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PETITIONER: B. N. MUTTO & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: T. K. NANDI

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/11/1978

BENCH: KAILASAM, P.S. BENCH: KAILASAM, P.S. DESAI, D.A. KOSHAL, A.D.

CITATION:  1979 AIR  460            1979 SCR  (2) 409  1979 SCC  (1) 361  CITATOR INFO :  D          1982 SC1518  (15,17)  D          1984 SC 458  (8)

ACT:      Delhi Rent  Control Act,  1958 Ss.  14(1)(e),  14A  and 25B(5)-Scope of.

HEADNOTE:      Section  14   of  the  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act,  1958 prohibits a  court from making any order or decree in favour of a  landlord for  recovery of  possession of  any premises except under  certain circumstances.  One of  the grounds on which the  landlord can  make an  application  to  the  Rent Controller for  recovery of  possession is  provided  in  s. 14(1)(e) of the Act is that the premises let for residential purposes  are   required  bonafide   by  the   landlord  for occupation a  a residence  for himself and that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.      In September,  1975 the Central Government decided that Government servants  who owned houses in the Union Territory of Delhi should, within three months from 1st October, 1975, vacate Government  accommodation let  out to  them.  By  the Delhi Rent  Control Act  (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 the Act was amended  and eventually the Amendment Act, 1976 replaced the Ordinance.  By a  deeming provision  the Act  came  into force on the date of the Ordinance i.e. 1st December, 1975.      Section 14A  which  was  added  by  the  amendment  Act provides  that   a,  land-  lord  who,  being  a  person  in occupation of  any residential  premises allotted  to him by the  Central   Government  is   required  to   vacate   such residential accommodation  on the ground that he owns in the Union Territory  of Delhi  a  residential  accommodation,  a right shall  accrue to  such landlord to recover immediately possession of  the premises  let out  by  him.  Section  25B provides for  special procedure  for disposal of application for eviction  under s.  14(1) (e)  and s.  14A, Section  25B provides that  when an  application is filed by the landlord under either  s. 14(1)(e)  or s.  14A, the  tenant shall not contest the prayer for eviction unless he files an affidavit and obtains  leave  from  the  Controller.  Sub-section  (5) requires that  the affidavit  filed  by  the  tenant  should

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disclose such  facts as  would disentitle the landlord from, obtaining, an  order for  the recovery  of possession of the premises on the ground specified in s. 14 (1)(e) or s. 14A.      The  appellant   (landlord)  let  out  his  residential accommodation in  New Delhi  to the respondent (tenant). The landlord was  a Government  servant who  had  been  allotted Government accommodation in New Delhi. On 9th December. 1975 the Government  issued a notice to the landlord calling upon him to  vacate Government  accommodation allotted to him. Tn the meantime  the landlord  retired  from  service  on  30th November, ]975.  On 9th  December, 1975 the landlord filed a petition for  eviction of  the tenant  from his  house.  The tenant raised  three objections as to the maintainability of the petition:  (i) that   the  landlord could not invoke the provisions of  s. 25B(5)  because he  was not  a  Government servant on  the date  of the  petition; (ii)  that since the ground on 8-978SCI/78 410 which eviction was sought in the petition was the same which had already  been filed  by the  landlord  and  was  pending before the  Rent  Controller,  the  petition  could  not  be entertained, and  (iii) that  the premises  occupied by  him were let  out for  residential or  professional purposes and therefore the  landlord was not entitled to ask for eviction as the premises were not let for residential purposes alone.      The Rent  Controller rejected  all the  contentions and refused  leave  to  the  tenant  to  defend  the  landlord’s eviction petition. He held that (i) the question whether the landlord was  a Government  servant or  not on the date when the notice  was received  and on  the date  when he  filed a petition  was   irrelevant  so  long  as  he  satisfied  the requirements laid  down in  s. 14(1),  (ii) the  ground  for eviction under  s.  14A  was  a  new  cause  of  action  and different from  the one raised in the previous petition and, therefore the  petition was  not barred,  (iii) it  was  not necessary  for  an  application  under  s.  14(1)  that  the building should  have been  let for  residential purposes as required under  s.  14(1)  (e),  it  is  sufficient  if  the landlord required the premises for residential accommodation .      Allowing the  tenant’s revision,  the High  Court  held that since  the landlord  had retired  from service  On 30th November, 1975  before the  Ordinance came  into force,  the tenant was  not liable  to vacate the premises independently of his ownership in the Premises in dispute.      Allowing the appeal. ^      HELD: 1  (a) Section  14A does  not  require  that  the person who  was in,  occupation of  the premises allotted by the Government  should be  a Government  servant. The policy decision of  9th September.  1975 related only to Government servants who were in occupation of premises allotted to them by the  Government. But  later the Government seemed to have realised  that   some  provision   should  be  made  to  get possession  of  the  premises  let  to  persons  other  than Government servants  and who owned their own houses in Delhi and whose premises had been let out to tenants. Although the circular dated  9th September,  1975 as  well as  the notice served by  the Government  on the  landlord support the view that the  intention of  the Government  was to  enable  only those  Government   servants  who   were  in  occupation  of Government  accommodation   and  who  owned  houses  to  get immediate                                         possession . s.  14A does  not restrict  the right to recover immediate

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possession to  Government servants  alone. Therefore, taking into account  the object of the Act, the meaning of the word "person" cannot  be confined  to Government servants because Government accommodation was provided not only to Government servants but to others as well. [417C-F]           Nihal Chand v. Kalyan Chand lain. [1978] 2 SCR 183      at p. 190, referred to.      (b) It  is not  necessary in  a petition  for  eviction under s.  14A to  specify that  the premises  were  let  for residential purpose  only. The  words used  in  s.  14A  are clearly different.  This section  contemplates the owning by the landlord  in Delhi of a residential accommodation. If he owns a residential accommodation he had the right to recover immediately possession  of any  premises let  out by him. If the premises were one intended for residential accommodation it would  not make  any difference  if the premises were let for residential as well 411 as other purposes. Evendif the residential accommodation was let for  professional or  commercial purposes,  the premises would  not   cease  to  be  for  residential  accommodation. Moreover the  requirement in  s. 14(1)(e) that to enable the landlord to  recover possession  the premises  ought to have been let for residential purposes is not found in s. 14A(1). [421A-C]           Busching Schmitz  Private Ltd.  v. P. T. Mengham &      Anr. [1977] 3 SCR 312, referred to.      2. The  submission that  as a  previous application for possession by the land lord was pending, a petition under s. 14A would  not be  permissible  has  no  force  because  the grounds on  which the  application for  possession was  file under s.  14A(1) Are  different and  ale  based  on  special rights conferred  on  the  class  of  persons  who  occupied Government accommodation. [421D]      (a) The  scope of  s. 25B is very restricted, for leave to contest  can only be given if the facts are such as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession  on the  ground specified  in s. 14A. Leave to contest an  application under s. 14A(1) cannot be said to be analogous to  the provisions  of grant  of leave  to  defend envisaged in the C.P.C. [422C & A]      (b) The  provisions of s. 25B and s. 25C are applicable to both  applications under  s. 14(1)(e) and under s 14A. By the introduction of s. 25C the condition imposed in s. 14(6) is varied.  The condition imposed under s. 14(6) is made not applicable to  persons who satisfy the requirements under s. 14A meaning thereby that this restriction will be applicable only to  an application  under s.  14(1)(e). Section  25C(2) makes it  clear that  not only in the case of an application under s.  14(1)(e) but  also under  s. 14A  the term  of six months prescribed  in s.  14(7) is reduced to two months. By prescribing a  specific period of two months under s. 25C(2) it is  made clear  that even an applicant under s. 14A would have to  satisfy the conditions laid down by s.25C, that is, period of  two months  should elapse before the landlord is’ entitled to  obtain possession from the date of an order for recovery of possession. [423D-G]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2302 of 1977.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated 6th  December. 1976  of the  Delhi High Court in Civil

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Revision No.247 of 1976.      Rameshwar Nath, for the Appellant.      G. L.  Sanghi. S.  S. Ray, S. R. Agarwal, Praveen Kumar and B. Mohan for the Respondent.      The  judgment of the Court was delivered by      KAILASAM. J.-This  appeal is  by special  leave by  the landlord against;  the judgment  of the  High Court of Delhi whereby it  allowed a  revision of the respondent-tenant and set  aside   the  order  of  eviction  passed  by  the  Rent Controller,  Delhi,   rejecting  the   application  of   the respondent seeking permission to contest the proceedings for eviction filed  by tile appellants under section 14(A)(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. 412      The appellant,  Shri B. N. Muttoo, Inspector General of Police, Leased  the property  No. F-9,  East of Kailash, New Delhi, to  the respondent  from 15th  September, 1972  at  a monthly rent  o.‘ Rs.  2,200/- exclusive  of electricity and water charges. The lease was for the use of the premises for residential and/or  professional purposes  only and  not for commercial purposes.  The lease  agreement was  renewed from time to  time and  the respondent  became a  monthly  tenant under the  Delhi Rent  Control Act, 1958. On 18th July, 1974 the landlord filed a petition for eviction of the respondent on the  grounds  OF  mis  user,  subletting  and  bona  fide requirement. The  petition was registered as Suit No. 182 of 1974 and is still pending.      The first appellant, B. N. Muttoo, retired as Inspector General of Police on 30th November, 1975. While in office he was occupying premises bearing No. C-II/ 77 Moti Bagh I, New Delhi, allotted  to him by the Government. On 9th September, 1975 the Government took a decision that Government servants who own  houses in the locality should vacate the Government accommodation allotted  to them  within 3  months  from  1st October, 1975.  On 9th December, 1975 a notice was served on the first  appellant by  the Deputy Director (Admn.) stating that the  Government by  its Office Memorandum No. 12031(1)/ 74-Pol.II dated  9th September  1975 required all Government officials who,  own houses  in Delhi  and New Delhi and have also been  allotted I‘  Government. residence  to vacate the Government residence  before  the  stipulated  date  failing which penal  rate of licence of market rate shall be charged besides necessary  action to  evict him  from the Government residence. On  the same  day the appellant filed the present Suit for  eviction of  the respondent. On 16th January, 1976 the respondent  applied ’or  leave to defend. On 10th March, 1976 the  Rent Controller refused leave and decreed the suit filed by  the landlord. A revision petition was filed by the respondent before  the High Court which allowed the revision and set  aside the order of the Rent Controller and remanded the  proceedings   to  the   Rent  Controller  for  disposal according to  law. Against  the  order  of  the  High  Court allowing the  revision by  the respondent the present appeal has been preferred to this Court by the landlord.      The question  that arises in this appeal is whether the Rent  Con  troller  was  right  in  refusing  leave  to  the respondent to  defend   the eviction  petition filed  by the landlord.      In order  to  appreciate  the  point  that  arises  for consideration it  is necessary  to  refer  to  the  relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Delhi Rent Control Act (Act 59 of 1958) came into force on 413 31st December,  1958.  By  Chapter  III  the  right  of  the landlord to   evict  the tenant  was restricted.  Section 14

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prohibited any order or decree for recovery of possession of any of  the premises  being made by any court in favour of a landlord except  under certain  circumstances. The  landlord was required  to make  an application  to the Controller for recovery of  the possession  on one of the grounds mentioned in sub-clauses  (a) to  (1) in section 14(1). The provisions of section 14(1)(e) which are relevant may be referred to:-           "14. (1)  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary      contained in  any other  law or  contract, no  order or      decree for  the recovery  of possession of any premises      shall be  made by  any court or Controller in favour of      the landlord against a tenant:           Provided  that   the   Controller   may,   on   an      application made  to him in the prescribed manner, make      an order for the recovery of possession of the premises      on one or mote of the following grounds, namely:-      (a) X X X      (b) X X X      (c) X X X      (d) X X X      (e) that  the premises let for residential purposes are required bona  fide by  the landlord  for  occupation  as  a residence For  himself or  for  any  member  of  his  family dependent on  him, if  he is  the owner  thereof, or for any person for  whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or  such person  has no  other reasonably  suitable residential accommodation:      Explanation the  purposes of  this clause "premises let for residential  purposes" include any premises which having been let  for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord,  used incidentally  for  commercial  or  other purposes;      By the  Delhi Rent  Control Act  (Amendment)  Ordinance (No. 24  of 1975),  1975 the  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act  was amended. the  Ordinance was eventually replaced by the Delhi Rent Control  (Amendment) Act  No. 18  of 1976. The Amending Act continued  the provisions  of the Ordinance but extended the  summary  procedure  which  was  applicable  to  section 14(1)(e) to  evictions on  the ground set out in section 14A of the  Act. The Amending Act came into force on February 9, 1976 but by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 1 it was 414 deemed to have come into force on 1st December, 1975 i.e. On the date on which the Ordinance came into force. Section 14A conferred  a   right  to  recover  immediate  possession  of premises to  certain persons.  The  amended  section  14A(1) reads:           "(1) Where  a landlord  who,  being  a  person  in      occupation of  any residential premises allotted to him      by the  Central Government  or any  local authority  is      required, by,  or  in  pursuance  of,  any  general  or      special order  made by that Government or authority, to      vacate such  residential accommodation,  or in default,      to incur  certain obligations,  on the  ground that  he      owns, in  the Union  territory of  Delhi a  residential      accommodation either  in his own name or in the name of      his wife or dependent child, there shall accrue, on and      from  the   date  of  such  order,  to  such  landlord,      notwithstanding anything  contained elsewhere  in  this      Act or  in any other law for the time being in force or      in any contract (whether express or implied), custom or      usage to  the contrary,  a right to recover immediately      possession of any premises let out by him:"      This  section   confers  on   a  landlord  who  owns  a residential accommodation. in his own name or in the name of

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his wife  or dependent child in the Union territory of Delhi and was  in occupation  of any residential premises allotted to him  by the Central Government or any local authority and is required  by any  general or  special order  made by  the Government or  the  authority  to  vacate  such  residential accommodation or  in default to incur certain obligations on the ground that he owns a residential accommodation in Delhi either in  his own  name or  in the  name  of  his  wife  or dependent child,  a right  shall accrue  to such landlord to recover immediate possession of any premises let out by him. Apart from  conferring rights  under section  14A a  summary procedure for  trial  of  applications  made  under  section 14(1)(e) and section 14A is provided under sections 25A, 25B and 25C. Section 25A provides that the provisions of Chapter IIIA which  contains sections  25A, 25B and 25C and any rule made thereunder  shall have  effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith  contained else  where in this Act or any other  law for  the time  being in  force.  The  special procedure for  disposal of  application for  eviction  under section 14(1)(e)  and section  14A is  prescribed by section 25B. The  procedure envisaged  is that  when an  application under section 14(1)(e) 415 or Section 14A is filed by the landlord the Controller shall issue summons  in the  prescribed form.  Sub-section (4)  to section 25B  restricts the  right of the tenant to defend by providing that  the tenant  shall not contest the prayer for eviction from  the premises  unless he  files  an  affidavit stating the  grounds  on  which  he  seeks  to  contest  the application  for   eviction  and   obtains  leave  from  the Controller. In default of his appearance in pursuance of the summons or  his obtaining  such leave, the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be  admitted by  the tenant  and the  applicant shall  be entitled to  an order  for eviction on the ground aforesaid. Sub-section (5)  to section  25B states the conditions under which the  Controller shall  give leave  to  the  tenant  to contest the  application. It  requires  that  the  affidavit filed by  the tenant  should disclose  such facts  as  would disentitle the  landlord from  obtaining an  order  for  the recovery  of  possession  of  the  premises  on  the  ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14,  or under  section 14A.  When once  the leave is granted  to  the  tenant  to  contest  the  application  the Controller shall  commence hearing  of  the  application  as early as practicable.      The introduction of section 14A became necessary as the Government took  a decision  on 9th September, 1975 that the Government servants who own houses in the Union territory of Delhi shall  be required  to vacate Government accommodation allotted to  them within 3 months from 1st October, 1975. If they fail  to vacate  the  accommodation  they  were  to  be charged licence fee at market rates. The Government servants who were  owing houses in the Union territory of Delhi could not get  possession of  their residential  accommodation. It became necessary  to confer  on them  the right  to  recover immediate possession of their premises and also to prescribe an expeditions procedure for achieving the object. According to the  procedure specified  in  section  25B  it  was  made incumbent on  the tenant  to apply  for and  obtain leave to contest the application for eviction      Coming to the facts of the case the Government took the decision to  require the  Government officers  who have been allotted premises  by the  Government and  who own their own houses in the area specified to vacate the premises allotted

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by the  Government within  3 months  from 1st October, 1975. Notice of  such intention was conveyed to be landlord on 9th December, 1975.  In the meantime on 30th November, 197’; the officer retired  from service.  Thus on the date 11 on which notice was  served  on  him  he  had  already  retired.  The petition for  eviction was  also filed on 9th December, 1975 after the 416 officer retired.  The main  contentions raised by the tenant in the  petition for  leave to contest were;(1) the landlord cannot invoke the provisions of section 25B(5) as he was not a Government  servant on  the date  of the petition; (2) the landlord had already filed a petition for eviction which was registered as  O.S. No.  182 of  1974 and was pending before the Additional Rent Controller. As the eviction is sought on the same  ground in  the present  petition it  was submitted that  this  petition  could  not  be  entertained;  (3)  the premises which the respondent is occupying were  let for the purpose  of   residential  or   professional  purposes   and therefore the  landlord is  not entitled to ask for eviction as the premises are not let for residential purposes.      The Rent  Controller rejected  all the  contentions put forward by  the respondent.  He held that the question as to whether the  landlord was a Government servant or not on the date when  the notice  was received  and on the date when he filed the petition is irrelevant so long as he satisfied the requirements laid  down in  section 14(1) of the Act. on the second contention  the Rent Controller found that the ground for eviction  under section 14A is a new cause of action and different from  the one  that was  raised  in  the  previous petitions and  hence the  present petition is not barred. On the third  point the  Rent Controller  found that  it is not necessary for  an application  under section  14(1) that the building should  have been  let for  residential purposes as required under section 14(1) (c) and it is sufficient if the landlord   requires    the    premises    for    residential accommodation. The  Rent Controller held that the grounds on which leave  to resist  an application  can be  granted  are those that are specified in section 25B(5) alone.      On appeal  the High  Court allowed  the revision by the tenant  mainly  on  the  ground  that  the  application  for eviction must fail on account of the admitted t‘act that the landlord had  retired from  service on  30th November,  1975 before the Ordinance came into force and was on that account liable to  vacate the  premises independently  of his  owner ship of the premises in dispute.      The important question that arises for consideration is whether the  landlord  who  retired  from  service  on  30th November, 1975  before the  Ordinance came  into force could avail himself of the provisions of section 14A(1). A reading of section  14A discloses  that a right to recover immediate possession of  premises accrues  to certain  persons if  the requisite conditions  are satisfied. The conditions are: (1) the landlord  must  be  in  occupation  of  any  residential premises allotted  to him  by the  Central Government or any local authority; (2) such 417 landlord is  required by  a general or special order made by the Government  or  authority  to  vacate  such  residential accommodation or  in default to incur certain obligations on the ground  that he  owns in  the Union territory of Delhi a residential accommodation  either in  his on  name or in the name of  his  wife  or  dependent  child  If  the  aforesaid conditions are  satisfied a  right shall  accrue to  such  a landlord on  and from  the date  of such  order  to  recover

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immediate possession  of any premises let out by him. It may be noted  that the  section does not require that the person who is  in  occupation  of  the  premises  allotted  by  the Government should  be a  Government servant. It is necessary that the  person is  required by the Government or authority to vacate  such accommodation  imposing certain consequences in the  event of his not vacating. The policy decision taken by the  Government on  9th September,  1975 only  related to Government servants  who  were  in  occupation  of  premises allotted to  them  by  the  Government.  If  the  Government servant had  another house  in the locality he was to vacate within 3  months from  the 1st  October, 1975.  This general order no  doubt relates  only to  government servants. After the decision  was taken  it was realized that some provision should be  made to  enable  the  persons  in  occupation  of buildings  allotted   to  them  by  the  Government  to  get possession of  the houses  they own  but have  been  let  to tenants. In  order to  enable them  to get possession of the premises let by them expditiously section 14A(1) was enacted and the  expeditious procedure  under section  25-B was made applicable. It  may also  be noted  that the order served on the  landlord  on  9th  December,  1975  mentions  that  all Government officials  who own  houses in Delhi and have also been allotted  Government residence are to vacate Government accommodation. the  general circular  dated  9th  September, 1975 as  well as  the notice  served on  the  landlord  thus support the view that the intention of the Government was to enable only  those Government servants who are in occupation of Government  accommodation  and  who  own  houses  to  get immediate possession,  though section  14A does not restrict the right  to recover  immediate  possession  to  Government servants alone.  In  these  circumstances,  the  conclusions arrived at  by the  High Court that a Government servant who had retired  before the  date on  which  he  had  filed  the application is not entitled to the benefits of section 14(1) is understandable.  This view was expressed by this Court in Nihal Chand  v. Kalyan Chand Jain(1) wherein it was observed "There appears  to be  some force  in the  view taken by the High Court  that the  provision of  section 14A(1)  was  not intended for Govern-      (1) [1978] 2 S.C.R. 183 at p. 190. 418 ment servant who have retired from Government service or who have been  transferred outside  Delhi ."  But this Court did not decide the issue because on the facts of the case it was of the  view that  the landlord  was entitled  to invoke the provisions of  section 14A(1)  notwithstanding the fact that he had retired from Government service with effect from 30th November, 1975.  In that  case the  notice was served on the appellant landlord  on 30th September, 1975 which was before the date of retirement which was on 31st November’, 1975. On the ground that the right to evict the tenant accrued to the landlord when  he was  in service  it was  held that  he was entitled to  the rights conferred under section 14A. In this case the  notice was  served on  9th December,  1975 and the officer had retired on 30th November, 1975. On the reasoning in the  above case the appellant will not be entitled to the relief. The  question therefore squarely arises in this case as to  whether a  Government servant  who retired before the notice was  served on  him requiring  to quit the Government accommodation is entitled to the benefit of section 14A(1).      It is  not  clear  as  to  why  the  right  to  recover immediate possession  is not confined to Government servants alone under  section 14A.  It is  clear  that  according  to Government’s policy  statement the  intention  was  only  to

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require the  Government  servants  to  vacate  the  premises allotted to  them by  the Government  if they  had their own houses in  the area.  It cannot  be  said  that  it  was  by inadvertance that  the Legislature mentioned persons instead of Government  servants and  made the  section applicable to persons other  than Government servants. It is stated at the Bar that  Government accommodation  is provided  not only to Government servants  but also  to Members  of Parliament and other non-officials who occupy important positions in public life. The Court will not be justified in presuming that when the legislature  used  the  word  "persons"  it  meant  only Government servants.  The rule  as to  construction  of  the statutes is  well-known and  has  been  clearly  laid  down. Craies on Statute Law (6th Ed. p. 66) relying on Tasmania v. Common wealth(1) has stated the rule as follows:-           "The cardinal  rule for  the constructions of Acts      of Parliament is that the should be construed according      to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves.        The Court has to determine the intention as expressed by the  words used.  If the words of statutes are themselves precise and  unambiguous then  no more can be necessary than to expound  those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in      (1) [1904] 1 C.L.R. 329. 419 such a  case best  declare the  intention of  the  lawgiver. Taking into  A account  the object of the Act there could be no difficulty  in giving  the  plain  meaning  to  the  word "person" as not being confined to Government servants for it is  seen   that  accommodation  has  been  provided  by  the Government not  only to  Government servants  but to  others also. In the circumstances, the Court cannot help giving the plain and unambiguous meaning to the section. It may be that the Retired Government servants as well as others who are in occupation of  Government accommodation  may become entitled to a  special advantage,  but the purpose of the legislation being  to   enable  the  Government  to  get  possession  of accommodation provided  by them  by enabling the allottee to get immediate  possession of  the residential  accommodation owned but  let by  them, the  Court will not be justified in giving a  meaning which  the words used will not warrant. On this question  therefore we  find ourselves unable to concur with the view taken by he High Court.      The next  question that  arises is  whether the  rights conferred under  section 14A(1)  are available  to  premises that had  been let  for residential  as well as professional purposes. It  is admitted  that the  premises were  let  for residential  as   well  as  professional  purposes.  Section 14(1)(e) requires  that in  order to avail the provisions of section 14(1)(e)  the premises  should be  "let for use as a residence’. It  has been held that when premises are let for residential as  well as  commercial or  for residential  and professional purposes  the provisions  of  section  14(1)(e) will not apply. This Court in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. S. K. Bhardwaj  and Anr.,(1)  in construing section 13(1)(e) of the Delhi  and  Ajmer  Rent  Control  Act,  1952  held  that premises let for residential purposes but used by the tenant with the consent of the landlord incidentally for commercial professional or  other purposes cease to be premises let for a residential  purpose alone  and as such the landlord would not be  entitled to  eject the tenant under section 13(1)(e) of the  Act. Section 13(1)(e) allowed a decree for ejectment to be passed if the Court is satisfied that the premises let for residential  purposes are  required  bona  fide  by  the landlord who is the owner of such premises for occupation as

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a residence  tor himself  or his  family and  that he has no other suitable  accommodation. On  the facts  of the case it was found  that right from the commencement of the tenancy a substantial part  of the  premises was  used by respondent I for his  professional purpose, and they have also found that this has  been  done  obviously  with  the  consent  of  the landlord. The  Court held  that the  professional use  of  a substantial part Or the premises with      (1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 678. 420 the consent  of the appellant clearly takes the case outside section 13(1)(e).  The view  expressed in the above case was reiterated by  this Court  in Kartar  Singh v.  Chaman Lal & Ors.(1) On the facts it was found that the premises had been taken for residential-cum-business or professional purposes. By the  rent deed  the owner  inducted as a tenant Labha Mal Arora who  was practising advocate. Along with the rent deed a letter  was written  by the landlord to the tenant stating that  he   had  no   objection  to  the  tenant  having  his professional office  along with  the  residence.  After  the tenant’s death  in 1952  the premises  were  used  only  for residence by  his sons  and widow till 1957. In August, 1957 the first  respondent  who  qualified  himself  as  a  legal practitioner started  having  an  office  in  the  premises. Another son  also started practising as a lawyer in the same premises sometime later. The landlord served a notice on the sons and  widow of the deceased for requiring them to vacate the premises.  The court  found two  rooms were  used by the original tenant as his office, one room by his clerk and the premises had  been let  for residence-cum business purposes. The plea  that the  tenant was only granted a licence to use the premises for residence-cum-profession which was personal to him  and which  came to  an end  on  his  death  was  not accepted. The  court agreed  with the  view expressed in Dr. Gopal Dass  Verma’s case  (supra) that a tenant could not be ejected  under  section  13(1)(h)  because  the  tenancy  of premises let  out or  used for  residence and carrying on of profession could  not be  terminated merely  by showing that the tenant  had acquired  a suitable  residence.  the  court rejected the  contention that  the tenant,  Labha Mal Arora, had been merely given a permission or licence which was of a personal nature  of his  office. It  also was unable to find that any test of dominant intention was applied in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma’s case.      It is  not necessary  for us  to go  into the  question whether the  words  "let  for  residential  purposes"  would exclude premises  let predominantly for residential purposes with a licence to use an insignificant part for professional purposes such  as lawyer’s  or doctor’s consulting room. The words used in section 14A are clearly different. Section 14A contemplates  the  owning  by  the  landlord  in  the  Union territory of Delhi a residential accommodation. If he owns a residential  accommodation   he  has   a  right  to  recover immediately possession  of any  premises let out by him. The emphasis is  on residential  accommodation. If  the premises are one  intended for  residential accommodation it will not make any difference if the premises are let for residential      (1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 9. 421 as well  as other  purposes.  Even  though  the  residential accommodation is let for professional or commercial purposes the  premises   will  not   cease  to   be  for  residential accommodation. It  is common  ground that  the Premises  let were put  up under  the Delhi Development Authority’s scheme for residential  purposes. The  only plea was that though it

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was  put   up  for  residential  purposes  it  was  let  for residential  as  well  as  for  professional  purposes.  The requirement in  section 14(1)(e) that in order to enable the landlord to  recover possession  the premises  ought to have been let  for residential  purposes is  not there in section 14A(1). In this view we agree with the High Court that it is not necessary  in a  petition for eviction under section 14A to satisfy  that it  was let  for residential purposes only. This view  has been  taken by this Court in Busching Schmitz Private Ltd. v. P. T. Menghani and Anr. (1)      The submission  that  as  a  previous  application  for possession by   the landlord was pending this petition would not be  permissible cannot  be accepted  as the  grounds  on which an  application for  possession is filed under section 14A(1) are  different and  based on special rights conferred on  the   class   of   persons   who   occupied   Government accommodation.      The only  other question  that remains to be considered is the  scope of  the right to contest the suit, that is, on what grounds  can the  tenant seek  leave to resist the suit filed by  the landlord  under section  14A(1).  The  special procedure prescribed under section 25B is made applicable in cases where  the landlord applies for recovery of possession on any  o f  the grounds  specified in  clause  (c)  of  the Proviso to  subsection (1)  of section  14 or  under section 14A. Sub-section (5) of section 25B says that the Controller shall give  leave to the tenant to contest it’ the affidavit filed  by   the  tenant  discloses  such  facts  that  would disentitle the  landlord from  obtaining an  order  for  the recovery of  possession  of  the  premises  on  the  grounds specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 or section 14A. Under section 14(1)(e) the tenant may resist  the application  on the grounds specified namely that the premises are not let for residential purposes, that they are  not required  holla fide  etc. So far as the facts which would  disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order under section  14A are  concerned they call only be that the landlord is  not  a  person  in  occupation  OF  residential premises allotted  to him  by the Central Government or that no general  or special order has been made by the Government requiring him to vacate such residential accommodation      (1) [1977] 3 S.C.R. 312. 422 on the  terms specified  in the section. Leave to contest an application under  section  14A(1)  cannot  be  said  to  be analogous to  the provisions, of grant of leave to defend as envisaged in the Civil Procedure Code. Order XXXVII, Rule 2, sub-rule (3)  of the  Code of  Civil Procedure provides that the defendant  shall not appear or defend the suit unless he obtains leave  from a  Judge as  hereinafter provided  so to appear and  defend. Sub-rule  (1) of Rule 3 of Order XXXVIII lays  down   the  procedure   to  obtain  leave.  Under  the provisions leave  to appear  and defend  the suit  is to  be given if  the affidavit  discloses such  facts as would make incumbent on the holder to prove consideration or such other facts as  the court  may  deem  sufficient  to  support  the application. The  scope of section 25B(5) is very restricted for leave to contest can only be given if the facts are such as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of  possession on  the ground  specified in section 14A.      The learned  counsel for  the tenant submitted that the requirements of  section 14(1)(e)  should also  be satisfied before the  landlord could  take advantage  of the procedure provided under  section 25B.  The learned  counsel drew  our

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attention to section 25C(1) and section 25C(2) and submitted that the  reading of  these two  sub-sections would indicate that  before   an  eviction   could  be   ordered  under  an application  under   section  14A(1)   the  requirements  of sections 14(6)  and (7)  should be  satisfied. While section 14(1) enumerates the grounds on which the landlord can get a decree for  recovery of  possession against  a  tenant  sub- sections (2)  to (11) place certain restrictions. Subsection (2)  provides  restriction  as  to  right  for  recovery  of possession under section 14(1)(e). Restriction regarding the right to  recover possession  under clause  (e) is laid down ill sub-sections  (6) and  (7) of  section 14. Section 14(6) states that  where a  landlord has  acquired any premises by transfer no application for recovery of possession shall lie under sub-section  (1) on the ground specified in clause (e) of the  proviso thereto,  unless a  period of five years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition. Sub-section (7) to section 14 lays down that where an order for the recovery of possession of  any premises  is made on the ground specified in clause  (e)  of  the  proviso  to  sub-section  (1),  the landlord shall  not be entitled to obtain possession thereof before The  expiration of  a period  of six  months from the date of  the order.  Section 25C  makes an  exception to the requirement of  section 14(6)  to the  effect that  where  a landlord  is  in  occupation  of  any  residential  premises allotted to  him by  the Central  Government  or  any  local authority and who fulfils the requirements of section 14A(1) the requirement  under section  14(6) that  he would  not be entitled to 423 possession unless  a period  of five  years has elapsed from the  date   of  his  acquisition  of  the  premises  is  not applicable  In   other  words,  he  can  straightway  obtain possession without  the  impediment  imposed  under  section 14(6). Great  stress was laid by the learned counsel for the tenant on  section 25C(2) which provides that in the case of a landlord  who, being a person of the category specified in sub-section (1),  has obtained,  on the  ground specified in clause (e)  of the  proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 or under  section 14A, an order for the eviction of a tenant from any  premises, the  provisions  of  subsection  (7)  of section 14  shall have  effect as  if  for  the  words  "six months", occurring  therein, the  words  "two  months"  were substituted The  contention was that if section 14A(1) stood by itself  and if  a landlord  applying under section 14A(1) would straightway get the possession after the tenant cannot contest the  suit on the grounds specified in section 25B(5) there is  no need  for mentioning  the provisions of section 14(1)(6) and  section  14(1)(7)  and  prescribing  a  lesser period for a prescribed period under section 14(7). In other words, the submission was that an application for possession under section  14A should  also satisfy  the requirements of section 14(1)(e).  The provisions of section 25B and 25C are applicable to  both applications  under section 14(1)(e) and under section  14A. Applications  under section 14(1)(e) are governed by section 14(6) and section 14(7). By introduction of section  25C the  condition imposed  in section  14(6) is varied. The  condition imposed  under section  14(6) is made not applicable to persons who satisfy the requirements under section 14A  meaning thereby  that this  restriction will be applicable only  to an  application under  section 14(1)(e). Section 25C(2)  makes it  clear that not only in the case of an application under section 14(1)(e) but also under section 14A the  term of  six months  prescribed in section 14(7) is educed to  two months.  The reason for specifying the period

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or two  months in  the case of section 14A is understandable for otherwise  an  applicant  under  section  14A  would  be entitled  to   possession  immediately.   By  prescribing  a specific period  of two  months under  sec ion  25C(2) it is made clear  that even  an applicant  under section 14A would have to satisfy the conditions laid down by section 25C i.e. a period  of two months should elapse before the landlord is entitled to  obtain possession from the date of an order for recovery of possession. This submission also fails.      In the  result we  hold that  the landlord  who retired before the date on which the notice to quit was given by the Government is  also entitled  to the benefits of section 14A and allow the appeal. P.B.R                                         Appeal allowed 424