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PETITIONER: B.R. MEHTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SMT. ATMA DEVI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/09/1987

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) OZA, G.L. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 2220            1987 SCR  (3)1184  1987 SCC  (4) 183        JT 1987 (3)   474  1987 SCALE  (2)436

ACT:     Delhi  Rent Control Act, 1958: Section  14(1)(h)--Allot- ment  of  house  to  wife---A  Government  employee--Whether disentitles  the husband to retain the tenanted premises  as tenant.

HEADNOTE:     The premises in question had been let out in April, 1968 to the appellant at a monthly rent of Rs.340 by the  husband of respondent No. 1 and the father of respondents Nos. 2  to 8.  In  July, 1977 the landlord filed an  eviction  petition against  the appellant on the ground of bona  fide  require- ment.  In  September, 1978 appellant’s wife was  allotted  a Government quarter due to her employment as a teacher In the Government school. In March, 1986 the first respondent filed a  petition before the Rent Controller that the wife of  the appellant  having been allotted a residential  quarter  came within  the mischief of clause (h) of Section 14(1)  of  the Act and was, therefore, liable for eviction.     The  appellant  contended that he had not  acquired  any house  and that the quarter in question was allotted to  his wife  on joint allotment basis on compassionate grounds  and that  the  same  had been surrendered  and,  therefore,  the appellant  was  not  liable to be evicted.  It  was  further contended  that  the  allotted accommodation  could  not  be treated  as alternative accommodation for the appellant  and his family.     The  Additional Rent Controller held that having  regard to the provisions of law, as the tenant had acquired  vacant possession  for residence, he became disentitled  to  retain the premises in question and, therefore, passed an order  of eviction.     The  Rent Control Tribunal dismissed the appeal  of  the appellant. The High Court rejected the second appeal.     In the appeal to this Court, the question for considera- tion  was: whether under clause (h) of Section 14(1) of  the Act  allotment of a house to the wife, who was a  Government employee,  in  all circumstances disentitled the  tenant  to retain the tenanted premises.            1185 Allowing the appeal, this Court,

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   HELD:  1. The premises in question which the wife  occu- pied was indisputably not the matrimonial home. The  husband would  not,  therefore, have any statutory  or  legal  right against  the Government to use and enjoy the allotted  prem- ises  to  the  wife of the tenant because of  her  job.  The tenant  cannot  be made to lose his tenancy because  of  the wife  acquiring possession of a flat or allotment of a  flat because of her official duties over which the husband has no right or domain or occupation. [1194C-D]     2.1  The  purpose of the Delhi Rent Control  Act  is  to control  rents  and evictions; in other  words,  to  control unreasonable  evictions and to ensure that in an  atmosphere of  acute shortage of accommodation, there is proper  enjoy- ment  of  available spaces by those who  want  and  deserve. [1189G-H]     2.2  Unless acquisition of a premises or allotment of  a premises  or a part of a premises by the tenant in which  he has domain which he can reasonably and alternatively use  as substitute  for  the place he is using in  the  tenancy,  it cannot lead to forfeiture of his right to occupy his tenant- ed  premises.  The case would be otherwise,  however,  if  a tenant comes into possession of a premises or is allotted  a piece  of  residence or acquires vacant  possession  of  the premises then such a tenant cannot prevent, if other  condi- tions are fulfilled under Section 14(1)(h) of the Act  being liable to forfeiture of his tenancy. [1190B-C]     2.3  Tenancy is a right vested in the tenant.  The  main purpose  of the Act is the protection of tenants from  evic- tion. The various provisos to sub-section (1) of section  14 laid  down the exception to this rule. The intention of  the Legislature  in divesting the tenant of his right was  based upon  the fact that the tenant had legally acquired  another residence  as of right. There is no law according  to  which husband and wife could be deemed to be one person. [1191E-F]     2.4  The acquisition of other residence must be  by  the tenant  himself before proviso (h) of sub-s. (1) of  section 14 of the Act would apply. [1191D]     2.5  If  a wife or husband acquires a property  and  the other  spouse if he/she is the tenant, has a legal right  by virtue  of  such acquisition and stay there, then  only  can such  acquisition or allotment of premises would  disentitle or attract the provisions of cl. (h) of section 14(1) of the Act, otherwise the whole purpose would be defeated. That  is the rationale behind the scheme. [1191F-G] 1186     2.6 From the fact that the wife of the tenant was allot- ted a temporary Government accommodation, it cannot be  said that there was admission by virtue of which the tenant could lose his tenancy that the wife has acquired a house which is available to the husband over which the husband has a domain which  could be a substitute to the tenanted premises.  This fact of acquisition or allotment of fiat in the name of wife (which  incidentally she has lost having given up  the  job) can be in certain circumstances a factor in judging the bona fide needs of the landlord; but the same indisputably cannot be any ground to evict the tenant on the ground that he  has acquired vacant possession or allotted residence in terms of cl. (h) of section 14(1). [1192E-F, 1193A-B]     3.  The rights, if any, of the parties in  the  eviction petition  on  the ground of bona fide need of  the  landlord will not in any manner be prejudicially affected. [1194F]     [In England the rights of the spouses to the matrimonial home  are now governed by the provisions of the  Matrimonial Homes  Act, 1967. Where one spouse is entitled to  occupy  a dwelling  house by virtue of any estate or interest or  con-

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tract  or by virtue of any enactment giving him or  her  the right  to remain in occupation, and the other spouse is  not so entitled, then the spouse not so entitled has the certain rights (known as "rights of occupation"), that is to say, if in  occupation, a right not to be evicted or  excluded  from the  dwelling  house or any part of it by the  other  spouse except with the leave of the court given by an order; if not in occupation, a right with the leave of the court so  given to enter into and occupy the dwelling house. [1193D-G]     Such  rights  are  not granted in India.  But  with  the change of situation and complex problems arising, it is high time to give the wife or the spouse a right of occupation in a truly matrimonial home, in case of marriage breaking up or in case of strained relationship between the husband and the wife.] [1193G]     Prem Chand and another v. Sher Singh, [1981] Delhi  Rent Judgment  287;  Smt. Revti Devi v. Kishan  Lal,  [1970]  All India  Rent  Control Journal 418; Phiroze Bamanji  Desai  v. Chandrakant  M. Patel and others, [1974] 3 SCR 267;  Galanan Dattatraya v. Sherbanu Hosang Patel and others, [1976] 1 SCR 535 and Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol.  22 page 650, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1170  of 1987. 1187     From the Judgment and Order dated 6.4. 1987 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 71 of 1987.     Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, Dr. Roxna Swamy and Bharat  Sangal for the Appellant. A.B. Rohtagi and Miss Bina Gupta for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. What is the true meaning of  the expression  ’tenant has before or after the commencement  of the  Act,  built,  acquired vacant possession  of,  or  been allotted,  a  residence’ in terms of clause (h)  of  Section 14(1)  of  the  Delhi Rent Control  Act,  1958  (hereinafter called  ’the Act’) is the question raised in this appeal  in the backdrop of interesting set of facts. This is an  appeal by  the  tenant  against the judgment and  order  dated  6th April,  1987  of the Delhi High Court. To the  facts  first, however,  we must go to appreciate the point. The  appellant was at all material times since 1968 a tenant of the  ground floor  of premises No. 2/14, Kalkaji Extention,  New  Delhi. The  premises had been let out in April, 1968 to the  appel- lant at a monthly rent of Rs.340 per month by one Shri  R.N. Kurra,  deceased husband of respondent No. 1 and  father  of respondents  Nos.  2 to 8. The premises consist of  two  bed rooms,  one drawing room, one dining room, one kitchen,  two bath rooms and court yard at the back and porch in the front and  one store and also one verandah. It is the case of  the appellant  that originally the appellant had occupied  these alongwith  his  wife, his aged mother,  his  son,  daughter, brother and sister-in-law. However, the brother and  sister- in-law  have since moved out and since 1979 the  appellant’s wife  Smt. Santosh Raj was only staying with the family  off and  on for short periods usually when the appellant was  on tour. In the meantime on or about 20th July, 1977 the  land- lord  filed eviction petition against the appellant  on  the ground of bona fide requirement. On or about 25th September, 1978 the appellant’s wife Smt. Santosh Raj was allotted Flat No. 93, Sadiq Nagar, i.e., a government quarter was given to

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her  due  to her employment as a teacher in  the  Government Girls  Higher Secondary School No. III, Kalkaji, New  Delhi. She goes to live there leaving the rest of her family in the premises in dispute. It is the case Of the appellant aS made out  in  appeal before us that one Shri P.R.  Arya  and  his family  were asked to share with the appellant’s wife  on  a joint-allotment basis because it was not safe for a lady  to live alone. The case of the appellant was that the relation- ship between the appellant and his wife Smt. 1188 Santosh  Raj  was not very good. There were  differences  of opinion.  The appellant wanted the wife to give up  her  job and concentrate on the upbringing of the children. The  lady was  reluctant. She wanted to pursue her own  avocation  and career.  It is highlighted before us that in  those  circum- stances  the  wife of appellant had applied  for  government accommodation  and  had gone to live in the  said  premises. However,  by  force of circumstances as  the  children  have grown  up and daughters became of marriageable age  she  was induced  to give up her job and allotment and she  has  come back  to the husband’s premises being the premises  in  dis- pute.  On 17th of March, 1986 respondent No. 1 filed in  the Court of the Rent Controller, Delhi a petition on the ground that  the  wife of the appellant Smt. Santosh Raj  had  been allotted  on 25th of September, 1978 a  residential  quarter from  the Directorate of Education, Delhi by virtue  of  her employment  in Government Girls Higher Secondary School  No. III, Kalkaji, New Delhi. The appellant therefore came within the  mischief  of clause (h) of section 14(1)  of  the  Act. Written statement was duly filed in which it was stated that appellant  had not acquired any house but that the  landlord had  tried  to take advantage of the  strained  relationship between  the  tenant and his wife. It was  stated  that  the tenant  had strained relationship with his wife and  on  ac- count of the same only she had acquired a separate  accommo- dation  and  started staying there and got her  ration  card prepared  at  the same address but since the  appellant  had grown up children and remained on touring job; therefore, in order to provide the required protection and care, the  wife of the appellant came to the house in question  temporarily. It was stated that this fact is well within the knowledge of the landlord and other members of the family. It was  denied that  Smt. Santosh Raj., the tenant had sublet  the  quarter No.  93. On the other hand it was apparent that the  depart- ment  had  allotted the house to the wife of  the  appellant alongwith  one other colleague jointly, who had now  surren- dered the same. It was further stated that this joint allot- ment had been made to the appellant’s wife on  compassionate grounds.  The  appellant was, therefore, not  liable  to  be evicted  from the premises in question it was asserted.  The case  was proceeded under section 37 of the Act. It was  the contention  of the appellant that he wanted to  substantiate by production of evidence both oral and documentary that the flat  allotted to his wife was on compassionate  grounds  in recognition  of her special need to live apart from him.  It could not be an alternative accommodation for the  appellant and  his  family. It was further stated that  the  wife  was allotted Flat No. 93, Sadiq Nagar on 25th September, 1978. A few months later, the appellant’s wife was all alone in  the flat  and felt the need for some company, and  she  arranged one of her colleagues Mrs. P.R Arya alongwith her        1189 family  should  come  to stay with her in  this  flat.  Mrs. Arya’s husband Mr. P.R. Arya was entitled to such accommoda- tion in his own right as a teacher in Government Boys Higher

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Secondary  School, Hari Nagar Ashram, New Delhi and  accord- ingly the appellant’s wife arranged to have the flat jointly allotted  to herself and Mr. P.R. Arya. Mr. P.R.  Arya  with his family entered the flat on or about 28th April, 1979 and continued  to share the flat with the appellant’s  wife  for three  years  only. In 1982 they moved out of the  flat  and since  then the appellant’s wife has continued in the  flat. In  1978 when she first occupied the flat,  the  appellant’s wife  had  a  separate ration card giving the  flat  as  her address and had drawn ration on that basis and not with  her family in the suit premises. It was further stated that  the appellant should have been permitted to adduce evidence both oral and documentary on all the above facts. But the learned Additional Rent Controller directed that no evidence need be necessary as the matter could be decided on admitted  facts. In view of the provisions of law as the tenant had  acquired vacant possession for residence became disentitled to retain the premises in question, he, therefore, passed an order  of eviction.     Aggrieved  by the aforesaid order the appellant went  up in  appeal  being R.C.A. No. 957 of 1986. The  learned  Rent Control  Tribunal  negatived the appellant’s  plea  that  he should  have been allowed to produce evidence in support  of his averment of strained relations with his wife and that on account of these strained relations he could not in any  way avail  of  the allotment of the flat to his wife.  The  Rent Control Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the appellant.     Being  aggrieved  thereby the appellant  approached  the High Court in second appeal. The High Court by its  impugned judgment  dated  6th of April, 1987 summarily  rejected  the appeal. Being further aggrieved the appellant has come up to this Court as mentioned hereinbefore.     The  short question is whether under clause (h) of  Sec- tion 14(1) of the Act allotment of a house to a wife who  is a  Government employee in all circumstances disentitled  the tenant  to  retain the tenanted premises. We are  unable  to accept  the view of the Delhi High Court. We have noted  the provisions.  The purpose of the Act is to control rents  and eviction, in other words, to control unreasonable  evictions and  to  ensure that in an atmosphere of acute  shortage  of accommodation, there is proper enjoyment of available spaces by  those  who want and deserve. In other words,  to  ensure that there is no unreasonable and unnecessary spaces in  the hands of one tenant and 1190 other  tenants and landlords’ need of occupation  of  spaces remains  unsatisfied;  clause  (h) of Section  14(1)  is  an attempt in a way to ration out accommodation between tenants and  landlords.  Looked at from that point  of  view  unless acquisition of a premises or a flat or allotment of a  prem- ises  or  part of a premises by the tenant in which  he  has domain  which he can reasonably and alternatively use  as  a substitute  for  the  place he is using in  the  tenancy  it cannot  lead  to  a forfeiture of his right  to  occupy  his tenanted premises. The case would be otherwise, however,  if a tenant comes into possession of a premises or is  allotted a  piece of residence or acquires vacant possession  of  the premises then such a tenant cannot prevent, if other  condi- tions are fulfilled under section 14(1)(h) of the Act  being liable  to  forfeiture of his tenancy. But counsel  for  the respondent  heavily  relied on a decision of this  Court  in Prem  Chand  and another v. Sher Singh,  [1981]  Delhi  Rent Judgment  287. That was a case under the Delhi Rent  Control Act,  1958 and section 14(1)(h) of the Act came up for  con- sideration.  The  respondent-tenant was  out  of  possession

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since October 9. 1976. He was dispossessed during the  pend- ency  of  the appeal before the Rent Control  Tribunal.  The respondent’s  son was a business executive, who was, at  one time,  allotted  a flat by his employers.  On  December  12, 1980,  the respondent’s wife purchased a flat at Saket  from the   Delhi  Development Authority,  at a cost of about  Rs. 1,20,000.  The flat was available to the  respondent  though his  explanation is that it had been let out by his wife  to their  son. The respondent thereafter has now no case to  be put back in possession of the flat in dispute.  Chandrachud, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Court observed that  the Court had allowed the appellants to amend their applications for possession by pleading that the respondent had  acquired possesion  of a vacant residence within the meaning of  sec- tion  14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,  1958.  Having considered  the  averments of the parties on  the  point  at issue  it  was  held in that case that  the  respondent  had through  his wife acquired vacant possession of a  residence in  Delhi and in that view of the matter was held not  enti- tled  to  retain  old tenanted premises.  Mr.  Avadh  Bihari Rohtagi,  learned  counsel strenuously contended  before  us that this proposition that acquisition of a flat by the wife was  acquisition by the tenant and such acquisition  in  all circumstances  would  be  within  the  mischief  of  section 14(1)(h)  of  the  Act and would disentitle  the  tenant  to retain  his flat in question. We are unable to  accept  this reading  of  the said Act. The said decision rested  on  the facts  of  that case. There in that case, this  Court  found that the respondent’s wife had purchased a flat in Saket and further found that the flat was available to the respondent. In  those circumstances it was held that there was  acquisi- tion of vacant possession of a residence and as such section 14(1)(h) of the Act would      1191 be  attracted. It cannot however be laid down as  a  general proposition  of law that acquisition of flat by the wife  in all circumstances would amount to acquisition of fiat by the tenant. This position has been very properly highlighted  in the  decision of the Delhi High Court in Smt. Revti Devi  v. Kishan Lal, [1970] All India Rent Control Journal 418  where Deshpandey,  J. as the learned Chief Justice then was;  held that  the mere occupation of a new residence by  the  tenant without  any  legal right to do so would not be  covered  by proviso (h) to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control  Act. If he goes to stay in the house of his wife, legally  speak- ing,  he has no right as such to stay and can be turned  out from  the house at any time by its legal owner, namely,  the wife.  There was no law according to which the  husband  and the wife could be deemed to be one person. Therefore,  where proviso (h) required that the tenant himself should  acquire vacant possession of another residence before he can  become liable  to  eviction, the effect of its language  cannot  be whittled  down by arguing that proviso (h) would apply  even if  it is not the tenant himself but his wife or  his  other relation were to acquire such other residence. Therefore, as a  general  proposition  of law, the  acquisition  of  other residence  must be by the tenant himself before proviso  (h) to  sub-s. (1) of s. 14 of the Act would apply. The  learned Judge  dealt with this and observed that in  construing  the above provision, it has to be borne in mind that the  scheme of the Act had to be appreciated. Tenancy is a right  vested in the tenant. The main purpose of the Act is the protection of tenants from eviction. The various provisos to sub-s. (1) of  s. 14 laid down the exception to this rule. The  learned Judge  observed that when proviso (h) made tenant liable  to

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eviction,  its effect was to divest the tenant of his  right of  tenancy. The intention of the legislature  in  divesting the  tenant  of his right was based upon the fact  that  the tenant  had legally acquired another residence as of  right. There is no law according to which husband and wife could be deemed  to  be one person. Therefore, the  correct  position must be that if a wife or a husband acquires a property  and the other spouse if he/she is the tenant, has a legal  right by virtue of such acquisition and stay there, then only  can such  acquisition or allotment of premises would  disentitle or  attract  the  provisions of cl. (h)  of  section  14(1), otherwise  the  whole purpose would be  defeated.  In  other words  if  for all practical and real sense the  tenant  ac- quired,  built  or was allotted another residence  then  his need  for  the old tenanted residence goes  and  the  tenant loses his right to retain his tenanted premises. That is the rationale behind the scheme.     Dr.  Roxna Swamy drew our attention to the  various  as- pects  of the case where no proper opportunity was given  to the  tenant to show that in fact the husband would  not  and did not have any right at all to 1192 come  to the premises allotted to the wife which  was  taken because  of  the strained relation of the husband  and  wife regarding  the career of the wife. In such a house the  hus- band will not come, he will certainly have no legal right or access for either staying or coming in the premises acquired by  the  wife. If it defeats the husband’s tenancy  then  it would  be  mockery of justice. Mr. Rohtagi tried  to  submit that  there was no evidence before the trial court  as  well the High Court of the alleged strained relationship  between the  parties.  What is necessary is that unless there  is  a positive evidence, and here there is none, of acquisition of property prima facie in the name of the tenant or  allotment of  flat to the tenant, it cannot be said to have  been  ac- quired by or allotted to some members of the tenant’s family other  than the wife. That cannot defeat the tenant’s  right under  clause  (h)  of section 14(1). If there  is  such  an acquisition  by or on behalf of the tenant then  the  tenant and members of the tenant’s family would have dominion  over the acquired residence. Such acquisition would bring to  the tenant  the mischief of section 14(1)(h) of the Act. In  the case  of this nature the appellate court had ample power  in our opinion to have taken additional evidence. Our attention was  drawn to a decision of the learned Single Judge in  the case of Raj Kumar v. Vedprakash, [ 1982] Jabalpur Law  Jour- nal 45 1. Our attention was drawn at the bar that a judgment can be given on admission, that is to say, in this case that an  allotment  had been made in favour of the  wife  or  the tenant.  Our  attention was drawn to Mulla’s Code  of  Civil Procedure, Vol. II, 14th Edition page 1148 which  highlights that  such oral admission must be definite  and  unambiguous and must be satisfactorily established. In our opinion, from the  fact that the wife of the tenant was allotted a  tempo- rary Government accommodation, it cannot be said that  there was admission by virtue of which the ’tenant could lose  his tenancy  that the wife has acquired a house which is  avail- able  to  the husband over which the husband  has  a  domain which  could  be a substitute to the tenanted  premises.  In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that there was no admission at all.     Our  attention  was  drawn to  certain  observations  of Bhagwati,  J.,  as the learned Chief Justice  then  was,  in Phiroze  Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel  and  others, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 267, where dealing with certain facts wheth-

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er  premises given on a licence could be considered in  con- sidering  the bona fide requirement of the landlord  to  the allotment or acquisition. In our opinion, this principle  is wholly  irrelevant for the point in controversy before  this Court.  We are not concerned here whether there  was  ground for  bona fide requirement of the landlord for which a  suit had been filed and which is pending 1193 appeal. This fact of acquisition or allotment of flat in the name  of wife (which incidentally she has lost having  given up  her  job) can be in certain circumstances  a  factor  in judging  the bona fide needs of the landlord; but  the  same indisputably cannot be any ground to evict the tenant on the ground that he has acquired vacant possession or been allot- ted  residence in terms of clause (h) of section 14(1).  Mr. Rohtagi  drew our attention to certain observations of  this Court  in  Gajanan Dattatraya v. Sherbanu Hosang  Patel  and others, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 535, where this Court held that  the tenant’s  liability  to  eviction arises when  the  fact  of unlawful  subletting is proved. The fact  that  subsequently the  other  tenant had left the premises does not  cure  the mischief  done. Mr. Rohtagi placing this decision  tried  to urge  before us that the allotment itself of a residence  or acquisition of a residence by the tenant or the wife of  the tenant was sufficient to attract clause (h) of section 14(1) of  the Act. The fact that subsequently the tenant had  left the premises was irrelevant and did not affect the position. It.was  further  submitted that the tenant  had  acquired  a premises  or allotted a residence which could be  considered to  be  so in terms of clause (h) of section 14(1)  but  the flat  in question allotted to the wife of the  tenant  could not  by  any stretch of imagination be considered  to  be  a matrimonial  home. In England the rights of the  spouses  be husband or wife to the matrimonial home are now governed  by the  provisions of Matrimonial Homes Act,  1967.  Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. 22 page 650 deals with the  rights of occupation in matrimonial home and  paragraph 1047 deals with and provides that where one spouse is  enti- tled  to occupy a dwelling house by virtue of any estate  or interest  or contract or by virtue of any  enactment  giving him or her the right to remain in occupation, and the  other spouse  is not so entitled, then the spouse not so  entitled has  the  certain rights (known as "rights  of  occupation") that  is to say if in occupation, a right not to be  evicted or  excluded  from the dwelling house or any part of  it  by the  .other spouse except with the leave of the court  given by an order if not in occupation, a right with the leave  of the  court  so given to enter into and occupy  the  dwelling house.  But such rights are not granted in India  though  it may  be that with change of situation and  complex  problems arising  it  is high time to give the wife or the  spouse  a right of occupation in a truly matrimonial home, in case  of marriage  breaking  up or in case of  strained  relationship between  the husband and the wife. We, however,  cannot  for the purpose of this case get much assistance from the  prin- ciple  adumbrated  in paragraph 1047 of Halsbury’s  Laws  of England.  In  England  cases before  1968  established  that occupation of the matrimonial home by a tenant’s wife  after the tenant had left counts as occupation by the tenant so as to preserve the 1194 statutory  tenancy for as long as the marriage  itself  sub- sists. In those circumstances in England the landlord  could not properly be granted an order for possession against  the husband  unless there were available grounds for  possession

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against both husband and wife. The tenant cannot abandon his rights  while his wife remains; nor can the  landlord  evict the wife even if the tenant consents or purports to  surren- der  his statutory tenancy. This is the result of  the  case law  in England and much social awareness and the case  laws have  been  given statutory expression  in  the  Matrimonial Homes  Act 1967. We have no such law. The premises in  ques- tion which the wife occupied was indisputably not the matri- monial  home.  It is nobody’s case. The husband  would  not, therefore,  have  any statutory or legal right  against  the Government  to  use and enjoy the allotted premises  to  the wife  of the tenant because of her job. Looked at  from  any point of view, the tenant cannot be made to lose his tenancy because of wife acquiring possession of a flat or  allotment of  a  flat because of her official duties  over  which  the husband has no right or domain or occupation.     In  the premises we are unable to sustain  the  judgment under  appeal. To complete the story the wife of the  tenant has  resigned  and has joined the husband at  2/14,  Kalkaji Extension, New Delhi. We hope there will be no more strained relationship in the family. Hereafter they will live happily provided  the  landlord permits so. We shall try  to  ensure that they so permit.     The appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of  the High Court and the Courts below are set aside. The  eviction petition  under section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi  Rent  Control Act,  1958 is dismissed. In the facts and  circumstances  of the  case  the parties will bear and pay  their  own  costs. This, however, will not in any manner prejudice the  fights, if any, of the parties in the other eviction petition on the ground  of bona fide need of the landlord which we are  told is still pending. N.P.V.                                       Appeal allowed. 1195