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PETITIONER: BABU SINGH BAINS ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       11/09/1996

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, FAIZAN UDDIN, G.B. PATTANAIK

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                             WITH     Civil Appeal Nos. 12932-35, 12955, 12936-49, 12951, 12953/1996 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 15376-77, 15393-94,  7960, 8118-19, 9174-79, 12491, 11578-79, 12389-90/90, 885,                       1650 and 14-15)                             AND           WRIT PETITION (C) NOS. 520/94, & 412/96                          O R D E R C.A. No. 12931/96 @ SLP No. 4559/93 & W.P. No. 520/96      Application  for impleadment is dismissed.      Leave granted in the special leave petition.      The city of beauty, Chandigarh, carefully architectured and meticulously executed as a model city in India by famous architect,  Shri   Le.  Corbursier;   when  it  was  getting desideration  compounded  by  disfiguration  of  beauty  and elegance, statutory  regulations stepped  in  to  stamp  out erosion and  to restore its natural environment. These cases are instances  of blatant misusage of the buildings or plots in the planned structures.      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the order of the Division  Bench of  the Punjab & Haryana High Court made on January  27, 1993  in C.W.P.  No. 14183/92  upholding the order of the Estate Officer who refused to condone the delay in making  application under  Rule 11-D  of  the  Chandigarh (Sale of  Sites and  Buildings) (Amendment) Rules, 1979 (for short, the  "Rules").      The writ  petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was filed  by the  petitioner challenging  the  validity  of Section  8A   of  the   Capital  of  Punjab  (Development  & Regulation) Act,  1952 (Punjab  Act of 1952) (for short, the "Act).      The facts  are long  and  tendentious.  Suffice  it  to state, in nutshell, that the appellant/petitioner having had the allotment  of free hold plot in residential Sector 21-A, viz, bearing  House No.  341 in Street ’D’ had constructed a double-storeyed house.  He had  used it  as Blue  Star Guest House,contrary to the regulations. Consequently, a notice of resumption under  Section 8  of the  Act was  given  to  the appellant/petitioner.   After    following   the   procedure

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prescribed thereunder,  the resumption   order  came  to  be passed on  October 17, 1977. The revision against that order came to be dismissed on August 28, 1978. Thus the resumption order had become final. Subsequently, notice under Section 5 of   the   Public   Premises   Act   was   issued   to   the appellant/petitioner for  taking  possession  of  the  land. Those proceedings also ultimately culminated in the judgment of this  Court made  in C.A.  No. 3102/81 on March 13, 1992. Therein,  this   court   had   given   an   opportunity   to appellant/petitioner to argue afresh on merits of resumption but he  could not point out any invalidity in the resumption order. Accordingly,  the resumption  was upheld. Even on the ground of  eviction also  this Court had upheld the order on merits thus :      "Learned counsel  for the appellant      was unable  to point  any infirmity      whatsoever of  order passed  by the      Estate Officer  under the  Eviction      Act. In  view of the circumstances,      we find no force in this appeal and      it is accordingly dismissed."      However,  one   year’s  time   was  given      to   the appellant/petitioner to  vacate the  premises subject to his giving  an   undertaking.  Since   he  had   not  filed  the undertaking within  the prescribed  time,  it    is  not  in dispute, possession  was taken. Thus the resumption order as well as  order  of  eviction  became  final  and  conclusive against  the  appellant/petitioner.  His  right,  title  and interest in   the  said  property  stood  divested  and  the Chandigarh  Administration   became   owner   thereof.   The appellant/petitioner then  filed an  application on April 6, 1992 and  April 9,  1992 under  Rule 11-D  of the Rules. The Estate  Officer  dismissed  the  petition  giving  elaborate reasons in  support thereof.  The High Court in the impugned order    thereunder     has    pointed    out    that    the appellant/petitioner  has   not   given   any   satisfactory explanation  for  the  delay  of  13  years  in  filing  the application and  no fault  could be  found  with  the  order passed by  the Estate  Officer. Thus  this appeal by special leave and the writ petition.      When the  matter came  up for hearing before a Bench of two  learned  Judges,  by  order  dated  February  14,  1995 reference was  made to  a three-Judge  Bench to consider the validity of  Section 8A  of the  Act  and  the  question  of resumption since  is has got a vital bearing on the right to property held  by a defaulter. Thus these cases have come up before this Bench.      It has  been very  strenuously argued  by Shri  Swaroop Singh, learned  counsel for  the appellant  with painstaking efforts, realising the tight spot in which the appellant was placed that  the appellant  though had used the house partly for non-residential  purpose, (which  we need not enter upon for adjudication)  Section 8A  of the  Act would  be invoked only when the installments of purchase price of the site, or other dues  were not  paid by  the purchaser.  On their  due discharge,  power  under  Section  8A  gets  exhausted.  For violation of  the rule for misuser of the property, there is no power under Section 8A of the Act to resume the property. Such power  would be  available and  be  invoked  only  when available under  any State  law. The  only  remedy  provided under Section  15 of  the Act  is to  stop misusage  without invoking the  power of  resumption, laying prosecution under Section 15  and to  collect the  penalty.  The  power  under Section 8A  cannot be  resorted  to  in  case  misuse;  such invocation of  power would be an arbitrary exercise of power

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violating  Article  14  of  the  Constitution.  It  is  also contended that  the  appellant  has  been  using  all  legal recourse open to redress his legal injury and was diligently prosecuting the  remedies available under the law. There was no need  for him  to challenge  the resumption  order in any court of  law for  the reason,  that the  resumption at  one point of  time was only divestiture of the little but not of dispossession from  the property.  When his  possession  was sought to  be interdicted  by having  him ejected  from  the premises, he  had challenged  the eviction  order which  was ultimately upheld  by this  Court. Thereafter, the appellant had availed of the right and remedy provided in Rule 11-D of the  Rules   and  that,   therefore,  this  was  the  proper explanation in  filing the application at a belated point of time. The  Estate Officer  and the High Court have committed error of  law in not considering the delay from this  proper perspective.    He     further    contended     that     the appellant/petitioner   having   invested   huge   money   in construction   of double-storeyed  building,  he  cannot  be visited with  the penalty  of divestiture  of title  to  and ejectment of  him from the said property. When penalty could be collected under Section 15, the recourse for eviction was bad in law. So, he availed of the right as provided in Rule- D of  the Rules.  The exercise  of the  power of the Estates Officer in  refusing  to  condone  the  delay  and  not  re- transferring the  property is  vitiated by manifest error of law warranting interference.      Mrs.  Kamini   Jaiswal,   learned   counsel   for   the respondent, has  argued that  the  resumption  and  eviction order having  become   final, it  is no  longer open  to the appellant/petitioner to  challenge the  validity of  Section 8A. In  fact, the  validity of Section 8A was dealt with and upheld by  majority of  the Full  Bench of the High Court in Ram Puri  Vs. Chief  Commissioner, Chandigarh  [AIR 1982 P&H 301]. When  this Court  had  given  an  opportunity  to  the appellant/petitioner to point out illegality, if any, in the action taken  under Section  8A of  the Act,  he  could  not satisfy this Court as to any invalidity thereof. Under these circumstances,  he   cannot  be  permitted  to  raise  these contentions in  the writ  petition. He  is not  entitled  to challenge the  validity of  Section 8A  in the writ petition since his  remedy has  already been  closed by the orders of this  Court.   She  also   contended  that  the  action  for resumption was  taken to maintain the ecology sanitation and beauty of  the  city  constructed  as  per  the  design  and planning, as  a model  city.  Contravention  of  the  scheme renders the beauty of the city irreversible. The appropriate course open  to the  authorities is  to resume  the land and prevent  such   misuser.  The   appellant/petitioner  having allowed all  the options closed to him, it is no longer open to him,  now to  challenge the validity of Section 8A of the Act at  this belated  stage. Even  otherwise, section  8A is ultra vires  the Act  as it seeks to sustain the purpose and policy  of   the  Act  which  otherwise  would  be  rendered ineffective and  toothless. She  further  contends  that  he having slept  over for  13 years,  the appellant  cannot  be permitted to  file an  application under  Rule 11-D  of  the Rules. He  has no  right as  such. He  has only  benefit  of making  an   application.  It   is  a  discretionary  relief available to  him under  the Rules  to be  considered by the Estate Officer.  In view  of the background of the case, the Estate Officer  had considered the totality of the facts and given elaborate  reasons for  refusing to  condone the delay and to  re-transfer of the property. In support thereof, she relies  upon  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Chandigarh

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Administration Vs. Johnson Paints [(1196)] 3 SCALE 680]. The High Court  also has  given cogent  reasons for  refusing to grant the  relief sought for. Accordingly,  no case has been made out warranting interference.      In view  of the  diverse contentions  raised, the  only question is  ; whether  the appellant/petitioner is entitled to avail  of the remedy under Article 32 of the Constitution ? But  for the  reference made  by the  Bench of two learned Judges, we  would have straightaway held that the doors to a litigant citizen  under Article  32 of  the Constitution are closed fast  and writ  petition is not maintainable since it amounts to  reviewing the order passed by this Court in C.A. No 3102/81  March 13,  1992. It  is settled law that once an order passed  on merits  by this  Court exercising the power under Article  136 has  become final, no writ petition under Article 32  on the  self-same issue is maintainable.  Though the resumption  order was  not challenged,  this  Court  had permitted the appellant to convince this Court had permitted the appellant to convince this Court as to the invalidity of the resumption  order passed  under Section  8A but he could not point out any invalidity nor did he raise any contention as regards  the  validity  of  Section  8A.  Therefore,  the principle of  constructive res  judicata stands  fast in his way to  raise the  same contention once over. However, since the two-Judge  Bench has  made the reference in this behalf, it is  necessary to briefly deal with the contentions raised by Sri Swaroop Singh learned counsel for the appellant.      After unsuccessful  challenge to  Section 9  of the Act under Article  226 before  the Full  Bench of  the Punjab  & Haryana High  Court, on  appeal, this Court in Jagdish Chand Vs. State  of Punjab  (AIR 1972  SC 2587)  had declared that Section 9  was invalid since the purchaser had  already paid the entire  consideration amount  and thereafter  the  power under Section 9 was not available for resuming the property. Consequently, the  Parliament amended the Act and introduced Section 8A  deleting Sections  9 and  11  of  the  Act.  The statement of Objects in that behalf read as under :      "The Supreme Court in Jagdish Chand      Radhey Shyam  V. State  of  Punjab,      (Civil Appeal  No.  1099  of  1967)      declared Section  9 of  the Capital      of    Punjab    (Development    and      Regulation) Act,  1952 (Punjab  Act      XXVII of  1952), as  is in force in      the Union  Territory of Chandigarh,      as being  violative of  Articles 14      and 19  (1) (f) of the Constitution      and  held   that   the      Central      Government  is   not  entitled   to      resume   the   site   or   building      transferred under Section 3 of that      Act,   or to forfeit the money paid      in respect  of such  transfer under      the said Section 9. The main ground      on  which  the  Supreme  Court  had      based  its   conclusions  was  that      there is  nothing  in  the  Act  to      guide the  exercise of power by the      Government as  to when  and how any      of the  methods for  recovering the      amount of  consideration in arrears      specified in Sections 3, 8 and 9 of      the Act,  will be chosen. (Emphasis      supplied.)      2.  The  decision  of  the  Supreme

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    Court has created several practical      difficulties in  administering  the      provisions of the Act. Further, the      situation created  by the  decision      of the  Supreme  Court  is  already      having an  adverse  effect  on  the      regulation and  development of  the      entire city  of  Chandigarh,  which      has been planned and developed with      great  care   and  at  considerable      expense  over   the  past   several      years. It  is, therefore, essential      to remove  the  objections  pointed      out  by   the  Supreme   Court   by      amending  the  Act  retrospectively      from the  1st of    November,  1966      being the  date on  which the Union      Territory of Chandigarh was formed,      and   to validate the actions taken      under the  impugned  provisions  of      the Act (Emphasis supplied.)      3.   The Bill  seeks to achieve the      aforesaid objections."                      (emphasis supplied) A reading  thereof would  clearly indicate  the animation of the Legislature  that the  aforesaid decision  of this Court was causing  inconvenience for  preventing  misuser  of  the property defeating  the scheme  of   the Act.  Therefore, it necessitated to  amend the  Act and bring on statute Section 8A for  of the property used in  violation of the conditions of the  sale, provisions  of the  Act and  the Rules made in that behalf.  Majority of  the Full Bench in Ram Puri’s case [supra] had  considered the effect of Section 8A and held in paragraph 66 thus ;      "66. Adverting specifically to Sec.      8A   the   restrictions   for   the      exercise  of    the  powers  vested      thereby  exist   not  only  in  the      express provision thereof,  but are      equally discernible from the larger      purpose of the Act, its preamble as      also  the  other  sections  thereof      when read  with the statutory rules      framed   thereunder.   The   larger      purpose of  the planed  development      and regulation  of the  new capital      city,  as   spelled  out   in   the      preamble of the  Act, is  the fixed      Pole the  power of resumption under      Section   8A   is   hitched.   What      deserves  highlighting   herein  is      that this power of resumption under      Section    8-A    is    merely    a      discretionary   and   an   enabling      power. The  statute  does  not  lay      down  any   mandate  that  it  must      necessarily  be  exercised  in    a      particular   situation.   In   sub-      section (1)  thereof it is first in      the  discretion   of   the   Estate      Officer that  he may issue a notice      to  show  cause  why  an  order  of      resumption of  site or building may      not be  made.  Equally  under  sub-      section (2)  after considering  the

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    cause shown  against such  a notice      it  is   optional  for  the  Estate      Officer to order such resumption or      not. The  word  used  in  both  the      sub-sections  is   ’may’  and   not      ’shall’. Mr.  Anand Swaroop rightly      pointed  out  that  this  power  of      resumption is indeed the last arrow      n  the   quiver  of   a  number  of      sanctions to  enforce  the  planned      development and  the regulation  of      the capital and to be only resorted      to in a situation commensurate with      its necessary  exercise. To  put it      in  plain   language  it   is   not      mandatory  for   the  authority  to      order  resumption,   but  only   in      extreme cases  it enables  it to do      so when   the    other  powers  and      sanctions to enforce the purpose of      the Act  have failed,  or in    the      circumstances  it   is   the   only      remedial   power   which   can   be      applied. Therefore,  it is farcical      and imaginary  to assume  that  the      authority  would   necessarily  use      this    power    arbitrarily    and      whimsically and  that they will use      this  hammer  to  swat  a  fly.  As      Section 8-A  now stands  (in  sharp      distinction to  the deleted Section      9) it mandatorily required a notice      to  show   cause  to   the   person      concerned whenever  the exercise of      this  power  is  contemplated.  Not      only is  such a  person entitled to      have a  reasonable  opportunity  of      contesting such  a notice,  but the      law in  terms confers  on  him  the      power to  lead evidence in  support      of his  stand. The  mandate as laid      on the Estate Officer is  to record      his  reasons   in  case  he  orders      resumption.   Apart    from   these      inbuilt safeguards under Section 8-      A,  it  is  statutory  rules  which      provide for  an appeal  against the      order of  resumption by  the Estate      Officer,     to      the      Chief      Administrator.  It   is  thereafter      that the  rules  zealously  provide      for  a   revision  to    the  Chief      Commissioner, who  is the executive      head  of   the  Union  Territories.      Obviously in  a  proper  case,  the      right to  approach the  Court under      Article 226  of the Constitution of      India is equally open.      68.  In  conclude,  in  the  larger      conspectus of  the purposes  of the      Act  itself,   its  preamble;   the      setting in which it is placed along      with the  supplementary sections of      the  Act  and    the  rules  framed      thereunder it  has to  be held that

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    the enabling  power  of  resumption      conferred  thereby     is   only  a      reasonable   restriction   on   the      fundamental right  to hold, acquire      and dispose  of property  and   is,      therefore, in  no way  violative of      Article 19 (1) (f)."      Accordingly, the  Full Bench had held that Sections 8-A was brought  on  statute  with  a  view  to  bring  it    in conformity with  the purpose  the  Act  seeks  to  subserve. Learned counsel  for the appellant relied upon  the minority judgment of  learned Judge.  It would,  however, appear that the learned   Judge,  with due  respect,   sought to set the clock back  to the Amendment by constructing  the meaning of the   words    ’forfeiture’   and   ’resumption’   and   the consequential effect  on   general principles of law without giving needed  effect to  the object  of the Amendment. Once the statute  occupied the field and gave power to resume the land  or   building  subject  to  the  conditions  mentioned therein, the  general principles  of  resumption  and  other principles considered  therein absolutely  remained no  more relevant. The  majority judgment  has rightly  focussed  the question   in   the correct  perspective and  had held  that Section 8-A is valid in law and, therefore, not violative of Article 14. In Northern India Caterers (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. State of Punjab  & Anr.  [AIR 1967  SC 1581],  this Court had held that when  there are  two modes of procedure, one being more drastic and  harsher than  the other without any guidelines, invocation   of the former was violative of Article 14 which was reversed  by a  larger Bench in Maganlal Chhagganlal [P] Ltd. vs  Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. [AIR 1974  SC   2009]  knocking   the  bottom   of  the  plea  of constitutional invalidity  of Section  8-A on  the anvil  of Article 14.  Though  softer  course  under  Section  15  was available, Section 8A does not become invalid on that score. Section 9  has been  deleted and  procedural safeguards have been provided  in Section 8-A. Therefore, Section 8A, having provided fair  procedure,  does  not  become  arbitrary  and violative of Article 14.      For these reasons and also for the reasons given in the majority judgment,  we are  of the  view that Section 8-A is not violative  of Article  14 since it has prescribed an in- built procedure of giving an opportunity and right to adduce evidence and  consideration thereof  by the  Estate  Officer before resumption  and to  pass a  reasoned order in support thereof. The  order is  also subject to an appeal before the Chief Administrator.  If permissible,  within  circumscribed parameters, appellate  order  may  be  subject  to  judicial review under  Article 226.  Since  this  procedure  was  not available under  Section  9  of  the  Act,  this  Court  had declared it  as ultra  vires of Article 14. The vice pointed out by this Court in Jagdish Chander’s case (supra) has been cured by  introducing Section  8-A. It  would, therefore, be clear that  the resumption  under Section 8-A is not only in case of non-payment of dues under the sale but for violation of the  conditions of  the sale,  the rules, regulations and other  relevant   conditions  applicable   in  that  behalf. Therefore, we do not find any invalidity in Section 8-A.      It  is   then  to  be  seen;  whether  the  appellant’s application under  Rule   11-D of  the Rules  has  not  been considered in  proper perspective  by the Estate Officer and whether any  illegality has been committed by the High Court by  not   interfering  therewith.   Having  considered   the reasoning given  by the Estate Officer in his order and  the conclusion reached  by the  High Court, we do not think that

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they have  committed any  illegality in  refusing to condone the delay.  This Court  has pointed out in  Johnson Paints’s case [supra] in paragraph 6 that once the original allotment stands  cancelled  and  resumption  by  the  Estate  Officer becomes final,  the   allottee has no right to the allotment of the    site  or  building.  Rule  11-D  deals  with  only discretionary power given to the Estate Officer. It does not clothe the  former allottee  with any  right to reallotment. The power under Rule 11-D is only discretionary; he may give the benefit  to the former transferee subject to fulfillment of the  conditions mentioned therein which includes power to refuse to order reallotment. In fact, this Court has doubted the wisdom behind Rule 11-D of reopening the issue once over through back  door entry  under Rule  11-D, after the entire process  of   resumption  has   become  final  and  received quiteous. It  would be  a constant sprout of corruption  and abuse of Rule 11-D for diverse reasons which in the interest of  smooth  administration  need  to  remove  the  irritant. However, we  need not dwell upon it any further as it is not necessary for  the purpose  of deciding the question in this case. Suffice it to state that Rule 11-D is only an enabling provision to  make an  application. The  Estate Officer  has discretion to  re-grant the  land or  building  which  stood already resumed  and vested  in the  State.  Of  course,  he cannot arbitrarily  reject the  petition;  he  has  to  give reasons in   support  thereof as  contemplated in  Rule 11-D itself.      Thus considered, the High Court has rightly pointed out that the  appellant has not given any proper explanation for inordinate delay  of 13 years in not making the application. It is true that the appellant was carrying on the litigation but was  not properly  advised at  the appropriate stages to avail the  remedies; he landed himself in trouble on account of his own conduct. Considered from this perspective, having regard to the facts in this case, we do not think that it is a case warranting interference.      The appeal  and the  writ  petition  accordingly  stand dismissed. No costs. I.W.P. (C) No. 412/96      The writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn. C.A. Nos. 12936-37/96 (@ SLP(C) Nos 8118-19/90)      Leave granted.      These appeals  by special leave arise from the judgment and order  of the  High  Court  of  Punjab  and  Haryana  at Chandigarh made  on January  25, 1990  and March 16, 1990 in Review Petition No. 45 of 1990 and CWP No. 8266 of 1988.      Admittedly the appellants though doctors, are using the premises for  nursing home/clinic.  Admittedly, the premises are located in residential zone. Therefore, it would clearly be a  contravention of  the rule  of by misuser of the house for non-residential purpose. Accordingly, we do not find any illegality in  the action taken by the respondents. However, six months  time is  granted to  the appellants  to stop the misuser. The  appellants should  give an  undertaking before the Estate  Officer within  four weeks  from today that they would stop  misuser on  expiry of six months from to-day. In case they do not misuser on expiry of six months, the Estate Officer is  entitled to  resume  the  property  without  any further  order   or  action.   For  misuser,   in  lieu   of resumption, the  Estate Officer  may impose  any  reasonable penalty which the appellants shall pay.      The appeals are accordingly disposed of. No costs. C.A. NOs. 12932-33/96 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 15376-77/90)

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    Application for intervention is dismissed.      Leave granted.      These appeals  by special leave arise from the judgment and order  of the  High Court  of Punjab  & Haryana  made on January 25,  1990 and  March 16, 1990 in Review Petition No. 49/90 and CWP No. 8317/88.      The appellant  is using  part of  the property for non- residential purpose,  viz., a  shop and,  therefore,  it  is clear case  of conversion  of  user  of  the  property  from residential to  non-residential. The  action  taken  by  the authorities is  perfectly legal. However, we give six months time to the appellant to stop the misuser. He should give an undertaking to  the Estate  Officer within  one  month  from today that  he would  stop misuser  within six  months  from today. If  he continues the misuser even after the expiry of six months  form today  or any  time thereafter,  the Estate Officer is  at liberty  to resume  the property  without any further order  or proceedings.  Similarly the Estate Officer is at  liberty to  impose any reasonable penalty for misuser which the appellant shall pay over.      The appeals are accordingly ordered. No costs. C.A. NO.     /96 (@ SLP (C) No. 12491/90).      Leave granted.      This appeal by special leave arises out of the judgment and order  of the  High Court  of Punjab  & Haryana  made on March 16,  1990 in  Review Petition  No.47/90 and  W.P.  No. 5576/88. The appeal filed against the main writ petition has already been  disposed of  by this  Court in R.C. Chawla vs. State of Haryana & Ors. [J] 1996 (1) SC 633].      The appeal  is disposed of in terms of decision in R.C. Chawla’s case. No costs. C.A. NOs. 12947-48/1996 of 1990 (@ SLP (C) Nos. 12389-90/ 1650/ and C.A. Nos. 12952-53/96 @ S.L.P (C) Nos. 14-15/91      Leave granted.      These appeals  by special  leave  arise    out  of  the judgment   and order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana made   on March  16, 1990  and January  25, 1990  in  Review Petition No.46/90 in W.P.5288/88 and other matters.      Admittedly, the  appellants were using the premises for non-residential purpose  in a  residential area.  Therefore, the authorities were well within their power to issue notice for resumption  of the properties. However, pending disposal of these  matters, the  appellants have stated that they had already stopped  misuser an  year ago. The appellants should file an  affidavit before  the Estate  Officer stating  that they have  already stopped misuser of the premises. On  such an affidavit  being filed,  it would  be open  to the Estate Officer to  have  it  verified  whether  they  have  already stopped the  misuser. If  they have already stopped misuser, the order  of resumption  may be  revoked. If they have not, the order  passed by  this Court would not be of any help to the appellants.  The order of resumption would stand upheld. The Estate Officer may fix any reasonable penalty for misuse and the  appellants shall pay over the same. If they were to repeat the  misuser, the  Estate Officer  would be  free  to resume the  property without  taking any  recourse to  fresh proceedings.      The appeals are accordingly disposed of. No costs. C.A. NOs. 1249,12934-35,12955,12938-43,12945-46/96 @ S.L.). (C)  Nos. 885/91,  15393-94, 7960,  9174-79 &  11578- 79/90      Leave granted.      These appeals by special leave arises from the judgment

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and order  of the  High Court  of Punjab and Haryana made on January 25, 1990 in CWP No. 1162/89 and other matters.      The  appellants,   admittedly,  have   been  using  the residential premises  for non-residential purpose converting it into  a shop  contrary to  the conditions of the sale and also the  Rules. Thereby,  it is  a clear case of misuser of the premises.  However,  an  opportunity  is  given  to  the appellants to  stop the misuser within six months form today and pay  reasonable penalty  levied  by  Estate  Officer  on misuser. They  should file  an undertaking before the Estate Officer within one month from today that they would stop the misuser with six months from today. On expiry of six months, it would be open to the Estate Officer to verify whether the appellants have stopped the misuser. If they would have not, the   resumption   order would get revived and thereafter it would be  open to  the  Estate  Officer  to  deal  with  the property in accordance with law without further reference to the appellants  or taking any further action in this behalf. If the  misuser is  repeated, he  would free  to resume  the property without further proceedings. Reasonable penalty may be fixed and the appellants shall pay over the same.      The appeals are accordingly disposed of. No costs. W.P. 250/96      This writ petition filed by the petitioners challenging the resumption  orders passed  by  the  Estate  Officer  for contravention of  the conditions  of the sale. Therefore, it would be  open to  the petitioners,  to avail  of remedy, if any, available under the law.      The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. One month’s time is  given to the petitioner to approach the High Court. In the meanwhile, status quo on today shall be maintained.