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PETITIONER: BABULAL NAGAR AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHREE SYNTHETICS LTD. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/05/1984

BENCH: DESAI, D.A. BENCH: DESAI, D.A. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) VARADARAJAN, A. (J)

CITATION:  1984 AIR 1164            1984 SCR  (3) 772  1984 SCALE  (1)884

ACT:      Madhya Pradesh  Industrial Relations  Act 1960-Sections 61 and  66-Order of  dismissal or  removal from service made against  an   employee-Jurisdiction  of   Labour  Court   to interfere in  an application  under Section  61-Labour Court entitled to  examine the  propriety or  impropriety  of  the order-Jurisdiction of Industrial Court to interfere with the order  of  Labour  Court-Industrial  Court  can  come  to  a different conclusion on same set of facts.      Words and  Phrases-"As it thanks fit"-Legality"-Meaning of-Madhya Pradesh  Industrial Relations  Act, 1960,  section 66(1).

HEADNOTE:      The appellants  were workmen  employee,  of  the  first respondent company.  It  was  alleged  that  they  assaulted another workman  as a  result of which he sustained bleeding injuries on  his head.  A chargesheet  was drawn  up by  the management was  served on the appellants, which was followed by a  composite domestic  enquiry at the end of which all of them were dismissed from service.      The appellants moved five different applications before the Labour  Court questioning  the validity  of the domestic enquiry as  also the  legality and  propriety of  the orders terminating their  services. The  Labour Court  finding that the domestic  enquiry was  held according  to  the  relevant rules, and that there was evidence in support of the alleged misconduct,  held  that  the  management  was  justified  in imposing the penalty of dismissal from service.      The appellants  filed five  Separate revision petitions before the  Industrial Court under sections 66 and 67 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960. The President of the  Industrial Court finding that the entire approach of the Inquiry  Officer-Manager in  arriving at the findings of mis conduct  in the  domestic enquiry  appeared to be biased and  unfair  and  that  the  conclusions  neither  fair  nor reasonable, held  that the dismissal could not be sustained. All the  revision petitions  were therefore allowed, and the orders of  the Labour Court dismissing the applications were set aside, and 773

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the matters  were remanded for a fresh decision after giving the parties due opportunity to adduce evidence in respect of the alleged misconduct.      The respondent-company  filed writ petitions before the High Court  questioning the  correctness of the order of the Industrial  Court   and  a  Division  Bench  held  that  the Industrial Court  exceeded its  jurisdiction by  interfering with the  findings of  facts,  and  as  this  was  an  error apparent on  the face  of the award, quashed the decision of the Industrial Court.      Allowing the appeals to this Court, ^      HELD: 1.  (i) Times without number, it has been pointed out that  Art. 226 is a device to secure and advance justice and not otherwise. [787E]      Sadhu Ram  v. Delhi Transport Corporation, [1983] 4 SCC 156, referred to.      (ii) ordinarily,  the Courts  exercising  extraordinary jurisdiction is  loathe to interfere with an order remanding the matter  to the  authority directed to investigate facts. [787F]      D.P.  Maheshwari  v.  Delhi  Administration  and  Ors., [1983] 4 SCC 293, referred to.      In the  instant case,  the Industrial Court had made an order of  remand.  The  High  Court  was  not  justified  in interfering  with   the   same.   By   this   uncalled   for interference, it  has merely  prolonged  the  agony  of  the unemployed workmen  and permitted  the jurisdiction  of  the High Court  under Art.  226 to he exploited by those who can well afford  to writ  to the detriment of those who can ill- afford to  wait by  dragging the  latter from court to court for adjudication  of peripheral  issues more  vital to them. [787F-G]      2. (i)  Dismissal from a service is an order made under the relevant standing orders. A relief against such an order can be obtained by making an application under section 61 to the Labour Court. Against the order made by the Labour Court under section  61, a  revision would lie under section 66 to the Industrial Court. [779H; 780C]      (ii) If  and when  an application  under section  61 is made the  Labour Court  will have jurisdiction to decide the legality and  propriety of the order of dismissal or removal from service. When jurisdiction is conferred upon the Labour Court, not only to examine the legality of the order as also the propriety of the order, the Labour Court can in exercise of the  jurisdiction examine the propriety or impropriety of the order. [781C]      3. (i)  The main part of Sec. 66 clearly spells out the jurisdiction of  the Industrial  Court to  pass any order in reference to  the case  brought before it as it thinks fit’. The expression ’as it thinks fit; confers a very 774 wide jurisdiction  enabling it to take an entirely different view on  the same set of facts: The expression ’as it thinks fit’ has  the same connotation, unless the context otherwise indicates ’as he deems fit’. [785B-C]      Raja Ram  Mahadev Paranjype and ors. v. Aba Maruti Mali and ors., [1962] Suppl. 1 SCR 739; referred to.      (ii) Sub-cl. (c) of the first proviso to Section 66 (1) will permit the Industrial Court to interfere with the order made by the Labour Court, if the Labour Court has acted with material irregularity  in disposal of the dispute before it. If the finding recorded by the Labour Court is such to which no reasonable  man  can  arrive,  the  Industrial  Court  in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction would be entitled to

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interfere even if patent jurisdictional error is not pointed out. [785E-F]      4. The  expression propriety  is variously  understood; one meaning  assigned to it being ’justice’. Amongst various shades of meaning assigned to the expression, the dictionary sets out;  ’fitness, appropriateness;  aptitude; suitability etc.’ as some of them. [781D-E]      5. If  the justice  or the  justness in  relation to  a legal proceeding where evidence is led is questioned and the authority is  conferred with  jurisdiction  to  examine  the propriety of  the order or decision that authority will have the same jurisdiction as the original authority to come to a different conclusion  on the same set of facts. If any other view is  taken, the  expression ’propriety’  would lose  all significance. The  expression ’legality  and propriety’  has been used  in various statutes where appellate or revisional jurisdiction  is   conferred  upon   a  superior  authority. [781E-G]      Raman and  Raman Ltd.  v. The State of Madras and Anr., [1956] S.C.R. 256, Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan and Ors., [1960] 2 S.C.R. 896, Awdesh Kumar Bhatnagar v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Weaving)  Co. Ltd  and Anr.  [1972] Lab.  and IC. 842; referred to. In the  instant case, the Industrial Court while hearing the revision petitions  found that  the petitioners  were trade- union workers  and that three of them were office-bearers of the union,  and that  a material  place of  evidence clearly pointing to  the  contrary  was  wholly  overlooked  by  the inquiry officer.  The Industrial Court also pointed out that report (Ex  D/18)  purporting  to  have  been  made  by  the assaulted worker to the factory Manager on the day following the date  of occurrence when properly scanned appeared to be highly suspicious  evidence because:  ’it was  not dated and did not  bear the  endorsement of the officer to whom it was presented. After  referring  to  other  infirmities  in  the approach of the Labour Court, the Industrial Court concluded that the  entire approach  of the Manager in arriving at the findings of misconduct in his enquiry ’appeared to be biased and  unfair’,   and  ’the   conclusions  neither   fair  nor reasonable and  any order  of dismissal  based thereon could not be  sustained.’  The  Industrial  Court  was,  therefore perfectly justified  in interfering  with   the order of the Labour Court. It merely set aside the award 775 of the  Labour Court  and did not proceed to re-appraise the evidence but remitted the case to the Labour Court for fresh decision. It  was thus  an eminently  just order.  The  High Court however,  observed that  the Labour  Court could  only interfere with  the decision  of the  inquiry officer if the findings arrived at were perverse. The High Court completely missed the ambit of jurisdiction of the Labour Court in that it had the jurisdiction to decide the legality and propriety of the order. Impropriety as converse of propriety cannot be equated with perversity. The High Court wholly,  misread the relevant provision  and interfered  with the decision of the Industrial Court  which was preeminently just and within the four corners of its jurisdiction. [785G; 786A-G; 787A-D]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal Nos. 1891- 1895 of 1982.      Appeals by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and order dated the  11th September,  1979 of  the Madhya Pradesh High

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Court in Misc. Petitions Nos; 77 to 81 of 1979.      J. Ramamurthy and Ms. R. Vaigai for the Appellants.      G.B. Pal,  S.K. Gambhir,  Ashok Mahajan  and Ms. Sunita Kripalani for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      DESAI, J.  Nothing appears  more well settled than that the extraordinary  jurisdiction under  Art. 226 conferred on the High  Court was  a weapon  forged to overreach injustice and  secure   and  advance  justice.  When  therefore,  this extraordinary power is used to defeat justice and to promote technicality not  only its  raison d’etre is violated but it becomes a handy instrument for those to whom litigation cost is a  luxury enjoyed  at the  cost of others and employed to exhaust and harass an unequal opponent. Sad as it may appear that unfortunate situation emerges in this appeal.      The    first     respondent-Shree    Synthetics    Ltd. (’respondent’ for short) appears to be a company governed by the Companies  Act, 1956.  It has set up a factory at Ujjain where it manufactures polyester fibre. Appellants in each of these appeals were the workmen of the respondent. There is a trade union  of the  workmen employed  by the  respondent of which at  the relevant time three out of the five appellants in this  group of appeals were office bearers. Babulal Nagar was the  President of  the Union:  Babulal Jaiswal  was  the General Secretary and Ramesh Chandra was the Secretary. 776      According to  the respondents  on June  3, 1975  around 11.10 P.  M. One  Verma a  workman of  the respondent on the shift being  over went-out of the compound gate and took his seat i  l a  tempo when  Babulal Nagar  and Babulal  Jaiswal along with  three other  appellant approached  him and asked Verma to  alight from  the tempo  as they  wanted to talk to him. On  Verma’s disinclination to come out of. the vehicle, it was alleged that Babulal Nagar and Babulal Jaiswal pulled Verma out  of the  vehicle and  all the appellants assaulted him with  fists and kicks and felled him down as a result of which Verma  sustained bleeding  injuries on  his  head.  On hearing the  commotion, staff  of  the  security  department intervened and rescued him.      Setting out these allegations a charge-sheet was drawn- up and served on the five appellants followed by a composite domestic enquiry  at the  end of  which  all  of  them  were dismissed from service.      The appellants moved five different applications before the labour  Court questioning  the validity  of the domestic enquiry held against them as also the legality and propriety of the  orders terminating  their services. The Labour Court was of  the opinion  that  the  domestic  enquiry  was  held according to  the   relevant rules and as there was evidence in support  of the  alleged misconduct  the  management  was justified in  imposing the penalty of dismissal from service and accordingly all the five applications were dismissed.      The appellants  filed five  separate revision petitions before the  industrial Court  under Secs.  66 and  67 of the Madhya  Pradesh  Industrial  Relations  Act,  1950  Act  for short). All  the five  revision petitions  were heard by the President of  the Industrial  Court at Indore who was of the opinion that  the entire  approach of  the inquiry  officer- Manager in  arriving at  the findings  of misconduct  in his enquiry  appear  to  be  biased  and  unfair  and  that  the conclusions are  neither fair nor reasonable and as such the dismissal  cannot   be  sustained   on  the   basis  thereof Accordingly he,  by a  common judgment  dated  February  26, 1979, allowed  all the  revision petitions and set aside the orders of  the Labour  Court dismissing the applications and

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remanded the  matters  to  the  Labour  Court  for  a  fresh decision after  giving both  the parties  due opportunity to adduce evidence in respect of the alleged misconduct.      The respondent  moved five  separate misc. petitions in the High 777 Court of  Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur at Indore under Arts. 226 and 227  of the  Constitution questioning the correctness of the decision  of the  Industrial Court.  A Division Bench of the High  Court held  that the Industrial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by  interfering with  the findings of facts and this was  ill error  apparent on  the  face  of  the  award. Accordingly, it  issued a writ of certiorari and quashed the decision of  the Industrial  Court. Hence  these five  civil appeals by special leave.      Conditions of  service  in  respect  of  the  employees employed by  the respondent  are governed  by the  Certified standing orders.  S. O.  12 (f) which was relied upon by the respondent for  imputing mis conduct to the appellants reads as under:           "12. Disciplinary  action for  misconduct (l)  The      following acts  or omissions on the part of an employee      shall amount to a major misconduct:      (a) to (e)        xx           xx              xx           (f) drunkenness,  riotous or disorderly behaviour,      during working  hours at  the  undertaking  or  conduct      endangering  the   life  or   safety  of   any  person,      intimidation, physical duress, or any act subversive of      discipline.      The allegation  in the  charge-sheet on  the  basis  of which the domestic enquiry was held reads as under: F           "Babulal was  on duty  on 3.6.1975  in the B Shift      from 3  p. m.  to 11 p. m. At about 8.15 p.m. when Shri      Satya Prakash  Verma, a  Telephone Operator and Shri K.      C. Bagdi,  Shift-time keeper  were coming  out  of  the      canteen after  taking their  meals, Babulal  Nagar  and      Babulal Jaiswal  were sitting  in the  lawn in front of      the  canteen.  At  that  time,  Babulal  Jaiswal  asked      Babulal Nagar to explain to Verma the whole position in      Hindi. There upon Babulal Nagar went to Bagdi and Verma      and uttered  the following  meaningful words:-  You are      just a  child now.  You do  not understand anything; if      you interfere  in this,  you will  have to  pay a heavy      price, (true  translation) Verma gave no reply and both      Verma and Bagdi 778      went into  the office.  Thereafter, at  9.15 p.m. A. K.      Awasthi and  Rajendra Jain  went to the canteen to take      their meals.  At that time both the petitioners namely,      Babulal Nagar  and Babulal  Jaiswal were present there.      Babulal Nagar  took out  a false  token and  challenged      that it  may  be  checked  by  any  security  official.      Rajendra Jain  thereupon said  that he  was not  in his      uniform. At  that time,  Babulal Jaiswal  uttered  some      filthy words  and thereafter  both  Babulal  Nagar  and      Babulal  Jaiswal   left  the  canteen  uttering  filthy      abuses.           At 9.30  p.m. Babulal  Nagar  spoke  to  Verma  on      telephone that  he should  come out  of the Plant as he      wanted to  talk to  him. Verma,  therefore, come out in      the lawn  from his  office where both Babulal Nagar and      Babulal Jaiswal  were present.  At that  time,  Babulal      Jaiswal said to Verma as under:-           "You have  put end  to  our  movement.  In  future      things will not be right, if you interfere with us, and

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    threatened, that  we shall  see at  11 O’ clock outside      the gate. (true translation)           After the  shift was over at about 11.10 p m. whom      Verma went  out of  the gate  and took  his seat in the      tempo. Babulal Nagar and Babulal Jaiswal along with the      other three  petitioners went to him and asked Verma to      come out  of the  tempo as  they wanted to talk to him.      Verma replied  that  they  could  talk  to  him  there.      Thereupon both Babulal Nagar and Babulal Jaiswal pulled      Verma  out   of  the  tempo  and  all  the  petitioners      assaulted Verma  with fists  and kicks  and felled  him      down as  a result  of which  he  sustained  a  bleeding      injury on  his head.  On hearing  the  cresc  of  Verma      members of the security Department rescued him and took      him inside the gate.      Apart from  anything  else,  a  very  serious  question touching upon the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Authority to hold  an enquiry  on the  allegation that S.O. 12 (1) (f) was violated  would  arise  before  the  Labour  Court  more particularly in view of the recent decision of this Court in M/s Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding officer, Labour Court, Meerut  & Ors.  wherein S.  O. 22 applicable to Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. wh ch is in pari materia 779 with the  S. O.  12 (1) (f) came up for construction of this Court. After  an exhaustive review of the various decisions: on the  subject, this Court after repelling the construction canvassed on behalf: of the appellant in that case that such acts as drunkenness, riotous or disorderly behaviour are per se misconduct  uncomplicated with  time  place  content  and wherever committed  would constitute  misconduct, held  that the various  acts of  misconduct therein  set out  would  be misconduct for  the purpose of the relevant standing orders, if committed  within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity  thereof. The  Court  further  held  that  what constitutes establishment  or its vicinity would depend upon the facts  and circumstances  of each case. But we shall not finally pronounce  on this point as the industrial Court had remanded  the   matter  to   the  Labour   Court  which  has jurisdiction to  examine this  case and  we are  inclined to uphold that order.      Therefore, the  narrow question  which  we  propose  to examine in  this case  is whether the High Court in exercise of its  extraordinary jurisdiction  under Arts.  226 and 227 should have  by  giving  undue  importance  to  a  technical objection of  jurisdiction which  on  proper  fathoming,  it itself  lacked  should  have  set  aside  a  well-considered reasoned judgment  of the  President of the Industrial Court which again  had merely  remanded the matter thus prolonging to  some   extent  the   agony  of  the  unemployed  workers commencing from 1975.      Let us  at the commencement acquaint ourselves with the scope and  ambit of the power of the Labour Court as such as the Industrial  Court under  the Act  which would  provide a correct perspective  to determine  whether the High Court in exercise of  its extraordinary  jurisdiction under Arts. 226 and 227  was at  all justified in interfering with the order mad, by the Industrial Court or that legalese prevailed over substantial social justice.      Sec. 61 prescribes the powers of the Labour Court which inter alia  includes the  power-(A) to  decide-(a)  disputes regarding which  application has  been made to it under sub- section (3)  of section  31 of  the Act-  Sec. 31 enables an employee to make an application for relief against all order of an  Employer made  under ally  of  the  standing  orders.

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Dismissal from  service is  an order made under the relevant standing orders. A relief against such order can be obtained by making all application under Sec. 61. Entry I in 780 Schedule II  of the  Act prior  to  the  amendment  of  1981 Provided that the Labour Court may examine:           "the propriety  or legality  of an order passed or      action taken by an employer acting or purporting to act      under the Standing orders.      The only feature worth-noticing is that the scope ambit and contours of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in such an application  would  have  to  be  determined  within  the parameters or the expression the propriety or legality of an order. Against  an order made by the Labour Court under Sec. 61, a  revision would  lie under  Sec. 66  to the Industrial Court. Sec.  66 has  been wholly  recast in 1981. However at the relevant time, Sec. 66 read-as under:           "66; Revision.  (1) The  Industrial Court  may, on      the application  by any  party to a case which has been      finally decided  by a  Labour Court  other than  a case      decided under  paragraph  (D)  of  sub-section  (1)  of      section 61,  call for  and examine  the record  of such      case and  may pass  order in  reference thereto  as  it      thinks fit:           Provided that  the Industrial Court shall not vary      or reverse  any order  of the  Labour Court  under this      section      (i) it is satisfied that the Labour Court has-           (a)  exercised jurisdiction  not vested  in it  by                law; or           (b)  failed to  exercise a jurisdiction so vested;                or           (c)     acted  in  exercise  of  its  jurisdiction                illegally to material irregularity;           (ii) notice  has been served on the parties to the                case and  opportunity given to them for being                heard.      (2) No  application under  sub-section (I) shall lie to           the Industrial  Court unless  it  is  made  within           thirty days of the date on which the case has been           finally decided by the Labour Court; 781      Provided that  in computing  the period  of thirty days      the period  requisite for obtaining a copy of the order      shall be excluded."      Having noticed  the  relevant  provisions,  it  is  now necessary to  ascertain with  precision the  jurisdiction of the Labour  Court under  Sec. 61. The scheme of the standing orders applicable  to the respondent Company would show that a penalty  of dismissal  or  removal  from  service  can  be imposed after  holding a  domestic enquiry  According to the relevant provisions  in the  standing orders,  such an order when made  would be  open  to  challenge  by  a  substantive application under  Sec. 66 (1) and in such an application if and when  made, the  Labour Court  will have jurisdiction to decide the  legality and  the propriety  of the  order. When jurisdiction is  conferred union  the Labour Court, not only to examine  the legality  of the order as also the propriety of the  order, the  Labour Court  can  in  exercise  of  the jurisdiction examine  the propriety  or impropriety  of  the order. The  expression ’propriety’  is variously understood, one  meaning   assigned  to  it  being  ’justice’  in  Legal Thesaurus by  Burton at  page 902. Amongst various shades of meaning assigned  to  the  expression,  the  oxford  English Dictionary,  VOl.   VIII  page   1484  sets   out  ’fitness;

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appropriateness; aptitude;  suitability; appropriateness the circumstances or  conditions, conformity  with  requirement; rule or principle, rightness, correctness, justness etc.’ If therefore, the  justice or  the justness  in relation  to  a legal proceeding where evidence is led is questioned and the authority is  conferred with  jurisdiction  to  examine  the propriety of  the order or decision that authority will have the same jurisdiction as the original authority to come to a different conclusion  on the same set of facts. If any other view is  taken the  expression ’propriety’  would  lose  all significance. The  expression ’legality  and propriety’  has been used  in various  statutes where  appellate or revision jurisdiction is  conferred upon  a  superior  authority.  In Raman &  Raman Ltd.  v. The  State of  Madras &  Anr.  while examining  the  ambit  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  State Government under Sec. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as amended by  the Motor  Vehicles (Madras) Amendment Act, 1948 to  interfere   with  the  orders  of  subordinate  Regional Transport Authority  on the  ground of propriety, this Court observed as under:           "The word  "propriety" has nowhere been defined in      the Act and is capable of a variety of meanings. In the 782      Oxford English  Dictionary (Vol.  VIII),  it  has  been      stated to  mean  "fitness;  appropriateness;  aptitude;      suitability; appropriateness  to the  circumstances  or      conditions;  conformity   with  requirement,   rule  or      principle; rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy".      If  the  State  Government  was  of  the  opinion  that      respondent No.  I had  better facilities  for operation      than the  appellant and  their service  to  the  public      would be more beneficial, lt could not be said that the      State Government  was in  error in  thinking  that  the      order of the Board confirming the order of the Regional      Trans port Authority was improper."      In Moti  Ram v.  Suraj Bhan  & Ors. while examining the scope and ambit of jurisdiction of the High Court under Sec. 15 (5)  of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, this Court observed as under:           "Under Sec. 15 (5) the High Court has jurisdiction      to examine the legality or propriety of the order under      revision and that would clearly justify the examination      of the propriety or legality of the finding made by the      authorities in  the present  case about the requirement      of the landlord under s. 13 (3) (a) (iii)."      After referring  to these two decisions, in Ching Chong Sine v.  Puttay Gowder, Alagiriswami, J. held that tho court exercising revisional jurisdiction to decide the legality or propriety of  an order has the power to come to a conclusion different from  that arrived by the subordinate court on the same set  of circumstances.  In  Ahmedabad  Sarangpur  Mills Company Ltd  v.  Industrial  Court,  Ahmedabad  and  Anr.  a Division Bench  of the  Gujarat High  Court  held  that  the expression ’legality  and propriety’  in  S.  78(1)  of  the Bombay  Industrial   Relations  Act   does  not   limit  the jurisdiction  of   the  labour   court   to   a   revisional jurisdiction. And  that any order made by the employer under the standing  order is subject to the jurisdiction conferred on the  labour court under Sec. 78, which can scrutinise the legality and  propriety of  the order. This jurisdiction was described by  the court  as  original  jurisdiction  meaning thereby that the labour 783 court can  come to  an entirely  different conclusion on the same set  of  facts.  This  view  was  followed  by  another

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Division Bench  of the  Gujarat High Court in Manekchown and Ahmedabad Manufacturing Company Ltd v. Industrial Court, and another. In  Vithoba Maruti  Chavan  v.  S.  Taki  Bilgrami, Member Industrial  Court, Bombay  and Anr., a Division Bench of the  Bombay High  Court held  that the  power  to  decide ’propriety’ and  legality of  the order  made under standing order does  not confer  a mere revisional jurisdiction but a wider jurisdiction which will enable the Labour Court to set aside the order of the employer depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case.      Mr. Pai  on  the  other  hand  drew  our  attention  to Vaidyanath v.  The Madhya  Pradesh v.  State Road  Transport Corporation and  Ors. While  observing that  a Labour  Court cannot exercise  the power  of an appellate court and cannot reappraise the  evidence yet  both the  Labour Court  or the Industrial Tribunal  can interfere with the findings of fact of the  inquiry officer  of the employer only where they are not supported  by any legal evidence or are so perverse that no reasonable  person would  arrive at  such findings on the materials placed  before him  It was  held that the power of the Labour  Court or  the Industrial Court under the Act are not wider  than  those  of  Industrial  Tribunal  under  the Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947  before the  introduction  of Sec. 11-A  in the  latter  Act.  In  Kymore  Cement  Mazdoor Congress v.  Industrial Court,  Indore and Ors., it was held that the expression ’illegally ar with material irregularity in sub-cl.  (c) of  the first  proviso of  Sec. 66(1) do not cover either errors of facts or law and they do not refer to the decision  arrived at  but to  the manner  in which it is reached. Approaching  the matter  from this  angle, the High Court set  aside the  decision of  the Industrial  Court  in revision against the order of the Labour Court on the ground that the  Industrial Court  had interfered with a finding of fact which  even if  erroneous would not confer jurisdiction on  the   Industrial  Court  to  interfere  in  exercise  of revisional jurisdiction  Mr. Pai emphasised that the view of M.P. High  Court on  the interpretation  of Sec.  61  should prevail over  the view  of Gujarat High Court interpreting a different statute.  This does  not carry  conviction because Sec. 61 of the Act is in pari materia with Sec. 78 784 of the Gujarat Act. However, it would be profitable to refer to the  decision of  this Court in Awdesh Kumar Bhatnagar v. The Gwalior  Rayon Silk  Mfg. (Weaving) Co. Ltd. and Anr. in which  this   Court  while   examining  the   scope  of  the jurisdiction conferred  by Sec.  66 on  the Industrial Court under the  Act held  that if  the Labour Court has committed serious mistakes,  the Industrial  Court has jurisdiction to interfere with  the same  and upheld  the  decision  of  the Industrial Court  which had  interfered with the findings of facts recorded  by the  Labour Court  A full  Bench  of  the Madhya Pradesh  High Court  in Nand Kumar Singh v. The State Industrial Court,  Indore and  Ors  held  that  perverse  or arbitrary findings  based on  no material  fall  within  the ambit of  the phrase  "exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with  material   irregularity"  justifying  interference  in revision. It  is  not  necessary  to  further  multiply  the authorities. Therefore, it appears well-established that the Labour Court having jurisdiction to examine the legality and propriety of  the order  made  by  the  employer  under  the standing  order   will  have  jurisdiction  to  examine  the propriety of  the order  which will  permit it  to come to a conclusion different  from the  role to  which the  employer arrived at  Such being  the amplitude of the jurisdiction of the Labour  Court if  upon a  wrong view  of  ambit  of  its

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jurisdiction Labour  Court approaches  the matter  as if  it exercises narrow  revisional  jurisdiction,  the  industrial Court in  revision can interfere on the ground of failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in the Labour Court or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.      Sec. 66(1)  of the  Act provides  that  the  Industrial Court omitting  the portion  not relevant  for  the  present purpose, may  call for  and examine  the record of such case and pass order in reference thereto as it thanks fit. If the Industrial Court  has the  jurisdiction to pass any order in reference to  a case  called for by it thinks fit, obviously it can  come to  a conclusion  on  the  same  set  of  facts different from  the  one  to  which  the  Labour  Court  had arrived. It was however urged that this jurisdiction of wide amplitude has  been cut  down by  the proviso which provides that the  Industrial Court  shall not  very or  reverse  any order of  the Labour Court under Sec. 66(1) unless-(i) it is satisfied  that   the   Labour   Court   has-(a)   exercised jurisdiction not  vested in  it by  law; or  (b)  failed  to exercise a 785 jurisdiction so  vested; or  (c) acted  in exercise  of  its jurisdiction A  illegally or  with material irregularity. It was urged  that these  clauses so  circumscribe and cut down the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under Sec. 66 as to be on  par with Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The main part  of Sec. 61 clearly spells out the jurisdiction of the Industrial  Court to  pass any order in reference to the case brought  before it as it thinks fit. The expression ’as it thinks  fit’ confers a very wide jurisdiction enabling it to take an entirely different view on the same set of facts. The expression  ’as it  thinks  fit’  confers  a  very  wide jurisdiction enabling  it to take an entirely different view on the  same set  of facts The expression ’as it thinks fit’ has  the   same  connotation,   unless   context   otherwise indicates, ’as  he deems  fit’ and the latter expression was interpreted by  this Court  in Raja  Ram Mahadev Paranjype & Ors. v.  Aba Maruti  Mali &  Ors to mean to make an order in terms of  the statute, an order which would give effect to a right  which  the  Act  has  elsewhere  conferred.  Is  this jurisdiction so  circumscribed as  to bring  it on  par with Sec. 115  of the, Code of Civil Procedure ? Proviso does cut down the  ambit of  the main  provision  but  it  cannot  be interpreted to denude the main provision of any efficacy and reduce it  to a paper provision. Both must be so interpreted as to  permit interference  which if  not  undertaken  there would be  miscarriage of  justice. Sub-cl.  (c) of the first proviso to  Sec. 66(1)  will permit  the Industrial Court to interfere with  the order  made by  the Labour Court, if the Labour  Court   has  acted  with  material  irregularity  in disposal of  the dispute  before it. If the finding recorded by the  Labour court is. such to which no reasonable man can arrive, obviously,  the Industrial  Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction  would be entitled to interfere with the same  even if patent jurisdictional error is not pointed out.      Reverting to  the facts  of this  case, the  Industrial Court while  having the  revision petitions  found that  the petitioners were  trade union  workers and the three of them were the  office-bearers of  the Union. It was further found that a  material piece  of evidence  clearly pointing to the contrary was  wholly overlooked  by the  inquiry officer. It extracted the  relevant portion  of the  evidence of witness Balchand and  pointed out  in no uncertain terms that if the inquiry officer  had taken  note of  the relevant  piece  of

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evidence and 786 had applied  its mind to it and dealt with it in the report, it would  have been difficult to hold the charge proved. The non-application of  mind of  the inquiry officer was pointed out by  referring to  that part  of the  final  order  which manifestly overlooked  the material  piece of evidence which would go  to the  root of  the matter.  The Industrial Court observed that  the inquiry officer quitely skipped over very material portion  of the  evidence of  Balchand which went a long way  to falsify  the charges  relating to the incidents which preceded  the actual assault on Verma. ’The Industrial Court then  pointed out that report (Ex. D/18) purporting to have been made by victim Verma to the factory Manager on the day following  the date  of  the  occurrence  when  properly scanned appears  to be a highly suspicious evidence because: ’it is  not dated  aud does  not bear the endorsement of the officer to  whom it  was  presented.’  This  is  permissible because the revisional jurisdiction enables the authority to point something  which is no evidence legally speaking or in the eye  of law.  It was  pointed out  that  Verma  did  not identify the report. The Industrial Court concluded that the possibility of this report being introduced at a later stage to strengthen the case against the live appellants cannot be ruled-out. After  referring  to  other  infirmities  in  the approach of the Labour Court, the Industrial Court concluded that the  entire approach  of the Manager in arriving at the findings of  misconduct in  his inquiry ’appear to be biased and unfair’,  and ’the  conclusions  are  neither  fair  nor reasonable and  any order  of dismissal based thereon cannot be sustained.’  Can it  ever be  said that  in reaching this conclusion, the  Industrial Court  exceeded  its  revisional jurisdiction ?  The  whole  approach  of  the  Labour  Court dealing with  the report  of the inquiry as also the inquiry itself clearly  disclosed material  irregularity and thereby the Labour  Court failed  to exercise jurisdiction vested in it namely,  to examine  the property of the order with in it failed to  do. The  Industrial Court  in  our  opinion,  was perfectly justified  in interfering  with the  order of  the Labour Court.  Even then  the  approach  of  the  Industrial Court, being  conscious of  the severe  constraints  on  its jurisdiction was  of dignified restraint and just. It merely set aside  the award of the Labour Court and did not proceed to reappraise  evidence but  remitted the case to the Labour Court for  a fresh  decision. It  was thus an eminently just order.      Is it  such an  order which  the High  Court could have interfered   with   in   exercise   of   its   extraordinary jurisdiction ? The High Court 787 observed that  the Labour  Court can only interfere with the decision of  the inquiry officer, if the findings arrived at by him  were perverse.  The High Court completely missed the ambit of jurisdiction of the Labour Court in that it had the jurisdiction to  decide the  legality and  propriety of  the order.  Impropriety  as  converse  of  propriety  cannot  be equated with perversity as understood by the High Court. The High Court  further observed  that if  ’the finding  of  the misconduct  is  a  plausible  conclusion  flowing  from  the evidence adduced  at the  enquiry, the labour tribunals have no jurisdiction  to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer, as  an appellate  body. This betrays complete lack of understanding  of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in respect of an order made under the standing order as set out in Schedule  II item  I to  the Act which enables the Labour

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Court to  examine the  legality and  propriety of the order. The  High  Court  therefore,  wholly  misread  the  relevant provision and interfered with the decision of the Industrial Court which  was pre-eminently  just  and  within  the  four corners of  its jurisdiction. What left us guessing was that according to  the High Court the Industrial Court had narrow jurisdiction while  dealing with  the order  of  the  Labour Court, yet  the High  Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction interfered  with the decision of the Industrial Tribunal. Times without number, it has been pointed out that Art. 225  is a  device to secure and advance justice and not otherwise. (Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corporation)      Ordinarily,   the   courts   exercising   extraordinary jurisdiction is  loathe to interfere with an order remanding the matter  to the  authority directed to investigate facts. The Industrial  Court had  made an order of remand. The High Court was  not justified  in interfering  with the  same. By this uncalled  for interference, it has merely prolonged the agony  of   the  unemployed   workmen  and   permitted   the jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court  under  Act.  226  to  be exploited by  those who  can well  afford  to  wait  to  the deteriment of  those who  can ill afford to wait by dragging the  latter   from  court   to  court  for  adjudication  of peripheral issues  avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. (D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and Ors. 788      Accordingly these  appeals succeed  and are allowed and the decision  of the High Court is. set aside and the one of the Industrial Court is restored with costs.      As the  matter is  an old  one,  the  Labour  Court  is directed to  give top  priority to  this matter  and dispose this of  as early  as possible and not later than six months from today. N.V.K.                                       Appeals allowed 789