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PETITIONER: BALAMMAL & ORS. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MADRAS & ORS.ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/04/1968

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1968 AIR 1425            1969 SCR  (1)  90  CITATOR INFO :  F          1973 SC 689  (37)  RF         1980 SC1789  (36)

ACT: Madras  City Improvement Trust Act 16 of 1945--Repealed  and replaced by Act 37 of 1950-Cl. 6(2) of Schedule deleting the provision  for  statutory  solatium  in  s.  23(2)  of  Land Acquisition  Act  1894 whether  valid--Whether  contravenes, Art.  14  of  Constitution--Compensation  on  the  basis  of market-value  of  property as on the  date  of  notification under s.47 of the Act whether "just equivalent".

HEADNOTE: Under  the  Madras City Improvement Trust Act 16 of  1945  a Board  of Trustees was created with powers to carry out  the provisions of the Act.  Section 73 of the Act provided  that for  purpose of acquiring land for the Board under the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the latter Act shall be subject to the modifications  specified in the; Schedule.. By cl.  6(2)  of the Schedule the 15% solatium payable under s. 23(2) of  the Land  Acquisition  Act would not be payable  in  respect  of certain  types  of land.  Act 16 of 1945  was  repealed  and replaced  by  Madras  Act 37 of 1950  and  under  s.  173(2) thereof all proceedings taken under the 1945 Act were to  be deemed  to have been taken under the new Act.  But cl.  6(2) of..  the Schedule to the 1950 Act deleted s. 23(2)  of  the 1894 Act and substituted for it a new provision, the  result of which was that under the new Act 15% solatium would  not, be  payable to those whose land was acquired.  The Board  of Trustees  framed two schemes for improvement of the town  of Madras  and in pursuance of the schemes notifications  under s. 47 of the 1945 Act (corresponding to a notification under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act) were issued in 1948 and notifications  under s. 53 (corresponding to a  notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act) were issued in 1950. The Land Acquisition Officer declined to award 15%  solatium to  the appellants and after valuing the lands according  to the  scheme framed by the Board awarded  compensation.   The Chief  Judge  of the Court of Small Causes  Madras  to  whom references under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act were made awarded enhanced compensation and also solatium at 15%.  The High Court in appeals filed before it determined the market-

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value of the lands at rates in excess of those fixed by  the Chief Judge but set aside the order awarding 15% solatium on the market-value.  In appeal to this Court against the order of the High Court among others the following questions arose for  determination  : (i) whether the notices  under  s.  47 having  been issued under the Act of 1945, the  solatium  of 15%  provided  for  under that Act would  still  be  payable despite  the passage of the 1950 Act; (ii) whether cl.  6(2) of the Schedule to the 1950 Act was ultra vires as violative of  Art.  14;  (iii) whether compensation on  the  basis  of marketvalue as on the date of issue of notification under s. 47  was  a  ’just  equivalent’ of the  value  of  the  lands expropriated  when there was a timelag between the issue  of the aforesaid notification and the date on which  possession was taken; (iv) whether the High Court was right in  raising the  rates of compensation alone those fixed by  the,  Chief Judge. HELD  : (i) Although by cl. 6 of the Schedule to Act  16  of 1945  solatium  was  awardable to the  owners  of  the  land acquired for the Improvement Trust yet since by s. 173(2) of Act  37  of 1950 all the proceedings  which  were  commenced under the Act of 1945 were to be 91 deemed  to  be  taken  under Act  37  of  1950  compensation awardable by virtue of cl. 6 of the Schedule to the new  Act read  with  s.  173(2) of that Act  could  not  include  the statutory  solatium.  The Legislature has  thereby  deprived the  owners of the lands of a right to compensation even  in proceedings  for acquisition commenced before Act  37  1945. [95 F-G] (ii) However sub-cl. (2) of cl. 6 of the Schedule to Act  37 of  1950 insofar as it deprived the owners of the  lands  of the  statutory  addition to the market-value  of  the  lands under  s. 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act is violative  of the  equality  clause  of the Constitution and  is  on  that account  void.  An owner of land is ordinarily  entitled  to receive  the solatium in addition to the  market-value,  for compulsory acquisition of his land, if it is acquired  under the Land Acquisition Act but not if it is acquired under the Madras  City  Improvement  Trust  Act.   A  clear  case   of discrimination thus arises. [95H-96-C] On the above finding the owners of land in the present  case were  entitled  to receive the statutory solatium  under  s. 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. [98 B-C] State  of  West Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee &  Ors.  [1954] S.C.R.  558, State of Madras v. D. Namasiva Mudaliar &  Ors. [1964] 6 S.C.R. 614, P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector,  Madras  &  Anr.  [1965] 1  S.C,.R.  614,  N.  B. Jeejabhoy v. Assistant Collector Thana Prant, Thana,  [1965] 1  S.C.R.  636 and Dalchand and Ors.  v.  Delhi  Improvement Trust  (Now Delhi Development Authority) New  Delhi,  [1966] Supp.  S.C.R. 27, referred to. (iii)  In  view  of the decision  in  Vajravelu’s  case  the contention that compensation payable on the basis of market- value  as on the date of notification under s. 47 of Act  37 of  1950 was not a ’just equivalent’ could not be  accepted. [101 F] P.  Vajravelu v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras and  Anr., [1965] I S.C.R. 614, relied on. (iv) The  High Court had committed no error of principle  in fixing  the  value  of the, lands in question,  nor  had  it failed to apply its mind to any important piece of evidence. This  Court  could  not therefore interfere  with  the  High Court’s order in this respect. [100 H] Nowroji  Rustomji Wadia v. Bombay Government, L.R.  52  I.A.

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367,  Prag  Narain v. Collector of Agra, L.R. 59  I.A.  155, Narsingh  Das v. Secretary of State for India, L.R. 52  I.A. 133  and Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore  v.  T. Adinarayan Setty, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 404, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 489,  513, 514, 645-648, 650, 651, 960-967 and 989-993 of 1965 and 2109 and 2228 of 1966. Appeals  from  the judgments and decrees dated  November  5. 1953  of the Madras High Court in Civil Appeals  Suits  Nos. 116 of 1953 etc. etc. R. Ramamurthy Iyer, T. S. Rangarajan and R.  Gopalakrishnan. for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 489, 514, 645-647 of  1965 and  2109  and 2228 of 1966) and for respondents  (in  C.As. Nos.  513 and 648 of 1965) for respondents Nos. 5 and 6  (in C.As. Nos. 92 960-962,  967 and 989-993 of 1965) and for respondents  Nos. 1 and 4 (in C.A. No. 966 of 1965). R. Thiagarajan, for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 650-651 of 1965). P. Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for the appellants (in C.As. Nos.  989-993  of 1965) and for respondent No. 2  (in  C.As. Nos. 960-962, 964 and 967 of 1965). K.  N. Mudaliyar, Advocate-General for the State  of  Madras and  A. V. Rangam, for the respondents (in C.As.  Nos.  489, 514,Respondent No. 1 (in C.A. Nos. 989-993 of 1965) and  for appellants (in C.As. Nos. 513, 648, 960 to 967 of 1965). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah,J.In  this  group  of  appeals  arising  out  of   land acquisition references, two questions fall to be determined:               (1)   Whether  the owners are entitled to  get               15%  solatium in addition to the market  value               for compulsory acquisition of the lands; and               (2)   Whether  the rate at which  compensation               has   been  awarded  to  the   claimants   for               compulsory   acquisition  of  the   lands   is               justified by the evidence. The Legislature of the Province of Madras enacted the Madras ,City  Improvement Trust Act 16 of 1945, to  provide,  inter alia. for improvement and expansion of the City of Madras by opening  up congested areas.  Under s. 3 of the Act a  Board of  Trustees. with power to carry out the provisions of  the Act,  is to be constituted.  The Board is empowered  by  the Act to frame a scheme to be called "Town Expansion  Scheme", and  to  notify  the scheme and also to publish  it  in  the Government Gazette.  After considering the objections raised by  persons  affected  by the  scheme  tile  Government  may sanction   the   improvement  scheme  with  or   with   ,out modifications   and  announce  the  fact  by   notification. Publication of the notification is conclusive evidence  that the  scheme has been duly framed and sanctioned.  The  Board shall  then proceed with the execution of the  scheme.   The Board  is by virtue of s. 71 authorised, with  the  previous sanction  of  the  Government, to  acquire  land  under  the provisions  of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894, for  carrying out  any of the purposes of the Act.  Section 72  authorises the  Government to constitute a Tribunal for performing  the functions  of the Court in reference to the acquisition  ,of land for the Board under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.  By s.73 it is provided "For  the purpose of acquiring land for the Board under  the

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Land Acquisition Act, 1894- 93 (a)  the  said  Act shall be subjected  to  the  modications specified in the Schedule; and (b)  ....................................... The  Schedule to the Act provided for modifications  in  the Land  Acquisition Act, 1894, for certain specific  purposes. By  cl. 6(2) of the Schedule the acquiring authority is  not liable  to pay the additional 15% of the market value  under s.  23(2)  of  the  Land Acquisition  Act  "where  the  land acquired  is  situated in an area which is declared  by  the Provincial Government to be a congested or slum area and the land is not in the actual possession of the owner".  It  may suffice  to  state that the land in the cases out  of  which these  appeals arise did not fall within the proviso and  in addition  to  the  market value fifteen  per  cent,  on  the market-value  in consideration of the compulsory  nature  of the  acquisition  was payable for acquisition of  land  made under Act 16 of 1945. Madras  Act  16  of 1945 was repealed and  was  replaced  by Madras Act 37 of 1950.  The scheme of the new Act  remained. with  some  modifications,  substantially the  same  as  the scheme  of the repealed Act.  By s. 173(2) it  was  provided that :               "Notwithstanding   such  repeal,  all   action               taken, all notifications published, all  rules               and  orders issued and all things  done  under               that  Act (Act 16 of 1945) shall be deemed  to               have  been taken, published, issued  and  done               under   this   Act,  and  may   be   continued               thereunder." All  the  proceedings commenced under Act 16  of  1945  were therefore  to be deemed to have been taken under Act  37  of 1950.   An  important  change,  however,  was  made  in  the Schedule to Act 37 of 1950 which modified the provisions  of the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in its application  to  the acquisition  of  lands under that Act.  By cl. 6(2)  of  the Schedule  it was provided that sub-s. (2) of s. 23 shall  be omitted, and in lieu thereof the following sub-section shall be deemed to have been substituted. namely               "(2)  For the purpose of clause first of  sub-               section               (1) of this section-               (a)  if the market value of the land has  been               increased  or  decreased  owing  to  the  land               falling  within or near to the alignment of  a               projected  public  street,  so  much  of   the               increase  or  decrease as may be due  to  such               cause shall be disregarded;               (b)   if   any  person,  otherwise   than   in               accordance  with the provisions of  this  Act,               erects, re-erects, 94               adds to, or alters any wall or building so  as               to  make  the  same project  into  the  street               alingment   or   beyond  the   building   line               prescribed by any scheme made under this  Act,               then,   any  increase  in  the  market   value               resulting  from  such  erection,  re-erection,               addition or alteration shall be disregarded." By that amendment persons whose lands were compulsorily  ac- quired  under  the Madras City Improvement Trust Act  37  of 1950 were deprived of the right to the solatium which  would be  awarded  if  the  lands were  acquired  under  the  Land Acquisition Act.

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The Board of Trustees framed two schemes for improvement ,of the town of Madras-"the Mandavalli Scheme" and "the Mowbrays Road  Scheme".   For the Mandavalli  Scheme  a  notification under  s.  47  of  Act  16  of  1945  which  operates  as  a notification  under  s. 4(1) of the  Land  Acquisition  Act, 1894,  was issued on August 24, 1948.  A notification  under s.  53 which is effective ,is a notification under s.  6  of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on May 23, 1950, and the Land  Acquisition Officer made his award of compensation  on November 22, 1951.  Under that scheme 14000 "grounds"  (each ground  is equal to 2400 sq. ft.) of land were notified  for acquisition.   For  the Nowbrays Road Scheme  which  was  to cover  689 grounds, the notification under s. 47 of the  Act of  1945  was issued on October 26, 1948,  the  notification under  s. 53 was issued on May 23, 1950, and the  award  was made on April 17, 1952.  The notifications under ss. 47  and 53  in respect of the two schemes published in  exercise  of the powers under Act 16 of 1945 and all actions and proceed- ings taken thereunder were by virtue of s. 173(2) of Act  37 of  1950 to be deemed to have been issued, and  taken  under the repealing Act. The Land Acquisition Officer declined to award 15%  solatium to  the owners of the lands.  He valued the lands  according to  a  scheme of classification of lands to  which  we  will presently  refer, and determined the compensation  awardable to  the owners on that basis.  References were then made  at the  instance  of  the  owners  under  s.  18  of  the  Land Acquisition  Act  to the Chief Judge of the Court  of  Small Causes, Madras, for enhanced compensation.  The Chief  Judge awarded  enhanced  compensation  and  in  addition   thereto awarded  15%  solatium  on the market  value  of  the  land. Against  the  awards made by the Chief Judge.  appeals  were preferred  by the State of Madras and by the owners  of  the lands.  The High Court modified the awards made by the Chief Judge and determined the market value of the lands at  rates in excess of the rates at which the Chief Judge had awarded 95 compensation, but set aside the order awarding 15%  solatium on  the market value.  Against the awards made by  the  High Court,  these appeals are preferred by the State and by  the owners  of the lands.  In appeals Nos. 513, 648 and  960-967 of  1965  filed by the State, modification in the  rates  of market  value  made by the High Court  for  determining  the compensation has been challenged.  In Appeals Nos. 489, 514, 645-647, 650-651, 989-993 of 1965 and 2109 and 2228 of  1966 filed by the owners of the lands the claimants have  claimed 15% solatium which has been denied to them by the High Court and have also claimed additional compensation. We may first deal with the claim of the owners to be awarded solatium  at  the  rate of 15% on the  market-value  of  the lands.   If  the  lands  of the  owners  were  notified  for acquisition  under the Land Acquisition Act,  the  acquiring authority was bound to award in addition to the market-value of the land a sum of fifteen per centum on the "market-value in consideration of be compulsory nature of the acquisition" vide  s. 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act.  But since  the lands were notified for acquisition for the purpose of  Town Expansion  Scheme,  it is claimed that the owners  were,  by virtue  of  Act  37  of  1950,  deprived  of  the  right  to additional  compensation.  It was urged by counsel  for  the owners  of the lands that proceedings for  acquisition  were commenced by the issue of notification under ss. 47 & 53  of Act  16 of 1945, and the owners acquired a vested  right  to compensation inclusive of 15% solatium, and that right could not  be taken away by repeal of the Act and enactment  of  a

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new Act when proceedings for assessment of compensation were pending  before  the Land Acquisition Officer.  It  is  true that by cl. 6 of the Schedule to Act 16 of 1945 solatium was awardable  to  the  owners of the  lands  acquired  for  the Improvement Trusts, but since by s. 173(2) of Act 37 of 1950 all  the proceedings which were commenced under the  Act  of 1945  were to be deemed to be taken tinder Act 37  of  1950, compensation awardable by virtue of cl. 6 of he Schedule  to the  new  Act  read with S. 173(2) of  that  Act  could  not include the statutory solatium.  The Legislature has thereby deprived the owners of the lands of a right to  compensation even in proceedings for acquisition commenced before Act  37 of 1945. But,  in  our judgment, counsel for the owners is  right  in contending that sub-cl. (2) of cl. 6 of the Schedule to  Act 37  of 1950, insofar as it deprived the owners of the  lands of  the statutory addition to the market-value of the  lands under  S. 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act is violative  of the  equality  clause of the Constitution, and  is  on  that account  void.   If the State had acquired  the  land,,  for improvement of the town under the Land Acquisition Act,  the acquiring authority was bound to award in addition to 96 the market-value 1501,, statutory under s. 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act.  But by acquiring the lands under the  Land Acquisition  Act as modified by the Schedule to  the  Madras City  Improvement Trust Act 37 of 1950 for  the  Improvement Trust which also is a public purpose, the owners are, it  is claimed,  deprived of the right to that statutory  addition. An  owner  of  land is ordinarily entitled  to  receive  the solarium  in  addition to the market-value,  for  compulsory acquisition  of his land, if it is acquired under  the  Land Acquisition Act, but not if it is acquired under the  Madras City Improvement Trust Act.  A clear case of  discrimination which infringes the guarantee of equal protection of the law arises,  and the provision which is more prejudicial to  the owners of the lands which are compulsorily acquired must  on the decisions of this Court, be- deemed invalid. In  The  State  of West Bengal v.  Mrs.  Bela  Banerjee  and others(1) the West Bengal Land Development and Planning  Act 21 of 1948 passed primarily for the settlement of immigrants who  had migrated into West Bengal provided  for  compulsory acquisition  of land for public purposes, but the amount  of compensation was not to exceed the market value of the  land on  December 31 , 1946.  It was held by this Court that  the provision  fixing the market-value of the land  on  December 31,  1946, as the ceiling on compensation without  reference to  the  value of the land at the time of  acquisition,  was arbitrary  and  could not be regarded as due  compliance  in letter  and spirit with the requirements of Art. 31  (2)  of the Constitution. In  State  of Madras v. D. Namasivya Mudaliar and  others  2 ,his  Court struck down the Madras Lignite  (Acquisition  of Land)  Act  11  of 1953, which provided,  inter  alia,  that compensation for acquisition of lignite bearing lands  under the  Land Acquisition Act shall be assessed on  the  market- value of the land prevailing on August 28, 1947, and not  on the date on which the notification was issued under s.  4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. In P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector  Madras and  Another(3),  it  was held  that  the  Land  Acquisition (Madras  Amendment)  Act, 1961, which inter  alia,  provided that for the compulsory acquisition of land, the owner  will be  entitled to the market-value of the land at the date  of the publication of the notification under s. 4 sub-s. (1) of

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the  Land Acquisition Act or in amount equal to the  average market-value  of the land during the five years  immediately preceding  such  date, whichever is less, and also  that  he shall  be  entitled  to solatium at the rate  of  "five  per centum",  was  pro tanto void as infringing Art. 14  of  the Constitution.   This  Court  observed  that   discrimination between (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 558.     (2) [1964] 6 S.C.R. 614. (3)  [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614. 97 persons  whose lands were acquired for housing  schemes  and those  whose lands were acquired for other  public  purposes was  not  sustained  on  the  principle  of  any  reasonable classification founded on intelligible differentia which had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. In  N.  B. Jeejeebhoy v. Assistant Collector,  Thana  Prant, Thana(1), this Court struck down as violative of Art. 14  of the  Constitution a provision made by the  Land  Acquisition (Bombay  Amendment) Act, 1948, which enjoined the  acquiring authority to assess compensation for the lands  compulsorily acquired for the purpose of "a housing scheme’ in the  State of  Bombay at the market rate prevailing not on the date  of the  issue  of  the  notification under S.  4  of  the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but on January 1, 1948. Compensation  awardable for compulsory acquisition  of  pro- perty must be a just equivalent of the value of the land  of which  a person is deprived.  When compensation  payable  to the  owner is to be based on the market value prevailing  on different dates, according as it is awardable under the Land Acquisition  Act or tinder some special provision,  or  when the compensation awardable to the owners of the lands, under the  Land Acquisition Act is reduced by a special  provision unless   the  distinction  is  supported  by  any   rational classification  having reasonable relation to  tile  subject matter or to the object sought to be achieved by the special provision  and is founded on some intelligible  differentia, the  special provision must be held void, as infringing  the guarantee tinder Art. 14. The  judgment of this Court in Dalchand and others v.  Delhi Improvement  Trust  (New Delhi  Development  Authority)  New Delhi  (2) , on which reliance, was placed by the  Advocate- General has no application to that principle.  In Dalchand’s case ( 2 ) under the U.P. Town Improvement Act 8 of 1908  as extended  to the territory of Delhi, (he  Delhi  Improvement Trust brought into force a scheme for industrial development under   which   lands  were  acquired.    The   Trust   paid compensation  based  on the market value,  but  without  the statutory  solatium.  It was observed in that case, that  if the  land had been acquired under the, Land Acquisition  Act the   claimants  would  have  been  entitled  to   statutory solatium,  but  not when they were acquired  for  the  Delhi Improvement  Trust.  In Dalchand’s case (2) the validity  of the  Act  was not open to challenge.  The  notification  for acquisition of ’and was issued many years before the date of the commencement of the Constitution and the land had vested in   the   Trust  also  before  the  commencement   of   the Constitution.   No question of deprivation of a  fundamental right of equality could (1) [1965] 1 S.C.R.636. (2) [1966] Supp.S.C.R.27. 98 therefore  be set up in that case and this Court  held  that the  claimants were not entitled to plead that if  the  land had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, they might have become entitled to a statutory solatium in addition  to

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the  market-value, whereas under the U.P.  Town  Improvement Act they were not so entitled. We,  therefore, hold that el. 6 sub-cl. (2) of the  Schedule read with S. 73 of Madras Act 37 of 1950 which deprives  the owners of the statutory right to solatium at the rate of 15% on the market-value of the lands is invalid, and the  owners of the lands are entitled to the statutory solatium under S. 23(2)  of  the  Land Acquisition  Act  in  consideration  of compulsory acquisition of their lands. We  may  now turn to the argument that rates at  which  com- pensation  was  awarded to the owners of the lands  was  not justified by ’the evidence.  Two schemes were framed by  the Board  of Trustees-(1) Mandavalli Scheme; and  (2)  Mowbrays Road  Scheme.  The Land Acquisition Officer  classified  the lands   in  the  Mandavalli  Scheme  into  two   groups-’the developed group’ and ’the undeveloped group’.  He designated small sites requiring no further improvement and which  were ready for being built upon as ’developed lands’ and the rest as  ’undeveloped  lands’ and fixed the market value  of  the developed lands at Rs. 1,550 per ground.  In determining the value  of undeveloped lands he reduced an amount of Rs.  500 per  ground being the estimated proportionate share  of  the cost  for  setting apart land for roads  and  for  providing amenities  and  fixed  the market value  at  Rs.  1,050  per ground.   Further  adjustments were made in  that  rate  for lands  1 individual cases in the light of  their  situation. The Chief Judge adopted the classification made by the  Land Acquisition   Officer,  and  assessed  the  land  value   of developed  plots at Rs. 2,000 ground.  For arriving  at  the value for undeveloped lands, he reduced the value by Rs. 500 per  ground  for roads and cost of development  and  awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,500 per around.  The  High Court also accepted the grouping of the lands into two broad groups  as  adopted  by the Chief Judge  and  the  Land  Ac- quisition  Officer,  and further sub-divided  the  developed plots  into "nice desirable plots exceeding one  ground  and below  three grounds, and facing well-known, convenient  and already  formed roads" and "standard developed plots".   The former  were Group K-A lands which were valued at Rs.  2,250 per ground, and the latter which were called Group I-B lands were  valued  at Rs. 2,000 per ground.  In the view  of  the High  Court a reduction of Rs. 400 per ground for the  value of  standard  developed  lands  was  adequate  to  meet  the expenses  for  providing  amenities.   The  basic  value  of undeveloped  plots  was assessed at Rs.  1,600  per  ground. Having regard. however, to the superior situation of some of the 99 undeveloped  plots  they  grouped them into  Group  2-A  and awarded  compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,750  per  ground, and for one plot which in view of its "desirable  situation" was awarded the rate of Rs. 1,850 per ground.  The remaining lands  which  were  called  Group  2-B  lands  were  awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,600 per ground. The  Mowbrays Road Scheme plots were classified by the  Land Acquisition Officer into four groups Group I-A, I-B, I-C and Group-II.  For groups I-A, I-B, and I-C lands the determined the basic rate of compensation per ground at Rs. 2,500,  Rs. 2,400  and Rs. 2,000 respectively, and on the  footing  that these  three  groups were undeveloped plots he  reduced  the rate by Rs. 800 per ground for expenses of laying out  roads and providing other amenities.  He valued the Group-II lands at  Rs. 1,600 and reduced it by 25% for expenses for  laying out  roads and providing other amenities.  The  Chief  Judge substantially   adopted   the   same   classification.    He

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designated  the  lands as Group 1, Group 11, Group  III  and Group IV.  After considering the situation of the lands, the Chief Judge estimated the basic compensation for Group I  at the  rate  of Rs. 2,400, for Group 11 at Rs. 2,300  and  for Group  III at Rs. 1,900 and declined to make  any  deduction for  development  on the footing that lands  were  developed lands and no expenditure was required to be incurred and  no deduction  had to be made.  For the interior  lands  forming Group  he estimated the basic price at Rs. 1,900 per  ground and  made  a deduction of Rs. 550 per ground  for  providing amenities  and  for meeting the expenses incidental  to  the development  of their lands.  In the view of the High  Court the  rate of compensation per around should be  respectively Rs. 2,500, Rs. 2,400 and Rs. 2,250 for lands in Groups I, II and III.  For Group IV the High Court assessed  compensation at  the rate of Rs. 1,630 per ground.  In arriving  at  that valuation they took into consideration the situation of  the land,  the stage of development the lands bad  reached,  the size  of  the plots and the estimated cost  of  raising  the level of the land and providing other amenities which  would make them similar to developed lands. On behalf of the State it is urged that the High Court erred in  increasing the value of the lands in the  Mowbrays  Road Scheme  and that the, High Court should have maintained  the order of the Chief Judge relating to those lands.  On behalf of  the owners of the lands it is urged, especially for  the lands in the Mandavalli Scheme, that there were transactions of  sale  proximate  in  time  to  the  date  on  which  the notification under S. 47 of Act 16 of 1945 was issued, which disclosed  a rate of market-value varying between Rs.  2,000 and  Rs. 3,000 per ground, and the Chief Judge and the  High Court  were  not justified in accepting the lowest  rate  as determinative  of  the  market-value of  the  lands  in  the neighbour- 100 hood.   But the instances relied upon by the owners  are  of sales  of very. small pieces of land approximately  of  one- half of a ground or less, and we do not think that the  High Court has committed any error of principle in rejecting  the higher  rates furnished by instances of sale of tiny  pieces of  land.  Again no evidence was led before the Chief  Judge that  the  sale transactions reflected the Current  rate  of market  value of lands in the locality, and that the  prices paid were not affected by special considerations. In  Nowroji  Rustomji  Wadia v.  Bombay  Government(1),  the Judicial  Committee  held  that  in  appeals  involving  the valuation  of  property,  the Judicial  Committee  will  not entertain an appeal as to the value of property compulsorily acquired,  except  upon questions  of  principle,  including errors in appreciating or applying the rules of evidence, or the judicial methods of weighing evidence. In  Prag Narain v. Collector of Agra(2), the  Judicial  Com- mittee  observed  that "it is well settled that  this  Board will  not  review the decree of an  Indian  Appellate  Court merely   upon  questions  of  value",  and  reiterated   the observations made in Narsingh Das v. Secretary of State  for India(2) that the Board will not interfere with judgments of the  Courts  in India as to matters involving  valuation  of property  and  similar  questions  where  knowledge  of  the circumstances  and  of the district may  have  an  important bearing on the conclusion reached, unless there is something to  show,  not merely that on the balance  of  evidence  -it would be possible to reach a different conclusion, but  that the  judgment  cannot be supported as it stands,  either  by reason  of a wrong application of principle or because  some

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important  point  in  the evidence has  been  overlooked  or misapplied. This  Court has adopted a similar approach in appeals  which raise  disputes relating to valuation of lands  compulsorily acquired. In The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty (1).  S. K. Das, J., speaking for the Court observed               "We are content to proceed in this case on the               footing  that we should not  interfere  unless               there is something to show, not merely that on               the  balance  of evidence it  is  possible  to               reach  a  different conclusion, but  that  the               judgment  cannot be supported by reason  of  a               wrong application of principle or because some               important  point affecting valuation has  been               overlooked or misapplied." The  learned  Advocate-General appearing on  behalf  of  the State  of Madras has not invited our attention to  any  such error of, (1)  L.R. 52 I.A. 367. (3)  L.R. 52 I.A, 133. (2)  L.R. 59 I.A. 155. (4)  [1959] Supp.  1 S.C.R. 404. 101 principle or non-application of mind to any important  piece of evidence which may have a bearing on the valuation.   The learned  Advocates appearing on behalf of the owners of  the lands also have not been able to invite our attention to any such error in the judgment of the High Court. Mr.  P.  Rama Reddy appearing on behalf  of  respondents  in Appeals  Nos.  960-962, 964 and 967 and  the  appellants  in Appeals Nos. 989-993 of 1965 raised a special argument which we may now consider.  Counsel contended that the  provisions of the Land Acquisition Act which are made applicable by  S. 73  read  with the Schedule to the Madras  City  Improvement Trust  Act and which require the market-value to be  awarded to  the  owners  of the land as on the  date  on  which  the notification  under s. 47 of the Act is issued  deprive  the owner of the true compensation which is a just equivalent of the  value of the lands expropriated. Counsel says  that  in all  cases  after  the notification is issued,  there  is  a considerable  time-lag  and  the title to the  land  is  ex- tinguished  only  when  the land  vests  absolutely  in  the Government under S. 16 of the Land Acquisition Act free from all  encumbrances.   He says that whereas  the  compensation payable  is the market value prevailing on the date  of  the issue of the notification under S. 4 of the Lana Acquisition Act  the title of the owners to the land is extinguished  on the  date on which possession is taken, and on that  account compensation is determined with reference to a date which in some  cases may be years before the date on which the  title is  extinguished.   Counsel  invited our  attention  to  the observations made by Subha Rao, J., in Vajravelu  Mudaliar’s case(1)  that  under  Art. 31 (2) a person  whose  land  was acquired   was  entitled  to  compensation  i.e.   a   "just equivalent"  of  the  land of which  he  was  deprived.   He contended  that if the just equivalent of the land is to  be awarded, it must be based on the market value of the land on the  date  on which the title is extinguished  and  not  the market  value  at  some date anterior thereto.   But  in  P. Vajravelu  Mudaliar’s  case(1) it was decided that  the  law which  determines  the market value as at the  date  of  the notification under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act  does not offend Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. Mr.  Thiagarajan  appearing on behalf of the  appellants  in

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Appeals  Nos. 650 & 651 of 1954 contended that  no  adequate compensation was awarded to the owners in respect of charges for  severance.   Counsel  submitted  that  a  part  of  the compound  of a cinema Theatre was acquired compulsorily  and that  deprived  the  owner of the land of  the  facility  of providing additional amenities to the patrons of the theatre and  also of making constructions on the land expanding  the business,  and on that account the owners were  entitled  to compensation either under "Thirdly" or (1)  [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614. 102 "Fourthly" or "Sixthly" of S. 23(1) of the Land  Acquisition Act.  Under these clauses the damage sustained by the person interested  by reason of severing such land from  his  other land, or by reason of the acquisition injuriously  affecting his other property movable or immovable in any other manner, or  his  earnings, or the damage bona  fide  resulting  from diminution  of the profits of the land between the  time  of the  publication of the declaration under s. 6 and the  time of  the  Collectors  taking possession of the  land  may  be awarded  to  the owners.  But there is no  evidence  on  the record  to which our attention was invited  which  supported the case of the appellants to compensation under any of  the clauses.   There  is nothing to prove that  the  owners  had sustained  any loss by reason of the severance of  the  land from ,their other lands, nor is there any evidence to  prove that  by reason of the acquisition the remaining lands  were injuriously  affected  or the earnings of  the  owners  were affected,  nor is there any evidence to show that there  was any  damage resulting from diminution of the profits of  the land between the time of the publication of the  declaration and  the  time of taking possession of the land.   The  High Court  has awarded Rs. 2,500 as compensation for  severance, and we see no reason to interfere with that order. The  appeals  filed  by the State  therefore  fail  and  are dismissed  with costs.  The appeals filed by the owners  are allowed 15% solatium under s. 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act  on  the  market-value of the land in  addition  to  the compensation  awarded to them.  Appellants in each of  these appeals  will  be  entitled to their costs  in  this  Court. Parties appearing through the same counsel will be  entitled to one hearing fee only. G.C.      Appeals Allowed. 103