVII  of  the  Indian  Penal   Code   with imprisonment of either description for a term of three years or upwards; or (ii)has been previously fined for theft by any bench of  the Gram Cutcherry; or (iii)     is  a registered member of a criminal tribe  under section 4 of the Criminal Tribes Act, 1924; or (iv) has been bound over to be of good behaviour in proceedings instituted under section 109 or 110 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1898."   It  is  worthy  of  note that  the  section  contains  two important  qualifications:  one  is contained  in  the  non- obstante clause with which the section begins and the  other is contained in the expression ’subject to the provisions of this Act.’ The importance of this second qualification  will be apparent when some of the other provisions of the Act are set out.  Subject to the two qualifications mentioned above, s.  62  gives  a bench of the  Gram  Cutcherry  Jurisdiction concurrent  with that of the ordinary criminal Court  within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the bench is  situate for the trial of the offences mentioned therein.  Section 63 vests the bench with the powers of a Magistrate of the third class.  Section 64 is not relevant for our purpose and  need not  be  read.   Section 65  provides  for  exclusive  civil jurisdiction  of  a bench of the Gram Cutcherry  in  certain classes  of suits, subject to certain provisos.  Section  66 says that certain suits shall not be heard by a bench of the Gram  Cutcherry.   Section 67 provides  for  appeals.   Then comes  s.  68, which is very important for our  purpose  and must be quoted in extenso-- "  No court shall take cognizance of any case or suit  which is cognizable under the Act by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry unless an order to the contrary has been passed by the  Sub- Divisional Magistrate or 999 the Munsif concerned under the provisions of the Act or  any other law for the time being in force." Section 69 gives the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif power to transfer a case or suit pending before a Magistrate or  a  Munsif  to  a bench  of  the  Gram  Cutcherry  having jurisdiction to try it.  Section 70 gives the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif power to withdraw any case or  suit pending  before a bench of the Gram Cutcherry  and  transfer the same to the ordinary Courts.  Section 71 provides, inter alia, that no legal practitioner shall appear, plead or  act on  behalf of any party in any suit or case before the  Gram Cutcherry.   Section  73 gives power to  the  Sub-Divisional Magistrate  and  the Munsif to take  necessary  action  when there  has  been  a miscarriage of justice or  there  is  an apprehension  of a miscarriage of justice.  Sub-section  (2) of  s. 73 says that when an order under sub-s. (1) has  been made in respect of any suit or case, the complainant or  the

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plaintiff,  as  the case may be, may institute the  case  or suit afresh in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Munsif of competent jurisdiction. The  argument of learned counsel for the appellants is  that inasmuch  as  s. 62 gives only concurrent  jurisdiction,  it leaves  it  open  to a party to go either  to  the  ordinary criminal  Courts  or  to  a bench  of  the  Gram  Cutcherry. According  to him, this opens the door  for  discrimination, because  the  procedure followed in  the  ordinary  criminal Courts  is substantially different from that followed  by  a Gram Cutcherry.  The procedure to be followed by the  latter is indicated in s. 60 which states: " Subject to the provisions of this Act and to any rules  or directions  that may be made or issued by the Government  in this behalf, the procedure to be followed by a bench of  the Gram  Cutcherry  shall be such as it may consider  just  and convenient  and the bench shall not be bound to  follow  any laws  of  evidence  or procedure other  than  the  procedure prescribed by or under this Act." This argument as to discrimination fails to take note of the other provisions of the Act which we have set 1000 out  above.   Section 62 is, in express  terms,  subject  to other  provisions  of the Act; therefore, it is  subject  to s.68 which states that no Court shall take cognizance of any case or suit which is cognizable under the Act by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, unless an order to the contrary has been passed  by  the  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate  or  the  Munsif concerned  under the provisions of the Actor any  other  law for the time being in force.  On a proper construction of s. 62  and  s.  68,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  really  no discrimination and a case cognizable by a bench of the  Gram Cutcherry  must  be tried there, unless there  has  been  an order  to  the  contrary in the  exercise  of  his  judicial discretion  by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or  the  Munsif concerned as contemplated by the latter part of s. 68.   The provisions  of  the  Act under which such an  order  can  be passed  are  contained in the  succeeding  sections  already referred to by us.  The whole scheme of Ch.  VII of the  Act is  that a case or suit cognizable under the Act by  a  Gram Cutcherry  should be tried by a bench of the Gram  Cutcherry save  in those exceptional cases which are provided  for  in ss. 70 and 73.  The reference to concurrent jurisdiction  in s. 62 is explainable by reason of the provisions in ss.  69, 70  and 73, so that on the transfer or withdrawal of a  case from   the  Gram  Cutcherry  or  the  cancellation  of   the jurisdiction  of  the  bench, it may not be  said  that  the ordinary  criminal Courts also have no jurisdiction  to  try it.   For  these reasons, we are of the view that  the  impugned provisions of the Act are not discriminatory in nature,  and there is no merit in the first contention pressed before us.   Secondly, learned counsel for the appellants has  referred us to rr. 60 and 61 of the Bihar Gram Cutcherry Rules, 1949. Rule  60(2)  requires that the decision of  the  full  bench shall  be  signed  by the members and  where  a  dissentient judgment  has  been delivered, the minute of  dissent  shall also  be  recorded under the signatures  of  the  dissenting members.   These requirements were fulfilled in the  present case’ and no materials have been placed before us which  may lead  to  the  conclusion  that rr.  60  and  61  have  been violated. 1001   The third and last contention on behalf of the  appellants is  that  the conviction of two of  the  appellants,  Ramdeo

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Singh  and  Sheodhar  Singh, is bad, because  there  was  no evidence at all against them.  The two witnesses examined on behalf  of  the prosecution definitely said  that  they  saw Baldeo  Singh  (appellant) and two other named  persons  who have  been  acquitted, but did not  identify  the  remaining persons  who  also forcibly cut and removed the  crops.   On this  evidence, there was no legal basis for the  conviction of Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh.  Our attention has  been drawn to Ramdeo Singh’s own statement in which he said  that he had removed the crops of his own field’.  That statement, standing by itself, is not an admission of guilt.  We  agree with  learned counsel for the appellants that there  was  no evidence whatever to sustain the conviction of Ramdeo  Singh and Sheodhar Singh.  Their conviction was manifestly, and on the face of the record, erroneous. The  High Court was moved for the exercise of its  power  of superintendence under Art. 227, and it is open to us in this appeal  to  exercise the same power.  We  would  accordingly allow this appeal so far as Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar  Singh are  concerned and set aside their conviction and  sentence. They  will  now be discharged from bail.  So far  as  Baldeo Singh  is concerned, he was rightly convicted.  We  do  not, however,  think  that any useful purpose will be  served  by sending   him  to  jail  for  a  short  period.   We   would accordingly reduce his sentence to a fine of Rs. 30/only  or in default imprisonment as directed by the full bench of the Gram Cutcherry.  The appeal is disposed of accordingly.                      Appeal disposed of accordingly. 129 1002