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PETITIONER: BABU SINGH AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF U.P.

DATE OF JUDGMENT31/01/1978

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. DESAI, D.A.

CITATION:  1978 AIR  527            1978 SCR  (2) 777  1978 SCC  (1) 579

ACT: Bail--Grant of bail--Practice and Procedure in the matter of granting of bail to an accused Person pending the hearing of an  appeal--Criteria for bail--Order XLVII Rule 6 r/w  Order XXI Rules 6 and 27 of Supreme Court Rules, 1966--Courts  are not  barred  from second consideration at a later  stage  by entertaining another application for bail--Effect of interim directions by the Court.

HEADNOTE: All the petitioners were charged with the offence of  murder u/s  302  I.P.C.,  but all of them  were  acquitted  by  the Sections   Judge  on  4-11-1972.   The  State   successfully appealed    against    the    acquittal    and    by     its judgment dated 20-5-1977 the High Court, while reversing the findings of the Sessions Court, held all of them guilty  and sentenced them all to life imprisonment.The petitioners came up to the Supreme Court exercising their statutory right  of appeal.   Pending the disposal of the appeal, they moved  an application  for bail which was rejected on  7-9-1977.   The petitioners moved another application for bail. Granting  the  bail,  subject to  fulfilment  of  conditions imposed, the Court HELD : 1. An order refusing an application for bail does not necessarily  preclude another, on a later  occasion,  giving more   materials,   further   developments   and   different considerations.  While it is a circumstance which the Courts surely  must  set store, Courts are not barred  from  second consideration at a later stage.  An interim direction is not a conclusive adjudication and updated reconsideration is not overturning an earlier negation. [779 D-E] 2.   The  significance  and  sweep  of  Art.  21  make   the deprivation  of liberty ephemeral or enduring, a  matter  of grave concern and permissible only when the law  authorising it  is  reasonable, even handed and geared to the  goals  of community good and State-necessity spelt out In Article  19. Reasonableness  postulates intelligent care  and  predicates that  deprivation of freedom by refusal of bail is  not  for punitive  purpose, but for the bifocal interests of  justice to the individual involved and society affected. [784 E-F] 3.  Personal liberty deprived when bail is refused,  is  too precious a value of ourconstitutional  system   recognised

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under Art. 21, that the curial power to negateit  is   a great  trust exercisable, not casually, but judicially  with lively  concern  for  the cost to  the  individual  and  the community.   Personal  liberty of an accused or  convict  is fundamental,  suffering  lawful  eclipse only  in  terms  of procedure  established by law.  The last four words of  Art. 21 are the life of that human right. [781 A-B] 4. All deprivation of liberty is validated by social defence and individual correction along an anti-criminal  direction. Public  justice is central to the whole scheme of bail  law. Feeling  justice  must be forbidden but  punitive  harshness should be minimised.  Restorative devises to redeem the man, even  through  community service,  meditative  drill,  study classes  or other resources should be innovated and  playing foul   with  public  peace  by  tampering   with   evidence, intimidating  witnesses  or  committing  offences  while  on judicially  sanctioned "free enterprise" should be  provided against.  No seeker of justice shall play confidence  tricks on  the Court or community.  Conditions may be  hung  around bail  orders,  not to cripple but to protect.  Such  is  the holistic jurisdiction and humanistic orientation invoked  by the  judicial  discretion correlated to the  values  of  our Constitution. [785 B-C] 5. The principal rule to guide release on bail should be  to secure  the  presence  of the applicant,  who  seeks  to  be liberated, to take judgment and serve sentence in the  event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment.  In this 778 perspective  relevance  of considerations  is  regulated  by their  nexus  with the likely absence of the  applicant  for fear of a severe sentence. [783 E] The vital considerations are: (a) The nature of charge,  the nature  of  the evidence and, the punishment  to  which  the party  may  be  liable,  if  convicted,  or  conviction   is confirmed.  When the crime charged is of the highest  magni- tude and the punishment of it assigned by law is of  extreme severity,  the Court may reasonably presume,  some  evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of  the  convict  at the stage of  judgment,  should  he  be enlarged  (b)  whether  the  course  of  justices  would  be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of  the Court to be freed for the time being (c) Antecedents of  the man and socio-geographical circumstance, and whether or  the petitioner’s  record shows him to be ’a  habitual  offender, (d)  When,  a person charged with a grave offence  has  been acquitted  at  a  stage,  the  intermediate  acquittal   has pertinence to a bail plea when the appeal before this  Court pends.   The  grounds  for denial  of  provisional  releases becomes  weaker  when a fair finding of innocence  has  been recorded by one court, (e) Whether the accused’s safety  may be.  more. in, prison, than in the, vengeful  village  where feuds  have provoked the violent offence and (f) The  period in.  prison already spent and the prospect of delay  in  the appeal being heard, and disposed of. [783 A-B,F, 784 C, D, 785 D-E, 786,A] Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab, [1978] 1 SCR 385 = A.I.R. 1977  SC  2147  @ 2148; Gudikanti Narasihmalu  and  Ors.  v. Public   Prosecutor,  Govt  of  A.P.,  [1978]  2  SCR;   371 Reiterated. Tinglay v. Dolby, 14 N.W. 146; Rex v. Rose, 1898-18 CC  717; 67 QB 289; quoted with approval. Courts  should  soberly  size up  police  exaggerations;  of prospective  misconduct  of the accused  if  enlarged,  lest danger  of  excesses  and injustice creep  subtly  into  the discretionary  curial  technique.   Bad  record  and  police

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prediction of criminal prospects to invalidate the bail plea are  admissible  in principle, but shall  not  stampede  the Court  into  complacent refusal.  The endemic  pathology  of factious  scrimmage  and bloodshed should  be  preempted  by suitable safe guards. [785 F-G] To  answer the test of reasonableness subject to-  the  need for  securing the presence of the bail applicant, the  Court must  also  weigh the contrary factors like-(i)  the  better chances  which a man on bail has to prepare or  present  his case than one remanded in custody, (ii) promotion of  public justice,  (iii) the considerable public expenses in  keeping in  custody where no danger of disappearance or  disturbance can  arise and (iv) the deplorable condition verging on  the inhuman of our sub-jails. [784 G-H; 785 A] In  the  instant case, the  following  ’significant  factors frown’   upon  continuance  of  incarceration   and   favour provisional but conditional enlargement of the petitioners. (a)  Petitioners  1  to 5 have suffered  sentences  in  some measures having been imprisoned for about twenty months. (b)  When the High Court entertained the appeal,  the  State did not press for their custody for apprehended  abscondence or menace to peace and justice. (c)  The sixth Petitioner had been on bail in  the  Sessions Court  and  all  the petitioners had been  free  during  the pendency of the appeal. (d) There is nothing indicated to show that during the  long five  years,  when the petitioners had been out  of  prison, pending  appeal,  there had been any conduct on  their  part suggestive   of  disturbing  the  peace  of  #he   locality, threatening  any one in the village or  otherwise  thwarting the life of the community or the cause of justice and (e)  All the petitioners 1 to 5 are the entire male  members of  a  family and their remaining in  jail  will  jeopardise their defence in this Court., [779 F, 790 B-E] 779

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal  Misc.Petition,No. 191 of 1978. in the Matter of:-                  CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 274 of 1977 R. k. Jain for the Petitioner. D. P. Uniyad and O. P. Rana for the Responent The Order of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J.-The petitioners have moved for bail setting out  special  grounds in support of the prayer.   The  State opposes on various grounds which we will presently set  out. One   of  us  sitting  as  a  Chamber  Judge  in   Gudikanti Narasihmalu and others v., Public Prosecutor, Govt. of AP(1) had  considered this question at some length and  since  the principles  set out herein commend themselves to  us,we  are proceeding  on the same lines and are inclined to reach  the same conclusion. Briefly  we will state the facts pertinent to  the,  present petition and prayer and proceed thereafter to ratiocinate on the  relevant  criteria  in  considering  the  interlocutory relief  of  bail.  Right at the beginning, we  must  mention that,  at an earlier stage, their application for  bail  was rejected by this, Court on September 7, 1977.  But an  order refusing  an  application  for  bail  does  not  necessarily preciude   another,  on  a  later  occasion,   giving   more materials,     further,    developments    and     different

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considerations.   While  we surely must set  store  by  this circumstance,  we  cannot accede to the faint plea  that  we are, barred from second consideration’ at a later stage.  An interim  direction  is not a  conclusive  adjudication,  and updated  reconsideration  is  not over  turning  an  earlier negation.   In this view, we entertain the  application  and evaluate the merits pro and con. Shri R.K. Jain has brought to our notice certain significant factors  which frown upon continuance of  incarceration  and favour  provisional, perhaps conditional enlargement of  the applicants. All  the petitioners were charged with an offence of  murder under  s.302 I.P.C. but all of them were acquitted  by  the, Sessions  Court  as early as November 4, 1972.   The,  State successfully  appealed  against the acquittal and  the  High Court, reversing the, findings of the, Sessions Court,  held all  the petitioners guilty and sentenced them all  to  life imprisonment.  This judgment was pronounced on May 20, 1977, after an unfortunately tragic sojourn of five years ’for  an appeal in a murder case.  Our justice, system, even in grave cases, suffers from slow motion syndrome which is lethal  to "fair  trial".,  whatever  the  ultimate  decision’   Speedy justice   is  a  component  of  social  justice  since   the community,  as a whole, is concerned in the  criminal  being condignly  and finaly punished within a reasonable  and  the innocent  being  absolved  from the  incordinate  ordeal  of criminal proceedings.  This is, (1) [1978] 2 S.C.R.371 780 by the way, although it is important that judicial  business management  by engineering, not tinkering, so as to  produce efficient  expedition, is in urgent, high-priority  item  on the  agenda of court reform, to be adically undertaken  none to soon. Back  to the necessary facts.  On the High  Court  upsetting the  acquittal, the petitioners have come up to  this  Court exercising  their  statutory right to appeal.   The  present petition, as earlier stated, is the second one for bail, the first  having  been  rejected about  six  months  ago.   The petitioners  1 to 5 have suffered sentence in some  Measure, having. been imprisoned for about twenty months.  The  sixth petitioner  had ’been on bail in the Sessions Court and  all the  petitioners  had been free during the pendency  of  the appeal. Certain other pregnant particulars deserve special  mention. All the petitioners 1 to 5 are the entire male members of  a family, and one point mentioned by Shri Jain is that all  of them  are  in  jail.   Their  defence  in  this  Court  may, therefore,   be   jeopardised.   Another   factor,   equally meaningful, is that there is nothing indicated before us  to show  that during the long five years, when the  petitioners had  been out of prison, pending appeal, there had been  any conduct on their part suggestive of disturbing the peace, of the locality, threatening anyone in the village or otherwise thwarting  the  life  of  the community  or  the  course  of justice.   Nay  more.  When the High Court  entertained  the appeal,  the  State  did not press  for  their  custody  for apprehended abscondence or menace to peace and justice.   It must  be  noticed  that  the episode  of  murder  itself  is attributed as the outcome of a faction fight or feud between the  two clans in the village, not an unusual phenomenon  in rural  India  riven by rivalry of castes,  sects  and  gens. This is, of course, a survival of primitive tribalism, as it were,   but  cannot  be  wished  away  unless   sociological therapeutics  were applied.  The pharmacopoeia of the  Penal

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Code  is no sufficient curative.  Nevertheless, we  have  to remember  the  reality of the village  feud  and  consequent proneness  to,  flare  ups  and  recrudescence  of  criminal conflicts. Against this backdrop of social and individual facts we must consider  the motion for bail.  The correct  legal  approach has been clouded in the past by focus on the ferocity of the crime  to the neglect of the real purposes of bail  or  jail and  indifferent  to  many  other  sensitive  and   sensible circumstances  which  deserve judicial, notice.   The  whole issue, going by decisional material and legal literature has been  relegated to a twilight zone of the  criminal  justice system.   Courts  have often acted  intuitively  or  reacted traditionally,  so much the fate of applicants for  bail  at the High Court level and in the, Supreme Court, has  largely hinged  on  the  hunch  of the bench  as  on  expression  of ’judicial  discretion’.   A  scientific  treatment  is   the desideratum. The  Code is cryptic on this topic and the court prefers  to be tacit, be the order custodial or not.  And yet, the issue is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden on  the public  treasury,  all  of which insists  that  a  developed jurisprudence  of bail is integral to a socially  sensitized judicial  process.  As Chamber Judge in the summit  court  I have to 781 deal with this uncanalised case-flow, ad hoc response to the docket  being  the  flickering  candle  light.   So  it   is desirable  that the subject disposed of on basic  principle, not  improvised  brevity  draped  as  discretion.   Personal liberty,  deprived whom bail is value of our  constitutional system recognised Under Art. 21 that curial power to  negate it   is  a  great  trust  exercisable,  not   casually   but judicially,  with  lively  concern  for  the  cost  to   the individual and the community.  To glamorise  impressionistic orders as discretionary may, on occasions, make a litigative gamble,  decisive  of  a  fundamental  right.   After   all, personal  liberty of an accused or convict  is  fundamental, suffering  lawful  eclipse  only  in  terms  of   "procedure established by law".  The last four words of Art. 21 are the life of that human right. The  doctrine of Police, Power,, constitutionally  validates punitive  processes  for the maintenance  of  public  order, security  of the State, national integrity and the  interest of  the  public generally.  Even so, having  regard  to  the solemn  issue  involved, deprivation  of  personal  freedom, ephemeral  or enduring, must be founded on the most  serious considerations   relevant  to  the  welfare  objectives   of society, specified in the Constitution. What  then, is ’judicial discretion’ in this  bail  context? In the elegant words of Benjamin Cardozo.               "The judge, even when he is free, is still not               wholly  free.   He  is  not  to  innovate   at               pleasure.   He is not a knight-errant  roaming               at will in pursuit of his own ideal of  beauty               or of goodness.  He is to draw his inspiration               from  consecrated  principles.  He is  not  to               yield  to  spasmodic sentiment, to  vague  and               unregulated benevolence.  He is to exercise  a               discretion  informed by tradition,  methodized               by   analogy,  disciplined  by   system,   and               subordinated  to ’the primordial necessity  of               order in the social life’.  Wide enough in all               conscience  is  the field of  discretion  that               remains."

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             (The    Nature   of   Judicial    Process-Yale               University Press (1921).               Even so it is useful to notice the tart  terms               of Lord Camdon that               "the  discretion  of  a judge is  the  law  of               tyrants: it is always unknown, it is different               in  different men; it is casual,  and  depends                             upon  constitution temper and passion.  In  th e               best, it is often times caprice; in the worst,               it  is every vice, folly and passion to  which               human nature is liable. . . . " (I Bovu.   Law               Dict.,  Rawles’ III Revision p. 685-quoted  in               Judicial  Discretion-National College  of  the               State Judiciary, Reno, Nevada p. 14). Some jurists have regarded the term ’judicial discretion’ as a misnomer.  Nevertheless, the vesting of ’discretion is the unspoken  but  inescapable, silent command of  our  judicial system, and those who exercise it will remember that 782               discretion,   when  applied  to  a  court   of               justice, means sound discretion guided by law.               It must be governed by rule, not by,humour, it               must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful  but               legal and regular.               (Attributed  to  Lord  Mansfield  Tinglay   v.               Dolby, 14 N.W. 146)               "An  appeal,  to a judge’s  discretion  is  an               appeal   to  his  judicial  conscience.    The               discretion   must   be   exercised,   not   in               opposition   to,  but  in   accordance   with,               established principles of law."               Judicial discretion, (ibid) p. 33 Having  grasped the core concept of judicial discretion  and the  constitutional  perspective in which  the  ’Court  must operate public policy by a restraint on liberty, we have  to proceed to see what are the relevant criteria for granty  or refusal of bail in the case of a person who has either  been convicted and has appealed or one whose conviction has  been set aside but leave has been granted by this Court to appeal against  the  acquittal.   "What  is  often  forgotten,  and therefore warrants reminder, is the object to keep a  person in judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an  appeal. Lord Russel, C.J. said               "I observe that in this case bail was  refused               for  the prisoner.  It cannot be too  strongly               impressed  on the, magistracy of  the  country               that   bail  is  not  to  be  withhold  as   a               punishment,  but that the requirements  as  to               bail  are merely to secure the  attendance  of               the prisoner at trial."               (R.v.  Rose 1898-18Cox CC. 717: 67  LJOB  289-               quoted  in ’The granting of Bail’,  Mod.   Law               Rev.  Vol. 81, Jan 1968 p. 40, 48). This  theme was developed by Lord Russel of killowen C.  J., when he charged the grand jury at Salisbury Assizes, 1899               "....it  was the duty of magistrates to  admit               accused persons to bail, wherever practicable,               unless there were strong grounds for supposing               that  such  persons would not appear  to  take               their  trial.  It was not the  poorer  classes                             who  did not appear, for  their  circumstances               were  such as to tie them to the place  where,               they carried on their work.  They had not  the               golden wings with which to fly from justice."

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             (1899) 63 J. P.     193, Mod.  Law Rev. p.  49               (ibid) In Archbold it is stated that               "The  proper  test of whether bail  should  be               granted  or refused is whether it is  probable               that  the  defendant will appear to  take  his               trial ....               The test should be applied by reference to the               following considerations 783               (1) The nature of the accusation               (2) The nature of the, evidence in support  of               the accusation               (a)   The  severity of the   Punishment  which               conviction will entail....               (4)  Whether the sureties are independent,  OF               indemnified by the accused person ...."               (Mod.    Law  Rev.  ibid.    P.   53-Archbold,               pleading  Evidence  and Practice  in  Criminal               Cases, 56th edn., London,1966 para 203) Perhaps, this is an overly simplistic statement and we  must remember  the constitutional focus in Art. 21 and 19  before following diffuse observations and practices in the  English system.   Even in England there is a growing awareness  that the  working of the bail system requires a second look  from the  point  of  view of correct  legal  criteria  and  sound principles,   has been pointed out by Pr.   Bottomley.  (The Granting of Bail: Principles and Practices : Mod.  Law  Rev. ibid p.40 to 54). Let  us  have a glance around which other  relevant  factors must  revolve.When  the case is finally disposed  of  and  a person  is  sentenced to incarceration, things  stand  on  a different  footing.  We are concerned with  the  penultimate stage and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be  to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to  be liberated,  to  take judgement  and serve  sentence  in  the event of the court punishing him with imprisonment.  In this perspective,  relevance  of considerations is  regulated  by their  nexus  with the likely absence of the  applicant  for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As  Erle J. indicated, ’when the crime charged, (of which  a convictions has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude, and  the  ’punishment of it assigned by law  is  of  extreme severity,  the Court may reasonably presume,  some  evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of  the convict at the stage of judgment, should he  be  en- larged. (Mod.  Law Rev. p. 50 ibid, 1952 I.E. & B.I.).  Lord Campbell  CJ  concurred in this approach in  that  case  and Coleridge J. down the order of priorities as follows "I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because  of  his  guilt, but because  there  are  sufficient probable  grounds for the charge against him as to  make  it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary  to  ensure  his appearance  at  trial,  .It  very important  element  in  considering whether  the  party,  if admitted  to  bail, would appear to take his  trial;  and  I think that in coming to a determination on that point  three elements  will generally be found the most important  :  the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, 784               and  the punishment to which the, party  would               be liable if convicted.  In the present  case,               the  charge  is that of’  wilful  murder;  the               evidence   contains   an  admission   by   the               prisoners of the truth of the charge, and  the               punishment of the offence is, by law, death".

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             (Mod.  Law Rev. ibid p. 50-51) it  is  thus obvious that the nature of the  charge  is  the vital  factor  and  the  nature  of  the  evidence  also  is pertinent.  The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. Another  relevant  factor  is as to whether  the  course  of justice  would  be thwarted by him who seeks  the  benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.               (Patrick  Devlin The Criminal  Prosecution  in               England  London)  1960, p. 75-Mod.   Law  Rev.               ibid p. 54); Thus  the  legal principle and practice validate  the  court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses  for  the prosecution or otherwise  polluting  the process  of  justice.   It  is  not  only  traditional   but rational,  in this context, to enquire into the  antecedents of  a man who is a lying for bail to find whether he  has  a bad  record-particularly a record which suggests that he  is likely to commit serious offences while on bail.  In  regard to  habituals  it is part of criminological history  that  a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to expoit  the opportunity  to  inflict further crimes on  the  members  of society.   Bail discretion, on the basis- of evidence  about the  criminal  record of a defendant, is  therefore  not  an exercise in irrelevance. The  significance and sweep of Art. 21 make the  deprivation of  liberty a matter of grave concern and  permissible  only when  the law authorising it is reasonable, even-handed  and geared  to the goals of community good and  State  necessity spelt  out in Art. 19.  Indeed, the, considerations  I  have set  out  as  criteria are  germane  to  the  constitutional proposition  I  have  deduced.   Reasonableness   postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of  freedom by refusal of bail is not for punitive purpose, but for  the bi-focal interests of justice-to the individual involved and society affected. We  must weigh the contrary factors to answer the.  test  of reasonableness,  subject  to  the  need  for  securing   the presence  of the bail applicant.  It makes sense  to  assume that a man on bail has a better chance to Prepare or present his  case  than  one remanded in  custody.   And  if  public justice  is to be promoted. mechanical detention  should  be demoted.   In the United States, which has a  constitutional perspective close to ours, the function of bail is  limited, ’community  roots’ of the applicant are stressed and,  after the  Vera  Foundation’s  Manhattan  Bail  Project,  monetary suretyship  is  losing  ground.   The  considerable   public expense in keeping in custody where no danger of 785 disappearance or disturbance can arise, is not a  negligible consideration.    Equally   important  is   the   deplorable condition,  verging on the inhuman, of our  sub-jails,  that the  unrewarding cruelty and expensive custody of  avoidable incarceration  makes  refusal  of bail  unreasonable  and  a policy favouring release justly sensible. A   few  other  weighty  factors  deserve  reference.    All deprivation  of liberty is validated by social  defense  and individual  correction  along  an  anti-criminal  direction. Public  justice is central to the whole scheme of bail  law. Fleeing  justice  must be forbidden but  punitive  harshness should be minimised.  Restorative devices to redeem the man, even  through  community service,  meditative  drill,  study classes or other resources should be innovated, and  playing foul   with  public  peace  by  tampering   with   evidence,

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intimidating  witnesses  or  committing  offences  while  on judicially  sanctioned ’free enterprise, should be  provided against.  No seeker of justice shall play confidence  tricks on  the  court or community.  Thus, conditions may  be  hung around bail orders, not to cripple but to protect.  Such  is the holistic jurisdiction and humanistic orientation invoked by  the judicial discretion correlated to the values of  our constitution. -Viewed  from  this perspective,, we gain a  better  insight into the ,rules of the game.  When a person, charged with  a grave  offence,  has  been acquitted at  a  stage,  has  the intermediate  acquittal pertinence to a bail plea  when  the appeal  before  ;his Court pends ? Yes, it has.   The  panic which  might  prompt  the accused to jump  the  gauntlet  of justice  is  less,  having enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the court’s verdict once.  Concurrent holdings of guilt hive the opposite   effect.    Again,  the  ground  for   denial   of provisional release becomes weaker where the fact stares  us in the fact that a fair finding-if that be so innocence  has been  recorded by one court.  It may be conclusive, for  the judgment of acquittal may be ex facie wrong, the  likelihood of  desperate reprisal, if enlarged, may be a deterrent  and his  own safety may be more in prison than in  the  vengeful village  where feuds have provoked the violent offence.   It depends.   Antecedents  of the  man  and  socio-geographical circumstances  have a bearing only from this angle.   Police exaggerations  of prospective misconduct of the accused,  if enlarged,  must be soberly sized up lest danger of  excesses and  injustice  creep subtly into the  discretionery  curial technique.   Bad  record and police prediction  of  criminal prospects  to  invalidate the bail plea  are  admissable  in principle but shall not stampede the court into a complacent refusal. Realisim  is a component of humanism which is the  heart  of the  legal system.  We come across cases where parties  have already suffered 3, 4 and in one case (the other day it  was unearthed)  over  10  years in prison.   These  persons  may perhaps  be acquitted-difficult to guess.  If they are,  the injustice  of  innocence  long  in  rigorous   incarceration inflicted  by  the  protraction of curial  processes  is  an irrevocable  injury.   And, taking a pragmatic  view,  while life  imprisonment  may,  in  law, last  a  whole  life,  in practice  it hardily survives ten years, thanks to rules  of remission.  Thus, at the worst, the prisoner 786 may have to serve some more years, and, at the best, law  is vicariously  guilty  of dilatory  deprivation  of  citizen’s liberty,  a  consummation vigilantly to be  vetoed.   So,  a circumstance of some consequence, when considering a  motion for  bail,  is the period in prison already  spent  and  the prospect  of  the appeal being delayed for  hearing,  having regard  to the suffocating crowd of dockets pressing  before the few Benches. It is , not out of place to mention that if the State  takes up  a  flexible attitude it may be possible to  permit  long spells of parole, under controlled conditions, so that  fear that the full freedom if bailed out, might be abused, may be eliminated  by  this  experimental  measure,  punctuated  by reversion  to prison.  Unremitting insulation in  the  harsh and  hardened company of prisoners leads to many  unmention- able vices that humanizing interludes of parole are part  of the compassionate constitutionalism of our system. The basics being thus illuminated, we have to apply them  to the  tangled knot of specifics projected by each case.   The delicate  light of the law favours release unless  countered

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by  the  negative criteria necessitating that  course.   The corrective instinct of the law plays upon release orders  by strapping  on  to them protective and  curative  conditions. Heavy  bail  from poor men is obviously wrong.   Poverty  is society’s  malady  and  sympathy,  not  sternness,  is   the judicial response. Yet another factor which heavily tips the scales of  justice in  favour  of  release Pendente lite is  the  thought  best expressed,  by Justice Bhagwati, speaking for the  Court  in Kashmira Singh v. The State of Punjab(1). "The  appellant, contends in this application  that  ?ending the  hearing  of the appeal he should be released  on  bail. Now, the practice in this Court as also in many of the  High Courts has been not to release on bail a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment for an offence under  section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.  The question is whether  this practice  should  be  departed  from  and  if  so  in   what circumstances.   It  is obvious that no  practice  howsoever sanctified by usage and hallowed by time can be’ allowed  to prevail  if it operates to cause injustice.  Every  practice of  the  Court must find its ultimate justification  in  the interest of justice.  The practice not to release on bail  a person  who  has  been sentenced to  life  imprisonment  was evolved  in the High Courts and in this Court on  the  basis that  once a person has been found guilty and  sentenced  to life imprisonment, he should not be let loose, so long I  as his  conviction  and  sentence are not set  aside,  but  the underlying,  postulate of this practice was that the  appeal of  such person would be disposed of within a measurable  of time,  so that if he is ultimately found to be innocent,  he would not have to remain in jail for an unduly long (1) [1978] 1 S.C.R. 385.== A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2147 at 2148. 787               period.   The rationale of this practice,  can               have no application where the Court is not  in               a  position to dispose of the appeal for  five               or  six years.  It would indeed be a  travesty               of  justice  to keep a person in  jail  for  a               period  of  five or six years for  an  offence               which  is  ultimately found not to  have  been               committed  by  him.  Can the Court  ever  com-               pensate  him  for his incarceration  which  is               found to be unjustified ? Would it be just  at               all for the Court to tell a person : "We  have               admitted your appeal because we think you have               a prima facie case, but unfortunately we  have               no  time to hear your appeal for quite  a  few               years  and,  therefore,  until  we  hear  your               appeal,  you must remain in jail, even  though               you  may be innocent ?" What confidence  would               such administration of justice, inspire in the               mind of the public ? It may quite  conceivably               happen,  and it has in fact happened in a  few               cases  in this Court, that a person may  serve               out  his full term of imprisonment before  his               appeal is taken up for hearing.  Would a judge               not   be   overwhelmed  with  a   feeling   of               contribution  while acquitting such  a  person               after hearing the appeal?  Would it not be  an               affront  to  his sense of  justice?   Of  what               avail  would the acquittal be to a person  who               has   already   served   out   his   term   of               imprisonment or at any rate a major part of it               ? It is, therefore, absolutely essential  that               the   practice  which  this  Court  has   been

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             following in the past must be reconsidered and               so long as this Court is not in a position  to               hear  the  appeal  of  an  accused  within   a               reasonable  period of time, the  Court  should               ordinarily unless there are cogent grounds for               acting otherwise, release the accused on  bail               in cases where special leave has been  granted               to   the   accused  to  appeal   against   his               conviction and sentence." Having  regard  to  this  constollation  of  considerations, carefully  viewed  in  the  jurisprudential  setting   above silhourted,  we  are of the view, that  subject  to  certain safeguards,  the petitioners are eligible to be enlarged  on bail. The  endemic pathology of factious scrimmage and  blood-shed should  be preempted by suitable safeguards, even if we  are inclined  to bail out the petitioners.  So, we  direct  that the petitioners be released on their own recognisances in  a sum of Rs. 5,000/- each, with one surety for each in a  like sum,  subject  to two conditions, viz.,  firstly,  that  the petitioners  shall  not  enter Bharaiyam  village  which  is alleged  to be the hot-bed of Plan clashes according to  the prosecution  and secondly, the petitioners shall  report  at the  Tandiawan Police Station (District Hardor)  once  every week.   We  direct  the  Sub-Inspector  of  Police   station concerned to see that both the conditions are observed.   In ’the  event ’of breach of either condition, the  prosecution will  be at liberty to move this Court for  cancellation  Of the bail hereby granted. S.R                                              Bail granted 788