07 August 1997
Supreme Court
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B. SUBBA RAO & ORS. Vs PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESHAT HYDERABAD

Bench: M. K. MUKHERJEE,S. SAGHIR AHMAD
Case number: Appeal Criminal 462 of 1993


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PETITIONER: B. SUBBA RAO & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESHAT HYDERABAD

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       07/08/1997

BENCH: M. K. MUKHERJEE, S. SAGHIR AHMAD

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T Mukherjee. J.      This appeal  under  Section  2  of  the  Supreme  Court (Enlargement of  Criminal Appellate  Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 read with  Section 379  of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure, 1973 is  directed  against  the  judgment  and  order  dated December 31, 1992, rendered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal  Appeal No.  256 of 1991 whereby it reversed the order  of   acquittal  recorded   in  favour  of  the  seven appellants herein  by the  Sessions Judge, Ongole in respect of charges  under Section  148 and 302/149 IPC and convicted them thereunder.  The gravamen  of the  charges was  that on February 26,  1988 at or about 6.30 P.M. the appellants (who were arrayed  as A-1, A-2 and A-4 to A-8 respectively in the trial Court  and hereinafter  will be  so referred to) along with A-3 (who died during the pendency of the trial), formed and unlawful  assembly in  the office  of the Mandal Revenue Officer, Peda  Cheriopalli (‘P.C.  Palli’ for short) village armed  with   deadly  weapons  with  the  common  object  of committing the  murder of  Nailuri Thirpathaiah  of  village Marella and  in furtherance of that common object did commit his  murder.   The  charges  were  based  on  the  following prosecution case: 2(a) A-1 to  A-5, A-6  and A-7  and A-8  were  residents  of villages  Marella,   Peda  Alavalapadu   and   Gudevaripalem respectively. A-1 was the President of Telugu Desam party of P.C. Palli  Mandalam and  A-2 to  A-8 were  his friends  and associates.  The   deceased,  Tirupathayya   (P.W.  1)   and Brahmayya (P.W. 2) were residents of Marella Village whereas Gangayya (P.W. 3) was a resident of Pothavaram village. Both these villages  were within  the jurisdiction  of P.C. Palli Mandalam. Suryanarayan  Rao (P.W.  4) was the Mandal Revenue Officer of P.C. Palli Mandalam at the material time. (b)  Since 1984, two rival political groups were functioning in Marella  village, one  led by  A-1 and  the other  by the deceased; and  a number  of criminal  case instituted by the groups against  each other  were pending.  In February 1987, elections were  held there  for the Mandal Praja Parishad in which wife  of A-1 was elected the President of the Parishad while the  deceased was  elected as  the President of Single

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Window Society of P.C. Palli Manadalam. (c)  In the  following year,  i.e. 1988,  February  27,  was fixed as  the date  for filling  nomination papers  for  the panchayat election. Some of the candidates for such election were to  file, along  with their nomination papers, extracts of voters  list and  their caste  certificates. As  such, on February 26,  1988 a  number of people came to the office of P.W. 4  to obtain  those documents. One of them was A-1, who approached P.W.  4 for  caste certificate  and  extracts  of voters list  for his  party members.  Following him came the deceased, P.W.  1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 at or about 6 P.M. with a similar  request. While they were sitting in the office of P.W. 4,  A-1, who  had  left  this  (P.W.4)  office  in  the meantime, came back and requested P.W. 4 to visit Pothavaram Village to  consider the  inclusion of  about 40 person, who were his  followers, as voter. The deceased however insisted that P.W.  4 could  not leave the office without issuing the voters’ lists  and caste  certificates asked for by him. A-1 then left  the office saying he would come back within half- an-hour and  asked  P.W.  4  to  complete  his  job  in  the meantime. (d)  Sometime later  (at  or  about  6.30  P.M.)  the  seven appellants along  with A-3  rushed into the office of P.W. 4 armed with  deadly weapons and started beating the deceased. While A-1  beat him  with an  axe on  his neck, A-2 beat him with a  similar  weapon  on  his  right  forearm  and  head. Thereafter the  others stabbed the deceased indiscriminately with knives  resulting in his instantaneous death. Then they fled away in a jeep and a car. (e)  On the following morning P.W. 1 went to Kanigiri Police Station at or about 8.30 A.M. and submitted a written report of the  incident (Ex.P-1) to S.I Sankara Reddy (P.W. 10). On that report  P.W. 10 registered a case (Crime No. 26/88) and sent copies  of the report to all concerned. On receipt of a copy  of  all  report  Srihari  Rao,  Inspector  of  Police, Kanigiri (P.W.  11) left  for Kanigiri  at 9 A.M. He visited the scene  of offence,  prepared observation report (Ex.P-2) in the  presence of  Kasavarao (P.W. 6) and other mediators, prepared rough  sketch of  the scene  of offence  (Ex. P.15) and seized some articles (M.O. 4 to 10) under a seizure list (Ex. P-2)  P.W. 11 also conducted inquest over the dead body of the  deceased in  presence of  P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 and other and then sent the corpse of post-mortem examination. (f)  Dr. Rammohana  Reddy (P.W.  7) Civil Assistant Surgeon, Government Hospital,  Kanigiri,  conducted  the  post-mortem examination on  February 28,  1988 and  found 45 injuries on the person  of the  deceased including 40 incised wounds. He issued a  post-mortem certificate (Ex. P-9) opining that the deceased died  due to  shock and  haemorrhage as a result of the  injuries  about  36  hours  prior  to  the  post-mortem examination. (g)  In course  of  investigation  P.W.  11  seized  a  jeep bearing No.  AAN- 6152  on February 29, 1988 from the garage of  one  S.  Prasad  Rao.  He  also  seized  a  car  bearing registration No.  APN-7953 on  the same  day at 8.00 P.M. In the presence  of G. Ramesh, driver of the said car. On March 7, 1988, P.W. 11 arrested A-8 and on March 31, 1988, A-2, A- 4 to  A-6, A-2,  A-4 to A-6 made statements (Ex. P-4 to P-7) respectively) before P.W. 11 pursuant to which he seized two battle axes  and two  knives (M.Os.  11 to  14 respectively) under a  Panchnama (Ex.P-8)  in the  presence of  P.W. 6 and another  witness.   After   completion   of   Investigation, successor of P.W. 11 filed the charge-sheet. 3.   The defence  of  the  appellants  was  that  they  were innocent  and  were  falsely  implicated  due  to  political

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rivalry. A-7  took a  further defence of alibi and contended that  at  the  material  time  he  was  working  as  Village Assistant in Chennupalli village, which was far off from the place of the incident. 4.   In support  of their  respective cases, the prosecution examined eleven  witnesses of  whom P.Ws.  1 to 4 figured as eye  witnesses   A-7  examined  one  witness  (D.W.  1)  and exhibited some documents to prove his plea of alibi 5.   On going  through the  judgment of  the trial  Court we find that  it put forth the following reasons for acquitting the appellants:      i)   P.W. 1  to  3  were  partisan,      interested and procured witnesses;      ii)  the   non   seizure   of   the      hurricane lamp,  which was  said to      be  burning  at  the  time  of  the      incident  and  with  the  light  of      which eye-witnesses claimed to have      seen the  incident, by  the  police      during    investigation     clearly      indicated that  there was  no  such      lamp    and    hence    story    of      identification  by  its  light  was      untrue.      iii) the  earliest report  that was      sent  by   P.W.  4  to  the  Police      Station which  could be  the F.I.R.      was not produced during trial; and,      Exhibit P-1  which was brought into      existence during  investigation  of      the  case   could  not  be  legally      admissible as F.I.R. in view of the      provisions of  Section 162 Cr. P.C.      ;      iv) the  non-examination of the (i)      jeep driver  in which  the  accused      persons allegedly  fled away,  (ii)      the village  servant  through  whom      P.W.4  claimed  to  have  sent  his      report to  the Police  Station  and      (iii) other villagers, who lived in      and around  the office  of P.W.  4,      raised   an   adverse   presumption      against the prosecution;      v) the  prosecution  case  suffered      from the  same infirmity  also  for      non-examination of  the fair  price      shop dealer,  who according  to  it      (the prosecution)  was present just      prior  to  the  commission  of  the      offence in  the office  of P.W.  4;      and      vi)   the    alleged   confessional      statements   of    some   of    the      appellants    were     deliberately      concocted   and    therefore,    no      reliance could  be  placed  on  the      alleged  recovery   of  weapons  of      offence pursuant thereto. 6.   In setting aside the order of acquittal, the High Court first demonstrated  that  each  of  the  above  reasons  was perverse and  then, on  discussion of the evidence held, the prosecution  succeeded   in  proving  its  case  beyond  all reasonable doubts  and that  the plea of alibi raised by A-7 was without any basis whatsoever.

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7.   We have  heard Mr.  Lalit and  Mr.  G.  Prabhakar,  the learned  counsel   for   the   appellants   and   respondent respectively and  with their  assistance  gone  through  the record. Mr.  Lalit submitted  that having regard to the fact that the  trial Court  detailed  and  appraised  the  entire evidence  and   gave  cogent   grounds  for  acquitting  the appellants the High Court was not justified in upsetting the same merely  because another  view of  the evidence could be taken. In support of his above contention, Mr. Lalit took us through the  finds recorded  by the  trial Court  to impress upon us  that were  the outcome  of a proper appreciation of the evidence. 8.   That in  the evening of February 26, 1988, the deceased met with  a homicidal  death in  the office  of PW  4 stands established by  overwhelming evidence on record. We need not however detail  or discuss  the evidence  on this  point for both the  Courts below  recorded concurrent findings in this regard and  those findings  were not  challenged before  us. Since, however,  the findings  of the  trial Court  in  this regard have  an important  bearing on  its other findings we extract the same:      "PWs 1  to 3  stated that  all  the      accused  entered  into  the  office      Room of  P.W. 4  and  attacked  the      deceased with axes and knives. P.W.      4 who is the Mandal Revenue Officer      sitting in  front of  the  deceased      thought  did  not  implicate  these      accused   specifically   testified,      that ten  (10) persons  armed  with      iron rods  attacked  the  deceased.      So, regarding  the  attack  on  the      deceased  by  the  assailants  with      deadly weapons  in the  Office Room      of P.W.  4 is  proved.  Admittedly,      the deceased  died  in  the  Office      Room   of    P.W.   4,    at   Peda      Cherlopalli. Peda  Cheriopalli will      herein  after   called   as   ‘P.C.      PALLI’.  The  evidence  of  P.W.  6      coupled with  Ex.P3 Inquest  report      would show  that the  deceased  had      ‘homicidal death’.  In Column-15 of      Ex.P3 Inquest  report, the cause of      death of the deceased is mentioned,      as  ‘HOMICIDAL’.  The  evidence  of      P.W. 7  (Doctor) who  conducted the      post mortem  examination  over  the      dead body  of the  deceased and who      issued    Ex.     P9    post-mortem      certificate would  go to show, that      the deceased  had  as  many  as  45      (forty five)  external injuries  an      opined,  that  the  deceased  would      appear to  have died  of shock  and      haemorrhage,   due    to   multiple      injuries. The  date of incident and      the  place  of  incident,  and  the      factum of the death of the death of      the deceased  in the Office Room of      P.W.   4,    instantaneously,   are      undisputed."              (emphasis supplied) 9.   The next  and the  crucial question  that falls for our consideration is  whether the  appellants caused  the  above

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death in  the manner  alleged by  the  prosecution.  If  the answer given  by the  trial Court  to the  above question is found to  be based  on a reasonable view of the evidence the impugned judgment  has got  to be  set aside, for law is now well settled  that if  two  reasonable  conclusions  can  be reached on  the basis  of the  evidence, the appellate Court should not  disturb the  order of acquittal. If, however, it is found  that the  finding of acquittal is manifestly wrong leading to  miscarriage of  justice as has been found by the High Court  the convictions of the appellants have got to be upheld. Keeping  in view the above principles we now proceed to consider  evidence of  the four  eye  witnesses,  namely, P.Ws. 1 to 4. Since the incident took place in the office of P.W. 4 we first take up his evidence for discussion. 10.  P.W. 4  detailed  the  prosecution  case,  as  narrated earlier except that he did not name any of the appellants as the miscreants.  There is  nothing on record to show that he was interested in the cause of the prosecution or inimically deposed toward appellants. Indeed, it was not even suggested to him in cross examination that he was deposing falsely. It can not  be gainsaid  also that  he was the most natural and probable witness  as the  incident took place in his office. His evidence  clearly establishes  that about  10 miscreants entered inside  his office  and one  of them dealt a blow on the head  of the  deceased, who was sitting in front of him, with an  iron instrument.  He further testified that when he saw one  of the  assailants raising  his hand to give anther blow to  the deceased  he ran away towards the field to save himself. In  cross examination he stated that one Fair Price Shop dealer  obtained a  release order  for palmolive oil at 6.30 P.M. Culling his evidence we get that the incident took place between 6.30 and 7.00 P.M. and at that time P.Ws. 1 to 3 were  also waiting  in his  room. Besides, A-1 was also in his room  sometime before  the incident  but left  the  room saying that he would be back within half an hour. As noticed earlier, the trial Court disbelieved the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 on the ground that they did not see the occurrence, but due to  enmity with  the party  of the  deceased concocted a false story. The unimpeachable evidence of P.W. 4 that P.Ws. 1 to  3 were present at the material time clearly shows that the above  finding of  the trial  Court is  patently  wrong. While on  this point  we may  also profitably  refer to  the earlier quoted  passage from the judgment of the trial Court where, besides  other evidence,  it relied upon the evidence of P.Ws.  1 to 3 to conclude that the incident took place in the office of P.W. 4. Mr. Lalit, however, drew our attention to the  statement of  P.W. 4  recorded by a Magistrate under Section 164  Cr.P.C wherein  he had stated that by 7 P.M. on the date  of offence  all the persons left his office except the deceased  and P.W.  3,  and  contended  that  the  above statement contradicted  his statement  in Court that all the three witnesses (P.Ws 1 to 3) were present. According to Mr. Lalit P.W.  4’s earlier  statement negatived the presence of P.Ws. 1  and 2  at the  material time.  We do  not find  any substance in  this contention;  firstly  because  the  above statement recorded  under Section 164 Cr.P.C. only indicates that P.Ws 1 and 2 were not in his office at 7 P.M. (by which time the  incident was  already over) and, secondly because, the earlier  statement did  not materially  affect the sworn testimony of  P.W. 4  that P.Ws 1 to 3 were present when the incident took place. 11.  As regards  the comments  of the  trial Court  that the non-seizure of  the hurricane lamp from the office of P.W. 4 materially affected  the prosecution  case, we  can only say that the same is baseless. Undoubtedly, at the material time

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P.W. 4  was engaged  in issuing  copies of  voters lists and caste certificates  and if  by then,  darkness has set in it can be  legitimately inferred  (leaving aside  the  positive evidence of  P.W. 4 in this regard) that there would be some source of  light to  enable him  to perform his job. In that context, it  was immaterial  whether the  police seized  the hurricane lamp, which according to P.W. 4 was burning inside the office as it was not electrified. 12.  Coming new to the criticism of the trial Court that the failure of  the prosecution  to produce  the report that was sent by  P.W. 4  to the  police station  in that  very night which according  to it was the F.I.R. made its case suspect, we may  first refer to the evidence of P.W. 4 on this point. He testified that after the incident he ran to the field and thereafter went  to the  house of  the Village servant at 11 P.M. and  gave a  written report  to him with a direction to have over  the same  to Kanigiri  Police Station. Relying on the above  testimony the  trial Court  held that that report sent to  the police  station was  the first in point of time and, therefore,  the report  that was  subsequently given to the police station by P.W. 1 (Ex. P-1) would be inadmissible in evidence  as F.I.R.  in view of the provisions of Section 162 Cr.P.C.  This aspect of the matter was dealt with by the High Court in extenso and the finding of the trial Court was taken exception to, with the following comments:-      "The learned  Judge  has  extracted      the evidence  of P.W.  4 to support      his contention  that Ex.P-1  is hit      by Section  162 of  the Code and in      fact there  was an  earlier  report      given by  P.W. 4 on record. But the      learned  Judge  has  not  correctly      quoted  the  relevant  evidence  of      P.W. 4 and only relied upon part of      it. It  is true  that P.W. 4 in his      evidence  stated  that  he  sent  a      report on the night of 26.2.1988 at      about 11  P.M. through  the village      servant    to    Police    Station,      Kanigiri. Regarding  the receipt of      Ex. P-1,  the evidence  of P.W. 10,      S.I of  Police, Kanigiri during the      relevant period, read as follow :-      ‘Prior to  P.W. 1  giving Ex.P-1 to      me, I had no information about this      crime.   None    of   the   persons      acquainted   with    this    crime,      appeared before  me  prior  to  Ex.      P.1.....  After   registering  this      crime and I issued Ex.P-14 F.I.R. I      received  a   report  from  P.W.  4      through village servant.      This statement  of P.W.  10 clearly      shows that  Ex.P-1 was  the  report      received by  P.W. 10 at the earlier      point of  time regarding this crime      and consequently P.W. 10 registered      the same  as F.I.R. and before P.W.      10 receiving  Ex.P-1, they  did not      have any information regarding this      crime.   His   evidence   is   also      specific to show that after P.W. 10      received Ex.P-1  and after  P.W. 10      issued  Ex.P-14   F.I.R  basing  on      Ex.P-1, he  received another report

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    from P.W. 4 through village servant      and probably  he has  not taken any      action thereon  since the  same was      hit be  section 162  of  the  Code.      Thus what  was received  by P.W. 10      regarding   this   crime   at   the      earliest point of time was only Ex.      P-1   which   P.W.   10   correctly      registered as  F.I.R. and  set  the      law in motion." 13.  Apart from  the above  comments of the High Court, with which we  are  in  complete  agreement,  we  find  that  the evidence of  P.W. 10  clearly shows  that the  repot sent by P.W.4, through the village servant, was received by him only after investigation was taken up. In other words, the report sent by  P.W.4 would  be a  statement recorded under Section 162 Cr.P.C  and consequently  it could  not be  admitted  in evidence. This  aspect of  the matter  can  be  viewed  from another angle also. Having regard to the fact that P.W.4 did not name  any of  the assailants,  suppression of the report sent by  him to  the Investigating  Agency did not and would not have  helped the prosecution in any way. In other words, the prosecution  would not have been benefited in any way by suppressing the report that was made by P.W.4, more so when, the fact  that the  incident took place inside the office of P.W.4 in the evening of February 26, 1988 was not challenged by the  defence. Judged  in that  perspective even  if  that report was  produced and  treated as  F.I.R. the prosecution case would  not have  been impaired  in any way much less on the ground canvassed by the trail Court. 14.  That bring us to the evidence of P.Ws.1,2 and 3. All of them claimed to have accompanied the deceased who, according to them,  was the  leader of  the Congress  party of village Marella, to  the office  of P.W.4  on the fateful evening to obtain caste  certificates and  copies of  voters’  list  of Marella and Pothavaram villages so as to enable them to file nominations  on   the  next   day  for  the  Gram  Panchayat elections. As  their such claim is fully supported by P.W.4, whom we  have no reason whatsoever to disbelieve, it must be said that they were the most natural and probable witness to the incident.  However, their  evidence has  to be  examined with utmost  care and  caution as  they belong  to the rival group of  the appellants and, hence, are partisan witnesses. In narrating  the incident  they stated  that while  four of them were  inside the  office of  P.W.4, A-1  came there and asked P.W.4   to  go to  Pothavaram to  verify  the  voters’ lists. The  deceased,  however,  insisted  that  only  after furnishing the  lists and  certificates for  which they  had come, P.W.4 could go to Pothavaram. A-1 then went out of the room. Sometime  later all the appellants and A-3 entered the room of  P.W.4, and  A-1 dealt  two successive blows, one on the head  and another  on the neck of the deceased. A-2 then beat him  with an  axe on  the right  forearm and the others started stabbing the deceased with knives. At that stage all three of  them ran away for fear of their lives. While P.Ws. 1 and  3 first  went towards  the road  and then the fields, P.W.2 ran  to his village. P.Ws. 1 and 3 next stated that on the following  morning they  reached Kanigiri by foot, got a report of  the incident  written by  a person of Cheriopalli whom they  met there  (Kanigiri)  and  then  to  the  police station at  or about  8.30 A.M.  and handed  over the report (Ex.P-1) to  S.I. Sankara  Reddy  (P.W.  10).  It  is  their further evidence that accompanied by the Circle Inspector of Police (P.W. 11) they came to the scene of occurrence and in their presence he (P.W. 11) held the inquest.

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15.  We have  carefully gone  through the  evidence  of  the above three  witnesses and  found  that  except  some  minor contradictions, the  defence could  not elicit any answer to discredit them.  Besides, the  F.I.R. fully corroborated the testimonies of  P.Ws. 1 and 3. It was, however, contended by Mr. Lalit  that the unusual delay of 14 hours in lodging the F.I.R. clearly  indicated that  P.Ws. 1  and 3  concocted  a story to implicate the appellants, who admittedly were their political rivals.  We do not find any substance in the above contention of  Mr. Lalit.  The evidence  of P.Ws.  1  and  3 clearly indicates  that they  spent the night in the fields, then walked  the entire  distance to  kanigiri which  is  10 miles got  the report  written there  and lodged  it at  the police station  at 8.30  A.M. Having seen the ghastly murder being committed  by their  rivals, it was too much to expect of P.Ws.  1 and  3  to  rush  to  the  police  station,  for reasonable apprehension to their lives in the event of their taking such  a step  could not  be excluded.  Obviously, for that purpose P.Ws. 1 and 3 took shelter in the fields in the darkness and  proceeded to  the police  station in the small hours of  the following  day.  We  are,  therefore,  of  the opinion that  there was  no avoidable  delay in  lodging the F.I.R. On  the contrary,  in our  view, it was lodged at the earliest opportunity. 16.  Another submission  that was made by Mr. Lalit was that thought P.Ws  1 to  3 claimed  to have seen A-1 to be one of the assailants,  P.W. 4, who spoke of A-1’s earlier presence in his  office, did  not mention  that A-1  was one  of  the miscreants. This  contention of Mr. Lalit is also unmerited. From  the  sequence  of  events  we  get  that  the  trouble originated when  A-1, who  was the  leader of the appellants group requested P.W. 4 to visit Pothavaram village while the deceased  insisted   that  the   voters   list   and   caste certificates sought  for by him should be handed over before A-1’s request  could be  entertained. Immediately thereafter A-1 left  the place  obviously to call his associates and to come fully  prepared with  arms. It seems to us that lest it be said that he was supporting either of the parties, P.W. 4 did not  name A-1 and for that matter any of the miscreants. We therefore  find no  reason to  disbelieve the evidence of P.Ws 1  to 3  that A-1, the leader of the group, started the assault, followed by the other appellants. 17.  As earlier  noticed,  the  trial  Court  discarded  the prosecution case  also for  non-examination of the driver of the jeep  in which  the appellants  fled away,  the  village servant and  the persons  present nearby, more particularly, the Fair  Price Shop  dealer. The High Court dealt with this aspect of  the matter  in details  and  made  the  following observation with which we are in agreement:      "It is  the case of the prosecution      that the  accused sped  away  in  a      jeep after  the offence.  It is the      submission of  the learned  counsel      for   the    accused   that    non-      examination of  the driver  of  the      said  jeep   speaks   against   the      prosecution. The jeep driver is not      an eye  witness to  the  crime  and      consequently  he   could  not  have      spoken anything  crime  proper.  At      the most  he would have stated that      the accused  has travelled  in  his      jeep soon  after the  offence. That      evidence   would   have   been   an      additional  piece  of  evidence  to

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    strengthen  the  prosecution  case.      But the  question which  we have to      consider is whether the trial Judge      is   assuming    that   the    non-      examination of  the jeep driver has      the  effect   of   displacing   the      evidence  of  eye  witnesses  about      what they  actually  witnessed.  We      are of  the opinion  that the trial      Judge was  wrong in  his assumption      that the jeep driver was a material      witness.  Consequently,   inference      adverse to  the  prosecution  could      not have  been drawn  from the non-      examination of  the driver  of  the      jeep.      P.W.  1  to  4  in  their  evidence      stated that  while P.W.s 1 to 3 and      the deceased  came to the office of      P.W. 4  the fair  price shop dealer      and some  persons were  coming  and      going to  the room  of P.W.  4, but      there is  no evidence  to show that      those persons were present when the      occurrence took  place. Accordingly      to the  prosecution, P.Ws.  1 to  4      along were present when the offence      took  place   and   witnessed   the      occurrence. Neither  the fair price      shop dealer  nor anybody  else, who      visited  the   office  of   P.W.  4      earlier were present at the time of      the offence.  In view of that, non-      examination of  the fair price shop      dealer or  other  who  visited  the      office of  P.W. 4  in  the  evening      hours on  the fateful day, is of no      consequence and  inference  adverse      to the  prosecution cannot be drawn      from their non-examination. 18.  As regards  the non  examination of the village servant to whom, P.W. 4 handed over a written report of the incident for onward  transmission  to  the  police  station,  we  may reiterate that the report did reach the hands of the Police, but only  after the  F.I.R. was  lodged and therefore, there was no need for the prosecution to examine him. 19.  So far as the alibi of A-7 is concerned both the Courts below dealt  with the  evidence given  in support thereof at length and  found the  same unacceptable.  Indeed, Mr. Lalit also did not advert to this aspect of the matter. 20.  Having carefully  gone through the evidence of the four eye witness,  the F.I.R.   and  the medical  evidence  which fully corroborates the ocular version, we are of the opinion that the  prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable  doubts. We  need not  therefore, go into the question whether  the finding  of the  trial Court regarding alleged recovery  of weapons  pursuant to  the statements of some of the appellants is perverse or not. 21.  For the  foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in this appeal and dismiss the same.