REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2684 OF 2007

B.Premanand & Others ..Appellants

versus

Mohan Koikal & Others ..Respondents

O R D E R

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

This Appeal has been filed  against the impugned  

judgment/order of the Full Bench of the High Court of Kerala  

at Ernakulam dated 24th May, 2006 passed in Writ Appeal No.  

1774 of 2003.  By that judgment the writ appeal filed by the  

appellants against the judgment of a learned Single Judge  

dated 24th September, 2003 has been dismissed.

The facts have been set out in the impugned judgment  

and hence we are not repeating the same here except wherever  

necessary.

The dispute in this appeal is about the  inter se  

seniority on the post of Block Development Officer between  

the general category candidates (the respondent Nos.1 to 5  

herein) and the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe candidates  

(the appellants herein).

The rule relevant for this purpose is Rule 27(c) of  

the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1959 (for

short 'the Rules'), which states:

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“27(c) Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  clauses  (a)  and  (b)  above,  the  seniority  of  a  person appointed to a class, category or grade in  a service on the advice of the Commission shall,  unless he has been reduced to a lower rank as  punishment, be determined by the  date of first  effective advice made for his appointment to such  class,  category  or  grade  and  when  two  or  more  persons  are  included  in  the  same  list  of  candidates  advised,  their  relative  seniority  shall be fixed according to the order in which  their names are arranged in the advice list.”

A perusal of the above rule shows that seniority is  

to be determined by the date of first effective advice made  

by the Public Service Commission to the State Government for  

appointment.   

Admittedly, in the present case, the first effective  

advice for the appellants was made by the Kerala Public  

Service  Commission  on  8.7.1992,  and  they  joined  between  

13.8.1992  and  22.10.1992  whereas  the  advice  for  the  

respondent Nos. 1 to 5 was made on 6.4.1993, and they were  

appointed as B.D.O. On 28.9.1993 and they joined between  

6.10.1993 and 17.11.1993.  Hence, it is obvious from Rule  

27(c) of the Rules that the appellants are senior to the  

private  respondents.   However,  both  the  learned  Single  

Judge  and  Full  Bench  have  held  in  favour  of  the  

respondents.

We have carefully perused the judgments of the Full  

Bench and the learned Single Judge, and we regret we cannot  

agree with them.

The Full Bench and Single Judge have relied on  

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equity, justice and good conscience, rather than law.  We  

are of the opinion that this approach is incorrect.  When  

there is a conflict between law and equity, it is the law  

which is to prevail.  Equity can only supplement the law  

when there is a gap in it, but it cannot supplant the law.

In the present case, Rule 27(c) clearly makes the  

appellants  senior  to  the  respondents  as  the  advice  for  

their  appointments  were  made  prior  to  that  for  the  

respondents.  

Mr. V.Shekhar, learned senior counsel, appearing for  

the  private  respondents,  however,  submitted  that  due  to  

certain obstructions for which the private respondents are  

not to be blamed, their first effective advice was sent  

later.  Mr. Shekhar submitted that the rank list for the  

respondents was prepared after due selection on 25.11.1987,  

but  the  advice  was  not  sent  by  the  Public  Service  

Commission till 1993 because of a letter dated 30.11.1988  

issued by the Chief Secretary, Kerala Government directing  

the Commissioner of Rural Development to start applying the  

ratio in respect of cadre strength instead of the practice

being  followed.   Since  the  respondents'  rank  list  was  

expiring on 24.11.1990, they apprehended that they would  

not get appointment, and hence they filed writ petition No.  

9161  of  1989  in  the  High  Court.  Ultimately,  the  writ  

petition was allowed and the order of the Chief Secretary  

set aside, but in the meantime, the State Government issued  

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notification  dated  5.12.1989  inviting  applications  from  

SC/ST  candidates  for  appointment  as  B.D.Os.  under  the  

special recruitment as per Rule 17A of the Rules. The rank  

list with regard to these SC/ST candidates was published on  

20.6.1992,  and  hence  they  were  appointed  before  the  

candidates  whose  rank  list  was  published  in  1987  (the  

respondents herein).  However, under Rule 27(c) what has to  

be seen for determining seniority is not the date when the  

rank list was published but the date when the advice was  

sent.

Mr. Shekhar has relied on the decision of this Court  

in Dalilah Sojah vs. State of Kerala & Others, (1998) 9 SCC  

641.   That  decision,  in  our  opinion,  is  clearly  

distinguishable as it makes no reference to Rule 27(c) of  

the Rules.  Moreover, the observation therein that “when  

two vacancies arose on 6.10.72 the appellant had a right to  

be  appointed  against  one  of  the  vacancies”  is  clearly

against  the  settled  legal  position  that  even  a  selected  

candidate has no indefeasible right to be appointed vide  

Constitution Bench decision in Shankarsan Dash vs. Union of  

India, AIR 1991 SC 1612, and several decisions thereafter.

In our opinion, Rule 27(c) of the Rules is plain and  

clear.   Hence,  the  literal  rule  of  interpretation  will  

apply to it.  No doubt, equity may be in favour of the  

respondents  because  they  were  selected  earlier,  but  as  

observed earlier, if there is a conflict between equity and  

the law, it is the law which must prevail.  The law, which  

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is contained in Rule 27(c), is clearly in favour of the  

appellants.  

Hence,  we  cannot  accept  the  submission  of  the  

learned senior counsel for the private respondents.  The  

language of Rule 27(c) of the Rules is clear and hence we  

have to follow that language.

In M/s. Hiralal Ratanlal vs. STO, AIR 1973 SC 1034,  

this Court observed:   

"In  construing  a  statutory  provision  the  first  and foremost rule of construction is the literaly  construction.  All that the Court has to see at  the very outset is what does the provision say.  If the provision is unambiguous and if from the  provision  the  legislative  intent  is  clear,  the  Court need not call into aid the other rules of  construction  of  statutes.   The  other  rules  of  construction are called into aid only when the  legislative intent is not clear."

       (emphasis supplied)  

It  may  be  mentioned  in  this  connection  that  the  

first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute  

in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of  

interpretation.  The other rules of interpretation e.g. the  

mischief rule, purposive interpretation etc. can only be  

resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous  

or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally  

would nullify the very object of the statute.   Where the  

words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous,  

recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation  

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other  than  the  literal  rule,  vide  Swedish  Match  AB vs.  

Securities and Exchange Board, India, AIR 2004 SC 4219.  As  

held in  Prakash Nath Khanna vs.  C.I.T. 2004 (9) SCC 686,  

the  language  employed  in  a  statute  is  the  determinative  

factor  of  the  legislative  intent.   The  legislature  is  

presumed to have made no mistake.  The presumption is that  

it intended to say what it has said.  Assuming there is a  

defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature,  

the Court cannot correct or make up the deficiency, vide  

Delhi Financial Corporation vs.  Rajiv Anand  2004 (11) SCC  

625.   Where  the  legislative  intent  is  clear  from  the  

language,  the  Court  should  give  effect  to  it,  vide

Government  of  Andhra  Pradesh vs.  Road  Rollers  Owners  

Welfare Association 2004(6) SCC 210, and the Court should  

not seek to amend the law in the garb of interpretation.    

As stated by Justice Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme  

Court (see 'Of Law & Men : Papers and Addresses of Felix  

Frankfurter') :

"Even within their area of choice the courts are  not at large.  They are confined by the nature  and  scope  of  the  judicial  function  in  its  particular  exercise  in  the  field  of  interpretation.  They  are  under  the  constraints  imposed  by  the  judicial  function  in  our  democratic  society.   As  a  matter  of  verbal  recognition certainly, no one will gainsay that  the  function  in  construing  a  statute  is  to  ascertain  the  meaning  of  words  used  by  the  legislature.  To go beyond it is to usurp a power  which  our  democracy  has  lodged  in  its  elected  legislature.   The  great  judges  have  constantly  admonished  their  brethren  of  the  need  for  discipline in observing the limitations.  A judge  

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must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge  nor  to  contract  it.   Whatever  temptations  the  statesmanship  of  policy-making  might  wisely  suggest,  construction  must  eschew  interpolation  and evisceration.  He must not read in by way of  creation.  He must not read out except to avoid  patent nonsense or internal contradiction."  

As observed by Lord Granworth in Grundy v. Pinniger,  

(1852) 1 LJ Ch 405:

"  'To  adhere  as  closely  as  possible  to  the  literal meaning of the words used, is a cardinal

rule from which if we depart we launch into a sea  of difficulties which it is not easy to fathom."

In  other  words,  once  we  depart  from  the  literal  

rule, then any number of interpretations can be put to a  

statutory provision, each Judge having a free play to put  

his  own  interpretation  as  he  likes.   This  would  be  

destructive  of  judicial  discipline,  and  also  the  basic  

principle in a democracy that it is not for the Judge to  

legislate  as  that  is  the  task  of  the  elected  

representatives  of  the  people.  Even  if  the  literal  

interpretation results in hardship or inconvenience, it has  

to be followed (see G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory  

Interpretations, 9th Edn. pp 45-49).  Hence departure from  

the literal rule should only be done in very rare cases,  

and ordinarily there should be judicial restraint in this  

connection.   

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As the Privy Council observed (per Viscount Simonds,  

L.C.):

"Again and again, this Board has insisted that in  construing  enacted  words  we  are  not  concerned  with  the  policy  involved  or  with  the  results,  injurious  or  otherwise,  which  may  follow  from  giving effect to the language used."(see Emperor  v. Benoarilal Sarma, AIR 1945 PC 48, pg. 53).

As observed by this Court in CIT vs. Keshab Chandra  

Mandal, AIR 1950 SC 265:

"Hardship  or  inconvenience  cannot  alter  the  meaning  of  the  language  employed  by  the  Legislature if such meaning is clear on the face  of the statute".   

Where the words are unequivocal, there is no scope  

for  importing  any  rule  of  interpretation  vide  Pandian  

Chemicals Ltd. vs. C.I.T. 2003(5) SCC 590.

It is only where the provisions of a statute are  

ambiguous  that  the  Court  can  depart  from  a  literal  or  

strict construction vide  Narsiruddin vs.  Sita Ram Agarwal  

AIR 2003 SC 1543.  Where the words of a statute are plain  

and unambiguous effect must be given to them vide  Bhaiji  

vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla 2003(1) SCC 692.

No doubt in some exceptional cases departure can be  

made from the literal rule of the interpretation, e.g. by  

adopting a purposive construction, Heydon's mischief rule,  

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etc.  but  that  should  only  be  done  in  very  exceptional  

cases.   Ordinarily,  it  is  not  proper  for  the  Court  to  

depart  from  the  literal  rule  as  that  would  really  be  

amending the law in the garb of interpretation, which is  

not permissible vide  J.P. Bansal vs.  State of Rajasthan &

Anr.  AIR 2003 SC 1405,  State of Jharkhand & Anr.  vs.  

Govind Singh   JT 2004(10) SC 349 etc..  It is for the  

legislature to amend the law and not the Court vide State  

of Jharkhand & Anr.  vs.  Govind Singh JT 2004(10) SC 349.  

In  Jinia Keotin vs.  K.S. Manjhi, 2003 (1) SCC 730, this  

Court observed :

" The Court cannot legislate.....under the garb  of interpretation.......".

Hence, there should be judicial restraint in this  

connection, and the temptation to do judicial legislation  

should  be  eschewed  by  the  Courts.   In  fact,  judicial  

legislation is an oxymoron.   

In  Shiv  Shakti  Co-operative  Housing  Society vs.  

Swaraj Developers AIR 2003 SC 2434, this Court observed:

"It is a well settled principle in law that the  Court  cannot  read  anything  into  a  statutory  provision  which  is  plain  and  unambiguous.   A  statute  is  an  edict  of  the  legislature.   The  language  employed  in  a  statute  is  the  determinative factor of legislative intent."

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Where the language is clear, the intention of the  

legislature has to be gathered from the language used vide  

Grasim Industries Limited vs. Collector of Customs 2002 (4)

SCC 297 and  Union of India  vs.  Hamsoli Devi  2002 (7) SCC  

273.

In Union of India and another vs. Hansoli Devi and  

others 2002(7)SCC (vide para 9), this Court observed :

"It is a cardinal principle of construction of a  statute that when the language of the statute is  plain and unambiguous, then the court must give  effect to the words used in the statute and it  would  not  be  open  to  the  courts  to  adopt  a  hypothetical  construction  on  the  grounds  that  such  construction  is  more  consistent  with  the  alleged object and policy of the Act."

The function of the Court is only to expound the law  

and not to legislate vide District Mining Officer vs. Tata  

Iron and Steel Company 2002 (7) SCC 358.  If we accept the  

interpretation  canvassed  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

private respondents, we will really be legislating because  

in the guise of interpretation we will be really amending  

Rule 27(c) of the Rules.  

In  Gurudevdatta  VKSSS  Maryadit  vs.  State  of  

Maharashtra AIR 2001 SC 1980, this Court observed :

"It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of  

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statute  that  the  words  of  a  statute  must  be  understood in their natural, ordinary or popular

sense  and  construed  according  to  their  grammatical  meaning,  unless  such  construction  leads  to  some  absurdity  or  unless  there  is  something in the context or in the object of the  statute to suggest to the contrary.  The golden  rule is that the words of a statute must prima  facie be given their ordinary meaning.  It is yet  another rule of construction that when the words  of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous,  then the Courts are bound to give effect to that  meaning, irrespective of the consequences.  It is  said that the words themselves best declare the  intention  of  the  law-giver.   The  Courts  are  adhered to the principle that efforts should be  made to give meaning to each and every word used  by  the  legislature  and  it  is  not  a  sound  principle of construction to brush aside words in  a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they  can  have  a  proper  application  in  circumstances  conceivable  within  the  contemplation  of  the  statute".  

The same view has been taken by this Court in  S.  

Mehta vs. State of Maharashtra 2001 (8) SCC 257 (vide para  

34)  and  Patangrao  Kaddam vs.  Prithviraj  Sajirao  Yadav  

Deshmugh AIR 2001 SC 1121.

The literal rule of interpretation really means that  

there  should  be  no  interpretation.   In  other  words,  we  

should read the statute as it is, without distorting or  

twisting its language.   

We  may  mention  here  that  the  literal  rule  of  

interpretation is not only followed by Judges and lawyers,  

but it is also followed by the lay man in his ordinary  

life.  To give an illustration, if a person says "this is a  

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pencil", then he means that it is a pencil; and it is not  

that when he says that the object is a pencil, he means  

that it is a horse, donkey or an elephant.  In other words,  

the  literal  rule  of  interpretation  simply  means  that  we  

mean what we say and we say what we mean.  If we do not  

follow the literal rule of interpretation, social life will  

become impossible, and we will not understand each other.  

If we say that a certain object is a book, then we mean it  

is a book.  If we say it is a book, but we mean it is a  

horse, table or an elephant, then we will not be able to  

communicate with each other.  Life will become impossible.  

Hence, the meaning of the literal rule of interpretation is  

simply that we mean what we say and we say what we mean.    

In this connection, we may also refer to the Mimansa  

Rules  of  Interpretation  which  were  our  traditional  

principles of interpretation used for thousand of years by  

our jurists.  It is deeply regrettable that in our law  

courts today these principles are not cited.  Today, our so  

called educated people are largely ignorant about the great  

intellectual  achievements  of  our  ancestors,  and  the  

intellectual  treasury  which  they  have  bequeathed  to  us.  

The Mimansa Rules of Interpretation are one of these great  

achievements, but regrettably they are hardly ever used in  

our law courts.

It may be mentioned that it is not stated anywhere  

in the Constitution of India that only Maxwell's Principles  

of Interpretation can be utilised. We can utilise any

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system  of  interpretation  which   can  help  to  resolve  a  

difficulty.   Principles  of  interpretation  are  not  

principles of law but are only a methodology for explaining  

the meaning of words used in a text.  There is no reason  

why we should not use Mimansa Principles of Interpretation  

in appropriate occasions.

In Mimansa, the literal rule of interpretation is  

known  as  the  'Shruti'  or  Abhida'  Principle.   This  is  

illustrated by the Garhapatya nyaya (In Mimansa Maxims are  

known  as  nyayas).   There  is  the  vedic  verse:  “Aindrya  

garhapatyam  upatishthate”,  which  means  “By  the  Mantra  

addressed  to  Indra  establish  the  household  fire.”   This  

verse can possibly have several meanings viz. (1) worship  

Indra  (2)  worship  Garhapatya  (the  household  fire)  (3)  

worship both, or (4) worship either.

However,  since  the  word  'Garhapatyam'  is  in  the  

objective case, the verse has only one meaning, that is,  

'worship Garhapatya'.  The word 'Aindrya' means 'by Indra',  

and hence the verse means that by verses dedicated to Indra  

one should worship Garhapatya.  The word 'Aindrya' in this  

verse is a Linga, (in Mimansa Linga means the suggestive  

power  of  a  word),  while  the   words  'Garhapatyam  

Upatishthate'  are  the  Shruti.   According  to  the  Mimansa  

principles, the Shruti (literal meaning) will prevail over

the Linga (suggestive power).

It  is  not  necessary  to  go  into  details,  but  

reference  can  be  made  to  the  Book  'Mimansa  Rules  of  

Interpretation' by K.L.Sarkar which is a collection of  

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Tagore Law Lectures delivered by him in 1909.  According to  

the Mimansa Principles, the Sruti Principle or literal rule  

of interpretation will prevail over all other principles,  

e.g., Linga, Vakya, Prakarana, Sthana, Samakhya etc.  

As a result of the above discussion, this appeal is  

allowed and the impugned judgment of the Full Bench of the  

High Court as also the judgment of the learned Single Judge  

are set aside and the writ petition filed by the private  

respondents before the High Court is dismissed.  No costs.

...........................J. [MARKANDEY KATJU]

NEW DELHI; ...........................J. MARCH 16, 2011 [GYAN SUDHA MISRA]