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PETITIONER: SHRI B. P. HIRA, WORKS MANAGER,CENTRAL RAILWAY, PAREL, BOMBA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI C. M. PRADHAN ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/05/1959

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. WANCHOO, K.N.

CITATION:  1959 AIR 1226            1960 SCR  (1) 137

ACT: Overtime  Wages-Claim  by  employees  in  railway   factory- Validity-Factories  Act, 1948 (LXIII of 1948), SS.  2(1),59- The  Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 (Bom.  79  of 1948). SS. 4, 70.

HEADNOTE: These appeals by special leave arose from applications  made by the respondents, who were employed as timekeepers in  the time  office  of the Central Railway Workshop  and  Factory, Parel, Bombay, claiming payment of overtime wages under  the Payment  of  Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936).  The case  of  the respondents was that they were workers within the meaning of S.  2(1) of the Factories Act, 1948 (LXIII Of 1948)  and  as such were entitled to overtime wages under s. 59 of the said Act.   Alternatively, they urged that even if they were  not workers within the meaning of S. 2(1) of the said Act,  they would  nevertheless be entitled to overtime wages under  the s.  59  by  reason  Of  s.  70  of  the  Bombay  Shops   and Establishments Act, 1948 (Bom. 79 of 1948).  The validity of the claim on both the grounds was disputed by the appellant. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act found that only four of the respondents, who were required to do the work of progress  timekeepers,  could claim the  status  of  workers within  the meaning Of S. 2(1) Of the Factories Act and  the rest  were  merely  employees  of  the  workshop,  but   the Authority accepted the alternative case made by the respond- ents and directed the appellant to file a statement  showing the  overtime  wages  due to each  of  the  respondents  and ordered it to pay the same. Held, that the Authority was right in the view that it  took Of  S. 70 Of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act,  1948, and its decision must be affirmed. On  a  proper construction Of S. 70 Of the Act it  is  clear that  the first part of the section excludes a  factory  and its employees from the operation of the Act; but the  second part  makes  the relevant provisions of  the  Factories  Act applicable to them.  The non-obstante clause in the  section shows  that the employees in a factory, although they  might not  be  workers  within  the meaning  Of  S.  2(1)  of  the Factories  Act,  are  entitled to claim  overtime  wages  as

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provided for by that Act. It  is not correct to say that S. 4 Of the Bombay Shops  and Establishments  Act, 1948, has the effect of  excluding  the operation  Of S. 70 Of the Act.  Section 4 applies  only  to establishments and not to factories; but even if it applied, to factories 18 138 that cannot materially affect the application Of s. 70 which is intended to operate not withstanding the other provisions of the Act. Consistently  with its policy, the Act, which  provides  for overtime wages for employees in all establishments, provides for  overtime  wages for employees in factories as  well  by making   the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Factories   Act applicable to them.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.131 to  304 of 1957. Appeals by special leave from the judgments and order  dated October  19,  1955 and January 31, 1956,  of  the  Authority under  Payment  of Wages Act, Bombay, in  Applications  Nos. 950-961,  963-967, 970-989, 992, 994-1013, 1015-1016,  1049- 1050 and 11510-11511 and 11513-11517 of 1955 respectively. M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellants. Purshottam   Tricumdas  and  G.  N.  Srivastava,   for   the respondents in all the appeals except C. A. No. 186 of 1957. 1959 May 8. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-This group of 174 appeals by special leave arises from the several applications made against Mr. B.  P. Hira,  Works Manager, Central Railway Workshop and  Factory, Parel,  Bombay  (hereafter  called  the  appellant)  by  the employees   at  the  said  factory  (hereafter  called   the respondents)  under  the Payment of Wages Act, 1936  (IV  of 1936)  claiming payment of overtime wages since  1948.   All these  applications  were  heard by  the  Payment  of  Wages Authority,  Bombay, as companion matters and they have  been disposed  of by a common judgment.  The main  judgment  has, however,  been  delivered  by  the  said  Authority  in  the application filed by Mr. C. M. Pradhan (hereafter called the respondent) which gives rise to Civil Appeal No. 131 of 1957 before  us.  We would, therefore, deal with this  appeal  in particular  and our decision in this appeal will govern  the rest of the appeals in this group. 139 In  his  application  made  before  the  Payment  of   Wages Authority  the respondent alleged that he had been  employed in  the  factory  called the Central  Railway  Workshop  and Factory,  Parel,  Bombay,  and that he  had  not  been  paid overtime  wages due to him from April 1, 1949, to  September 30, 1954.  The respondent claimed that the delay made by him in filing the present application should be condoned because jointly  with his co-workers he had been  in  correspondence with  the  railway  administration in  regard  to  the  said payment  of  overtime wages since, 1948 and that  the  claim made by him and his colleagues had been finally rejected  by the railway administration on August 31, 1954.  His case was that  he had filed the present application  soon  thereafter and so the delay made by him ,in making the claim before the Authority  should  be  condoned.  The  Authority  heard  the parties  on the; question of delay and held that  the  delay

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only  in respect of the claim for the period after May  1953 should  be condoned.  In the result the claim  for  overtime wages for the period prior to May 19, 1953, was rejected  on the  preliminary ground of delay whereas the claim. for  the period  subsequent  to the said date was considered  on  the merits. The  respondent’s  case  was that he  was  entitled  to  the overtime  wages  for work on such Sundays when  he  was  not given  a  holiday within three days prior to or  three  days subsequent to the Sundays on which he worked.  The appellant conceded  that the respondent had not been given  a  holiday within the three days prior to or the three days  subsequent to  the Sundays on which he had worked as required by s.  52 of the Indian Factories Act.  The respondent alleged that he was  a worker within the meaning of s. 2, sub-s. (1) of  the said  Factories  Act  (LXIII of 1948) and  as  such  he  was entitled  to  overtime  wages under s 59 of  the  said  Act. Alternatively  he  urged that even if he was  not  a  worker within  the  meaning of s. 2(1) of the said  Act,  he  would nevertheless be entitled to overtime wages under the said s. 59 by reason of s. 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act,  1948  (Bom. 79 of 1948) (hereafter  called  the  Act). Thus the claim for 140 overtime wages was made by the respondent on two alternative grounds. The  appellant disputed the validity of this claim.  It  was urged  on  its behalf that the respondent was not  a  worker under s. 2(1) of the Factories Act and that s. 70 of the Act did   not  justfy  the  claim  alternatively  made  by   the respondent for overtime wages. The  Authority  considered  the evidence led  before  it  in respect  of  all  the repondents  for  overtime  wages.   It appears that these respondents are employed by the appellant in  the  time office of the Parel Workshop and  not  in  the factory  itself.   The duties of these  timekeepers  are  to maintain initial records of attendance of workshop staff, to prepare   pay-sheets  for  them  to  maintain  their   leave accounts,  to dispose of final settlement cases of the  said staff  and to maintain records for statistical  information. The   Authority  held  that  the  time  office   where   the timekeepers  work is an integral part of the factory and  so it came to the conclusion that the timekeepers are  employed in  the  factory  called the Central  Railway  Workshop  and Factory, Parel, Bombay. The  Authority then examined the question as to whether  the timekeepers are workers within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Factories  Act.  Evidence showed that four timekeepers,  are required to do the work of progress timekeepers.  This  work consists in preparing the progress time-sheets and operation time-sheets  of machine-shop staff working on  various  jobs dealing  with  the production of railway spare  parts.   The Authority  was disposed to take the view that having  regard to  the  nature of the work assigned to the  progress  time- keepers  they  must be held to be persons employed  in  work incidental  to, or connected with the manufacturing  process or the subject of the manufacturing process and as such they are  workers within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the  Factories Act.   In the result, the finding made by the Authority  was that timekeepers are employees of the workshop, but are  not workers  under the Factories Act; while the  progress  time- keepers can claim the status of workers under the said Act. 141 The Authority then considered the respondent’s argument that even  if he was not a worker under the Factories Act he  was

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neverthless  entitled to claim the benefit of s. 59  of  the said  Act  by  virtue of s. 70 of the  Act.   The  Authority accepted  this  contention  and  held  that,  even  if   the respondent  was not a worker under the Factories Act, s.  70 of the Act entitled him to claim overtime wages under s.  59 of  the  Factories Act.  That is why the  Authority  ordered that the respondents would be entitled for the period  19-5- 1953  to 30-9-1954 to overtime wages at double the  ordinary rate for the Sundays on which they worked when they were not given  a  a  holiday on one of the  three  days  immediately preceding  or  after  the said Sunday.   The  appellant  was accordingly  directed  to  file  a  statement  showing   the overtime  wages  to  which  the  several  respondents   were entitled  and  orders  were  passed  on  each  one  of   the applications  directing the appellant to pay the  respective amounts  to.  each one of the respondents.  -It  is  against these orders that the appellant has filed the present  group of appeals by special leave. The  first  point  which has been urged  before  us  by  the learned Attorney-General on behalf of the appellant is  that the  Authority  was in error in holding  that  the  progress timekeepers are workers under s. 2(1) of the Factories  Act. A  worker under s. 2(1) means a person employed directly  or through  any  agency,  whether  for wages  or  not,  in  any manufacturing  process,  or  in cleaning  any  part  of  the machinery or premises used for manufacturing process, or  in any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing  process, or the subject of the  manufacturing process;  and the manufacturing process under s. 2(k)  means any process for inter alia (1) making, altering,  repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing,  cleaning, breaking-up,  demolishing or otherwise treating or  adapting any  article  or  substance with a view to  its  use,  sale, transport,  delivery  or  disposal.  It is  clear  that  the duties  of the progress timekeepers do not fall  within  the first part of a. 2(k).  The Authority has however, 142 held  that the said duties can be treated as incidental  to, or connected with, the manufacturing process or the  subject of  manufacturing  process; it is the  correctness  of  this finding that is challenged by the appellant. On  the  other hand, Mr. Purshottam,  for  the  respondents, argues  that the Authority was in error in holding that  the timekeepers are not workers under s. 2 (1).  His  contention is  that the expression "incidental to, or  connected  with, the  manufacturing process " is wide enough to  include  not only the cases of the progress timekeepers but the cases  of all timekeepers as a class.  It is true that the finding  of the.Authority  in respect of the timekeepers is against  the respondents; but Mr. Purshottam says that he is entitled  to support  the  final  order passed by the  Authority  on  the additional ground that the time. keepers, like the  progress timekeepers, are workers under s. 2(1) and as such they  are entitled  to  claim  overtime  wages  under  s.  59  of  the Factories Act. The  final decision of the Authority is, however,  based  on the  view that under s. 70 of the Act the respondents  would be  entitled to overtime wages under s. 59 of the  Factories Act even if they are not workers under s. 2(1).  That  being so,  we  think  it  is  necessary  first  to  consider   the correctness  of  this  view.   If  the  conclusion  of   the Authority on the scope and effect of the provisions of s. 70 of  the  Act  is correct, then it would  be  unnecessary  to consider   whether   the  timekeepers   and   the   progress timekeepers are workers under s. 2(1) of the Factories  Act.

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We would, therefore, deal with that question first. It appears that there are three statutes which pro. vide for the  payment of extra wages for overtime work.  The  proviso to  s. 71 (c) of the Indian Railways Act (IX of  1890)  lays down that the exempted railway servant specified in it shall be  paid  for overtime at not less than one  and  a  quarter times  his  ordinary rate of pay.  This provision  has  been subsequently amended by Act 59 of 1956, which makes the rate for  overtime  one and one-half times the ordinary  rate  of pay; but it is common ground that we are not 143 concerned with the amended provision in these appeals  since the respondents’ claim is for. a period prior to the date of the  amendment.  It is suggested by the appellant  that  the respondents are railway servants under s. 3 (7) of the  said Act,  and as such they may be entitled to make a  claim  for overtime  wages under the said proviso; but the  respondents have  not made, and do not wish to make, a claim  under  the said provision; and so the question as to the application of the  said section need not detain us.  If  the  construction placed on s. 70 of the Act by the Authority is correct,  the claims  of  employees who are working in a  factory  in  the State  of Bombay would be governed by that  provision;  this position is not seriously disputed before us. Section 59 of the Factories Act also deals with the question of extra wages for overtime.  It provides for the payment of wages  in respect of overtime work at the rate of twice  the ordinary rate of wages.  This benefit is, however, available only  to  persons who are workers within the meaning  of  s. 2(1)  of the said Act Since we are dealing with the case  on the  assumption that the respondents are not -workers  under s’  2(1)  it  follows  that s. 59 by  itself  would  not  be applicable to them. The Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948, is the  third statute  which  makes a provision for the payment  of  extra wages  for overtime work.  Section 63 of the Act deals  with this  topic.   Section  63(1) provides for  the  payment  of overtime  work at the rate of 1-1/2 times the ordinary  rate of wages in the case of employees in any establishment other than  a  residential  hotel,  restaurant,  or  eating-house, whereas  sub-s. (2) provides for wages for overtime  at  the rate  of  twice  the ordinary rate of wages  in  respect  of employees in a residential hotel, restaurant or eatinghouse, subject  to  the  other conditions  specified  in  the  said section.   It is clear that this section does not  apply  to the respondents because they are employees in a factory  and not in any of the establishments enumerated in its two  sub- sections. 144 The respondents’ case, however, is that by virtue of s. 70 of  the.  Act the provisions of the Factories  Act,including a.  59,  are  extended  to the cases  of  all  employees  in factories,  and  so  they are entitled to  claim  wages  for overtime under the said section of the Factories Act.   This contention  has  been upheld by the Authority.   It  is  not disputed  by the appellant that the Bombay  Legislature  was competent  to prescribe for the extension of the  provisions of  the Factories Act to employees in the  factories  within the territory of the State of Bombay; and since sanction for this  legislation has been duly obtained from the  Governor- General  of India on January 3, 1949(1), no  question  about any repugnance between the provisions of s. 70 and those  of the Factories Act can possibly arise.  Thus the validity  of the  said section is not in dispute; and so the  only  point which calls for our decision is one of construction: Does s.

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70  supplement  the  provisions  of  the  Factories  Act  by extending  them  to  all employees  in  factories  like  the respondents though they are not workers under s. 2(1) of the said Act ? Before  dealing  with this point it is  necessary  to  refer briefly to the broad features of the Act.  The Act no  doubt is  a  piece of beneficent social  legislation  intended  to serve  the cause of labour welfare.  It has been  passed  in order  to  consolidate  and amend the law  relating  to  the regulation  and conditions of work and employment in  shops, commercial establishments, residential hotels,  restaurants, eating-houses,  theaters, other places of public  amusements and  entertainments  and other establishments.   Section  2, sub-ss.   (3),   (4)  and  (27)   define   respectivly   the establishment,  commercial  establishment  and  shop.    The definitions  of  commercial establishment and  shop  exclude inter  alia factory.  Establishment is defend as  meaning  a shop,    commercial   establishment,   residential    hotel, restaurant,  eating-house, theatre or other place of  public amusement  are  entertainment to which the Act  applies  and includes  such other establishment as the  State  Government may by notification in the official gazette declare (1) Published in the Bombay Government Gazette, Part IV, dated 11-1-1949. 145 to  be, an establishment for the purposes of this  Act.   It would  be  noticed that the definition of  establishment  is very wide, and it does not purport to be exhaustive  because it expressly empowers the State Government to include within its   purview  by  notification  other  establishments   not specified in it.  Section 2, sub-s. (6) defines an  employee as  meaning a person wholly or principally employed in,  and in  connection  with,  any establishment,  and  includes  an apprentice  but does not include a member of the  employer’s family.   This  definition  shows that the  Act  intends  to confer the benefit of its provision on all persons who  fall within the wide definition of the expression " Employee ". It is necessary at this stage to refer to the definition  of "factory" under the Act.  Section 2(9) defines a factory  as meaning  any premises which is a factory within the  meaning of  cl. (m) of s. 2 of the Factories Act or which is  deemed to be a factory under s. 85 of the said Act. Now  s.  2(m)  of the Factories Act  defines  a  factory  as meaning  any premises including the precincts  thereof "  (i)  whereon  ten or more workers are  working,  or  were working  on any day of the preceding twelve months,  and  in any  part of which a manufacturing process is being  carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or (ii) whereon  twenty  or more workers are working,  or  were working  on any day of the preceding twelve months,  and  in any  part of which a manufacturing process is being  carried on  without  the aid of power, or is ordinarily  so  carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of  the Mines Act, 1952 (XXXV of 1952), or a railway running shed; " and  s.  85  confers authority on the  State  Government  to extend the definition of factory to other places subject  to the  requirements  specified  in the said  section.   It  is common  ground  that  the place where  the  respondents  are employed  is a factory under s. 2(m) of the  Factories  Act, and so it satisfies the definition of s. 2(9) of the Act. 19 146 The  scheme of the Act shows that it deals  separately  with shops  and commercial establishments (ch. 111),  residential

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hotels, restaurants and eating-houses (ch., IV) and theaters and  other  places of public amusement (ch.   V).   Separate provisions   are   made   to   regulate   these    different establishments  having regard to the special needs  of  each one  of  them.   There  are,  however,  general   provisions applicable  to and regulating all the  establishments  alike and  these  are found in chs.  VI to IX. It  is  significant that  with the exception of s. 70, no other section  of  the Act deals with factories. We  have  already  noticed that  in  defining  "  commercial establishment  "  and  " shop "  respectively  the  Act  has expressly excluded " factories " from the said  expressions. It is true that the definition of " establishment " does not expressly  exclude factory; but it is plain that factory  is treated by the Act as separate and distinct and there can be no  doubt  that  the provisions in the Act  which  apply  to establishment  are  not intended to, and do  not,  apply  to factories.   In  other  words, though the  definition  of  " establishment " is wide enough, it does not include  factory for  the  purposes  of the Act.  It is  conceivable  that  a kitchen  attached  to an establishment  like  a  residential hotel may satisfy the definition of factory; but it seems to us  that such an adjunct of an establishment is prima  facie not  intended by the Act to be treated apart and  separately from the main establishment itself, and so it would be taken as  a  part  of the establishment and  be  governed  by  the provisions  of  the Act in relation  thereto.   The  factory where  the respondents are employed is not  connected  with, much less an inseparable adjunct of, any establishment,  and so this academic aspect of the matter which was incidentally posed before us by the learned Attorney-General need not  be pursued any further in the present appeal. The  conclusion of the Authority has been challenged by  the appellant  on  the ground that s. 70 on which  it  is  based cannot  be invoked by the respondents.  In support  of  this argument  reliance is placed on s. 4 of the Act.  Section  4 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the  Act its provisions mentioned                             147 in  the  third  column of sch. 11 shall  not  apply  to  the establishments,   employees  and  other  persons   mentioned against them in the second column of the said schedule.  The proviso  to this section authorises the State Government  to add  to,  omit  or  alter any of the  entries  in  the  said schedule  in the manner indicated( by it.  It is urged  that the establishment of any railway administration is mentioned as sr. no. 5 in sch.  II and the entry against it in col.  3 of  the said schedule shows that the provisions of  the  Act are  inapplicable  to  the  said  establishments.   If   the establishment  in question is exempted from the  application of  all the provisions of the Act, how can s. 70 be said  to apply  to  it?  asks the learned  Attorney-General.   It  is obvious   that   s.   4  mentions  and   applies   only   to establishments  and it has no application to factories;  and we  are dealing with employees in a factory.  Indeed  as  we have already observed, no provision of the Act except s.  70 applies  to factories and so it would not be  legitimate  to base any argument on the assumption that s.  4 is applicable to the present case. Incidentally the learned Attorney-General suggested,  though faintly, that the establishments mentioned at sr. nos.  1 to 6  in col. 2 of sch.  II are wider than and  different  from the  establishment as defined by s. 2(8).  We do  not  think that this suggestion is well-founded.  There can be no doubt that s. 4 grants exemptions to the said establishments  from

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the  application  of the provisions mentioned in col.  3  of sch.   II;  and  that itself postulates  that  but  for  the exemption thus granted the provisions of the Act would  have applied  to them.  Indeed the scheme of sch. 11  shows  that whereas all the provisions of the Act are made  inapplicable to the establishments and offices enumerated at sr. nos.   1 to  6 including 6(a) to 6(k), in regard to the others  which are  enumerated  at  sr.  nos.  7 to  55  it  is  only  some provisions of the Act specified in col. 3 that are excluded. In  other  words, the remaining sections  not  so  specified would  apply to them.  If that is so, they must be  and  are establishments under s. 2(8) of the Act. 148 In this connection it must be borne in mind thats.     2(8) empowers the State Government to include by notification any office    or   institution   within   the   definition    of establishment;  and so the inclusion of any such  office  or institution  in  col.  2  of  sch.  11  would  make  it  -an establishment  under  the  Act,  and as  such  it  would  be governed by it subject of course to the corresponding  entry in  col. 3. That is why we think that the suggestion of  the learned Attorney-General as to the denotation and  character of  establishments enumerated in sr. nos.  1 to 5 in col.  2 of   sch.   11  cannot  be  accepted.   All   the   offices, establishments and other institutions mentioned in col. 2 of sch.  II are and must be held to be establishments under  s. 2(8). In regard to the argument that the operation of s.     4 excludes the application of s. 70 we have held that s. 4 applies  only  to establishments and not to  factories.  But even if s. 4 is assumed to be applicable to factories, we do not  think it would materially affect the application of  s. 70.   The  plain  object underlying s. 70  and  its  context emphatically  point  out  that it  is  intended  to  operate independently of the other provisions of the Act and in that sense  it stands apart from them.  It is this aspect of  the matter which is clarified by the Legislature by laying  down in s. 70 that nothing in the Act shall be deemed to apply to any  persons  employed  in  the  factory.   That,   however, anticipates the argument on the construction of s., 70.  Let us therefore,cite the said section and construe it. Section 70 provides that nothing in this Act shall be deemed to  apply to any person employed in or within the  precincts of a factory and the provisions of the Factories Act  shall, notwithstanding  anything  in the said Act,  apply  to  such person.  This section consists of two parts.  The first part makes it clear that no provision in the Act shall be  deemed to  apply to the persons specified in it.   The  Legislature knew  that in fact the Act contained no provision  which  in terms or expressly applies to any such person; but in  order to  remove  any  possible  doubt it  has  provided  that  no provision  in the Act shall even by inference or fiction  be deemed to apply to them.  In other words this clause                             149 is intended to clarify the position that though factory  has been defined by s. 2(9) of the Act, no provision of the  Act is intended to be applied to a factory or employees in.  it. Having  clarified  this  position the  second  part  of  the section extends the application of the Factories Act to  the said persons. It  would have been possible for the Legislature to  include in  the present statute all the relevant provisions  of  the Factories  Act  and  make them applicable  to  factories  as defined  by s. 2(9); but apparently the Legislature  thought that the same object can be achieved by enacting the  second

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part  of s. 70.  This part provides that the  provisions  of the  Factories  Act shall apply to the persons  in  question notwithstanding  anything  contained in the said  Act.   The said Act contains the provision by which workers are defined under  s. 2(1), and it necessarily involves the  consequence that  the relevant provision about the payment  of  overtime wages  applies  only  to  workers  as  defined  and  not  to employees  in  factories  who are not  workers.   It  is  in reference  to  this provision that s. 70 has  provided  that notwithstanding  the said provision the relevant  provisions of  the  Factories Act will apply to persons employed  in  a factory.   The non-obstante clause in s. 70 thus serves  the purpose of clarifying the position that the Factories Act is made applicable to employees in factories and that they  are not  governed  by any of the provisions of  the  Act.   This conclusion  is obviously consistent -with the policy of  the Act.   It  has  itself made provision  for  the  payment  of overtime wages to employees in all establishments by s.  63; and   it  has  made  applicable  inter  alia  the   relevant provisions  of the Factories Act in regard to  employees  in factories.  That is the view which the Authority has  taken, and  in our opinion its validity or correctness is not  open to doubt. In  the  result  the  orders passed  by  the  authority  are confirmed  and the appeals are dismissed with costs  in  one set.                              Appeals dismissed. 150