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PETITIONER: BABU LAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHEONATH DAS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/12/1966

BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. SHELAT, J.M.

CITATION:  1967 AIR 1329            1967 SCR  (2) 241

ACT:      U.P.  (Temporary)  control of Rent  and  Eviction  Act, 1947, ss. 7(2),7A(1) & (2)--Landlord securing decree against tenant--Collector   allotting   accommodation   to   another person--Landlord  entering into arrangement with  tenant  to continue  his  tenancy--Powers  of  Collector  to  make  new allotment and to evict tenant.

HEADNOTE: The appellant was a tenant of respondents 2 & 3 in Varanasi. The  said landlords obtained a decree for ejectment  of  the tenant  from the accommodation, Exercising  the  Collector’s powers under s. 7(2) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent JUDGMENT: Officer  passed an order directing the landlords to let  the accommodation  to respondent No. 1. However,  subsequent  to this order, the landlords allowed the appellant to  continue as  tenant on enhanced rent.  The Assistant Rent  Control  & Eviction  Officer  thereupon started  proceedings  under  s. 7A(1)  of  the  Act.   He passed an  order  under  s.  7A(2) directing  the appellant to vacate the  accommodation.   The appellant  filed a writ petition but failing to  get  relief from  the  High  Court,  he  filed  a  suit  asking  for   a declaration  that  the orders passed by the  Assistant  Rent Control  & Eviction Officer were without jurisdiction.   The trial court dismissed the suit, the appellate court  decreed it., but on second appeal the High Court restored the decree of the trial court dismissing the suit.  The appellant  was granted special leave to appeal to this Court. It  was  urged  on  behalf of the  appellant  (i)  that  the District  Magistrate  had  no powers to pass  the  order  of allotment  under s. 7(2) till the accommodation  had  fallen vacant,  (ii) that even if he had the power the order  would take effect only when the accommodation fell vacant and (ii) that  the proceedings under s. 7A were without  jurisdiction as there was no contravention of the order under s. 7(2). HELD  : (i) The District Magistrate can pass an order  under s.  7(2) not only when the accommodation is or  has  fallen vacant  but  also when it is about to fall vacant.   In  the present  case  both  the landlord and the  tenant  had  made statements that the accommodation was about to fall  vacant. On the materials on the record there could be no doubt  that

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the accommodation was about to fall vacant when the District Magistrate passed the order under s. 7(2). [243 D-E] (ii) The  order under s. 7(2) directed the landlords to  let the  accommodation to the allottee.  The order  took  effect immediately.  It could not be said that the order would take effect  only  when the accommodation actually  fell  vacant. [244 A-B] (iii)     After  the  allotment was  passed,  the  landlords agreed to accept the appellant as a tenant at enhanced rent. This  letting  and  the continuance  of  occupation  by  the appellant  under it were in direct breach of  the  allotment order.  There was thus a contravention of the order and  the District  Magistrate had therefore jurisdiction to  initiate proceedings  under sub-section (1) of s. 7A and to pass  the orders under sub-sections (2) & (3) of s. 7A. [244 D-F] 1Sup. CI/67-2 242

& CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  2271  of 1966. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated the February 12, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in  Second Appeal No. 2862 of 1963. B.   C. Misra, M. V. Goswami, and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant. J. P.  Goyal and H. K. Puri, for the respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat,  J.  The appellant is the tenant  and  respondents Nos.  2  and  3  are  the  landlords  of  a  non-residential accommodation  in a. part of a building in Mohalla  Bulanala in  the city of Varanasi.  Respondent No. 1 as the  allottee of  the  accommodation.  Respondent No. 5 is  the  Assistant Rent  Control and Eviction Officer, Varanasi, authorised  by the  District Magistrate to perform his functions under  the U.P.  (Temporary)  Control of Rent and  Eviction  Act,  1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).  On February 11,  1956 the landlords obtained a decree for ejectment of the  tenant from  the accommodation.  As the tenant was about to  vacate the  accommodation, on February 20, 1957, respondent  No.  5 passed  order  under  s..  7(2) of  the  Act  directing  the landlords  to let the accommodation to respondent No. 1.  On February 22,.1957, the landlords and the tenant agreed  that the tenant would continue to occupy the accommodation at  an enhanced  rent and would be liable to eviction in  execution of  the decree for ejectment in the event of his failing  to pay  the  outstanding  arrears of  rent  in  certain  stated instalments.  As the tenant failed to pay the agreed instal- ments  of rent, on May 21, 1957, the landlords in  execution of  the  decree  for ejectment obtained an  order  from  the executing  court for the issue of a warrant for delivery  of possession.    In  the  meantime  on  ’February  23,   1957, proceedings  were  started against the  appellant  under  S. 7A(1)  of the Act.  By an order dated March 23, 1957,  under S. 7A(2) respondent No. 5 directed the tenant to vacate  the accommodation  by  March 24, 1957.  By another  order  dated December  2, 1957, under S. 7A(3) respondent No. 5  directed S.O. P. S. Chowk to evict the tenant and put the allottee in occupation  of the accommodation.  The tenant filed  a  writ petition  challenging  the orders of respondent No.  5.  The writ petition was dismissed and the tenant was relegated  to a  suit.   A  special appeal from this order  filed  by  the tenant  was  also  dismissed.  On September,  9,  1958,  the

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tenant filed the present suit asking for a declaration  that the orders passed by respondent No. 5 were without jurisdic- tion  and  for  consequential  reliefs.   The  trial   court dismissed  the  suit.   The appellate  court  reversed  this decree  and  decreed the suit.  On second appeal,  the  High Court restored the decree of the                             243 trial  court  and dismissed the suit.  The  tenant  has  now filed this appeal by special leave. In  this appeal the tenant challenges the orders  passed  by respondent No. 5 under sub-s. (2) of 7 and sub-sections  (2) and (3) of  s. 7A  of  the Act.  Section 7(2)  is  in  these terms                "7. (1) (a)                (b)                (c)                (2)  The  District Magistrate may by  general               or special order require a landlord to let  or               not  to  let to any person  any  accommodation               which  is or has fallen vacant or is about  to               fall vacant." Under s. 7(2), the District Magistrate can pass an order  in respect of an accommodation which is or has fallen vacant or is  about to fall vacant.  The accommodation must either  be vacant or about to fall vacant before he can pass the  order under  s. 7(2).  If the accommodation is neither vacant  nor about  to  fall  vacant, when the order  under  s.  7(2)  is passed, the order is void and is without jurisdiction. Counsel   for  the  tenant  submitted  that   the   District Magistrate has no power to pass an order of allotment  under s.  7(2) unless the accommodation is or has  fallen  vacant. This submission is based on ,a misconception.  The  District Magistrate can pass an order under s. 7(2) not only when the accommodation  is or has fallen vacant but also when  it  is about to fall vacant.  On the materials oh the record  there can  be  no doubt that the accommodation was about  to  fall vacant when respondent No. 5 passed the order under s. 7(2). Before passing the order, he issued notices to the landlords and  the tenant.  On January 5, 1957, the  landlords  stated before him in writing that the accommodation was about to be vacated  by  the tenant.  On January 22,  1957,  the  tenant stated before him in writing that he was going to leave  the accommodation in a month’s time.  On February 12, 1957,  the tenant  again made a statement before him that he wanted  to vacate the shop as the decree for ejectment had been  passed against  him.  The declared intention of the tenant that  he was  about  to  vacate the accommodation  coupled  with  the decree  for  ejectment show that on February 20,  1957,  the accommodation  was  on the point of becoming vacant  or  was about  to  fall vacant.  As a matter of fact in  the  courts below  the  appellant did not contend that on  February  20, 1957  the accommodation was not about to fall  vacant.   His contention  was that as the accommodation had  not  actually fallen  vacant,  respondent No. 5 had no power to  pass  the order under s. 7(2). 244 Counsel  next  submitted that even though respondent  No.  5 might  have  power to pass an order under s. 7(2)  when  the accommodation was about to fall vacant, the order could take effect  only when the accommodation fell vacant.  We  cannot accept  this contention.  The order dated February 20,  1957 directed  the  landlords  to lot the  accommodation  to  the allottee.   Respondent No. 5 had power to pass  this  order. The order took effect immediately. Counsel for the tenant submitted that the proceedings  under

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s.   7A  were  without  jurisdiction.   Now   the   District Magistrate  can  take  action under s. 7A  "where  an  order requiring  any accommodation to be let or not to be let  has been duly passed under sub-section (2) of section 7 and  the District  Magistrate believes or has reason to believe  that any person has in contravention of the said order,  occupied the  accommodation or any part thereof".  Counsel  submitted that  as the tenant was in occupation of  the  accommodation before the passing of the order under s. 7(2), he cannot  be said to have occupied the accommodation in contravention  of the  order.  This contention; is’ supported by the  decision in  Ram Lal v. Shiv Mani Singh and others(1), but we  cannot agree  with  the  broad  statement in  this  case  that  the continuance  after  the  allotment order  of  an  occupation previous   to   the  order  cannot  be  an   occupation   in contravention  of  the order.  It is a question of  fact  in each   case   whether  a  person  in   occupation   of   the accommodation  since before the allotment order can be  said to  have occupied the accommodation in contravention of  the order,  see  A.  K.  Khandelwal  v.  Moti  Lal  Chawla   and others.(2) In the instant case after the allotment order was passed,  the landlords agreed to accept the appellant  as  a tenant  at enhanced rent.  This letting and the  continuance of  occupation  by  the appellant under it  were  in  direct breach  of the allotment order.  In the  circumstances,  the appellant   can   well  be  said  to   have   occupied   the accommodation in contravention of the order.  The respondent No.  5 had, therefore, jurisdiction to initiate  proceedings under sub-section (1) of s. 7A and to pass the orders  under sub-sections  (2) and (3) of s. 7A.  The propriety  of  this order cannot be questioned An this suit. The  appeal  is  dismissed.  There will be no  order  as  to costs. G.C.                    Appeal dismissed. (1)  [1962] A.L.J. 260. (2)  [1964] A.L.J. 20. 245