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PETITIONER: BAL NIKETAN NURSERY SCHOOL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KESARI PRASAD

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/07/1987

BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 1970            1987 SCR  (3) 510  1987 SCC  (3) 587        JT 1987 (3)    93  1987 SCALE  (2)67

ACT:     Civil Procedure Code, 1908--Order 1 Rule 10---Bona  fide mistake  in  filing suit in name of  wrong  person--Duty  of Court to set right mistake by ordering addition/substitution of the proper plaintiff.     U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972--School recognised  under the  Act--Exempted from provisions of Rent  Act--Proceedings instituted  to impugn recognition of school--Do  not  affect status  of  school  at time eviction  suits  were  filed  by school.     U.P.  Urban  Building Regulation of  Letting,  Rent  and Eviction Act, 1972--Section 2(1)(b)--Landlord--A  recognised school--Exempted  from  provisions of Act entitled  to  file suits through Manager for eviction of tenants.

HEADNOTE:     Section 2(1)(b) of the U.P. Urban Building Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 lays down that "nothing in  this  Act shall apply to any building  belonging  to  or Vested in a recognised institution, the whole of the  income from which is utilised for the purpose of such institution."     The manager of the appellant school, a recognised insti- tution  under  the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972,  run  and managed by a Registered Society issued notice of termination of  tenancy  to  the four tenants  of  the  super-structures (Khaprails) purchased by it, under Section 106 of the Trans- fer of Property Act and demanded surrender of possession. As the tenants failed to surrender possession, he filed sepa- rate  suits against the four tenants for ejectment and  pay- ment  of arrears of rent. The respondent and the other  ten- ants  contended that the school was not a recognised  educa- tional  institution  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  Section 2(1)(b)  of the U.P. Urban Building Regulation  of  Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 and that the notice of  termina- tion of tenancy was not valid. The trial court rejected  the contentions  of the tenants and decreed the suits in  favour of  the school. The revisional court confirmed the  judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed all the revision petitions.             511     In  the  writ petitions before the High  Court,  it  was

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contended  for the first time that the appellant school  was not  a juristic person and was not, therefore,  entitled  to file  the  suits through its manager. It  was  submitted  on behalf of the school that as a recognised institution  under the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972, it has juristic  status, that  the suit had been instituted by a person who  was  not only the manager of the school but also the secretary of the Registered  Society and as such the suits were  fully  main- tainable  under  law.  The appellant school,  also  filed  a petition  under Order 1 Rule 10 of Code of  Civil  Procedure for amending the plaint by correcting the name of the plain- tiff into the name of the Society by its secretary in  place of the name of the school by its manager.     The High Court held that in view of the specific  provi- sion  in Clause (14) of the Constitution of  the  Registered Society to the effect that "all the legal proceedings by the Society  and against the Society will be done either by  the Manager  or  by the Secretary or by a person  authorised  by them",  the appellant school was not a juristic  person  and only the Registered Society had the authority and competence to file the suits and that the suits filed by the  appellant school  were not maintainable. It quashed the judgments  and decrees passed by the courts below in three suits since  the fourth  suit  had been compromised after the filing  of  the writ petition.     Insofar  as  the application under Order 1 Rule  10  was concerned the High Court held that the proper course for the appellant school was to move the trial court for getting the description  of the appellant corrected and then pursue  the proceedings for eviction. Allowing the appeal by special leave, this Court,     HELD: 1. It is well settled that if the court is  satis- fied that a bona fide mistake has occurred in the filing  of the  suits in the name of the wrong person, then  the  court should  set  right matters in exercise of its  powers  under Order 1 Rule 10 and promote the cause of justice. The Courts have also held that even if the suit had been instituted  in the name of a person who had no competence to file the suit, the courts should set right matters by ordering the addition or substitution of the proper plaintiff for ensuring the due dispensation of justice. [519D-E]     2.1  By reason of recognition granted under  U.P.  Basic Education  Act,  1972, the appellant school  stands  clothed with  legal  status, and is not a non-entity in the  eye  of law. [517G] 512     2.2 Any proceedings instituted to impugn the recognition of  the school subsequent to the filing of the suits  cannot affect  the status of the school at the time the suits  were filed. [518A]     2.3  The appellant constitutes the landlord of the  ten- ants after the property was purchased in its name and  rents from  the tenants came to be collected. Once a  jural  rela- tionship between landlord and tenants was formed between the appellant  and the tenants by operation of law,  the  appel- lant’s  right  to initiate actions against the  tenants  for recovery of arrears of rent or recovery of possession of the leased property cannot be questioned or disputed. [518C-D]     2.4 Even if the status of the appellant is to be  judged solely with reference to clause (14) of the Constitution  of the Society, the person who filed the suits is not only  the manager of the school but also the Secretary of the  Society and even as per this clause he is competent to file suits on behalf of the Society. The suits, even if not instituted  in the  name of Registered Society, are nevertheless  competent

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actions  because they have been filed by the Manager of  the school  who  is  competent to file suits on  behalf  of  the Society also for recovering possession of the leased proper- ty. [518E-H; 519A]     2.5  The appellant is, therefore, entitled to  file  the suits  through its Manager to seek the eviction of the  ten- ants occupying the superstructure. [517]     3. The High Court was in error in sustaining the belated objection. taken by the tenants regarding the competence  of the appellant to file the suits and quashing the decrees for eviction passed against the tenants and remanding the  suits to the trial court for fresh disposal, after first consider- ing whether the suits had been instituted in the name of the wrong  plaintiff due to a bona fide mistake and whether  the mistake  called for rectification by allowing  the  petition filed under Order 1 Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure.  [517D- E]     4.  Appeal allowed and the matter remitted to  the  High Court for disposal on merits after allowing the  application filed  under Order 1 Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure by  the appellant and ordering the Society through its Secretary  to be  also added as a plaintiff in the suits so as to make  it clear that the person who has filed the suits is  represent- ing  not only the appellant school but also  the  Registered Society. [522A-B] Hughes v. The Pump House Hotel Company Limited (No. 2),  513 [1902]  2 Kings Bench 485; Krishna Bai v. The Collector  and Government Agent, Tanjore & Others, ILR 30 Madras 419; Sitla Bux  Singh  v. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1936 Oudh  275;  Dinanath Kumar v. Nishi Kanta Kumar and Others, A.I.R. 1952  Calcutta 102;  Laxmi  Kumar Srinivas Das v. Krishnaram  Baldev  Bank, Lashkar  and another, A.I.R. 1954 M.B. 156; Karri Somalu  v. Thimmalapalli Venkataswamy and others, [1963] 2 A.W.R.  138; Udit  Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member Board  of Revenue,  Bihar and another, A.I.R. 1963 SC 786  and  Murari Mohan Deb v. Secretary to Government of India, [1985] 3  SCC 120, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  55A  of 1987.     From  the  Judgment and Order dated 8.10.  1985  of  the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Petn. No. 2278 of 1981.     S.N.  Kacker, R.N. Sharma, J.K Jain and N.N. Sharma  for the Appellant. Gopal Singh and L.R. Singh for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     NATARAJAN, J. The question failing for consideration  in this  appeal by special leave is whether the High Court  has erred  in  law  in quashing the  order  of  eviction  passed against  the respondent by the Judge, Small Cause  Court  as confirmed by the Additional District Judge and remitting the suit to the trial court for fresh consideration in the event of the trial court allowing an application by the  appellant under  Order I Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code  for  correcting the name of the plaintiff in the plaint.     The  background of events to this Appeal may briefly  be stated. The appellant Bal Niketan Nursery School is a recog- nised institution under the U.P. Basic Education Act,  1972, and is run and managed by a Society, "Smt. Chandramukhi  Ram Saran Shiksha Samiti", registered under the Societies Regis- tration Act. Dr. Om Prakash is the Manager of the  appellant

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school  and  also the Secretary of  the  registered  Society mentioned  above. On 10.3.1977 the Society purchased a  plot of  the land adjoining the school together with  four  super structures  (Khaprails) standing thereon in the name of  the appellant  school through its Manager Om Prakash Gupta.  The super-structures were in 514 the  occupation  of four tenants. The entire  rental  income derived  from the tenants is being utilised for the  purpose of running the school. Under the U.P. Urban Building Regula- tion of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 (for short  the Rent  Act)  the provisions of the Act would not apply  to  a property  owned by a recognised educational  institution  if the  whole of the income from the property is  utilised  for the  purposes  of  the institution.  Section  2(1)(b)  which provides for the exemption is in the following terms:               "Nothing  in  this  Act  shall  apply  to  any               building   belonging   to  or  vested   in   a               recognised  institution,  the  whole  of   the               income from which is utilised for the  purpose               of such institution."     As the appellant was in dire need of additional area for the growing needs of the school and as the property acquired by  the school attracted the ’Exemption Clause’ in the  Rent Act, the Manager of the school issued notices of termination of tenancy to the tenants on 30.5. 1977 under Section 106 of the  Transfer  of  Property Act and  demanded  surrender  of possession.  As the tenants failed to surrender  possession, the appellant filed separate suits against the four  tenants for ejectment and payment of arrears of rent. The suits were filed in the name of the appellant school through its Manag- er  Dr. Om Prakash. The Cause Title of the plaintiff in  the plaint was given as under:-               "BaI   Niketan  Nursery  School,   Near   Ganj               Gurhatti,  Moradabad through Dr.  Om  Prakash,               Manager of the School." All the four tenants including the respondent herein  raised only  two defences in the suit, namely, that  the  appellant school is not a recognised educational institution so as  to be  entitled to the benefit of Section 2(1)(b) of  the  Rent Act and secondly, that the notice of termination of  tenancy was not a valid notice because it had not been issued by  an institution having juristic status.     The  Small Cause Court consolidated all  the-four  suits and held a joint trial and rejected both the contentions  of the  tenants and decreed the suits in favour of the  school. The tenants preferred revisions against the judgment to  the District Judge and the learned Judge confirmed the  judgment and  decree of the Small Cause Court and dismissed  all  the revisions.  515     Thereafter the tenants filed writ petitions under  Arti- cles  226/227 of the Constitution before the High Court  ,of Allahabad.  Before the High Court it was contended  for  the first  time  that the appellant school was  not  a  juristic person  and was not, therefore, entitled to file  the  suits through  its Manager and as such the judgments of the  Small Cause Court and the District Judge were ineffective and  the decrees  unenforceable. The counter argument of  the  school was  that as a recognised institution under the  U.P.  Basic Education  Act, 1972 it has juristic status and  furthermore it  is  the registered owner of the  suit  property,  having obtained  the sale deed in its own name and over  and  above all these the suit had been instituted by Dr. Om Prakash who was  not only the Manager of the school but also the  Secre-

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tary  of the Registered Society and as such, the suits  were fully maintainable under law and consequently the  judgments and decrees of the Small Cause Court and the District  Judge were perfectly valid and enforceable. Besides putting  forth such  contentions, the appellant school, by way of  abundant caution  also filed a petition under Order 1 Rule  10  Civil Procedure  Code  for amending the plaint by  correcting  the name  of  the  plaintiff into Smt.  Chandramukhi  Ram  Saran Shiksha Samiti by Secretary Om Prakash in place of the  name of the Bal Niketan Nursery School by Manager Dr. Om Prakash.     The High Court declined to uphold the contentions of the appellant school as in its view Clause (14) of the Constitu- tion  of the Registered Society contained a specific  provi- sion to the following effect. "All the legal proceedings  by the  Society and against the Society will be done either  by the Manager or by the Secretary or by a person authorised by them"  and as such, the appellant school was not a  juristic person and only the registered society.had the authority and competence  to  file the suits. The High  Court,  therefore, held  that the suits filed by the appellant school were  not maintainable  and  consequently the  judgments  and  decrees passed by the Small Cause Court and the District Judge  were liable  to  the set aside and accordingly  quashed  them  in three suits alone since the 4th suit (SCC Case No. 259/1977) had been compromised after the filing of the Writ  Petition. In  so far as the application under Order 1 Rule 10 is  con- cerned,  the High Court observed that the proper course  for the  appellant school was to move the Small Cause Court  for getting the description of the plaintiff corrected and  then pursue  the  proceedings for eviction. The High  Court  also gave directions to the Small Cause Court as to how the suits were  to be dealt with after amendment of the plaint in  the following terms:- 516               "It is made clear that in case the Judge Small               Cause Court exercises the powers under Order 1               Rule 10, C.P.C. by correcting the  description               of the plaintiff, i.e. by getting the juristic               person the Society substituted as plaintiff in               the  suit the defendant would be  entitled  to               file  additional  written  statement  and  the               parties shall be afforded opportunity to  lead               fresh evidence in the case."     Aggrieved  by the judgment of the High Court the  appel- lant school has preferred this appeal by special leave.  Mr. Kacker,  learned  counsel for the  appellant  advanced  five contentions set out below to impugn the judgment of the High Court. The contentions are as follows:-               (1)  The appellant school being  a  recognised               institution  under  the U.P.  Basic  Education               Act, 1972 is a legal entity and is, therefore,               entitled to file the suits in its own name.               (2)  Besides,  the  suit  property  has   been               purchased in the name of the appellant  school               and as the owner of the property the appellant               is by itself entitled under law to file  suits               for seeking ejectment of the tenants.               (3)  Consequent upon the purchase of the  land               and   super-structures  and  the  vesting   of               possession  in  it, the appellant  became  the               landlord of the tenants and the entire  rental               income  is being used for running the  school.               Therefore, in its capacity as the landlord  of               the  tenants the appellant school is  entitled               to    file    the    suits    for    ejectment

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             notwithstanding clause 14 of the  Constitution               of the Registered Society.               (4)  Even if it is viewed that the  Registered               Society is alone entitled to-file the suit Dr.               Om  Prakash who is competent to file the  suit               on behalf of the Registered Society has  filed               the suits on behalf of the school and as  such               the  Society  is fully represented by  Dr.  Om               Prakash   and  thereby  Clause  (14)  of   the               Constitution of the Soceity stands satisfied.               (5)  Even  if  a hyper-technical  view  is  to               prevail  requiring the suits to be filed  only               in the name of the Registered Society  through               its  Secretary/Manager, the High Court  should               have  allowed the petition under Order 1  Rule               10  C.P.C. and disposed of the Writ  Petitions               on  merits instead of quashing the  concurrent               findings of                517               the  courts below and remitting the  suits  to               the Small Cause Court for fresh disposal after               dealing  with the petition under Order 1  Rule               10 C.P.C.     Learned  counsel for the respondent refuted the  conten- tions  of Mr. Kacker and strenuously argued that the  appel- lant is not a recognised school but even if it is treated as a recognised institution under the U.P. Basic Education  Act and even if the sale deed pertaining to the land and  super- structures  has been obtained in the name of the school,  it is only the Registered Society which can lawfully  institute suits  on behalf of the school or defend actions against  it and that Clause (14) of the Constitution of the Society  has overriding  effect, and hence the suits filed by the  appel- lant school are not maintainable.     Having given our careful consideration to the  arguments of the learned counsel and the view taken by the High  Court we  are of the opinion that the High Court was in  error  in sustaining  the belated objection taken by the  tenants  re- garding  the competence of the appellant to file  the  suits and  quashing  the decrees for eviction passed  against  the tenants and remanding the suits to the Small Cause Court for fresh disposal after first considering whether the suits had been instituted in the name of the wrong plaintiff due to  a bona fide mistake and whether the mistake calls for rectifi- cation by allowing the petition filed under Order 1 Rule  10 C.P.C.  The reasons which have prompted us to come  to  this conclusion are manifold and may be enunciated in the follow- ing paragraphs.     Under the U.P. Basic Education Act, the appellant school has been granted recognition as a recognised institution and by  reason of such recognition the school is conferred  cer- tain  rights and obliged to perform certain duties.  One  of the  rights  flowing  from the recognition  granted  to  the school is an exemption from the provisions of the Rent  Act. Consequently,  the appellant school has acquired  rights  by reason  of the statutory recognition given to it  under  the U.P.  Basic Education Act and to that extent  the  appellant school  stands clothed with legal status. It is not,  there- fore,  a  non-entity  in the eye of law.  Viewed  from  that perspective  the  appellant is entitled to  file  the  suits through  its  Manager to seek the eviction  of  the  tenants occupying the superstructures. Of course, the learned  coun- sel  for the respondent tried to contend that  certain  pro- ceedings  have been initiated for impugning the  recognition granted to the appellant school under the U.P. Basic  Educa-

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tion Act and as such the appellant’s status as a  recognised institution  cannot be taken for granted. We cannot  counte- nance this argument  518 because any proceedings instituted to impugn the recognition of  the school subsequent to the filing of the suits  cannot affect  the status of the school at the time the suits  were filed.  Furthermore,  the respondent has  not  produced  any material to show that the recognition granted to the  school has been subsequently withdrawn.     Secondly,  apart from the legal status acquired  by  the school  as  a recognised institution, it is  admittedly  the registered  owner of the suit property even though the  pur- chase price may have been provided by the society. It is not in dispute that the sale deed pertaining to the land and the super-structures  has  been  obtained in  the  name  of  the school.  Even as a benami owner of the property, the  appel- lant  is entitled in law to preserve and protect it  and  to institute  actions  in that behalf so long as  they  do  not conflict  with the rights of the society. As a corollary  to this  proposition it follows that the appellant  constitutes the landlord of the tenants after the property was purchased in its name and rents from the tenants became to be collect- ed.  Once a jural relationship of landlord and  tenants  was formed between the appellant and the tenants by operation of law  the appellant’s right to initiate actions  against  the tenants  for  recovery  of arrears of rent  or  recovery  of possession  of the leased property cannot be  questioned  or disputed.     Even  if  we are to close our eyes to the right  of  the appellant to file suits against the tenants in its  capacity as  a recognised institution or as the ostensible  owner  of the  property or as the landlord of the tenants and  are  to judge  the status of the appellant solely with reference  to Clause  (14)  of the Constitution of the Society it  may  be noticed  that Dr. Om Prakash is not only the Manager of  the School but also the Secretary of the Registered Society. The suits against the tenants have admittedly been filed by  Dr. Om  Prakash and even as per Clause (14) of the  Constitution of  the Society he is competent to file suits on  behalf  of the  Society. The school as well as the Registered  Society, being institutions, they can file suits or defend-suits only through  a competent office-bearer managing the  affairs  of the school or the Registered Society. Inasmuch as the  suits have been instituted by Dr. Om Prakash albeit as Manager  of the  school  he has not ceased to be the  Secretary  of  the Society and it can, therefore, will be taken that the  suits have not been instituted by an incompetent person who is not empowered  under  the Constitution of the  Society  to  file suits  on  behalf of the Society. There  is,  therefore,  no merit  in the belated objection raised by the  tenants  that the suits are not maintainable in view of Clause (14) of the Constitution  of the Society. The suits, even if not  insti- tuted  in the name of the Registered Society, are  neverthe- less competent actions  519 because they have been filed by Dr. Om Prakash who is compe- tent to file suits on behalf of the Society also for  recov- ering possession of the leased property to the school.     The  last  and final ground which needs setting  out  in some detail is that even if a rigid view is taken and it  is to  be held that the suits have not been instituted  in  the name  of the proper person viz. the Society, the High  Court should  have  seen that Order 1 Rule 10-has  been  expressly provided  in  the  Civil Procedure Code to  meet  with  such

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situations so that the rendering of justice is not hampered. The Rule provides that if a suit has been instituted in  the name  of a wrong person as plaintiff or if there is a  doubt as  to whether the suit has been instituted in the  name  of the right plaintiff the court may, at any stage of the suit, if it is satisfied that the suit has been instituted due  to a bona fide mistake and that is necessary for the determina- tion of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person  to  be substituted or added as plaintiff  upon  such terms  as  the court thinks just. The scope  and  effect  of Order  1 Rule 10 has been considered in numerous  cases  and there is a plethora of decisions laying down the ratio  that if  the  court  is satisfied that a bona  fide  mistake  has occurred in the filing of the suit in the name of the  wrong person  then the court should set right matters in  exercise of its powers under Order 1 Rule 10 and promote the cause of justice. The courts have gone so far as to hold that even if the suit had been instituted in the name of a person who had no competence to file the suit, the courts should set  right matters  by  ordering the addition or  substitution  of  the proper  plaintiff for ensuring the due dispensation of  jus- tice. We may only refer to a few decisions in this behalf.     In  Hughes v. The Pump House Hotel Company Limited  (No. 2), [1902] 2 Kings Bench 485) a dispute was raised regarding the  competence  of  the plaintiff to file  a  suit  because doubts  were  cast as to whether the plaintiff had  made  an absolute assignment of his claim against the defendants,  or only  an assignment by way of charge. Thereupon an  applica- tion was made under Order XVI Rule 2 (corresponding to Order 1 Rule 10 CPC) for substitution of another person as  plain- tiff. The application was allowed and that was upheld by the Court  of Appeal and it was pointed out that the  fact  that the original plaintiff had no cause of action would not take away the jurisdiction of the court to order the substitution of another person as plaintiff.     In  Krishna Bai v. The Collector and  Government  Agent, Tanjore & Others, (ILR 30 Madras 419) when it was found that a suit for ejectment of a defendant had been brought by  the Collector and 520 Government  Agent due to a bona fide mistake instead of  the beneficiaries  of the estate, the court allowed an  applica- tion  for substitution of the correct plaintiff and  it  was further  held that the fact that the Collector had no  right to  institute  the suit would not stand in the  way  of  the court ordering the substitution of the correct plaintiff.     In  Sitla  Bux Singh v. Mahabir Prasad, (AIR  1936  Oudh 275) it was held that where a person prohibited from dealing in  actionable claim under Section 136 Transfer of  Property Act  obtained  an assignment of a bond through a  bona  fide mistake and instituted a suit on the basis of the same,  the provisions  of Order 1 Rule 10 would apply and the  assignor can be substituted in place of the assignee as plaintiff and allowed to continue the suit.     In  Dinanath  Kumar  v. Nishi Kanta  Kumar  and  Others, (A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 102) the court allowed an  application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC and permitted a person who claimed that he was the real owner of the property and the  original plaintiff  was only a benamidar to be added as plaintiff  in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and that he was a necessary party to the proceedings.     In  Laxmikumar Srinivas Das v. Krishnaram  Baldev  Bank, Lashkar and another, (A.I.R. 1954 M.B. 156) it was held that the  words "where a suit has been instituted in the name  of the wrong person as plaintiff" must be construed to  include

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those suits which the instituted by persons who had no right to  do so and that the fact that the person instituting  the suit had no cause of action would not take away the  court’s jurisdiction to order substitution of another as plaintiff.     In  Karri Somalu v. Thimmalapalli Venkataswamy and  oth- ers,  (1963  2 A.W.R. 138) it was held that  the  expression "wrong person" in Order 1 Rule 10 cannot be confined  merely to  a  person  wrongly described but would  also  extend  to include  a  person whose name ought not to have  figures  as plaintiff  for want of right to file the suit and  that  the object  of  the Rule is to save  suits  instituted  honestly although in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff and to ensure that honest plaintiffs do not suffer.     In  Udit  Narain Singh Malpaharia v.  Additional  Member Board of Revenue, Bihar and another, (A.I.R. 1963 SC 786) it was held that in proceedings for a writ of certiorari it  is not only the Tribunal or Authority whose order is sought  to be  quashed  but also the parties in whose favour  the  said order is issued who are necessary parties and      521 that it is in the discretion of the court to add or  implead proper  parties  for completely settling all  the  questions that  may be involved in the controversy either suo motu  or on the application of a party to the writ or on  application filed at the instance of such proper party.     In Murari Mohan Deo v. Secretary to Government of India, [1985]  3 SCC 120 the dismissal of a petition under  Article 226  of  the Constitution by the Judicial  Commissioner  was challenged  by the appellant therein. The  Judicial  Commis- sioner  found that the appellant who was a forester  in  the employment  of Tripura Government had been  wrongly  removed from service by an order of compulsory retirement but never- theless refused to grant relief to the appellant because  he had  failed to implead the Government of India which  was  a necessary  party to the proceedings. This Court  disapproved the  dismissal of the writ petition on the technical  ground and observed as follows:-               "Respondent 1 is shown to be the Secretary  to               the  Government  of India,  Ministry  of  Home               Affairs.  If there was technical error in  the               draftsmanship  of the petition by a lawyer,  a               Forester  a Class IV low grade servant  should               not have been made to suffer. An oral  request               to  correct  the  description  of  the   first               respondent would have satisfied the procedural               requirement.  By raising and accepting such  a               contention,  after a lapse of six  years,  the               law is brought into ridicule. The court  could               have  conveniently  read the  cause  title  as               Government of India which means Union of India               through   the  Secretary,  Ministry  of   Home               Affairs instead of the description set out  in               the writ petition and this very petition would               be  competent by any standard. The  contention               is   all  the  more  objectionable   for   the               additional   reason   that   the    appointing               authority of the appellant, the Chief  Commis-               sioner  of the Government of Tripura  as  well               the  Chief  Forest  Officer  who  passed   the               impugned   order  were  impleaded   and   they               represented  the  administration  of   Tripura               Government as well as the concerned  officers.               Therefore,  not only the petition as drawn  up               was competent but no bone of contention  could               be taken about its incompetence."

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   Having  regard to this settled position of law the  High Court  ought not to have sustained the objection  raised  by the  tenants  regarding the competency of the  appellant  to file  the suits and quashed the orders of  eviction  concur- rently passed by the Small Cause Court and 522 the Appellate Judge and remitted the suits for fresh consid- eration with directions to consider the merits of the appli- cation  under  Order 1 Rule 10 CPC but  should  have  itself allowed the petition and added the Registered Society repre- sented  by  its Secretary Dr. Om Prakash who is  already  on record,  also as a party and disposed of the writ  petitions on their merits.     We, therefore, allow the appeal and remit the matter  to the  High  Court for disposal on merits after  allowing  the application filed under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC by the appellant and  ordering  Smt. Chandramukhi Ram  Saran  Shiksha  Samiti through  its Secretary Dr. Om Prakash to be also added as  a plaintiff  in the suits so as to make it clear that  Dr.  Om Prakash is representing not only the appellant’s school  but also  the Registered Society and dispose of the  writ  peti- tions  on merits after the formal amendments have been  car- ried out in the pleadings. The parties are directed to  bear their respective costs. N.P.V.                                                Appeal allowed. 523