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PETITIONER: B.PRABHAKARA RAO.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DESARI PANAKALALA RAO & ORS & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/04/1976

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. UNTWALIA, N.L.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 1803            1976 SCR  (3)1032  1976 SCC  (3) 550

ACT:      Motor Vehicles  Act. 1947  s. 47  and 57-Andhra Pradesh State  Transport   Appellate  Tribunal  Rules,  1971,  s.15- Validity of.

HEADNOTE:      Tribunal-If had power to admit evidence beyond the time limited by 57(4).      Rule 15 of the Andhra Pradesh State Transport Appellate Tribunal Rule  1971, states  that parties  to the  appeal or application shall  not be  entitled  to  produce  additional evidence, whether  oral or  documentary, before the Tribunal except in  cases stated therein but it empowers the Tribunal to allow  evidence or  documents to be produced or witnesses to be examined for any other sufficient reason.      The  Regional   Transport  Authority  granted  a  stage carriage permit to the appellant. Before the State Transport Appellate  Tribunal   another  applicant   produced  certain information against  the appellant  which was  not mentioned either in his history sheet or in the representations of any party under  s. 57(3)  of the Act. Rejecting the appellant’s objection that  such new  grounds could not be heard from an rejector  at  the  stage  of  appeal,  the  State  Transport Appellate Tribunal cancelled the appellant’s permit and gave it to respondent      On appeal  it was contended that a representation under s. 57(4) could not be made at the appellate stage beyond the time limited by that section and if rule IS permitted it, it violated the substantive provisions of the Act.      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD: Rule 15 is intra vires and it merely makes patent what is otherwise latent in the statutory provisions. . Rule 15 does  not entitle parries to the appeal or application to produce additional evidence but clothes the Tribunal with dn creationary power  to allow  such evidence. What is received is not  qua representation  under 8.  57(4) but qua evidence with public  interest flavor.  [1041F  1039C]  United  Motor Works, A.l.R. 1964 Pat. 154 and Cumbum Roadways, A.I.R. 1965 Mad. 79, approved.      (a) Public  interest is  the paramount consideration in

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transport   business   while   private   rights   apparently constitute a  quasi-lis  for  decision.  The  touchstone  of better merit  is solely  the ability to serve the public and the hierarchy of transport tribunals, bearing true faith and allegiance to s. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1948 have the duty and,  therefore, the  power  to  consider  all  factors pertinent  to   the  larger   scheme  of   efficient  public transport. The  duplex scheme  of the statute is the holding of a  public enquiry  to determine  who  will  serve  public interest best  but ordinarily activated into that enquiry by private  applicants   for  permits.  The  pro  bono  publico character of  the hearing  cannot be scuttled in the name of competitive  individual   rights   and   narrow   procedural trappings. [1033E-G]      (b) Section  47 enjoins  upon  the  Regional  Transport Authority to  have regard  to the  presiding idea  of public interest generally  and in  ib ramification as set out in s. 47(1)(a) to  (f). In  addition, the  RTA shall  also receive representations as  mentioned therein and take them into the reckoning. It  is not  as if  the sole  source of  decision- making materials  consists of the representations made under s. 57(3) within the time stipulated in s. 57(4). The primary channel the  information that  the RTA may gather bearing on matters touched  upon in   47(1)(a)  to (f)  supplemented by facts stated in representation referred to In 1033 s. 57(3).  Under  s.  47  passengers’  associations,  police officers, local  authorities and  existing operators who may have nothing  directly to do with the rivalry for A a permit have a  place in the scheme and may make representation on a variety of  matters. So  also, in  an appeal, the RTA itself may be heard. Thus the consideration going into the judicial verdict are  dominated by  public interest.  non-parties who have Only  to present  points germane to public interest are allowed to represent their point of view. [1038C; 1035B-C]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1985 of 1975.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated the  28th November  1975 of  the Andhra  Pradesh  High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1038 of 1973.      M. N. Phadke and B. Kantarao, for the Appellant.      V. S.  Desai K.  R. Chaudhury,  S. L. Setia and Mrs. V. Khanna, for Respondent No. 1.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA IYER,  J. Counsel  for the  appellant a  jolted transport operator  has assertively  argued for an untenable position, heedless  of the true nature of ’transport permit’ jurisprudence. The  sole issue  on which  limited leave  has been granted  to him  by this  Court under  Art.  136  lends itself to  straight forward  resolution, once we grasp the . public character of the litigation and public purpose of the jurisdiction where  per nits  regulating the plying of stage carriages are  awarded or  refused. The  conscience of  this branch of  public law is justice to the public, although, in the process  of adjudication,  private claims  to  carry  on transport  business   through  permits   are   comparatively evaluated. Public  interest is  the paramount consideration, while  private   rights,  fundamental   though,   apparently constitute the  quasi-lis for  decision. The  touchstone  of better merit  is solely the ability to serve the public, and the hierarchy of transport tribunals, bearing true faith and

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allegiance to  s. 47  of the  Motor Vehicles  Act, 1948 (for short, the  Act) have  the duty and, therefore, the power to consider as  factors  pertinent  to  the  larger  scheme  of efficient public  transport. To equate-and thereby hamstring this jurisdiction  and processual  law with  what governs  a civil proceeding  under the Civil Procedure Code, is to miss the policing policy of the law and maim the amplitude of the power duty  complete. In  other words,  the duplex scheme of the statute  is the holding of a public enquiry to determine who will serve public interest best but ordinarily activated into that enquiry by private applicants for permits. The pro bono publico  character of the hearing cannot be scuttled in the  name   of  competitive  individual  rights  and  narrow procedural trappings.        The   minimal  facts.   The  appellant  and  the  1st respondent, among others, applied for permits to ply a stage carriage on  a specified  route  in  the  Krishna  District, Andhra  Pradesh.   Although  there   were  two  permits  for issuance, one  was given to R2 and that has become final. We are now  concerned only with the other permit which had been granted by  the Regional Transport Authority (acronymically, RTA) to  the appellant  but was  switched over  to  the  1st respondent by the 1034 State Transport  Appellate Tribunal  (STAT) or  taking  into consideration a  fresh ground and supporting evidence to the effect that  the appellant  was guilty  of a  transport  tax violation and  had compounded that offence under s. 60(3) of the Act.  The power in this behalf was stated to be based on s. 15  of the  Andhra  Pradesh  State  Transports  Appellate Tribunal  Rules,   1971  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the Appellate rules), which reads:           "15. Additional  Evidence (i)  The parties  to the      appeal 9  or  application  shall  not  be  entitled  to      produce additional evidence whether oral or documentary      before the Tribunal but,-           (a)   if the authority from whose order the appeal                or application  is preferred  has refused  to                admit  evidence  which  ought  to  have  been                admitted, or           (b)   if the  party seeking  to adduce  additional                evidence   satisfies the  Tribunal that  such                evidence, notwithstanding the exercise of due                diligence was  not within  his  knowledge  or                could not be produced by him at or before the                time when  the order under appeal was passed;                or           (c)   if the Tribunal requires any documents to be                produced or  any witnesses  to be examined to                enable it to pass just orders, or           (d)  for any other sufficient reason, the Tribunal                may allow  such evidence  or documents  to be                produced or witnesses examined:           Provided that  where such evidence is received the      other party  shall be  entitled, to  produce  rebutting      evidence, if any.           (ii) If  the  Tribunal  is  of  opinion  that  any      witness should  be examined in connection with any case      before it,  it may   instead  of examining  him  before      itself, issue  a commission  to the  concerned Regional      Transport Authorities  or the State Transport Authority      as. the  case may  be, or  to an Advocate or such other      suitable  person   as  it   may  deem   fit,   in   the      circumstances of the case."      The vires  of this rule was challenged before us and we

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will examine the contention. But, to continue the narrative" when the  appellate authority  deprived the appellant of his permit he  attacked the order without avail, before the High Court at  both tiers. Undaunted he has carried the appeal to this Court where the controversy is confined to the validity of s.  15, although we have heard arguments on a wider basis to appreciate  the point  made by  counsel. The  argument of ultra vires  urged before us rests on The scope of ss. 57(4) and 64  of the  Motor Vehicles  Act and the fitment of s. 15 into the purpose and text of these provisions.      Having heard  counsel on both sides, we are disinclined to  accede   to  the  submission  of  Shri  Phadke  for  the appellant. Why ? We will proceed to answer. 1035      Rulings galore, of this Court and the High Courts, have focussed A  on s. 47 of the Act to emphasize that the quasi- judicial bodies  entrust ed  with the work of issuing stage- carriage permits  must be conscious of the brooding presence of public  interest, in the midst of the sparring contest of private applicants.  A  casual  perusal  of  that  provision brings home this juristic under-pinning of the jurisdiction. Against this  background, we  may notice  the meaning of the clauses which  - broaden  the nature of the enquiry and mark it off  from a  traditional  civil  litigation.  Passengers’ associations,  police   officers,  local   authorities   and existing operators  who may have nothing directly to do with the rivalry  for a permit have a place in the scheme and may make representations on a variety of matters. So also, in an appeal,  the   RTA  itself   may   be   heard.   Thus,   the considerations going into the judicial verdict are dominated by public  interest; non-parties  who have  only to  present points germane  to public  interest are allowed to represent their point  of  view.  Why?  Because  the  object  of  thus regulatory statute is to promote smooth public transport and subject to  the weighty  factors bearing thereon set down in s. 47(1)  of the  Act and,  indeed, with a view to serve the public the  better, applicants  are chosen in recognition of their  fundamental   right  under   Art.  19   canalised  by reasonable restrictions in public interest. To imprison such an enquiry  into the familiar mould of a civil proceeding in ordinary courts  is to be pathological, if one may say so. A freer, healthier,  approach is  the prescription. Of course, Shri Phadke  is right  in that any representation, ground or evidence presented  by anyone  prejudicing the  right of  an applicant has to be considered only subject to the canons of natural justice  and in  the  discretion  of  quasi-judicial authority. Justice  to the  public and  the parties  can and must be  harmonised. Such is the simplistic statement of the law.      A few more facts and some more law are necessary.      As stated  earlier, the  appellant got  the permit from the RTA although both the contestants before us were equally qualified, having  obtained equal  marks on the basis of the Andhra Pradesh  Motor Vehicles  Rules  (for  short,  the  MV rules). The  appellate result  went  against  the  appellant because another applicant who had filed an appeal before the STAT  produced,  at  that  stage,  a  certificate  from  the concerned authority  to prove that the present appellant had used a  contract carriage  as a  stage-carriage on a trip to Tirupati and had compounded this offence by payment of a fee of Rs.  2,340/-. This  circumstance was regarded by the STAT as a  blot on  the history-sheet  of the appellant, although inadvertently  omitted   from  the   history-sheet  prepared officially for  the consideration of the RTA. It is admitted on  all   hands  that  this  semi-punishment  had  not  been

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mentioned in the representations of any party under s. 57(3) of the MV Act. Therefore, an objection was raised before the STAT that  this ground  was new,  although the episode which formed its  basis existed  prior  to  the  disposal  of  the applications by  the RTA. It was further urged that such new grounds could  not be  heard from  an objector  who had  not included it  in his  representation  made  within  the  time limited by s. 57(4) of the Act. However, the STAT over-ruled these objections  and proceeded on the footing that this was material information 1036 A relevant  to s.  47(1) and  used it,  after giving  a fair opportunity  to   the  affected   appellant  to   meet   it. Consequentially, he  upset the  award of  the permit  to the appellant since  this factor  tilted the  scales against the appellant. We  cannot, in  this Court,  and especially  on a limited leave, look into the evaluation.      These foundational  facts are  common ground,  but  the divergence rises  on the exercise of the power under s.15 of the  Appellate   Rules.  Shri   Phadke  contended   that   a representationist, under s. 57(3) & (4), had to abide by the time-limit  discipline   of  the  provision  and  could  not transgress it  by making an additional representation at the appellate stage  beyond the  time limited by s. 57(4). If s. 15 permitted  such a  course, it  violated  the  substantive provision of  the Act.  Since a stream cannot rise above its source and  rules cannot  go beyond the sections of the Act, this Court  must hold  the said  rule avoid.  Any way, if s. 57(3) &  (4)  had  a  more  spacious  connotation  than  was attributed to  it by Shri Phadke, s. 15 could have full play and be  accommodated within  the parent provision in the Act regulating procedure.  This was  the  counter-contention  of Shri V. S. Desai for the contesting respondent.      Before proceeding  further, it  is useful to extract s. 57(3) and  (4) and  test whether  the rule-making  power has exceeded the ambit of s. 57 or gone counter to it in framing s. 15 (earlier extracted):      "57. Procedure in applying for and granting permits.-                x         x         x         x           (3)   on  receipt  of  an  application  for  stage                carriage permit or a public carrier’s permit,                the Regional  Trans port Authority shall make                the application  available for  inspection at                the office of the authority and shall publish                the application  or the  substance thereof in                the prescribed  manner together with a notice                of the  date before  which representations in                connect‘ion therewith  may be  submitted  and                the date,  not being  less than  thirty  days                from such  publication, on which and the time                and place  at which,  the application and any                representations received, will be considered:                Provided that,  if the grant of any permit in                accordance  with   the  application  or  with                modifications  would   have  the   effect  of                increasing the  number of  vehicles operating                in the region, or in any area or on any route                within the region, under the class of permits                to which  the applications relate, beyond the                limit filed  in that behalf under sub-section                (3) of  Section  47  or  sub-section  (2)  of                Section 55,  as the case may be, the Regional                Transport Authority  may summarily refuse the                application without  following the  procedure                laid down in this sub-section.

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         (4)   No  representation  in  connection  with  an                application referred  to in  sub-section  (3)                shall be considered 1037                by the Regional Transport Authority unless it                is made  in writing before the appointed date                and  unless   a  copy  thereof  is  furnished                simultaneously  to  the    applicant  by  the                person making such representation." We  unhesitatingly  agree  with  Shri  Phadke  that  natural justice-that J  fine facet  of judicial  ethos-must  broadly inform exercise  of power by  administrative tribunals. This obligates such  bodies to  give an  ’a affected party a fair opportunity to meet any evidence obnoxious to his case if it is to  be pressed  into service against him. In the pre sent instance, it  is not  disputed, as the High Court has noted, that the  canons of  natural justice have been conformed to. The surviving  issue therefore is as to whether there is any soundness in the submission that s. 57(3) & (4) read with s. 47 builds  barricades against   receiving any information by the STAT from any representator beyond the time filed in the above sub-sections of s. 57.      Administrative   law-a   growing   branch   of   Indian jurisprudence has  a mission.  Where  the  trellis  work  of technical  procedures   and  rules   of   evidence   usually applicable to  ordinary courts  under the  Code contains too many taboos  regarding pleadings  and too many prescriptions regarding trials,  administrative bodies, manned by lay  and legal men, charged with duties which are wider than decision of  individual   disputes  between   specific  parties   and operating quasi-judicially  at  the  public-interest  level, have to  enjoy more  liberal powers and less formal and more flexible processes  if they  are  to  fulfil  the  statutory behest efficaciously.  To over  judicialize is to undermine. In the  construction of statutes establishing administrative agencies and  r defining their powers, there is little scope for the  deep-rooted shibboleth  that into  the statute must be, read,  by lawyer’s  instinct, the  requirements  of  the trial of  a civil  suit or  the hearing  of an appeal by the ordinary courts  of the  land. This  may result in defeating their obvious purpose. We will therefore briefly examine the legislative goal  of the  statute  under  construction,  the general policy  of the  legislature in enacting the relevant sections and  the  definition  of  the  sources  from  which information or  evidence  may  be  sought  by  the  tribunal working  within   the  framework  of  the  Act.  Mr  Justice Frankfurter has  aptly  stated  that  ’the  answers  to  the problem of  an art are in its exercise’ and John Chipman had paid  that  the  process  of  statutory  construction  is  a practical art  (See: Extrinsic  Aid in  the Construction  of Statutes-by  V.   S.  Deshpande-Journal   of  Indian     Law Institute-Vol. II,  April-June 1969, p. 123, 126). Thus, the true test  of the amplitude and correct interpretation of s. 57(3) &  (4) is  to be  found in a study of its area and its exercise, as  intended by  its makers. The oft-quoted saying of Mr.  Justice Holmes  that - ’the meaning of a sentence it to be  felt rather than to be proved’ also  helps us to feel our way  through the  public law area sketched by s. 57(3) & (4) understood in the background of s. 47 and the conspectus of other  provisions. We  have to  shake off from our  minds that the  type of  litigation contemplated  by s.  57 is the thrust and  parry in  a civil  suit or  appeal.  With  these observations we  may take  a bird’s eye view of the relevant provisions of  the Act  to give us a hang of the subject and help us interpret adequately.

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1038      Section 42  of the  Act insists on a permit being taken by every  transport operator.  Section 44  lays down how the RTA is  to be constituted. It has a mixed composition of lay aud judicially-trained me, the reason being that the process of adjudication  is not  purely legal  pugilis but a broader search taking note of public considerations which may not be brought to  its notice by contenders for permits. The nature of the enquiry is reflected in the very structure  of  the body.  Section 46 speaks of applications for stage- carriage permits.  When we  reach s.  47, we  have to take a close-up of  that  provision.  Properly  understood,  s.  47 enjoins upon the RTA to have regard to the presiding idea of public interest  generally and  in  its ramifications as set out in  s. 47(1) (a) to (f). In addition, the RTA shall also receive representations  as mentioned  therein and take them into the  reckoning. It  is not  as if  the sole  source  of decision making  materials consists  of the  representations made under  s. 57(3) within the time stipulated in s. 57(4). The primary channel, it , looks, is the information that the RTA may  gather, bearing on matters touched upon in s. 47(1) (a) to  (f), supplemented by facts stated in representations referred to  in s.  57(3). Once  we grasp    this  essential truth, the resolution of the conflict raised in this case is easy. The  focus is  not on who, as between A and B, has the title to  the permit, but on who, as between A and B, should be preferred to better sene the public interest.      We may,  as a  result of the above discussion, set down the following five propositions:      1.    Stage-carriage  permits are granted for providing           an F. efficient public transport system.      2.    The adjudicatory content has dual elements-public           interest in  the best  stage-carriage service  and           private title to better sene the public.      3.    The  procedure is flexible, free from-the rigidly           of court  trials, and  this flexibility flows from           the duty  of the tribunal charged with the task of           picking out  him who  has the best plus points for           playing  a  good  bus  service,  to  discharge  it           properly. A people-conscious power cannot be pared           down in a self-defeating manner.      4.    An  activist tribunal  (RTA, and,  in exceptional           case, even  the  STAT)  may  even  collect  useful           information   bearing on considerations set out in           s.  47   and,  after   public  exposure   of  such           information  at   the   hearing   and   reasonable           opportunity to  meet it,  if anyone  is  adversely           affected, put it into the crucible of judgment.      5.    The  antithesis  is  not  between  the  right  of           representation within the time limited by s. 57(4)           and  beyond  it  but  between  representations  by           statutorily authorised  entities under  ss. 47 and           57 and receipt of relevant 1039           evidence or information from any source whatsoever           at  any   stage  whatsoever  but  subject  to  the           wholesome rules of natural justice. These fivefold  guidelines squarely accommodate s. 15 within the framework  of ss.  47, 57 and 54 of the Act and there is no spill-over  breaching the  banks of  the provisions.  The rule merely  gives effect to what the sections intend and is not therefore ultra vires.      Here the certificate of payment of compounding fees was filed by  one of  the appellants  before the  STAT  and  was received not  as a representation under s. 57(4) but as some

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information the  STAT regarded  had  a  bearing  on  matters falling under s. 47. It is important to note that s. 15 does not entitle  parties to the appeal or application to produce additional  evidence   but   clothes   the   tribunal   with discretionary power to allow such evidence. What is received is not  qua representation  under s.  57(4) but qua evidence with public  interest flavor.  The rule  is good  and covers familiar ground  to  enable  just  orders  being  passed.  A reference to  order XLI, rule 27 C.P.C. and s. 540 Crl. P.C. proves this  point. Justice  to the public is the keynote of ss. 47, 57 and s. 15. We are not lobbying for unconventional procedures of  quasi-judicial tribunals but interpreting the relevant provisions according to well-established canons. We must listen  to the signature tune of quasi-judicial justice to appreciate  the note.  We may  also highlight  the  basic principle  that   subject  to  statutory  regulations,  each tribunal has its inherent power to device its own procedure. Novelty,  if  it  improves  purposeful  efficiency,  is  not anathema. But  caution must  be exercised  in going  against time tried  procedures lest  processual law  prove a charter for chaos. Like- wise, it is necessary to mention that while a ’representator’  under s. 47, read with s. 57, has a right to  make  representations  and  be  heard,  subject  to  the limitations written  into those  provisions, those  who fall under it or outside it have no right to bring in evidence or urge grounds  as and  when they  please or at all unless the tribunal, in  its discretion,  chooses to  accept such extra information. The first is a right of the ’representator’ the second is the power of the tribunal. F      We  are   strengthened  in  our  general  approach  and particular construction  by a  ruling of  this Court  in New Prakash Transport(l) and two rulings of the High Courts, one of a  Full Bench  of the  Madras High Court (AIR 1965 Madras 79) and  the other  a Division Bench of the Patna High Court to which  one of  us (Untwalia,  J.) was  a party  (AIR 1964 Patna 154).      In United  Motor Works(2),  the Patna  Case, the  Court observed:           "It was  also pointed  out by the Supreme Court in      that case  that the  Motor Vehicles  Act and  the rules      framed thereunder  do not  contemplate anything  like a      regular hearing  in a Court of Justice and no elaborate      procedure has  been prescribed  as to  how the  parties      interested have  to be heard either before the Regional      Transport Authority or 1040      before the Appellate Transport Authority. The principle      is well  established that  in the  absence of  any such      prescribed procedure  the appellate authority may adopt      any procedure  which it  thinks best  for  hearing  the      appeal provide always that the rules of natural justice      are observed.  The matter  has been clearly put by Lord      Loreburn in  the course  of  his  speech  in  Board  of      Education v. Rice (1911 AC 179) as follows:           "Comparatively recent  statutes have  extended, if      they have not originated, the practice of imposing upon      departments or  officers of  State the duty of deciding      or determining  questions  of  various  kinds.  In  the      present instance,  as in  many others,  what comes  for      determination is  sometimes a  matter to  be settled by      discretion, involving  no  law.  It  will,  I  suppose,      usually be  of an administrative kind; but sometimes it      will involve  a matter  of law  as well  as a matter of      fact, or  even depend upon matter of law alone. In such      cases the Board of Education will have to ascertain the

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    law and  also to  ascertain the  facts. I  need not add      that ill  doing either  they must act in good faith and      fairly listen  to both  sides, for that is a duty lying      upon every one who decides anything. But I do not think      they are  bound to  treat such  a question as though it      were a trial. They have no power to administer an oath,      and  need   not  examine  witnesses.  They  can  obtain      information in any way they think best, always giving a      fair opportunity  to  those  who  are  parties  in  the      controversy  for   correcting  or   contradieting   any      relevant statement prejudicial to their view." Ramaswami C. J., (as he then was) also laid down:           "It is.  .  .  manifest  that  the  power  of  the      appellate authority  is co-extensive  with the power of      the Regional’  Transport-Authority in this respect, and      there is  no reason  why the appellate authority should      not take  these matters  into consideration in deciding      the appeal under s. 64 of the Act" It is  trite that  an appeal  is a re-hearing and ordinarily appellate power  is as  wide as original power. The facts of the Patna case (supra) bear a close parallel to our case.      Another point  with which we are not concerned and also decided in the Patna judgment (one of the two writ petitions heard together)  was challenged  in the  Supreme  Court  and reversed. That  bears upon  the interstate routes which does not arise in the instant appeal before us.      In Cumbum  Roadways(1) Kailsam  J. (as  he  then  was), speaking for  the Full  Bench, stressed  the same  view. The head note  in the  Report is  sufficiently explicit  and  we quote:           "The representator,  who makes  the representation      other wise than under s. 57(4) will not have a right to      have his 1041      objection  heard   and  considered,  but  there  is  no      prohibition   against    the   authority   taking   the      information furnished  by the objector and acting on it      after giving  an opportunity  to the affected party, to      prove that  the information  is false or that it should      not be  acted upon.  The jurisdiction  of the  Regional      Transport Authority  or the  Appellate Tribunal  to act      upon any  information, whether  it was  brought to  its      notice by  the objector  or by  the Transport Authority      cannot be  questioned. But  it is within the discretion      of the  Regional Transport  Authority or  the Appellate      Tribunal to  accept the information taking into account      the relevant  circumstances under which the information      was brought  before it.  If the  authority  decides  to      accept, it  is bound to ‘ give a reasonable opportunity      to the  affected person  to show  cause as  to why  the      information should  not  be  acted  upon.  r  When  the      authority is  acting on  the information,  but not as a      representation by the objector, the person affected can      not object to the authority considering the information      on the  ground that it was brought to its notice by one      of the  objectors without  including the information in      the representation  made by  the objector. The right of      the representer  as such  is no  doubt limited, for, he      has no  right to  insist that  any representation  made      otherwise than  under s.  57(4) should be considered in      the manner prescribed under s. 57(5). But that does not      in any  way debar  the authority  under s. 47(1) of the      Act  from  taking  the  information  into  account  for      deciding to  whom the  permit should  be given  in  the      interests of the public."

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The decision  of the  Assam High  Court (AIR 1959 Assam 183) brought to  our  notice  by  Shri  Phadke  does  not  really consider the  issue from the position we have delineated and turns on approach which is not quite correct.      Our conclusion  therefore is  that s. 15 is intra vires and, further  that the said rule merely makes patent what is otherwise latent  in the  statutory provisions.  The  appeal accordingly, fails and is dismissed with costs. P.B.R     Appeal dismissed. 1042