20 February 1996
Supreme Court
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BADDULA LAKSHMAIAH & OTHERS Vs SRI ANJANEYA SWAMI TEMPLE & OTHERS

Bench: PUNCHHI,M.M.
Case number: Appeal Civil 4090 of 1984


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PETITIONER: BADDULA LAKSHMAIAH & OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SRI ANJANEYA SWAMI TEMPLE & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       20/02/1996

BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. SEN, S.C. (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (3)  52        JT 1996 (3)   198  1996 SCALE  (2)409

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Title to  29 acres of agricultural land, its possession and recovery of mense profits, was sought by the respondent- temple from  the appellants.  The trial  court dismissed the suit. A  learned Single  Judge of the High Court, in appeal, in re-appraising  the  evidence  adduced,  prominently  paid attention to  two  documents  containing  certain  recitals, which partly  supported the  case  of  the  plaintiff-temple respondent and  partly that  of  the  defendants-appellants. Reading them  together, the  learned Single  Judge aimed  to reconcile  the   entries  instead   of   holding   them   as inconsistent. He  made an  attempt to gather the predominant intention of the concerned authorities while preparing those documents, by  looking  at  both  of  them  integrally.  The dispute plainly  was whether the grant made in favour of the Archaka was  meant to  be conferred  on him personally or on the temple through the Archaka. The trial court, as also the learned Single Judge held that the grant was personal to the Archaka and thus the alienations made by him thereafter were in order.  The result  thereof was  that the decision of the trial court  dismissing the  suit was  upheld by the learned Single Judge.  Further bout  fought by the temple-respondent before the  Letters Patent  Bench of  the  High  Court  bore results inasmuch  as the  Bench, on  fresh reconciliation of those two  documents, bearing  in mind the other surrounding circumstances, came  to the view that the grant was intended to be  in favour  of the  temple  and  not  to  the  Archaka personally.      Mr. Ram  Kumar, learned  counsel  for  the  appellants, inter alia  contends that  the Letters  Patent Bench  of the High Court  could not  have upset a finding of fact recorded by a learned Single Judge on fresh reconciliation of the two documents, arriving  at different results than those arrived at earlier  by the  two courts  aforementioned.  Though  the argument sounds  attractive,  it  does  not  bear  scrutiny.

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Against the  orders of  the trial  court, first  appeal  lay before the  High Court,  both on facts as well as law. It is the internal  working of the High Court which splits it into different ’Benches’ and yet the court remains one. A Letters Patent Appeal,  as permitted  under the  Letters Patent,  is normally an intra-court appeal whereunder the Letters Patent Bench, sitting  as a  Court of  Correction. corrects its own orders in exercise of the same jurisdiction as was vested in the Single  Bench. Such is not an appeal against an order of a subordinate Court. In such appellate jurisdiction the High Court  exercises   the  powers  of  a  Court  of  Error.  So understood, the  appellate power under the Letters Patent is quite distinct, in contrast to what is ordinarily understood in procedural  language. That  apart the construction of the aforementioned two documents involved, in the very nature of their import,  a mixed question of law and fact, well within the posers  of the Letters Patent Bench to decide. The Bench was not powerless in that regard.      We are  therefore of  the view  that the Letters Patent Bench  committed  no  error  in  re-doing  the  exercise  to reconcile those two questioned documents so as to get to the result in  favour of  the temple-respondent.  Except for the point afore  dealt with.  no other  point has been raised by learned counsel.      For the  foregoing reasons,  this appeal  fails and  is hereby dismissed. No costs.