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PETITIONER: BAJAJ AUTO LIMITED

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BEHARI LAL KOHLI

DATE OF JUDGMENT08/08/1989

BENCH: SHARMA, L.M. (J) BENCH: SHARMA, L.M. (J) OJHA, N.D. (J)

CITATION:  1989 AIR 1806            1989 SCR  (3) 730  1989 SCC  (4)  39        JT 1989 (3)   324  1989 SCALE  (2)285  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1991 SC2053  (16)

ACT:     Delhi  Rent  Control Act,  1958: Section  14(1)  Proviso (b)Eviction  of  tenant on  ground  of  sub-letting--Whether lessee entitled to create sub-lease--Lease deed inadmissible for non-registration--Term of the lease deed regarding  sub- lease--Whether could be relied upon.

HEADNOTE:     The respondent let out his premises to the appellant  by way  of an unregistered lease deed which inter  alia  stated that  without  the permission of the landlord  the  premises should not he sub-let except to associate concerns, and  the lessee  was  liable for payment of rent. Alleging  that  the appellant, a manufacturing company of automobiles, had  sub- let  the  premises  to M/s United  Automobiles  without  his consent, the respondent initiated eviction proceedings.     The  appellant  contended that M/s  United  Automobiles, being the authorised dealer and distributor of the  products manufactured  by it, has been in occupation of the  premises in  that  capacity and cannot therefore he  described  as  a sub-tenant.  Alternatively, in view of the specific term  in the  lease deed, the arrangement with the associate  concern was  not a sub-lease without the consent of the  respondent, it  was  contended. The respondent took the stand  that  the term  cannot be looked into, as the document was not  regis- tered  and that M/s United Automobiles cannot be assumed  to he  an ’associate concern’ within the meaning of  the  term. Both  the Rent Controller and the appellate  authority  held that the term of the lease was not inadmissible, but ordered eviction  on  the  ground that M/s  United  Automobiles  was inducted in the premises as a sub-lessee.     The  appellant  filed a second appeal  before  the  High Court  which  dismissed it in limine. Hence this  appeal  by special leave. Dismissing the appeal,     HELD: 1. The appellant has created a sub-lease in favour of  its  dealer,  and has thus parted  with  the  possession within the meaning of s. 14(1) Proviso (b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The appellant-Com-

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730 731 pany has a separate legal entity and has nothing to do  with M/s  United  Automobiles  except  that  the  latter  is  the dealer-distributor of some of its manufactured articles. M/s United  Automobiles is not a licensee and is not in  posses- sion  of the premises on behalf of the appellant. The  mone- tary  benefit  available to the dealer is  confined  to  the commission  it  receives on the sale of every  vehicle;  and does not include the right of enjoyment of the premises. The dealer  pays  a fixed sum as rent to the appellant  and  the rent is not related or dependant on the sale of any vehicle. The  fact  that this amount is same as what is paid  by  the appellant to the respondent does not appear to be  material. [733E-G]     2. The question whether a lessee is entitled to create a sub-lease or not is undoubtedly a term of the transaction of lease,  and if it is incorporated in the document it  cannot be disassociated from the lease and considered separately in isolation.  If a document is inadmissible for  non-registra- tion,  all  its  terms are inadmissible  including  the  one dealing with landlord’s permission to his tenant to sub-let. The  appellant  cannot,  in the  present  circumstances,  be allowed  to rely upon the clause in the  unregistered  lease deed. [734C-D]     Sachindra  Mohan Ghose v. Ramesh Agarwalla, A.I.R.  1932 Patna 97; referred to.     3.  In the instant case, a perusal of the clause  relied on by the appellant would show that it contains the respond- ent’s  consent  in general terms without  reference  to  M/s United  Automobiles. As a matter of fact M/s United  Automo- biles came to be inducted as a sub-tenant much later. Such a general  permission cannot be treated to be the  consent  as required  by s. 14(1) Proviso (b) of the Act. Since  consent of the respondent was not obtained specifically with  refer- ence to the sub-letting in favour of M/s United Automobiles, the clause in the lease deed cannot save the appellant, even if it be assumed in its favour that the clause is admissible and the sub-lessee is appellant’s associate concern.  [734E- G]     M/s  Shalimar Tar Products v. S.C. Sharma, [1988] 1  SCC 70; relied on.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2443  of 1980.     From  the Judgment and Order dated 8.9.80 of  the  Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 339 of 1980. 732               Mukul Mudgal for the Appellant.               Rajinder  Sachhar  and  Mrs. J.  Wad  for  the               Respondent.               The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SHARMA, J. This is a tenant’s appeal against the  decree for  his eviction from certain disputed premises  passed  by the  Rent  Controller,  Delhi and confirmed  in  appeal  and second appeal.     2. The respondent, the owner of the premises, let it out to  the appellant in 1961 as a monthly tenant.  An  unregis- tered deed of lease was executed on that occasion containing the following statement as one of the clauses:               "That they will not assign or underlet or part               with  the premises hereby demised without  the

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             permission in writing of the landlord  subject               however  to  this proviso that they  shall  be               entitled to assign or otherwise part with  the               possession  of the said premises or  any  part               thereof  to their associate  concerns  without               such  consent  but in any  event  the  lessees               shall  be liable for the payment of  the  rent               during the term hereby granted."     3. The appellant is a manufacturing company of Scooters, Pickup  Vans  and  Auto-Three-Wheelers.  Alleging  that  the appellant  had sub-let the premises to M/s.  United  Automo- biles without his consent, the respondent contended that the ground mentioned in S. 14 (1) Proviso (b) of the Delhi  Rent Control Act, 1958 was made out and the appellant was  liable to be evicted.     4. The eviction proceeding was defended by the appellant on  the  ground  that the M/s. United  Automobiles  are  the authorised  dealer and distributor of the  product  manufac- tured  by  the appellant and has been in occupation  of  the premises  in  that capacity and can not, therefore,  be  de- scribed as a sub-tenant. It was alternatively argued that in view  of the term of the lease as quoted above the  arrange- ment  with the M/s. United Automobiles can not be  condemned as  a  sublease without the consent of the  respondent.  The stand  of the respondent has been that  the  above-mentioned term,  of the lease can not be looked into as  document  was not  registered and further the M/s. United Automobiles  can not  be  assumed to be an ’associate a concern’  within  the meaning of the term. The Rent Controller, as well as, the 733 appellate  authority held that the afore-mentioned  term  of the  lease was not inadmissible and the appellant was  enti- tled  to  rely upon the same, but ordered  eviction  on  the ground  that  M/s. United Automobiles was  inducted  in  the premises  as  a  sub-lessee. The High  Court  dismissed  the appellant’s  second appeal in limine, and in this  situation the present appeal by special leave has been filed.     5.  It  has been strenuously contended  by  the  learned counsel  for the appellant that as, (i) the  United  Automo- biles  is a distributor of the product manufactured  by  the appellant on the basis of commission, (ii) it pays the  same amount to the appellant as the rent of the premises  payable by the appellant to the respondent, and (iii) is entitled to be  in possession only as long as it continues to be a  dis- tributor,  it  should be held to be an  ’associate  concern’ within the meaning of the aforementioned term of the  lease. In  reply of the respondent’s contention that the  term  can not be taken into consideration as the deed is not a  regis- tered  one, it was urged that the appellant, in view of  the provisions of S. 49 of the Registration Act, is entitled  to rely upon the term for ’collateral purpose’. The argument is that  the document may not be admissible for the purpose  of proving  the existence of a lease or the terms thereof,  but as  the  afore-mentioned clause does not  come  within  that category,  in  as much as, it merely amounts  to  a  written permission  to the appellant to create a sub-lease,  it  can not  be  excluded from consideration on the ground  of  non- registration.     6.  There is no dispute that the appellant has put  M/s. United  Automobiles  in possession of the premises  and  has thus  parted  with the possession within the meaning  of  S. 14(1)  Proviso (b) of the Act. The appellant-Company  has  a separate legal entity and has nothing to do with M/s. United Automobiles ’except that the latter is the dealer  distribu- tor of some of its manufactured articles. M/s. United  Auto-

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mobiles  is not a licensee and is not in possession  of  the premises  on behalf of the appellant. The  monetary  benefit available  to  the dealer is confined to the  commission  it receives on the sale of every vehicles; and does not include the  right of enjoyment of the premises. The dealer  pays  a fixed  sum  as  rent to the appellant and the  rent  is  not related  or dependant on the sale of any vehicle. ’The  fact that this amount is same as what is paid by the appellant to the respondent does not appear to be material. The irresist- ible  conclusion  is that the appellant has created  a  sub- lease  in favour of its dealer. The question now is  whether the  clause  in  the lease mentioned above  amounts  to  the respondent’s consent in writing. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the  respondent that 734 the  aforesaid  clause can not be looked into  for  want  of registration of the lease deed appears to be correct.  Reli- ance has been placed on the observations of Fazal Ali, J. in Sachindra  Mohan  Ghose v. Ramjash  Agarwalla,  A.I.R.  1932 Patna  97 that if a decree purporting to create a  lease  is inadmissible  in evidence for want of registration, none  of the terms of the lease can be admitted in evidence and  that to  use a document for the purpose of proving  an  important clause in the lease is not using it as a collateral purpose.     8.  The learned counsel for the appellant  attempted  to meet  the  point by saying that so far the  consent  of  the landlord  permitting sub-letting is concerned, it  does  not require  registration  and the clause,  therefore,  must  be excepted from the requirement of registration and consequent exclusion  from  evidence. We do not see any force  in  this argument.  The  question  whether a lessee  is  entitled  to create  a  sub-lease, or not is undoubtedly a  term  of  the transaction  of  lease,  and if it is  incorporated  in  the document  it  can not be disassociated from  the  lease  and considered  separately in isolation. If a document is  inad- missible for non-registration, all its terms are  inadmissi- ble including the one dealing with landlord’s permission  to his  tenant  to sub-let. It follows that the  appellant  can not,  in the present circumstances, be allowed to rely  upon the clause in his unregistered lease deed.     9. There is still another reason to hold that the afore- said  clause  can not come to the aid of  the  appellant.  A perusal  of  its language would show that  it  contains  the respondent’s  consent in general terms without reference  to M/s.  United  Automobiles. As a matter of fact  M/s.  United Automobiles came to be inducted as a sub-tenant much  later. Can  such a general permission be treated to be the  consent as required by S. 14 (1) Proviso (b) of the Act? It was held by this Court In M/s. Shalimar Tar Products v. S.C.  Sharma, [1988]  1 SCC 70; that Ss. 14(1) Proviso (b) and  16(2)  and (3) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 enjoin the tenant to obtain  consent of the landlord in writing to  the  specific sub-letting  and any other interpretation of the  provisions will  defeat  the object of the statute and  is,  therefore, inpermissible. Since it is not suggested that the consent of the  respondent was obtained specifically with reference  to the  Sub-letting in favour of M/s. United  Automobiles,  the clause  in the lease deed, which has been relied on can  not save  the  appellant, even if it be assumed  in  its  favour that  the clause is admissible and the sUb-lessee is  appel- lant’s  associate concern. The appeal, therefore, fails  and is dismissed with Costs. G.N.                                            Appeal  dis- missed.’

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