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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 774  of  1997

PETITIONER: BABU KHAN AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NAZIM KHAN (DEAD) BY LRS. & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       16/04/2001

BENCH: V.N. Khare & Shivaraj V. Patil

JUDGMENT:

V. N. KHARE, J. L...I...T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

   This  appeal is directed against the judgment of  Madhya Pradesh  High  Court whereby the High Court has allowed  the second  appeal  preferred by the defendants/respondents  and dismissed the suit brought by the appellants herein.

   The facts of the case in brief are these:

   On 14.5.1954, one Nathe Khan, predecessor-in-interest of the  appellants  herein,  and  one  Shankar  Rao,  filed  an application  before the Tehsildar under Section 91 of the of the  Madhya  Bharat  Land  Revenue  and  Tenancy  Act,  1950 (hereinafter referred to the Act) for reinstatement of pucca tenant  Nathe  Khan  who was alleged to be  dispossessed  by Najim  Khan, predecessor-in-interest of respondents 1(a)  to 1(k) in respect of agricultural land measuring .135 hectare, situated  at  village Maksi, Distt.  Shajapur.  The case  of Najim  Khan was that the land in dispute was given to him on patta  for consideration of a premium of Rs.  100/- and  he, thereafter,  planted  trees and constructed two houses  over the  said  land.   On 31.8.1960, the Tehsildar  allowed  the application  with a direction to late Najim Khan to  restore back  possession of the land to Shankar Rao instead of Nathe Khan.   Feeling  aggrieved, late Najim Khan filed an  appeal before  the  Sub-divisional Officer, Shajapur.   Nathe  Khan also  filed  a  cross-objection  against the  order  of  the Tehsildar  directing delivery of possession to Shankar  Rao. The  Sub-  divisional  Officer, on  20.3.1963,  allowed  the appeal of Najim Khan and dismissed the cross objection filed by  Nathe Khan.  Nathe Khan and Shankar Rao thereafter filed second appeal before the Commissioner, Bhopal, being Revenue Case   No.   357/63.   The   Commissioner  by  order   dated 30.4.1963,  dismissed  the  appeal and  affirmed  the  order passed by the Sub-divisional Officer.  The revision petition filed  before the Board of Revenue, M.P.  Gwalior by Shankar Rao  and Nathe Khan was also dismissed.  It was held by  the Board of Revenue that Najim Khan and Pan Mal were already in possession of the land since 1950 and they planted trees and also  constructed two houses over the said plot of land.  On

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9.2.1972,   the  appellant  herein,   brought  a  suit   for declaration  of  title  and delivery of  possession  against Najim  Khan  and Shankar Rao.  Defendant Najim Khan filed  a written  statement  wherein  it was pleaded  that  the  suit brought  by  plaintiff was barred by limitation.  The  trial court framed various issues and one of the issues framed was whether  the  suit  laid  by the  plaintiff  was  barred  by limitation.   The trial court was of the view that the  time spent in prosecuting the case in the revenue court should be excluded  under  Section  14  of the  Limitation  Act  while computing the period of limitation for the present suit.  In view  of the matter, the trial court held that the suit  was filed  within  the period of limitation.  Consequently,  the suit  was  decreed.   The  decree of  the  trial  court  was affirmed  by  the  first   appellate  court.   However,  the defendants/respondents  second  appeal was allowed  by  the High Court.  The High Court was of the view that the benefit of Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act can be availed by the plaintiff  only  if  the  court   had  not  entertained  the plaintiffs  earlier  suit  on  the   ground  of  defect  of jurisdiction  or  other  cause of like  nature.   Since  the earlier  application  of the plaintiff was  entertained  and decided  on  merit, the benefit under Section 14(1)  of  the Limitation  Act was not available to the plaintiff.  In view of  the matter, the suit stood dismissed.  It is against the said judgment the plaintiffs/appellants are in appeal before us.

   On  30.9.1996, this Court while entertaining the Special Leave Petition passed the following order:

   The   submission  of  the   learned  counsel  for   the petitioner is that the petitioner could not have filed civil suit  without  resorting  to remedies available  before  the revenue  courts and the suit could not be filed only when he fails  before  the revenue court under Section 91 and 92  of the  Act and that being so the question of limitation cannot be  raised  against  the  petitioner  as  according  to  him limitation  will  commence  only after the decision  by  the revenue   court.   The  second   submission  is  that  after resorting  to the remedy under Sections 91 and 92 of the Act the limitation for adverse possession remains asserted.

   Issue  notice.  Mr.  Gambhir accepts notice on behalf of legal  heirs  of  respondent  No.    1.   Issue  notice   to respondent  No.   2.  Issue notice on application  for  stay also."

   Shri  U.N.  Bachawat, learned senior counsel raised  two submissions.   The  first submission is that the  remedy  of filing the suit for recovery of possession of the land under Section  93  of the Act is available to a pakka tenant  only after exhausting remedy provided under Sections 91 and 92 of the  Act  and, therefore, the suit brought by the  plaintiff was not barred by limitation.  The second submission is that once an application under Section 91 of the Act was filed by the  plaintiff before the Tehsildar, the adverse  possession of  the defendant ceased to continue thereafter and in  view of  this  legal position, the suit brought by the  plaintiff was  not  barred by limitation.  Whereas, the contention  of Shri S.K.Gambhir, learned senior counsel, is that the remedy under  Section  91 of the Act is summary in nature, akin  to Section  6 of Specific Reliefs Act and further, it is always open to the plaintiff either to take recourse to the summary

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proceedings under Sections 91 and 92 of the Act or to file a regular  title  suit  in  the civil  court  and  also  claim possession  in the same suit.  In nut-shell, the argument is that  the filing of the suit is not envisaged only after the recourse  had been taken under Sections 91 and 92 of the Act and in view of the matter, the suit brought by the plaintiff was barred by limitation.

   On  the arguments of learned counsel for the parties the questions  that  arise  for consideration  are  whether  the proceedings under Section 91 of the Act is summary in nature and,  secondly, whether it was permissible under law to file a  suit  for  recovery of possession  without  resorting  to remedy  available under Section 91 of the Act.  In order  to appreciate  the  arguments of learned counsel appearing  for the parties it is necessary to reproduce Sections 91, 92 and 93 of the Act which run as under :

   91.    Re-instatement   of   pakka  tenant   improperly dispossessed  -(1) If a pakka tenant has been  dispossessed of  the  whole or any part of his holding otherwise than  in due course of law, he or his successor in interest may apply to  the  Tehsildar  within  three years  from  the  date  of dispossession for the restoration of the possession.

   (2)  The  Tehsildar shall, after making an enquiry  into the  respective claims of the parties, pass necessary orders in  the matter and shall hand-over possession of the land to the party entitled to it.

   (3)   Before  proceeding  to   make  the  full   enquiry prescribed  by the foregoing sub-section, the Tehsildar  may pass  after  such enquiry as he may deem proper, an  interim order  for  handing-over the possession of the land  to  the applicant  if  he  finds  that he was  dispossessed  by  the opposite  party within six months prior to the submission of the  application  under  this section.  In such a  case  the opposite  party shall be ejected, if necessary, under orders of the Tehsildar.

   (4)  When  an  interim order has been  passed  regarding possession  of the land under the foregoing sub-section, the opposite party may be required by the Tehsildar to execute a bond  for  such  sum  as  the Tehsildar  may  deem  fit  for abstaining  from  taking  possession of the land  until  the final order is passed by the Tehsildar.

   (5)  If  the  person executing a bond is found  to  have entered   into   or  taken  possession   of  the   land   in contravention  of  the bond, the Tehsildar may  forfeit  the bond  in  whole  or in part and may recover such  amount  as arrears of land revenue.

   (6)  If  the  order passed under sub-section (2)  is  in favour  of  the applicant, the Tehsildar shall also award  a reasonable  compensation to be paid to the applicant by  the opposite party.

   (7) The compensation awarded under this section shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue.

   (8)  When final order has been passed under sub- section (2), the Tehsildar may require the opposite party to execute a  bond  for  such  sum as the Tehsildar may  deem  fit  for abstaining   from   taking  possession  of   the   land   in

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contravention of the order.

   92.   Reinstatement  of  ordinary tenant or  sub  tenant improperly  dispossessed    If  an  ordinary  tenant  or  a sub-tenant has been dispossessed of the whole or any part of his  holding otherwise than in due course of law, he or  his successor  in interest may apply to the Tehsildar within two years  from the date of dispossession for the restoration of the  possession.  The Tehsildar shall after making necessary enquiry  in  accordance with the provisions of  section  91, pass such orders as he thinks fit.

   93.  Civil Courts jurisdiction in regard to sections 91 and  92    No order passed under section 91  and  92  shall preclude  any person from establishing such rights as he may claim  in  the  whole or any part of the  holding  and  from obtaining  possession  of  such holding or part  thereof  by means of a regular suit in a competent civil court.

   A perusal of Section 91 of the Act shows that if a pakka tenant  has been dispossessed from the land, otherwise  than in  accordance  with  law  and if he  wants  restoration  of possession  he is required to file an application before the Tehsildar  within  3 years from the date  of  dispossession. The remedy for restoration of possession is not available to anyone   else  except  to  a   pakka  tenant  who  has  been dispossessed  otherwise  than in accordance with law.   When such an application is moved by an applicant for restoration of  his  possession,  the  first thing  what  the  court  is required  to  enquire  into  and find  out  is  whether  the applicant  is  a pakka tenant or not.  The  applicant  under Section  91 of the Act has to prove and establish that he is a  pakka tenant and he has been dispossessed otherwise  than in  due course of law.  Thus, Section 91 of the Act requires the  Court  to  go into the title of the applicant  who  has applied for restoration of possession.  In view of nature of enquiry  which  is  required to be made by  the  Court,  the proceedings  under Section 91 of the Act cannot be termed as summary  in  nature  and akin to Section 6 of  the  Specific Relief  Act.  Under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act,  a person  who  has  been dispossessed otherwise  than  in  due course  of  law can claim restoration of possession  without proving  his  title to the land.  He can succeed  merely  by establishing that he was in possession over the land and has been dispossessed otherwise than in accordance with law.  We do not, therefore, find that proceedings under Section 91 of the  Act  is akin to Section 6 of the Specific  Relief  Act. Learned  counsel  appearing for the respondent then  pointed out  that  Section 91 is in pari materia to Section  250  of M.P.  Land Revenue Code and a Full Bench of M.P.  High Court while  interpreting  Section 250 of the Code has  held  that proceedings  under  Section  250 of the Code is  summary  in nature  and,  therefore,  in view of the said  decision  the proceedings  under  Section 91 of the Act has to be held  as summary  in  nature.   In  the case of  Nathu  v.   Dilbande Hussain  AIR 1967 M.P.  p.14 which was subsequently approved in  the  case  of  Ramgopal v.  Chetu Batte  AIR  1976  M.P. p.160,  it  was held by the Madhya Pradesh High  Court  that proceedings  under  Section 250 of the Code are  summary  in nature  and  it  is open to the plaintiff to file  suit  for recovery of possession without resorting to remedy available under  Section 250 of the Code.  It is true that the  courts while  construing  a provision of an enactment often  follow the  decisions by the courts construing similar provision of

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an  enactment  in  pari  materia.   The  object  behind  the application  of  the said rule of construction is  to  avoid contradiction between the two statutes dealing with the same subject.  But in the present case , what we find is that the Madhya  Bharat  Land  Revenue and Tenancy Act  contains  one integrated  scheme  providing for remedy to a  pakka  tenant claiming  restoration of possession under sections 91 and 93 of  the Act.  The Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act was  repealed by M.P.  Land Revenue Code.  In repealing  Act i.e.,  M.P.  Land Revenue Code we do not find any  provision like  Section 93 of the Act.  We are, therefore, of the view that  Sections 91, 92 and 93 of the Act are not pari materia with  the provision of Section 250 of the M.P.  Code.  It is not sound principle of construction to interpret a provision of  an enactment following the decisions rendered on similar provision  of an enactment when two statutes are not in pari materia.   For  the aforesaid reasons we find that Sri  U.N. Bachawat  is  absolutely  correct  when  he  contended  that proceeding  under  Section 91 of the Act is not  summary  in nature.

   Coming  to the next question whether the plaintiff could have  brought  a  suit for restoration of  possession  under Section  93 of the Act without resorting to remedy  provided under  Section  91 of the Act, it is necessary to look  into the  relevant provisions of the Act.  An analysis of Section 91  read with Section 93 shows that the recourse to a  civil court  is  not  available  to a pakka tenant  who  has  been dispossessed  unless he exhausts the remedy under Section 91 of the Act.  In this connection the use of the expression in Section 93 of the Act that no order passed under Section 91 and  92  shall  preclude any person from  establishing  such rights  shows that a pakka tenant who has been dispossessed and  claims recovery of possession is first required to take recourse  to  the remedy available under Section 91  of  the Act.   This  matter  may  be examined  from  another  angle. Section  9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that  the civil  courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of  a civil  nature  except  suits of which  their  cognizance  is either  expressly  or impliedly barred.  Section 147 of  the Act runs as thus :

   147.   Exclusive  jurisdiction of Revenue  Authority Except  as  otherwise provided in this Act, no  Civil  Court shall  entertain any suit instituted or application made, to obtain  a  decision  or  order  on  any  matter  which   the Government  are,  or  a  Revenue Officer is,  by  this  Act, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of.

   If  Section 93 of the Act for the time being is kept out of  sight, it could be easily said that any civil suit by  a pakka  tenant for recovery of possession is barred by virtue of  Section  147  of  the Act.  The provisions  of  the  Act besides  conferring right on a pakka tenant for  restoration of   possession  of  the  land   from  which  he  has   been dispossessed  provides for complete procedure and  machinery for  getting  the relief of restoration of possession.   The scheme  envisaged under the Act which comprises of  Sections 91, 92 and 93 of the Act shows that where a pakka tenant who has  been dispossessed without due course of law and such  a pakka  tenant  wants  restoration of  possession,  there  is implied  exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court to grant relief to a pakka tenant.  In such a situation a pakka tenant  who  has  been  dispossessed is  at  first  instance required  to  file  an application for  restoration  of  his

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possession before the Tehsildar under Section 91 of the Act. In  view  of  the  matter, it cannot  be  said  that  remedy available  under Section 91 of the Act is discretionary  and it  is  open  to a pakka tenant either to take  recourse  to Section  91 of the Act or file suit under Section 93 of  the Act.   If such a suit is filed in a civil court at the first instance without resorting to the remedy under Section 91 of the Act, the same would be not maintainable.  We, therefore, uphold  the  contention of Shri Bachawat that unless  remedy contemplated  under  Section 91 of the Act is  resorted  to, there  would  be  no cause of action to a pakka  tenant  for filing a suit under Section 93 of the Act.

   The third question that arises for consideration in this case  is whether once a remedy available under Section 91 of the  Act is resorted to the period of limitation for adverse possession  is arrested.  In other words, whether filing  an application   under  Section  91  of   the  Act  causes   an interruption  to  the  continuity   of  adverse  possession. Article 65 of the Limitation Act runs as under :

   65  For  possession  of   Twelve  When  the  possession immovable  property  or years of the defendant  becomes  any interest therein based adverse to the plaintiff on title.

   For bringing a suit for possession of immovable property the  period of limitation is 12 years when the possession of a  defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.  Once a  suit for recovery of possession is instituted against a defendant in  adverse  possession  his  adverse  possession  does  not continue  thereafter.   In other words, the running of  time for acquiring title by adverse possession gets arrested.

   In Sultan Khan v.  State of M.P.  & Anr.  1991 M.P.  Law Journal p.81 it was held as under :

   It is true that in instant case no suit for recovery of possession  was filed but only proceedings under Section 248 of  the  Code  were  filed.  Section 248 of  the  Code  only provides an alternative forum for recovery of possession and therefore,  proceedings  under this provision will have  the same  effect  as a suit in a regular Civil Court.   Since  a suit  for recovery of possession is sufficient to  interrupt the adverse possession, proceedings under Section 248 of the Code must have the same effect.

   In Sultan Jehan Begum & Ors.  v.  Gul Mohd.  & Ors.  AIR 1973  Madhya Pradesh p.72 it was held that very  institution of  the suit arrests the period of adverse possession of the defendant.

   In Ragho Prasad v.  P.N.  Agarwal & Ors.  1969 Allahabad Law Journal p.975 it was held as under:

   It  is  not possible to hold that if the defendant  has been  in  adverse possession before the institution  of  the suit,  such  adverse possession continues to run even  after the  institution of the suit so as to prescribe a good title in favour of the defendant.

   The  legal  position that emerges out of  the  decisions extracted  above  is  that  once  a  suit  for  recovery  of possession   against  the  defendant   who  is  in   adverse possession is filed, the period of limitation for perfecting

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title  by  adverse possession comes to a grinding halt.   We are in respectable agreement with the said statement of law. In  the present case, as soon as the predecessor-in-interest of  the  applicant filed an application under Section 91  of the  Act  for restoration of possession of the land  against the defendant in adverse possession, the defendants adverse possession  ceased  to  continue thereafter in view  of  the legal  position  that  such   adverse  possession  does  not continue to run after filing of the suit, we are, therefore, of  the  view  that the suit brought by  the  plaintiff  for recovery  of  possession  of  the land  was  not  barred  by limitation.

   For the aforesaid stated reasons this appeal deserves to succeed.   We  accordingly  set  aside  the  judgment  under challenge.   The appeal is allowed.  There shall be no order as to costs.