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PETITIONER: R. RUDRAIAH & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       04/02/1998

BENCH: S.B. MAJMUDAR, M. JAGANNADHA RAO

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T M. JAGANNADHA RAO. J.      Leave granted in both SLPs.      In each  of these  appeals, the  appellants are  Sri B. Rudraiah and  his son  Sri B.Veeranna. The party respondents are Sri  Lakshmi Narasappa  (3rd respondent).  Smt. Kittamma (wife of Late Narasimha Murthy) 4th respondent) and Sri S.N. Prahlada Rao,  (son of Late Narasiah (Jr.) (5th respondent). These two  appeals aeon  directed against  the order sin CRP No. 625  of 1988 and CRP No. 2829 of 1988 dated 18.7.1989 of the karnataka  High Court  allowing the said revisions which were Karnataka  High Court allowing the said revisions which were filed  by Lakshmi  Narasappa (3rd  respondent) and S.N. Prahlada  Ram.   (5th  respondent)  respectively.  In  those revisions the  appellants were  respondents.  The  revisions filed in the High Court under Section 121-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms  Act, 1961  were  allowed,  setting  aside  the orders dated 7.11.1987 passed by the appellate authority and by the  Land Tribunal  on  27.4.1987  registering  occupancy rights in  favour of  the first appellant i.e. B.Rudraiah in respect of  3 acres 34 juntas and 1 acre 24 juntas in Survey No. 55  and 62  respectively of  Saneguruvanahalli  village, Bangalore North  Taluk. Aggrieved  by the orders of the High Court dated  18.7.1989,  these  two  appeals  are  filed  by Rudraiah, the  aggrieved party.  His  son  B.  Veeranna  has joined as the second appellant.      The main ground on which the High Court has allowed the revisions of  respondents 3  and 5  and dismissed the Form 7 applications of  the 1st  appellant b.  Rudraiah is that the said application  for grant  of occupancy right was filed on 7.3.1984 beyond the period prescribed by Section 48-A of the Karnataka Land  Reforms act,  1961 (hereinafter  called  the Land Reforms  Act, 1961). The said provision in Section 48-A was introduced  by Karnataka Act 1 of 1979 (with effect from 1.3.1974) fixing  time limit  for filing  applications under Section  45  for  registration  as  "occupants"  before  the Tribunal. These  words introduced  by the  amending Act 1 of 1979 fixing time limit read as follows:       "before  the expert of a period of      six months  from the  date  of  the

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    commencement of  Section 1  of  the      Karnataka Land  reforms (amendment)      Act, 1978"      In view  of the  amendment made by Act 1/1979, the High Court held  that the  time stood  extended only for 6 months from 1.1.1979  i.e. upto  30.6.1979 and this  date being not in dispute,  the application  filed by  the 1st appellant on 7.3.1984 before the Land Tribunal was time barred.      The  appellant   No.1  seeks  to  have  the  period  of limitation extended  beyond  30.6.1979  by  linking  up  the commencement of  limitation under  Section 48-A  of the  KLR Act, 1961  with certain  orders passed  in proceedings under the  Karnataka   Village   offices   Abolition   Act,   1961 (hereinafter called  the Village  offices  (Abolition)  Act, 1961) against  Kittamma, (wife  of  Narasimha  Murthy)  (4th respondent)  and   in  favour   of  Lakshmi  Narasappa  (3rd respondent) and  S.N.Prahlada  Rao  (5th  respondent).  they being her  husband’s  brother  and  deceased  brother’s  son respectively.      We shall  therefore refer  to the facts relating to the connection of  the proceedings  before us,  under  the  Land Reforms Act,  1961 with  the proceedings under the Karnataka Village Officers Abolition Act, 1961.      The facts  leading to the dispute inter Se between S.K. Lakshmi Narasappa  (3rd respondent),  S.N. Prahlada Rao (5th respondent) on  the one hand and Kittamma on the others, are as follows:      Narasaih  (Jr),  Narasimha  Moorthi  and  S.K.  Lakshmi Narasappa (3rd respondent) are the sons of Narasiah (Sr) who was the  Baravardar of  the Shamboghi  Office of the village Saheguruvanahalli. The  lands in  question  were  emoluments attached to  the said  village office.  Th  rights  thereto, according the  respondents 3  and 5 devolved on the death of Narasiah  (Sr)  upon  his  aforesaid  three  sons.  Of  them Narasimha Moorthi  (who  allegedly  sold  this  property  on 11.3.1970 to  Rudraiah, 1st appellant) died in 1971, leaving being him, his wife Kittamma (4th respondent in these Case). Later on,  Narasiah (Jr)  died in  1975  leaving  being  him Prahlada Rao  (5th respondent).  The village  offices  stood abolished under  the Village  offices Abolition  Act,  1961, w.e.f. 1.2.1963 and under the provision of Section 5 of that Act, the  erstwhile holders  of  the  village  office  could obtain re-grant of the lands after the village offices stood abolished under  Section 4(1)  of the said Act and after the emoluments stood  "resumed" by  force of Section 4(3) of the said Act.  It is  the case  of the  1st appellant  that even before 1961,  he was  the cultivating  tenant of the land in question and  continued to  be in  possession. Prior  to his death in  1971,  Narasimha  Moorthi,  one  of  the  sons  of Narasiah (Sr)  applied before  the Asstt. Commissioner under section 5  of the  KVO Act,  1961 for re-grant of the entire lands exclusively  in his  favour. This was contested by his brother S.K. Lakshmi Narasappa (3rd respondent) and narasiah (Jr.). It  appears that  the Asstt.  Commissioner by  orders dated 22.6.1970  decided the   lands should be re-granted in favour of  all three brothers, i.e. sons of the last holders and he  did not  accept the report of the Tahsildar that re- grant should  be in  favour of Narasimha Moorthi (husband of Kittamma) alone for the entire land. narasimha Moorthi filed an appeal MA No.21 of 1971  before the District Judge and as he died,  his wife Kittamma came on record as appellant. The matter was  remanded on 20.2.1973 and after remand, an order was  passed  on  19.4.82  by  the  Tahsildar  again  against Kittamma. During  the pendently  of the appeal, Narasiah Jr, died in 1975 and Prahlada Rao, his son came on record in his

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place. Against  the fresh  order dated  19.4.1982,  Kittamma filed appeal  MA 20  of 1982 questioning the aforesaid order of the Tahsildar, before the appellate authority, impleading Lakshmi Narasappa  her husband’s brother) and Prahlada- Rao, (her husband’s  nephew), as respondents. In that appeal, the 1st appellant  Rudraiah filed  IA  No. 3 for being impleaded as purchaser  of the  entire property from narasimha Moorthi and the  said  application  for  implement  was  allowed  on 30.1.84 by  the  Addl.  City  Civil  Judge,  thew  appellate authority. Thereafter,  the appeal of Kittamma was dismissed on 17.12.1984  and the  revision of Kittamma CRP 300 OF 1985 was  also   dismissed  by   the  High  Court  on  22.1.1985. Kittamma’s SLP  (c) 9387 of 1985 was dismissed by this Court on 9.1.1987. It appears that appellant also filed CRP 654 of 1985 and  it was  rejected on  30.7.1989.  (There  are  also another SLP  (C) 14391/1981  by 1st appellant’s son Veeranna (second appellant)  and others  against an  order in another CRP 624/1985 which was dismissed by this Court on 9.5.1991). It is  to be  noticed that  Veeranna, 2nd  appellant son  of Rudraiah (1st  appellant) claims to have purchased the share of Narasimha  Moorthi from Kittamma. This is why Kittamma is now supporting  the case  of the  appellants. The above is a rsum of  the facts  in the  proceedings under section 5 of the Village Officers (Abolition) Act, 1961.      We shall  now refer  to the  rival contentions  of  the parties in the appeals before us.      It  is   contended  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the appellants Sri. R.S. Hegde that the provision in section 48- A   prescribing limitation has to be considered liberally in favour of  tenants and  the period  is to be extended. It is also  contended   alternatively  that   unless  the   claims regarding re-grant  of the  emoluments of the village office under Sections  5 of  the Village  Officers (Abolition) Act, 1961 were finally decided by the concerned authorities under that Act,  the period of limitation fixed under Section 48-A of the  Land Reforms Act, 1961 did not start, inasmuch as it is not  possible to specify who the landlord is. He contends that the application under Section 45 in Form 7 requires the name of  landlords to  be specified  and that  if it  is not known who  the landlords  are until the case under section 5 of the Village Officer’s emoluments is finally decided, time does not  start till  that question  is finally decided. yet another contention is that affect 1.2.1963, when the village offices stood  abolished and when under Section 4(3) of that Act the emoluments of the village office stood automatically resumed, the  lands stood  vested in  the  Government  under Section 4  of that  Act  and  therefore  became  ’government lands’. Consequently,  under Section 107 of the Land Reforms Act, 1961  these lands  were not  covered by  the said  Land Reforms Act.  if they  were not  so covered,  then the  time limit in  Section 48-A  of that  Act, relating  to filing of applications by  tenants for  occupancy did  not also apply. Contention is  that the said provisions under Section 45 and Section 48-A operated - by virtue of Section 126 of the Land Reforms Act,  1961 -  only  from  the  dates  on  which  the question of  re -  grant to  favour of the erstwhile village officers was  finally decided.  Hence it  is argued that the provision relating  to the period of limitation mentioned in Section 48-A  of the  Land Reforms Act, 1961 namely 6 months from the commencement of Section 1 of Karnataka Land Reforms Amendment  Act.   1978  (Act1/1979)  -  did  not  come  into operation till 22.1.1985 when Kittamma’s CRP 300 of 1985 was dismissed or  when appellants  CRP 653 of 1985 was dismissed on 20.7.1989.  yet another  contention is  that amendment to section 126  by Land  Reforms Act  introduced by act 1/79 is

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not classificatory.      The above  contentions of  the appellants are supported by learned  senior counsel  Sri P.  Krishna Murthy Appearing for Kittamma, 4th respondent. learned counsel relies also on rule 4 of the Karnataka Village office Abolition rules, 1961 dealing with  the time and manner of payment of ‘occupancy - price’  under  Section  5  and  6  of  the  Village  Offices (Abolition) Act,  1961 by  the erstwhile  village office  Es upon re - grant of lands in their favour after the abolition of the village offices. he contends that until the erstwhile village offices  are declared  entitled to  re -  grant upon payment of  occupancy price and until they had actually paid the same,  the time  fixed under  Section 48-A  of the  Land Reforms Act, 1961 does not start to run.      On the  other hand,  Sri  N.S.  Hegde,  learned  senior counsel for  the respondents  3 and  5  (i.e.  S.K.  Lakshmi Narasappa and  S.N. Prahlada Rao) contends that Section 48-A of the  Land Reforms Act, 1961 which refers to the period of limitation for  filing application  under section  45 of the Land Reforms  Act, 1961  is unambiguous  and operates by its own force  and no resort can be made to Section 5 of Village Offices (Abolition) Act, 1961 which deals with re - grant of emoluments attached  to village  office Es.  It is contended that there  can be  no linkage  between the  two Acts. it is argued that  time in the present case had expired clearly on 30.6.1979, as  fixed by  statute and  there was therefore no ambiguity in  the language  f that provision. Alternatively, it is  argued  that  these  lands,  upon  abolition  village offices, are  not ‘government  lands’. Hence  Section 107 of the Land  reforms Act,  1961 does  not apply.  On the  other hand, Section  126 of  that Act  came into  play immediately after  1.3.1974   when  section  48-A  was  introduced  with retrospective effect  by Act 1/79 w.e.f. 1.3.1974. After the Amendment in  1979, time  stood extended  for section 126 by Act 1  of 1979  was only  classificatory and only removal of doubts. Further, the respondent 3 and 5 did not. In the re - grant proceedings  under section  5 of  the Village  Offices (Abolition)  Act,   1961  disputes  the  right  of  Kittamma regarding re  - grant  of the share of her husband Narasimha Murthy and  it was  only Kittamma  who disputed the right of her husband’s  brothers to  get two  shares.  Once  the  Dy. Commissioner had  passed orders  on 22.6.1970  to re - grant under section 5 of the Village Offices Abolition Act of 1961 in favour  of respondent  3 and  5 as  also respondent  4 or again after  remand, the  Tahsildar passed  fresh orders  on 19.4.1982, the  intention of  the government  to re  - grant became  clear.   Even  assuming   that  the   lands   became ‘government  lands’   after  the   village   officers   were abolished, the provisions of Section 126 of the Land reforms Act, 1961  came into  operation, at  any rate from 19.4.1982 when the second order of re - grant was passed after remand. It is  argued that  there was  therefore no justification on the part  of the 1st appellant to file the application under section 45  (read with  section 48-A) on 7.3.1984, was filed only on  7.3.1984 and was hopelessly time barred by 5 years. Alternatively, viewed  from 19.4.1982,  it was  barred by  2 years.      On  these   contentions,  the  following  points  arise consideration :      (1) Are  the provisions of Sections      45, 48-A  of the  Land Reforms Act.      1961 dealing  with  the  period  of      limitation for  filing  application      for  grant   of   occupancy   right      (namely  6   months  from  date  of

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    Commencement of  Section 1  of Ac t      1/1979 i.e.  30.6.1979)  clear  and      unambiguous  and   not  capable  of      extension on  the ground that there      is ambiguity  or on the around that      they lead to grave injustice?      (2)  Can   the  appellant  rely  on      Section 5  and  8  of  the  Village      Officer (Abolition)  Act, 1961  and      Rule 4  Karnataka  Village  Offices      Abolition  Rules,  1961  read  with      Section 107  and 126  of  the  Land      Reforms Act,  1961 and Form 7 under      that Act,  to contend  that  unless      the rights of recontend that unless      the  rights   of  regrant   to  the      erstwhile  village  officers  under      Section   5    of    the    Village      Offices(Abolition)  Act,   1961  is      finally  decided,   the  limitation      under  Section  46-A  of  the  land      Reforms   Act,    1961   does   not      commence? Point 1:      The point  is whether  the language  in Section 48-A of the Land  Reforms Act. 1961 fixing a period of limitation is clear and  unambiguous. If  the period  is 6 months from the date of  commencement of  section 1 of the KLR Amendment Act of 1978  (Act 1/1979),  and if  the date  of commencement of that section  is not in dispute and the six month period for filing application   is  to count from 1.1.79 and it expired on 30.6.1979,  can it  be said  that the language of section 48-A is  ambiguous and  is to be liberally construed? Can it be said  that if  30.6.79 is  the last  day  for  filing  of applications by  tenant then section 48-A must be treated as harsh and  unjust  to  tenants  and  should  be  interpreted differently?      We shall  first examine the relevant provisions of Land Reforms Act,  1961.  The  said  Act  came  into  force  from 2.10.1965. Chapter  1 thereof  deals  with  ‘definitions’  . Chapter II deals with general provisions regarding tenancies like, who are tenants or deemed tenant, rent, termination of tenancies, eviction  of tenants, tenants’ right to purchase, procedure for taking possession or recovery rent etc. We are here concerned with Chapter III which deals with ‘conferment of  ownership   of  tenants’   in  possession  and  who  are personally cultivating lands as on 1.3.1974. In fact that is the date  when new Sections 44. 45 were substituted by Act 1 of 1974  W.e.f. 1.3.1974.  Section 44(1) says that all lands held by or in possession of tenants immediately prior to the date of commencement of the Amendment Act (except lands held by reasons  permitted under  Section 5) shall, w.e.f. on and from the  said date (i.e. 1.3.1974) stand transferred to and vest in the State Government.      Then come  Sections 45  and 48-A  (as  amended  by  Act 1/1979) and they read as follows:       "45.Tenants  to be  registered  as      occupants  of   land   on   certain      conditions,  (1)   Subject  to  the      provision   of    the    succeeding      sections  of  this  Chapter,  every      person who  was a permanent tenant,      protected tenant or other tenant or      where a tenant has lawfully sublet,      such subtenant shall with effect on

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    and from  the date  of  vesting  be      entitled to  be  registered  as  an      occupant in respect of the lands of      which he  was a  permanent  tenant,      protected tenant or other tenant or      sub-tenant  before   the  date   of      vesting  and   which  he  has  been      cultivating personally.      48-A.  Enquiry   by  the  Tribunal,      etc.- (1)  Every person entitled to      be registered  as an occupant under      section 45  may made an application      to the  Tribunal  in  this  behalf.      Every such  application shall, save      as provided  in this  Act, be  made      before the  expiry of  a period  of      six months  from the  date  of  the      commencement of  section 1  of  the      Karnataka Land  Reforms (Amendment)      Act. 1978".      In order to understood the intention of the legislature in bringing  forward the  above Amendment, we shall refer to section 48-A  as it  stood before the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act,  1978 (Act  1/1979).  We  shall  show  that earlier it  is  fact  contained  a  specific  provision  for condonation of delay in filing the application under Section 45, but  the same  was deleted  by the  1978 Amendment.  The unamended Section 48-A read as follows:      "Every person entitled to be      registered as an occupant under      Section 45 may make an application      to the tribunal in this behalf.      Every such applications shall, save      as provided in this Act, be made on      or before the 31st day of December      1974.      Provided that the tribunal may, for      sufficient cause  shown,  admit  an      application well  beyond that  date      but on or before 30th June, 1977".      Comparing this  with the  amended section  48-A set out above, it will be noticed that the above proviso was deleted by the  Amending  Act  1/1979  with  effect  from  1.3.1979. Therefore to  obviate hardship, 6 months time was given from date of  commencement of  Section 1  of the  Amending Act, 6 months from 1.1.1979, i.e. upto 30.6.1979.      It is  obvious that by deleting the provisions relating to the  power to condone the delay for sufficient cause, the legislature  had  clearly  intended  sufficient  cause,  the Legislature had  clearly intended  to do away with the  said power of condonation of the Tribunal. It was in fact so held by a  learned Single  Judge of  the Karnataka  High Court in Virupaxappa Vs.  Land Tribunal [1980 (2) Karnataka L.J.428]. This view,  in our  opinion, is  quite correct. If therefore the Legislature  wanted to  make a  deliberate departure and introduced  an   amendment  to   take  away   the  power  of condonation  of   delay,  it  is  difficult  to  accept  the contention that  Section 48-A  is capable  of more  than one interpretation  -  one  leading  to  injustice  and  another permitting avoidance  of such  injustice to tenants and that the Court  should opt  for a liberal interpretation. Another reason for  rejecting the  appellant’s contention is that we have also  to give importance to the words ‘save as provided in the  Act’, occurring in section 48-A. It is no where else provided in the Land Reforms Act, 1961 that the period fixed

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for tenant  to file  an application  under section  45  gets extended, None has been brought to our notice.      It is  true there  is a  principle of interpretation of statutes that  the plain  or grammatical  construction which leads to  injustice or  absurdity  is  to  be  avoided  (See Venkatarama Iyer, J in Tirath Singh vs. Bachiter Singh  (AIR 1955 SC  830 at 855). But that principle can be applied only if "the  language admits  of an  interpretation which  would avoid it".  Sham Rai  Vs. Dt. Magistrate (AIR 1952 SC 624 AT 327). In  our view  Section 48-A,  as amended,  has fixed  a specific date  for the  making of an application by a simple rule of  arithmetic, and  there is  therefore no  scope  for implying any  ‘ambiguity’ at  all. Further  "the fixation of periods  of   limitation  must  always  be  to  some  extent arbitrary and  may frequently  result in  hardship.  But  in construing such provisions, equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide". (Sir Dinshaw Mulla in Nagendranath Dev vs. Suresh Chandra Dev [ILR 60 Cal 1 (PC)].      For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the application filed by  the 1st  appellant under  Section 45  on 7.3.1984, long after  30.6.1979 is  barred  by  section  48A  of  Land Reforms Act, 1961 and the High Court was right in dismissing the said  application while  exercising  revisional  powers. Point 1 is said against the appellants. Point 2:      We shall  now  deal  with  the  alternative  contention advanced for  the appellant  and on  behalf of Kittamma (4th respondent) that until proceedings under the Village offices (Abolition) Act,  1961 as  to re-grant  became final  in the CRPs disposed on  22.1.1985 or 20.7.1989, the limitation for filing application under Section 45 did not start:      It is true that Form 7 framed for purposes of filing an application by  the  tenant  under  Section  45  [read  with Section 48-A  and Rule 19(1)] of the Land Reforms Act, 1961, requires  in   the   first   column   that   the   name   of Landlord/landlords’ and  their address  to be given. But, on the facts  of this case, if after 1.1.1979 when fresh period of limitation  was given  upto 30.6.1979 - the 1st appellant did want  to file an application, he could have mentioned in the above  column that  the landlord,  according to  him was Narasimha Moorthi  (on hid  death, Kittamma).  He could have also stated  by was  of a Note that there was dispute raised by Laxmi Narasappa and Prahlada Rao that they had two shares out of  the land  and that the said question  was pending in proceedings under Section 5 of the Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961.      Further, even  if it  was not  possible to  add such  a Note, there  is a  clear provision in Section 48-A read with Rule 19(1)  for a  public notice  in Form 8 addressed to all other persons  entitled to  be registered as occupants under Section 45  and to all Landlords of such lands and all other persons interested  in such  lands. Unfortunately,  the  1st appellant did  not avail  of  such  a  procedure  which  was clearly available and permissible. We may also state that in an application  under Section  45 as present din Form 7, the tenant  who   claims  occupancy   rights  mouser  prove  his possession as  tenant before  1.3.1974. Even if the names of landlords are  not known,  the provision  for public  notice protects the  rights to  natural  justice  of  landlords  or persons interested  in the  lands, whose names are not known to the  tenant applicant  and not  shown in Form 7. There is therefore  no   such  difficulty  as  imagined  by  the  1st appellant in  the matter of filing an application under Form 7 before 30.6.1979.

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    We shall  next take  up the  main point  that after the village offices  stood abolished  under Section  4(1) of the Village Offices  Abolition Act,  1961 and  the emoluments of the office  holders stood  ‘resumed’ under Section 4(3), the lands became ‘government lands’ and hence Section 107 of the Land Reforms Act, 1961 excluded such ‘government lands’ from the purview  of that  Act (including  Section 45) and it was only when the question  of re-grant of those lands under the Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 was finally decided that the lands  ceased to  be ‘government  lands’ and  it  became possible  to   know  who  the  landlord  was,  that  Form  7 application could be filed.      It is  true that  under Section  4(1)  of  the  Village Offices Abolition  Act, 1961  it is stated that "all village offices shall  be and are hereby abolished" and Section 4(3) says that  land attached  to the  office "be  and is  hereby resumed". It is true that Section 5 provides for re-grant if land so  resumed to  the holder  of the village office. Here what is important to notice is the language employed in sub- clause (3)  of Section  4 which  deals  with  resumption  as compared to  the language  employed later in section 5(3) of the same Act. It reads:-      "Section  4(3):   Subject  to   the      provisions of  Section 5. Section 6      and Section  7. all land granted or      continued in  respect of or annexed      to a  village office  by the  State      shall  be   an  is  hereby  resumed      and..." In other  words, the  resumption is not absolute but subject to the  provision relating  to re-grant  to erstwhile office holders as  in Section  5 and  other types  of  re-grant  in Section 6  and 7.  Section 5(1)  deals with  re-grant to the office holders  and procedure  to be followed by them to pay the occupancy-price  and  upon such payment on or before the date stated in the provision, the holder "shall be deemed to be an  occupant or  holder of  a  rioter  patty"  and  under Section 4(2),  if he does not pay the occupancy price within the  prescribed  period,  he  shall  be  summarily  evicted. Therefore,  on  ambulation  and  resumption,  the  erstwhile office holder  continues in  occupation of  the  land  which previously was  attached to  his office  and with a right to have his  claim for  re-grant considered. If he does not pay the occupancy price then he can be evicted. Of course, if he is not re-granted the land, he has any way to vacate.      Section 5  (3) which  prohibits transfer  of  land  re- granted under  Section 5(1)  (and now  as per  amending  Act 13/78 within  a period  of 15  years after  the date  of the commencement of  Act 13/78)  says in  Section 5(4) that such transfers shall be null and void and be.      "forfeited to and vest in the State      Government    free     from     all      encumbrance".      On a comparison of language employed by the legislature in Section  4(3) of  the Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 which only  speaks of  resumption subject  to re-grant under Sections 5,6,  and 7  with the  language employed in Section 5(3) which  speaks of  ‘vesting in the State Government free of all  encumbrances". It  is clear  that by mere resumption under Section  4(3) subject  to Sections  5,6, and 7, it was not intended  by the  legislature to  equate  constitutional resumption  with   absolute  vesting  of  the  land  in  the Government free from all encumbrances so as to be treated as ‘government land’.  In  fact,  because  of  the  restriction imposed by  Section  4(3)  that  resumption  is  subject  to

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Sections 5,6,  and 7,  the land  resumed under  Section 4(3) cannot be  allotted  for  general  or  public  purposes  but remains strictly  earmarked for re-grant and is liable to be re-granted under  sections 5,6,  and 7.  On the  other hand, land coming under Section 5(3) where it vests in government, free from  all encumbrance, is clearly ‘government land’ and is at  the disposal  of government  for all public purposes. Therefore, on resumption under the section 4(3) the land has not become ‘government land’.      Next we  shall refer to Section 107 of the Land Reforms Act, 1961  which is  the main  plank of  the 1st appellant’s argument.      "Section 107:  Act not  to apply to      certain  lands:   Subject  to   the      provision of  Section 110,  nothing      in  this  act,  except  Section  8,      shall apply to lands-     (i)   belonging to Government     (ii)  .......................      (iii) belonging to or held on lease           by or from a local           authority....      (iv) given as gallantry award...      (vii) used  for cultivation  by the           Coffee Board...      (viii)  held   by  any  Corporation           contract    by    the    State           Government  or   the   Central           Government or both...      Section 107  says that  the Land  Reforms Act  does not apply to  ‘government lands’. This is however subject to the provision of  section 110. Under section 110, Government may ‘by notification’  direct that  any land covered by sections 107 and  108 shall not be exempt from such of the provisions of this  Act from  which they  have been  exempted under the said section.      Reading the  section, it  appears that  there are  good reasons of  policy as  to why,  under  section  107  of  the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, government land is exempt. Firstly the  section takes  notice of  the  fact  that  when ceiling on  land held  by various  bodies is  to be imposed, such a  ceiling cannot be imposed on land held by Government or certain  other enumerated  bodies. Government  ‘right  to hold land’  can not  be limited, inasmuch as government does require lakhs  of acres for use for public purposes. Further there is  no purpose  in taking  over excess land from State Government and  again revesting  the said  land in the State Government. Again  the policy  of the legislature appears to be, so  far as Chapter III of the Act and amendments thereto are concerned, that tenants from Government are not entitled to claim  occupancy under section 435 of the Act against the Government, even if they were in possession before 1.3.1974.      We shall  first assume  that the  contention of the 1st appellant that  upon ‘resumption’  under Section 4(3) of the Village Offices  Abolition Act,  1961 the  land held  by the erstwhile office  holder had  become  ‘government  land’  is correct. The  position then  will be that if, as a matter of policy the  provisions of  section 107  of the  Land Reforms Act, came  into force, were not to be applied to such lands, then Section 45 and 48-A substituted by Act 1 of 1974 w.e.f. 1.3.1974 or  as they  now stand,  would not also apply, ever after 1.1.79  or 30.6.79. Therefore such tenants cannot seek occupancy or  ownership rights  in lands held by government, even after  1.1.79. No application under section 45 would be maintainable and the very application of the appellant would

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have to  be dismissed  on that ground, whether filed in 1974 or 1979  or later. This contention of the appellants appears to have  been advanced  without noticing  that it    clearly self-destructive.      Further, even if the land had become ‘government land’, on  resumption,   there  is   no  procedure  for  change  of ownership; from  government land  to the erstwhile-holder of village office  outside section  4(3)  so  as  to  permit  a contention that the land ceased to be government land. There can be  a cessation  of the  land as  government land  under section 107  only  if  government  proceeds  to  exclude  by notification under section 110 such land from the purview of section 107.  It is  no body’s case that after a decision as to who  is entitled  to re-grant  under  section  5  of  the Village offices  (Abolition) Act,  1961.  government  is  to issue a notification under section 110 excluding the land so re-granted from  the purview of ‘government land’. Hence the entire  theory  based  on  section  107  propounded  by  the appellant does  not fit  into the scheme of the Land Reforms Abolition Act, 1961.      Learned counsel  for  the  appellant  relied  upon  the decision of  a learned  Single Judge  of the  Karnataka High Court  in   Eswarappa  vs.  State  of  Karnataka  (1979  (2) Karn.L.J.182) as  an authority  to say  that  the  appellant could file  an application  under Section  45  of  the  Land Reforms Act,  1961 only after the determination of rights of the erstwhile  village  office  holders’  of  re-grant  were finally decided under the latter Act.      We do  not think  that the aforesaid decision helps the appellants. What is important to notice is that in that case the application  under Section  45 in  Form 7  was filed  in time. This is clear from the case Nos. of the cases filed in the Tribunal  as given in the Judgment. They appear to be of 1974 (before  1978 Amendment)  and were  disposed of  by the Land Tribunal  of 27.12.1976, long before the 1978 amendment gave further  time upto  30.6.79. In  fact, no  question  of limitation of  an application  filed under  Section 45 after 30.6.79 arose in that case nor was decided. The applications of the  tenants were contested by the opposite party stating that the  lands in question were Patel Umbli lands, and that the lands  were not  yet re-granted  to the opposite parties under the  Village Offices Abolition Act. 1961 and hence the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to decide the application filed under  section 45  of the  Land Reforms Act, 1961. The applicants-tenants, on  the other  hand, contended  that the lands  were   not  attached  to  village  offices  but  were Devadayam Inam  lands, and  that the  services  attached  to temples and  the inam  lands attached  to the  said services were both  abolished w.e.f.  1.1.1970. The Tribunal accepted the plea  of the opposite party and dismissed the Section 45 applications. The  tenants filed a writ petition in the High Court and  it was  held that if the inam lands were attached to services  rendered to religious institutions as contended for by  the tenants,  they would  stand abolished  under the statute of  1955. On  the other  hand, if  they  were  inams attached to  village offices,  they would stand abolished by Act of 1961 w.e.f. 1.2.1963. The Land Reforms Act, 1961 came into force  from 2.10.1965  and right to Occupancy had to be judged under section 45 on the basis of possession as tenant immediately before  1.3.1974 under  Act 1/1974 as amended by Act 1/1979.  On the  above basis,  it was  held by  the High Court   that is  view of  the contention of the tenants, the rights of  service   holders under  the 1955  Act had  to be consider first  because if  the lands  were  attached  to  a religious  service   as  inam,   then  the  Village  Offices

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(Abolition) Act  would not apply and no question of re-grant under that  Act could  arise. In case, it was held under the 1955 Act  that the  lands  were  not  inams  attached  to  a religious service,  then the  question of  their  resumption under  Village  Offices  Abolition  Act  would  have  to  be decided. It  was   further held  that it was only thereafter that claims  under section  45 of the Land Reforms Act, 1961 could be "considered" and      "therefore the  Tribunal will  have      to keep  these applications pending      instead of disposing them of."      Thus, all  that was  decided in  that case  was that in cases where  Section 45  applications under the Land Reforms Act, 1961  had been  filed in  time, and there was a dispute whether they were inam lands attached to a service connected with a  temple or were emoluments attached 45 should be kept pending and  adjourned till  these auctions  as to which Act applied, was decided. it is therefore clear that no question of limitation  in filing  application under  section 45  and particularly one  relating to the Amendment of Act 1/79 came up for  consideration, in  the above  case.  In  fact,  when Tribunal  in   that  case  passed  orders  on  27.12.76  the provision for  condonation of  delay in section 49A was very much in  existence. That power was taken away only under Act 1/79. Hence the above judgment is clearly not relevant.      We shall  then refer to Section 126 of the Land Reforms Abolition Act,  1961 upon  which both sides relied. It deals with "Application  of Act  to Inams".  It  starts  with  the words. "For  the removal  of  doubts"  and  states  that  is "hereby" declared  that the provisions of the Act, in so far as they  confer any  rights and  impose  any  obligation  on tenants  and  landlords,  shall  be  applicable  to  tenants holding lands  in inams  and other  aliened village or lands including tenants  referred to  in Section  8 of the Village Offices Abolition  Act, 1961,  but subject  to the provision the said  Act and  to landlords and inamdars holding in such villages or lands.      The underlined  words were  introduced by Act 1 of 1979 w.e.f. 1.1.1979.  It is  the contention of the 1st appellant that it  was only  w.e.f. 1.1.1979 that the Act gave certain rights to  tenants of  land held by village offices and that the amendment  of 1979 was not retrospective in the sense of being classificatory.  It will  be noticed  that  after  the Amendment by  Act 1/1979 in Section 126, the added words are preceded by  the words  "including". The  words ‘removal  of doubts’ therefore  govern  the  inams  abolished  under  the Village Offices  (Abolition) Act, 1961 also. in other words, the Amendment  of 1979 is classificatory or declaratory that the Land  Reforms Act,  1961 was  always applicable to lands attached to  village offices  after abolitions  of the  said offices under  the Village  Offices (Abolition)  Act.  1961. This contention  of the  appellant therefore  fails. Even if the amendment  is prospective, the application under section 45 is  to be  filed on  or before 30.6.1979 and that was not done.      Learned senior  counsel for  Kittamma (4th  respondent) Sri Krishnamoorthi  contended that  till the occupancy-price is paid by the erstwhile office holder under Section 5(1) of the Village  offices Abolition  Act read  with Rule 4 of the Rules made  under the  Village Offices  Abolition  Act,  the rights as  to re-grant  do not get crystallised and hence it is not  possible to fill up Form 7 for filing an application under Section 45 of the Land Reforms Act, 1961. It is argued that till  re-grant, the  land is ‘government land’. We have already considered this contention and rejected the same.

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    For all  the above  reasons, the appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.