REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.    3938-3939                     OF 2008 Arising out of S.L.P. (C) NOS.19335-19336 OF 2003

BALBIR KAUR & ANR. — APPELLANTS

VERSUS

U.P. SECONDARY EDUCATION SERVICES SELECTION BOARD, ALLAHABAD & ORS.

— RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  3806-3817, 3828-3838,3841- 3842,3844,3846-3864,3866-3901, 3903-3905, 3907- 3921,4085-4087,3924-3937                      OF 2008

[Arising  out  of  SLP (C)  NOS.  19368,  19779,  19780,  20860, 20877-20878,  20916,  20943, 20983,  21135,  21573,  21608, 21694-21704,  21707,  21708, 22525,  22679,  22904,  22934, 22935,  22975,  22976-22978, 22980,  23084,  23163,  23164, 23322, 23679, 23689, 23691, 23692, 24000, 24075, 24217, 24555  OF  2003,  11726,  11727,  14189,  1419-1423,  1486, 150,  1777,  1778,  1779,  1780-1781,  1782,  1783,   21567, 21568-21571, 2270, 2271, 2274, 2276, 24520, 2657, 26818, 2691, 2969, 2977, 3386, 3999, 4094-4095, 4285, 4783, 4784, 5781, 5786, 6380, 6383, 7125, 806, 814-816, 833, 834, 835, 836,  3009-3010,  3015,  11392,  11394  OF  2004,  124-125, 1605-1606,  9794,  18880,  14417-14418,  24475,  24535  OF 2005,  SLP (C)  N0 13613..OF 2008 [CC NO.8812 OF 2005], I.A.No.1-2 IN SLP (C) NO13618 .OF 2008 [CC NO.11142], SLP (C) NO. 1863-1864 OF 2004, SLP(C) NO. 16502 OF 2004  

AND

1

CONTEMPT  PETITION  (C)  NO.269  OF  2005  IN  SLP  (C) NO.2691 OF 2004  

J U D G M E N T

Civil Appeal No.              3806                     of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.19368 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.              3807             of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.19779 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.              3808                     of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.19780 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.              3809                     of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.20860 of 2003) Civil Appeal Nos.            3810-3811                    of 2008 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.20877-20878 of 2003 Civil Appeal No.               3812                    of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.20916 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.               3813                    of 2008   (Arising out of SLP(C) No.20943 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.                3814                   of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.20983 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.                3815                   of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.21135 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.                 3816                  of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.21573 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.                 3817                  of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.21608 of 2003) Civil Appeal Nos.               3828-3838                     of 2008 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.21694-21704 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.             3841                      of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.21707 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.             3842                      of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.21708 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.            3844                       of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.22525 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.           3846                        of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.22679 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.            3847                       of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.22904 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.            3848                       of 2008  

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(Arising out of SLP(C) No.22934 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.            3849                       of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.22935 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.             3850                      of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.22975 of 2003) Civil Appeal Nos.            3851-3853                       of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.22976-22978 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.              3854                     of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.22980 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.               3855                    of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.23084 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.               3856                of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.23163 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.              3857                     of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.23164 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.              3858                     of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.23322 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.             3859                      of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.23679 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.             3860                      of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.23689 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.             3862                      of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.23692 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.              3863                     of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.24000 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.              3864                     of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.24075 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.               3866                    of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.24217 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.               3867                    of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.24555 of 2003) Civil Appeal No.                3868                   of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.11726 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                3869                   of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.11727 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.              3870                      of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.14189 of 2004) Civil Appeal Nos.              3871-3875                     of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.1419-1423 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                  3876                 of 2008  

3

(Arising out of SLP(C) No.1486 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                   3877                of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.150 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                   3878                of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.1777 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                  3879                 of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.1778 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                   3880                of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.1779 of 2004) Civil Appeal Nos.      3881-3882                      of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.1780-1781 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.            3883                       of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.1782 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.             3884                      of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.1783 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.         3885                          of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.21567 of 2004) Civil Appeal Nos.       3886-3889                            of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.21568-21571 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.              3890                     of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.2270 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.               3891                    of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.2271 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                3892                   of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.2274 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                 3893                  of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.2276 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                  3894                 of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.24520 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                    3895               of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.2657 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                    3896               of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.26818 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                    3898               of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.2969 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                   3899                of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.2977 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                   3900                of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.3386 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                 3901                  of 2008  

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(Arising out of SLP(C) No.3999 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.             3905                      of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.4285 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.           3907                        of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.4783 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.       3908                            of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.4784 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.            3909                       of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.5781 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.         3910                          of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.5786 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.             3911                      of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.6380 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.              3912                     of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.6383 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.             3914                      of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.806 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.              3918                     of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.833 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.               3919                    of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.834 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                3920                   of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.835 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.            3921                         of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.836 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.         4085-4086                          of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.3009-3010 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.            4087                       of 2008  Arising out of SLP(C) No.3015 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.          3924                         of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.11392 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.          3925                         of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.11394 of 2004) Civil Appeal Nos.       3926-3927                           of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.124-125 of 2005) Civil Appeal No.                 3930                   of  2008 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.9794 of 2005)  Civil Appeal No.               3931                      of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.18880 of 2005) Civil Appeal Nos.           3932-3933                         of 2008

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(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.14417-14418 of 2005)

Civil Appeal No.           3936               of 2008  (Arising out of SLP(C) No 13613 of 2008)                     [CC No.8812 of 2005] Civil Appeal No.               3937                       of 2008  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.13618 of 2008)  [CC No.11142 of 2005] Contempt Petition (C) No.269 of 2005  in SLP (C) No.2691 of 2004  

D.K. JAIN, J.:

Permission to file the Special Leave Petitions is granted.

2. Delay condoned.

3.Leave granted.

4.Challenge in this batch of appeals is to a common judgment

rendered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature

at  Allahabad  in  Special  Appeal  No.  159  of  2001  and other

connected appeals, partly disagreeing with and reversing the

view of the learned Single Judge in regard to the selection of

Principals of various institutions, by direct recruitment.

6

5.To  comprehend  the  controversy  in  these  cases,  it  would

suffice  to  refer  to  the  facts  in  SLP (C)  Nos.19335-19336  of

2003, which was otherwise treated as the lead case.

6. On 12th August, 1998, 24th December, 1999 and 3rd March,

2002, U.P. Secondary Selection Board (hereinafter referred to

as the Board) issued advertisements inviting applications for

direct recruitment to the posts of teachers, lecturers and the

heads  of  several  Institutions.   In  these  appeals  we  are

concerned  with  the  selection  of  heads  of  the

Institutions/Principals. The advertisements were issued under

the  U.P.  Secondary  Education  Selection  Board  Act,  1982

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  Principal  Act).   In  the

advertisement,  the  vacancies  for  the  post  of  Principal  in

respective  Institutions  were  indicated  regionwise.  The

candidates were to be considered regionwise and results were

also to be declared regionwise.  The candidates were required

to give the choice of not more than three institutions in order

of  preference  and  if  he  wanted  to  be  considered  for  any

particular  institution  or  institutions  and  not  for  other

institutions he could mention this fact in the application.  In

7

addition to  the  candidates  applying directly,  the Board was

also  required  to  consider  the  names  of  two  senior-most

teachers of the Institution concerned.  These two senior-most

teachers were not required to apply but their names were to

be forwarded by the management in accordance with Rule 11

(2)  (b)  of  the  U.P.  Secondary  Education  Services  Selection

Board Rules, 1998 (for short ‘the 1998 Rules’).  Nonetheless,

they could apply for other Institutions as well.   

7. The  said  advertisements  were  challenged  by  the

Principals, who were already heading some institutions on ad-

hoc basis, and the senior-most teachers of various institutions

mainly on the grounds that : (i) the cut off date i.e. 6th August,

1993 fixed by the 1998 amendment, for regularizing the ad-

hoc  Principals/teachers  was  arbitrary,  discriminatory  and

violative  of  Article  14  of  the  Constitution  of  India  (ii)  the

exclusion and inclusion of candidates eligible for selection was

not in conformity with Appendix A of Regulation 1 of Chapter

II  of  the  Regulations  framed  under  the  U.P.  Intermediate

Education Act, 1921 (for short ‘the Intermediate Act’) (iii) the

regionwise consideration and declaration of the result for the

8

post  of  Heads  of  the  Institution,  unlike  the  teachers,  was

violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution; (iv) sub rule

(5) of Rule 12 was unreasonable and discriminatory as it gave

undue  importance  to  educational  qualifications  and  no

importance to the service record; (v) the manner of allocation

of marks and the selection process was arbitrary and (vi) the

Principal Act did not provide for any reservation for the post of

the Head of the Institution for backward class or scheduled

caste or scheduled tribe candidates, which was contrary to the

provisions  and  in  violation  of  the  U.P.  Public  Service

(Reservation for Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Other

Backward Classes) Act, 1994 (for short the 1994 Act).

8. On the basis of rival stands of the parties, including the

State,  the  learned  Single  Judge  formulated  as  many  as  15

points for determination.

9. The learned Single Judge answered all the 15 points, so

formulated,  against  the  writ  petitioners.  Consequently,  vide

order  dated 14th February,  2001,  all  the writ petitions were

dismissed.

9

10.Being aggrieved, the writ petitioners carried the matter in

Special  Appeals  to  the  Division  Bench.  The  Division  Bench

affirmed the view taken by the learned Single Judge on all the

points except on one point (No.(iii)), namely, in regard to the

requirement  of  minimum  qualification  mentioned  in  the

advertisements.  The Division Bench held that under sub rule

(5) of Rule 15 of the Rules, the qualification as laid down in

Appendix A of Regulation 1 of Chapter II of the Intermediate

Act had been adopted for appointment to the post of teachers,

which includes Principals.  For the post of Principal, the said

provision  provides  only  for  4  years  teaching  experience  of

class IX to XII and not the teaching experience of 4 years as

Lecturer, as prescribed in the advertisements.  Therefore, by

prescribing in the advertisement 4 years teaching experience

as a Lecturer, the Board had exceeded its jurisdiction, which,

being  contrary  to  law  could  not  be  permitted.  Thus,  the

Division Bench came to the conclusion that the advertisement

issued by the Board prescribing teaching experience of 4 years

as Lecturer for the post of Principal of an Intermediate College

was  contrary  to  the  statutory  requirement  of  academic

1 0

qualifications  stipulated  in  Appendix  A  of  Regulation  1  of

Chapter II  of Intermediate  Act, as adopted by sub rule 5 of

Rule 15 of the Rules and as a result thereof it was possible

that many candidates having 4 years teaching experience of

class IX and X could not apply, resulting in serious prejudice

to  them.   Accordingly,  the  appeals  were  allowed  and  the

selections made in pursuance of the said advertisements were

set aside.  It is this common judgment which is questioned in

these appeals by the selected candidates.

11.Although we have heard learned counsel for the parties on

all  the  issues  which  have  been  answered  by  the  Division

Bench against the writ petitioners, we shall first deal with the

central point, namely, the prescription of minimum teaching

experience  as  Lecturer,  stipulated  in  the  impugned

advertisements, on which the Division Bench disagreed with

the  learned  Single  Judge  and  has  struck  down  the

advertisements and quashed the entire  selection process for

the said post.

1 1

12.Mr.  Rakesh  Dwivedi,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  in

the  lead  case  for  the  selected  candidates,  the  appellants

herein, submitted that in the light of the ‘Note’  appended to

sub-rule (5) of Rule XII of the 1998 Rules, the requirement of

minimum  experience  as  stipulated  in  Appendix  A  of

Regulation 1 of Chapter II of the Regulations framed under the

Intermediate  Act,  stands  modified  and,  therefore,  the

advertisements being in conformity with the ‘Note’  could not

be struck down as being in conflict with the said Appendix.

Learned  counsel  argued  that  the  ‘Note’  expresses  the

legislative  intent  and  being  a  part  of  the  Rules,  framed  in

terms of Section 35 of the Principal Act, has full efficacy and

cannot  be  ignored.   In  support  of  the  proposition  that

Notes/Explanations  are  one  of  the  modes  by  which  the

legislature expresses itself and the words used therein alone

being  the  repository  of  legislative  intent,  any  ‘Note’  or  the

‘Explanation’  must  be  construed  according  to  its  plain

language  and  not  on  a  priori considerations,  reliance  was

placed on the decisions of this Court in  Dattatraya Govind

Mahajan & Ors.  Vs.  State of Maharashtra & Anr.1, Rani 1  (1977) 2 SCC 548

1 2

Choudhury  Vs.  Lt.  Col.  Suraj  Jit  Choudhury2 and  M/s.

Aphali Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra &

Ors.3.  It was also contended that in view of Section 32 of the

Principal Act, the said Appendix has to give way to the new

Rules and, therefore,  with regard to the post of a Principal,

insofar  as  the  experience  is  concerned,  the  minimum

qualification would stand modified in terms of the said ‘Note’.

It  is,  thus,  asserted  that  there  is  no  conflict  between  the

contents  of  the  impugned  advertisements  and  the  relevant

Rules.  

13.Dr. R.G. Padia, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf

of the ad-hoc Principals,  on the other hand, submitted that

insofar  as  the  academic  qualifications  under  Rule  5  of  the

1998  Rules  are  concerned,  qualifications  specified  in

Regulation 1 of Chapter II of the Regulations made under the

Intermediate Act having been adopted for the purpose of 1998

Rules  as  well,  the  minimum  qualification  for  the  post  of

Principal cannot be at variance with what is specified in the

said Appendix, which includes experience of teaching classes

2  (1982) 2 SCC 596 3  (1989) 4 SCC 378

1 3

IX to XII and, therefore, experience of teaching classes IX & X

had  been  erroneously  excluded  in  the  impugned

advertisements.   It  is  pleaded  that Rule  12 (5)  of  the 1998

Rules  cannot  have  the  effect  of  altering  or  modifying  the

conditions of qualifying experience mentioned in the Appendix

of the said Regulations.

14.In order to appreciate the rival stands on the issue, it would

be expedient to briefly notice the historical background of the

statutory  provisions  relating  to  the  selection  of  heads  of

educational  institutions  in  the  State  of  U.P.   Prior  to  the

enactment  of  the  Principal  Act,  by  U.P.  Act  No.5  of  1982,

selections for the posts of Head of the educational institutions

were made as per the provisions of the Intermediate Act by the

Selection  Committee  constituted  by  the  Committee  of

Management,  managing  the  institution,  with  the  prior

approval  of  the  concerned  District  Inspector  of  Schools.

Minimum  qualifications  for  the  post  of  the  Head  in  an

Institution  were  prescribed  in  Appendix  A  in  reference  to

Regulation 1 of Chapter II of the Intermediate Act.  However,

with the coming into force of the Principal Act, with effect from

1 4

14th July, 1981, selections for the posts were entrusted to a

Commission,  in  order  to  ensure  that  good  and  competent

persons  were  selected  and  appointed  to  the  said  posts.

Relevant  rules  in  this  behalf  were  framed  by  the  State

Government for the first time in the year 1983, called the U.P.

Secondary  Education  Services  Commission  Rules,  1983.

However  vide  Notification  dated  13th July,  1998,  the  1998

Rules,  enforced  with  effect  from  8th August,  1998,  were

notified.   As  noted  above,  selections  in  question  were  held

under the 1998 Rules.

15. It appears that in order to obviate the difficulty faced by the

ad-hoc teachers and the Principals/Heads of the Institution,

who had been continuing on the post for a long time and to

bring an end to adhocism, the Principal Act was amended in

the  year  1985  by  which  Section  31-A  was  inserted,

regularizing  certain  appointments.  Another  amendment  was

made in the Principal Act in the year 1991, inserting Section

33-A for regularizing some more ad-hoc appointments.  It was

enforced on 7th August, 1993.  In the year 1993, by another

amendment in the Principal Act, Section 33-B was introduced,

1 5

regularizing  some  more  ad-hoc  appointments.   In  the  year

1995, by way of an amendment in the Principal Act, enforced

with effect from 28th December, 1994, four Regional Selection

Boards, which were established by the 1993 amendment, were

abolished  and  one  Commission  for  the  entire  State  was

provided  for.   In  the  year  1998,  yet  another  amendment,

effective from 20th April, 1998, was made to the Principal Act,

entrusting the entire selection process to the Board in place of

the Commission.  By the said amendment, Section 33-C was

also inserted in the Principal  Act  by which ad-hoc teachers

and  Heads,  who  were  appointed  not  later  than 6th August,

1993, were sought to be regularized.

16.The pivotal Rule 5 of the 1998 Rules, prescribes academic

qualifications for appointment to the post of teacher.  It reads

as follows:

“5.Academic qualifications.-A candidate for appointment to a post of teacher must possess  qualifications  specified  in Regulation  1  of  Chapter  II  of  the Regulations made under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921.”

1 6

17.Chapter II of the Intermediate Act deals with appointment

of heads of institutions and teachers.  Regulation 1 of the said

Chapter  stipulates  that  the  minimum  qualification  for

appointment  as  heads  of  institutions  and  teachers  in  any

recognized  institution,  whether  by  direct  recruitment  or

otherwise, shall be as given in Appendix A.  As per the said

Appendix, the essential qualification for the post of head of the

institution is as follows:

“Essential Qualification S.No. Name  of  the  post  &

educational  training experience

Age Desirable qualification

1 2 3 4

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1. Head  of  the  institution (1)  Trained  M.A.  or M.Sc.  or  M.Com.  or M.Sc.  (Agri)  or  any equivalent  post- graduate  or  any  other degree  which  is awarded  by  corporate body specified in above- mentioned  para  one and  should  have  at least  teaching experience of four years in  classes  9  to  12  in any training institute or in  any  institution  or University  specified  in above-mentioned  para one  or  in  any  degree college affiliated to such University  or institution,  recognized by  Board  or  any institution  affiliated from  Boards  of  other States  or  such  other institutions  whose examinations  are recognized  by  the Board,  or  should  the condition  is  also  that he/she  should  not  be below 30 years of age.

Mini mum

30 years

Or

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2. First  or  second  class post-graduate  degree along  with  teaching experience  of  ten years in  intermediate  classes of  any  recognized institutions  or  third class  post-graduate degree  with  teaching experience  of  fifteen years.

Or

3. Trained  post-graduate diploma-holder  in science.   The  condition is  that  he  has  passed this  diploma  course  in first  or  second  class and  have  efficiently worked  for  15  or  20 years  respectively  after passing  such  diploma course.”

18.Part  III  of  the  1998  Rules  lays  down the  procedure  for

recruitment  to  various  categories  of  teachers.   Rule  10  (a)

thereof provides that the mode of recruitment of Principal of

an Intermediate College or Headmaster of a High School shall

be by direct  recruitment.   The  number  of  vacancies  for the

purpose of direct recruitment are determined and notified in

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the  manner  laid  down in Rule  11.   Rule  12 lays down the

procedure  for  direct  recruitment.   Relevant  portion  thereof

reads thus:

“12. Procedure for direct recruitment.- (1)  The  Board  shall,  in  respect  of  the vacancies  to  be  filled  by  direct recruitment,  advertise  the  vacancies including  those  reserved  for  candidates belonging  to  Scheduled  Castes, Scheduled  Tribes  and  Other  Backward Classes  of  citizens in at  least  two daily newspapers,  having  wide  circulation  in the State, and call for the applications for being  considered  for  selection  in  the proforma published in the advertisement. For  the  post  of  Principal  of  an Intermediate  College  or  the  Headmaster of a High School, the name and place of the institution shall also be mentioned in the  advertisement  and  the  candidates shall be required to give the choice of not more than three  institutions in order of preference  and  if  he  wishes  to  be considered for  any particular institution or  institutions  and  for  no  other institution,  he  may  mention  the  fact  in his application.

(2) … … … (3) … … …

(4) The  Board  shall  prepare  lists  for each  category  of  posts  on  the  basis  of quality points specified in Appendix ‘B’ or Appendix ‘C’, as the case may be, marks in  written  examination  and  marks  for experience as follows:

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(i) 30 per cent  marks on the basis of quality points;

(ii) 40 per cent  marks on the basis of the written examination; and

(iii) 20  per  cent  marks  for  experience more  than the  required  experience in such manner that 4 marks shall be  allotted  for  having  doctorate’s degree and 2 marks shall  be given for  each  year  of  such  experience with maximum of 16 marks.

Notes (1) - The  teaching  experience for  this  purpose  shall  be  counted only  for  the  recognized  High School/Intermediate  College(s)  or Junior  High  School  and  such certificate shall actually mention the date of appointment, date of joining and the scale of pay and duly signed by  the  Principal/Headmaster  and countersigned  by  the  District Inspector  of  Schools  or  Zila  Basic Shiksha Adhikari,  as the case may be,  with  full  name  of  the countersigning authority.

(2) Any  Wrong  information submitted in this regard shall make the applications of such candidates liable to be rejected and for this the candidate  himself  shall  be  solely responsible.

(5) The  Board  shall,  in  respect  to  the selection for the post of Headmaster and Principal, allot the marks in the following manner-

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(i) 60 per cent marks on the basis of  quality  points  specified  in Appendix ‘D’;

(ii) 20 per  cent  marks for  having experience  more  than the  required experience,  1  mark  for  each research  paper  published  with  a maximum of 4 marks and 2 marks for  each  year  of  such  experience with a maximum of 16 marks; and  

(iii) 10 per  cent  marks for  having doctorate degree.

Note.- For the purpose of calculating experience  the  service  rendered  as Headmaster  of  Junior  High  School or  as  assistant  teacher  in  a  High School/Intermediate  College  shall be counted in the case of selection of Headmaster; and for selection of Principal,  the  service  rendered  as Headmaster of a High School or as a Lecturer shall only be counted.  The provision of sub-rule (4) of Rule 12 regarding  the  certificate  of experience  shall  mutatis  mutandis apply.

(6) The  Board,  having  regard  to  the need  for  securing  due  representation  of the  candidates  belonging  to  the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and Other  Backward  Classes  of  citizens  in respect of the post of teacher in lecturers and  trained  graduates  grade,  call  for interview  such  candidates  who  have secured the maximum marks under sub- clause  (4)  above  and  for  the  post  of Principal/Headmaster,  call  for  interview

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such  candidates  who  have  secured maximum  marks  under  sub-clause  (5) above in such manner that the number of candidates  shall  not  be  less  than three and  not  more  than  five  times  of  the number of vacancies.

Provided that in respect of the post of  the  Principal  or  Headmaster  of  an institution  the  Board  shall  also  in addition  call  for  interview  two  senior- most  teachers  of  the  institution  whose names are forwarded by the Management through  Inspector  under  Clause  (b)  of sub-rule (2) of Rule 11.

(7) The  Board  shall  hold  interview  of the  candidates  and  10  per  cent  marks shall be allotted for interview.  The marks obtained  in  the  written  test  and  the quality points by the eligible  candidates shall not be disclosed to the members of the Interview Board:

Provided further that in the interview, ten per  cent  marks  shall  be  divided  in  the following manner:

(i) 4  per  cent  marks  on  the  basis  of subject/general knowledge;

(ii) 3  per  cent  marks  on  the  basis  of personality; and

(iii) 3  per  cent  marks  on  the  basis  of ability of expression.

(8) The Board then, for each category of post, prepare panel of those found most suitable for appointment in order of merit as  disclosed  by  the  marks  obtained  by them  after  adding  the  marks  obtained

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under  sub-clause  (4)  or  sub-clause  (5) above,  as  the  case  may  be,  with  the marks  obtained  in  the  interview.   The panel  for  the  post  of  Principal  or Headmaster  shall  be  prepared institution-wise after giving due regard to the  preference  given  by  a  candidate,  if any,  for  appointment  in  a  particular institution whereas  for  the  posts  in the lecturers and trained graduates grade, it shall  be  prepared  subject-wise  and group-wise respectively,   If  two or more candidates obtain equal marks, the name of the candidate who has higher quality points shall be placed higher in the panel and if the marks obtained in the quality points  are  also  equal  then the  name  of the candidate who in older in age shall be placed higher.  In the panel for the post of Principal  or Headmaster,  the number of  names  shall  be  three  times  of  the number of the vacancies and for the post of  teachers in the lecturers  and trained graduates  grade,  it  shall  be  larger  (but not larger than twenty-five per cent) than the number of vacancies. …… ….. …..”

19.As  noted  supra,  Rule  5  of  the  1998  Rules  deals  with

academic qualifications for appointment to the post of teacher

and contemplates that a candidate must possess qualification

as specified in Regulation 1 of Chapter II  of the Regulations

made under the Intermediate Act.  As per Appendix A of the

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Intermediate Regulations, a candidate should have four years

experience of teaching classes X to XII.   However, the ‘Note’

appended  to sub rule  (5)  of  Rule  XII  excludes  the  teaching

experience  of  Assistant  Teacher  for  being  construed  as

qualifying  him  for  the  post  of  Principal  of  an  Intermediate

College, although the afore-extracted Appendix A provides for

it.  The ‘Note’ clearly stipulates that for selection to the post of

the Principal  of  an Intermediate  College,  with which we are

concerned,  for  the  purpose  of  calculating  the  experience,

services  rendered  as  Headmaster  of  a  High  school  or  as  a

Lecturer only has to be taken into consideration.  Obviously,

the  expression  ‘teaching  experience’  as contemplated  in  the

‘Note’  would  apply  both to  the  required  experience  and the

experience  more than that and, therefore,  even for required

experience  only service  rendered as Headmaster/Lecturer  is

relevant.

20.It is trite that true nature of a statutory provision has to be

determined  from  the  content  of  the  provision,  its  import

gathered  from  the  language  implied  and  the  language

construed in the context in which the provision was enacted.

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In Dattatraya Govind (supra) and Rani Choudhury (supra),

this  Court  has  said  that  mere  description  of  a  certain

provision,  such  as  explanation,  is  not  decisive  of  its  true

meaning.   It  is  the  intention  of  the  legislature  which  is

paramount and mere use of a label cannot control or deflect

such  intention.   In  Dattatraya  Govind’s  case,  it  was

observed that the legislature has different ways of expressing

itself  and in the last analysis the words used alone are the

true repository of legislative intent.

21.Applying the aforenoted principles,  we are of the opinion

that the ‘Note’ appended to sub rule (5) of Rule 12 of the 1998

Rules has the effect of modifying the conditions of qualifying

experience mentioned in Appendix A of the Regulations under

the Intermediate Act.

22.Having come to the said conclusion, the issue which still

survives for consideration is whether for appointment to the

post of Principal, the qualifying experience as stipulated in the

said  ‘Note’  would  apply  or  the  one  prescribed  in  the

Appendix-A to Regulation I  of  Chapter II  of  the Regulations

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made under the Intermediate Act.  In our view, answer to the

question  can  be  found  in  Section  32  of  the  Principal  Act,

which provides that the provision of the Intermediate Act and

Regulations made thereunder will  continue to be in force in

case they are not inconsistent with the Principal Act and the

Rules made thereunder.  As noted hereinbefore ‘Note’ to sub

rule (5) of Rule 12 of 1998 Rules prescribes the requirement of

experience  for  the  post,  which  is  different  from  what  is

prescribed in the said Appendix A and, therefore, there being

a conflict between the two provisions, in the teeth of Section

32,  the  said  ‘Note’  shall  have  an  overriding  effect  over

Appendix A insofar as the question of experience is concerned.

In  this  view  of  the  matter,  we  are  in  agreement  with  the

learned Single Judge that the impugned advertisements were

in conformity with the said ‘Note’ and, therefore, the selection

procedure could not be faulted on that score.  We do not think

that the contention of the writ petitioner that some persons

who  had  essential  qualifications  had  been  excluded  from

consideration  or  any  person  who  ought  not  to  have  been

considered for the said post had been considered for selection,

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is well founded.  We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding

that  the  Division  Bench  had  erred  in  law  in  reversing  the

decision of the learned Single Judge on the point.

23.We may now advert to other points on which the Division

Bench has endorsed the view taken by the Single Judge and

has negatived the stand of the respondents.  As noted above,

out of the fifteen points formulated and decided by the learned

Single Judge, the Division Bench had disagreed with him only

on  the  issue  regarding  the  requirement  of  minimum

qualification  mentioned  in  the  advertisements.   In  order  to

ward off any preliminary objection regarding the right of the

respondents to be heard on the points decided against them

by  the  Division  Bench,  without  preferring  independent

petitions,  Dr.  Padia,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents

sought our permission to be heard on these points.  In order

to  assert  Respondents’  right  of  being  heard  on  the  points

answered  against  them,  learned  counsel  placed  reliance  on

the decisions of  this Court  in  Ramanbhai  Ashabhai Patel

Vs. Dabhi  Ajitkumar  Fulsinji  and Ors4, J.K.  Cotton

4  AIR 1965 SC 669

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Spinning & Weaving Mills Company Ltd.  Vs.  Collector of

Central Excise5,  Jamshed Hormusji  Wadia  Vs.  Board of

Trustees, Port of Mumbai and Anr.6, Bharat Kala Bhandar

Ltd.  Vs. Municipal  Committee,  Dhamangaon7,  Nalakath

Sainuddin Vs. Koorikadan Sulaiman8 and Management of

Northern Railway Co-operative Society Ltd.Vs. Industrial

Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur and Anr.9

24.In Ramanbhai’s case (supra) this Court had said that while

dealing with an appeal before it, this Supreme Court has the

power  to  decide  all  the  points  arising  from  the  judgment

appealed  against  and  even  in  the  absence  of  an  express

provision  like  Order  XLI,  Rule  22  of  the  Code  of  Civil

Procedure,  it  can  devise  an  appropriate  procedure  to  be

adopted at the hearing. It was observed that there could be no

better way of supplying the deficiency than by drawing upon

the provisions of a general law like the Code of Civil Procedure

and adopting such of those provisions as are suitable.    It was

held  that  normally  a  party  in  whose  favour  the  judgment

5  (1998) 3 SCC 540 6  (2004) 3 SCC 214 7  AIR 1966 SC 249 8  (2002) 6 SCC 1 9  AIR 1967 SC 1182

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appealed from has been given is not granted special leave to

appeal from it and, therefore, considerations of justice require

that in appropriate cases a party placed in such a position

should be permitted to support  the judgment in his favour,

even  upon  the  grounds  which  were  negatived  in  that

judgment.  Subsequently, explaining the issue a little further,

in Jamshed Hormusji Wadia’s case (supra) it was observed

that the permission to the respondent to support the decree or

decision  under  appeal  by  laying  challenge  to  a  finding

recorded or issue decided  against him is not given because

Order 41 Rule 22 CPC is applicable to appeals preferred under

Article  136  of  the  Constitution;  it  is  because  of  a  basic

principle  of  justice  applicable  to  Courts  of  superior

jurisdiction. It was, thus, held that a person who has entirely

succeeded  before  a  Court  or  Tribunal  below  cannot  file  an

appeal solely for the sake of clearing himself from the effect of

an adverse finding or an adverse decision on one of the issues

as he would not be a person falling within the meaning of the

words 'person aggrieved'.   However, in an appeal or revision,

as a matter of general principle, the party who has an order in

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his favour, is entitled to show that even if the order was liable

to be set aside on the grounds decided in his favour, yet the

order  could  be  sustained  by reversing  the  finding  on  some

other  ground  which  was  decided  against  him  in  the  court

below.

25.In the light of the aforenoted legal position, we permitted

Dr. Padia to address us on those points which were decided by

the High Court against the respondents.

26.To start with, Dr. Padia contended that the High Court was

not correct in holding that there could not be any reservation

for  the  post  of  head  of  a  high  school  or  an  intermediate

college.   According  to  the  learned  counsel,  in  all  public

appointments made by the Union Public Service Commission

or  the  State  Public  Service  Commission,  provision  for

reservation is always made in respect of Scheduled Castes and

Backward  Class  category  candidates.   It  was  argued  that

under the provisions of 1994 Act, in all appointments to be

made in the State Public Service, reservation in terms of the

said  Act  had  to  be  provided  for  and,  therefore,  by  not

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providing  for  similar  reservation  in  the  advertisements  in

question, selections made pursuant thereto are per se illegal,

being violative of Article 16(4) of the Constitution.  In support,

reliance  was  placed  on  a  Division  Bench  decision  of  the

Allahabad High Court in the case of Onkar Datt Sharma &

Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.10  wherein it was held that for

the post of a head of the institution in degree/post-graduate

colleges  throughout  the  State  of  U.P.,  the  principle  of

reservation  as  provided  under  the  1994  Act  would  apply.

According  to  the  learned  counsel,  the  reservation  Act  (the

1994 Act)  being a special  statute,  it  would prevail  over  the

Principal  Act.   Relying on the decision of  this  Court  in  Dr.

Suresh  Chandra  Verma  &  Ors.  Vs. The  Chancellor,

Nagpur  University  &  Ors11., it  is  urged  that  if  the

advertisements are held to be bad for ignoring the provision

for reservation, these have to be struck down in entirety.  

27.Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants,  on  the  other  hand,

submitted that the post of Principal being a single post, the

provisions  of  the  1994  Act  shall  have  no  application.

10  [(2001) 2 UPLBEC 1149] 11  (1990) 4 SCC 55

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According  to  the  learned  counsel,  the  heads  of  several

institutions  are  neither  treated  nor  do  they  belong  to  a

common cadre.  Their employers are different. The Board only

makes the selection of the head of the institution concerned

and  the  appointment  letters  are  issued  by  the  respective

committees of the management.  It was further submitted that

though the Principal  Act was enacted in the year 1982, yet

Section  10  thereof  expressly  excludes  the  post  of  Principal

from the purview of 1994 Act, which applies only to the post of

teachers.  It was asserted that the post of the Principal being a

single cadre post, the policy of reservation cannot be applied

as it would amount to 100 per cent reservation, which is not

permissible  in law.  In support,  reliance was placed on the

decisions of this Court in Dr. Chakrdhar Paswan Vs. State

of Bihar12, Bhide Girls Education Society Vs. Education Officer, Zila Parishad13, Chetana

Dilip Motghare Vs.  Bhide Girls Education Society14, PGI Chandigarh Vs.  Faculty Association15,

State of U.P. Vs. M.C. Chattopadhyay16.

12  (1988) 2 SCC 214 13  (1993) Suppl. 3 SCC 527 14  (1995) Suppl. 1 SCC 157 15  (1998) 4 SCC 1 16  (2004) 12 SCC 333

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28.Having  examined  the  issue  in  the  light  of  the  1994  Act,

Section 10 of the Principal Act and the settled position in law,

we are of the view that the stand of the respondents is not well

founded.   Under  Section  10  of  the  Principal  Act,  the

management is required to intimate the number of vacancies

to be filled by way of selection by direct recruitment.  While

doing  so,  the  management  is  also  required  to  intimate  the

number  of  vacancies  to  be  reserved  for  the  candidates

belonging  to  the  Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes  and

Other  Backward  Classes  of  citizens  in accordance  with the

1994 Act.  However, Section 10 expressly excludes the post of

the Principal from the purview of the 1994 Act.  Thus, from a

plain  reading  of  the  said  provision,  the  intention  of  the

Legislature  is  manifestly  clear.   The  legislature,  in  its  own

wisdom did not think it proper to provide for any reservation

under  the  1994 Act  for  the  post  of  head of  the institution.

Indubitably, there is no challenge to the validity of Section 10

of the Principal Act.  Moreover, the post of the Principal in an

educational  institution  being  in  a  single  post  cadre,  in  the

light of the clear dictum laid down by this Court, such a post

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cannot be subjected to reservation.  It will result in 100 per

cent reservation, which is not permissible in terms of Articles

15 and 16 of the Constitution of India.  In PGI Chandigarh’s

case (supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court, while holding

that plurality of posts in a cadre is a sine qua non for a valid

reservation, affirmed the view taken in Chakradhar Paswan

Vs. State of Bihar and Ors.17.  In that case, it was held that

there cannot be any reservation in a single post cadre and the

decisions to the contrary, upholding reservation in single post

cadre either directly or by device of rotation of roster were not

approved.  Besides, as noted above, neither the Principal Act,

nor the rules  made thereunder  or the 1994 Act provide for

clubbing of all educational institutions in the State of U.P. for

the purpose of reservation and, therefore, there is no question

of  clubbing  the  post  of  the  Principals  in  all  the  educations

institutions  for  the  purpose  of  applying  the  principle  of

reservation  under  the  1994  Act.   We  are,  therefore,  in

agreement  with  the  High  Court  that  the  advertisements

impugned  in  the  writ  petition were  not  vitiated  for  want  of

provision for reservation.  It is also pertinent to note that none 17  (1988) 2 SCC 214

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of  the  respondents  belong  to  the  reserved  category  of

Scheduled  Castes  or  Scheduled  Tribes  or  other  Backward

Classes.  All of them are from the general category.  Therefore,

even otherwise they have no  locus standi to raise the plea of

reservation.

29.It  was  then  contended  by  learned  counsel  for  the

respondents  that  under  Section  10  of  the  Principal  Act,

vacancies  are  to  be  notified  in  respect  of  each  year  of

recruitment  and  if  the  vacancies  are  clubbed  together,  the

basic purpose of notifying the vacancies every year in terms of

the said Section will get frustrated, which cannot be permitted

in law.  According to the learned counsel, since the vacancies

have  to  be  notified  each year  it  would  naturally  mean that

they  are  also  to  be  filled  up  each  year  from  amongst  the

eligible  candidates  available  in  respect  of  that  recruitment

year.  Therefore, the person who became eligible subsequently

could not be considered in respect of the vacancies occurring

in respect of the earlier recruitment year.  The stand of the

learned counsel is that in the present recruitment, the Board

wrongly clubbed all such vacancies by taking recourse to the

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second proviso to Rule 11(2) (a) of the 1998 Rules.  Learned

counsel asserts that in the light of clear provision of Section

10 of the Principal Act, the said Rule cannot be resorted to.

30.We do not find much substance in the contention.  Section

2(l)  of the Principal Act, as amended by the U.P. Secondary

Service  Commission  and  Selection  Board  (Amendment)  Act,

1992 defines “year of recruitment” to mean a period of twelve

months commencing from 1st day of July of a calendar year.

Section 10 of the Principal Act prescribes the procedure for

determination  of  number  of  vacancies  and  directs  the

management to determine the number of vacancies, ‘existing

or likely to fall vacant during the year of recruitment’. On a

bare reading of the provision, it is manifestly clear that when a

selection is held in a “year of recruitment” then all the existing

vacancies  and the vacancies  likely to fall  vacant during the

year  of  recruitment  are  clubbed  and  notified.   Moreover,

Section 11 of the Principal Act also contemplates preparation

of  a  panel  of  the  selected  candidates  with  respect  to  the

vacancies notified under Section 10(1) thereof.  It is clear that

though  it  may  be  desirable  for  better  administration  but

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neither Section 10 nor 11 of the Principal Act nor the 1998

Rules  as  such  mandate  that  selection  or  determination  of

vacancies must be yearwise and, therefore, all the vacancies

which are “existing or which are likely to fall vacant during the

year of recruitment” can be clubbed irrespective of the year of

occurrence of the vacancy.  Moreover, second proviso to Rule

11 (2) (a) also contemplates that the vacancies existing on the

date of commencement of these Rules as well as the vacancies

which are likely to arise on 30th June, 1998, shall be included

in the consolidated statement by the management and sent to

the  Board  for  making  selection  which  shows  that  all  the

existing vacancies irrespective of the year of occurrence can be

clubbed for being filled up together by the Board.  In this view

of the matter, it cannot be said that Rule 11(2) (a) is in conflict

with the provisions of Section 10(1) of the Principal Act, as is

sought to be pleaded on behalf of the respondents.  We have,

therefore,  no hesitation in endorsing  the view taken by the

High  Court  that  the  Board  and  the  Management  have  not

committed  any  error  in  clubbing  vacancies  which  were

existing on the date of selection.

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31.It was then submitted by Dr. Padia that there was difference

in the Hindi and English version of the notification given in

Appendix  D  framed  in  terms  of  Rule  12(5)  (i)  of  the  1998

Rules,  on  the  basis  whereof  quality  points  were  to  be

calculated.   According  to  the  learned  counsel,  in  the  Hindi

version  weightage  to  the  percentage  of  marks  in  the  high

school, intermediate, graduate and post-graduate degree was

in the ratio of 1,2,4 and 8 respectively whereas in the English

version it was only 1,2,3 and 4.  The submission was that in

case  the  Hindi  version  was  followed  then  maximum marks

that could be awarded, as calculated in terms of Appendix D

would be 174 and in case English version was to be followed

then  it  would  come  to  only  124.   Further,  the  Board  had

scaled  the  said  marks  upto  300  by  multiplying  the  quality

point marks of the candidate by 300/174 as the total marks

out of which the merit was to be declared had been taken as

500 and 60 per cent of it came to 300.  But this was down by

following the Hindi version.  The contention was that in case

the English version was to be followed, the quality point marks

had to be calculated after giving due weightage for graduate

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and post-graduate degree and also it was to be scaled upto

300 by multiplying the quality point marks of 300 by 124 and

not by 174, which would result in some difference.  Learned

counsel  contended  that  though  the  State  Government  had

issued a corrigendum on 17th January, 2001 and the English

version  of  the  Appendix  B,  C  and  D  of  the  Rules  was

corrected,  the  English  translation  of  the  corrigendum  was

published  only  on  31st January,  2001.   According  to  the

learned counsel, this amounted to a retrospective amendment,

carried out with a view to validate the result and, therefore,

the  same  was  violative  of  Article  166  of  the  Constitution.

Learned  counsel  urged  that  the  corrigendum  also  suffered

from  a  technical  defect  inasmuch  as  the  same  had  to  be

issued  only  in  the  name  of  the  Governor  and  not  by  the

Secretary as was done in the instant case.

32.We are  of  the  view  that  insofar  as  the  final  results  are

concerned, the issue raised is of no consequence.  Admittedly,

there  was  no  ambiguity  in  the  Hindi  version  of  the  said

Appendix,  which had been followed by the Board.  Though,

technically the respondents stand that the corrigendum had

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not been issued strictly as per the procedure prescribed may

have some substance but we are convinced that in the final

analysis no prejudice has been caused to them because the

stated discrepancy had been rectified and the English version

had been brought in consonance with the Hindi version.  In

this view of the matter, we deem it unnecessary to dilate on

the scope and effect of Article 348(3) of the Constitution, to

which reference was made by learned counsel for the parties.

33.Dr. Padia also contended that the regionwise selection and

declaration of the results for the post of the Principals is not

only violative of the procedure prescribed in Section 10 of the

Principal Act; it will also lead to discriminatory results.  It was

pleaded  that  the  procedure  adopted  is  against  the  spirit  of

Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the principles of

law enunciated  by this  Court  in  Radhey Shyam Singh &

Others,  etc.  Vs. Union  of  India  &  Ors.18,  Nidamarti

Maheshkumar  Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.19 and

Minor P. Rajendran Vs. State of Madras & Ors.20

18  (1997) 1 SCC 60 19  (1986) 2 SCC 534 20  AIR 1968 SC 1012

4 1

34.In our view, the said contention is also not well-founded.

There is no warrant for accepting as a general proposition that

a  regionwise  or  districtwise  selection  is  per  se  violative  of

equality  clause  enshrined  in  Articles  14  and  16  of  the

Constitution.   It  would  be  discriminatory  only  when  the

person,  who  alleges  discrimination,  demonstrates  certain

appreciable  disadvantages,  qua  similarly  situated  persons,

which he would not have faced but for the impugned State

action.   Therefore,  the  onus  was  on  the  writ  petitioners  to

show  by  cogent  material  that  by  resorting  to  regionwise

selection, they were placed in some disadvantageous position

as compared to their counterparts or that in this process merit

was the casualty.   

35.In the present case, neither Section 10 of the Principal Act

nor any other statutory provision forbids regionwise selection.

Besides,  no  restriction  was  imposed  upon  the  candidates

insofar  as  their  choice  for  the  regions  was  concerned.   An

eligible  candidate could apply in any of the regions and his

application  was  to  be  considered  in  accordance  with  the

Rules.  It has neither been pleaded nor can it be held that the

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right of any eligible candidate to apply in a particular zone was

curtailed or that an equal opportunity to compete had been

denied  to  the  respondents.   It  is  not  even  the  case  of  the

respondents  that  a  less  meritorious  candidate  has  been

selected on account of regionwise selection.   The ratio of the

decisions, relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents

is  not  attracted  to  the  facts  of  the  present  case.   In  the

aforenoted  decisions,  zonewise,  districtwise  and  unitwise

allocation of seats and/or preparation of separate merit list for

each  zone  in  respect  of  candidates  who  appeared  at  the

centres within the same zone were held to be discriminatory

on  the  ground  that  by  resorting  to  these  procedures,  the

objective  of  selecting  the  best  possible  candidates  was

defeated.  In all these cases, the petitioners had successfully

demonstrated  that  as  a  result  of  zonewise  or  districtwise

allocations,  more  meritorious  candidates  were  denied

admissions/employment and candidates with low merit were

selected, which is not the case here.  As noted above, in the

present case the respondents have neither pleaded nor placed

on record any material to show that as a result of regionwise

4 3

selection they have not been selected despite the fact that they

were  more  meritorious  as  compared  to  the  selected

candidates.   In our opinion, therefore,  the selection process

cannot  be  struck  down  as  violative  of  the  principles

enunciated in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

36.It was then argued by learned counsel for the respondents

that  Section  33C  inserted  by  the  Amending  Act  is  wholly

arbitrary,  illegal  and  discriminatory  inasmuch  as  though  it

had been enforced with effect from 20th April, 1998, it provided

for regularization of only such ad-hoc Principals who had been

appointed on or  before  6th August,  1993.   According to the

learned  counsel,  the  said  cut  off  date  is  arbitrary  and

discriminatory as there is no nexus or relationship with the

object  sought  to  be  achieved  i.e.  regularization  of  ad-hoc

Principals as it would exclude ad-hoc Principals who had been

appointed after 6th August, 1993 and prior to 20th April, 1998,

the  date  of  enforcement  of  the  said  provision.   It  was also

pointed  out  that  by  the  aforementioned  provisions  of

regularization  incorporated  in  the  Principal  Act  by  the

Amendment Acts of 1993 and 1991, all ad-hoc Principals, who

4 4

were working on the date of enforcement of those Amendment

Acts were regularized whereas in the instant case a gap of five

years  had  been  left  between  the  cut  off  date  and  the

enforcement  of the Amendment Act,  which according to the

learned counsel, is wholly unreasonable and arbitrary.  It was

then pleaded that the cut off date of 6th August, 1993 deserves

to be struck down and all Principals who were working on ad-

hoc basis up to the date of enforcement of Section 33C are

entitled to be regularized.  

37.We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with learned

counsel for the respondents.  Admittedly, Section 33C of the

Principal  Act  was inserted  with effect  from 20th April,  1998

providing for the regularization of ad-hoc Principals who had

been appointed by promotion on or after 31st July, 1988 but

not later than 6th August, 1993, in accordance with Section 18

of the Principal Act, which pertained to ad-hoc appointments.

Section 16 of  the Principal  Act  which contemplates  that all

appointments will be made through the Selection Board, was

substituted  by the  1993  Amendment  Act  and was enforced

with effect from 7th August, 1993.  It prohibited appointments

4 5

of  teachers  and  heads  of  the  institutions,  except  on  the

recommendation of  the  Commission.   However,  by virtue  of

Section  1(2)  of  the  1993  Amendment  Act,  the  date  of

enforcement  of  the  Amendment  Act  was  left  to  the  State

Government  and  it  was  by  virtue  of  Notification  dated  7th

August,  1993  that  the  State  Government  prescribed  7th

August, 1993 as the date on which the Amendment Act except

Section 13 thereof was to come into force.  Though Section 18

was reintroduced  by the 1995 Amendment  Act  with certain

conditions yet the Legislature fixed 6th August, 1993 as the cut

off date as the State Government had decided to make regular

selections and steps in that behalf had already been initiated.

Thus, it cannot be held that fixing of 6th August, 1993 as the

cut  off  date  for  regularization  is  arbitrary  or  whimsical,

warranting interference by the Court.  Moreover, the State is

not obliged to regularize all  ad-hoc appointments merely on

the strength of their continuance on the post for a long period,

particularly when their original appointments were not made

by following a due  process  of  selection as envisaged in the

4 6

relevant rules.  (See also:  Secretary, State of Karnataka &

Ors. Vs. Umadevi (3) & Ors.21)

38.In  view  of  the  aforegoing  discussion,  the  appeals  are

allowed; the judgment of the Division Bench to the extent it

has reversed the decision of the Single Judge is set aside; the

decision  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  is  restored  and  as  a

consequence, the writ petitions filed by the respondents stand

dismissed.   

Civil Appeal No.   3897                                 of  2008 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.2691 of 2004)  Civil Appeal Nos.         3928-3929                          of  2008 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.1605-1606 of 2005)  Civil Appeal No.          3861                          of  2008 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.23691 of 2003)  Civil Appeal Nos.          3903-3904                         of  2008 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.4094-4095 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.               3913                      of  2008 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.7125 of 2004) Civil Appeal Nos.            3915-3917                       of  2008 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.814-816 of 2004) Civil Appeal No.                   3934                 of  2008 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.24475 of 2005  Civil Appeal No.                  3935                  of  2008 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.24535 of 2005)

21  (2006) 4 SCC 1

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39.Delay condoned.  

40.Leave granted.  

41.The  challenge  in  these  appeals  is  to  the  interim  orders

passed  by  the  High  Court  in  regard  to  the  selection  of

Principals  of  various  institutions,  pursuant  to  the

advertisements dated 12th August, 1998, 24th December, 1999

and 3rd March, 2002.  In view of our judgment and order in

Civil  Appeals  (Arising out of SLP (C)  Nos.19335-36 of 2003)

and other connected appeals, these appeals are also allowed

and the impugned orders passed by the High Court are set

aside.

42.In  view  of  our  order  in  the  main  appeals,  all  pending

Applications and Contempt Petitions stand disposed of.

43.No order as to costs.

SLP  (C)  Nos.1863-64  of  2004  and  SLP  (C)  No.16502  of 2004

44.These petitions are delinked.   Be listed in usual course.

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.………………………………………CJI.        (K.G. BALAKRISHNAN)  

………………………………………….J.        (R.V. RAVEENDRAN)

                              ..….…………………………………….J.        (D.K. JAIN)

NEW DELHI MAY 16, 2008.

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