Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICITION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.933-935 OF 2004

B. Manmad Reddy & Ors. …Appellants

Versus

Chandra Prakash Reddy & Ors. …Respondents

WITH  CIVIL APPEAL NOS.937-939 OF 2004

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. These appeals  by special  leave  arise  out of  a  common  

order passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh whereby  

Writ Petition Nos.537, 2073, 2075, 7234 and 11033 of 2002  

have  been partly  allowed,  and the  order  passed  by  Andhra

Pradesh Administrative  Tribunal  set  aside to  the  extent the  

same had declared Note 1(i) to Rule 3 of the Andhra Pradesh  

Educational  Service  Rules  to  be  unconstitutional.  To  the  

extent the Tribunal had declared Note 6 to Rule 3 of the Rules  

aforementioned to be ultra vires the High Court has affirmed  

the  view  taken  by  the  Tribunal  and  dismissed  the  writ  

petitions. It is noteworthy that the State of Andhra Pradesh  

has not assailed the judgment delivered by the High Court of  

Andhra Pradesh. The present appeals have been preferred by  

the direct recruits to the Andhra Pradesh State Educational  

Service who contend that the Tribunal and the High Court fell  

in error in declaring Note 6 to Rule 3 of the Rules in question  

to be unconstitutional.  

2. The short question that falls for consideration and that  

was  argued  at  considerable  length  before  us  by  learned  

counsel  for  the  parties  is  whether  persons  drawn  from  

different sources and integrated into one class/cadre/category  

can  be  classified  into  separate  categories  for  purposes  of  

promotion on the basis of the source from which they were  

2

drawn. The question is, in our opinion, squarely covered by  

the decisions of this Court to which we shall presently refer  

but  before  we  do  so,  we  may  briefly  set  out  the  factual  

backdrop in which controversy arises.

3. In exercise of the powers vested in it under Sections 78  

and 99 of  the Andhra Pradesh Education Act,  1982 and in  

suppression of  the  earlier  rules,  the Government of  Andhra  

Pradesh  framed  what  are  known  as  “Andhra  Pradesh  

Educational Service Rules”. Rule 2 of the said Rules provides  

for  the  composition  of  the  service  which  broadly  speaking  

comprises  four  distinct  classes  of  employees  enumerated  

under  the  said  Rules.  Each  one  of  these  classes  in  turn  

comprises  different  category  of  officers  enlisted  therein.  For  

instance in Class-I there are in all three category of officers. In  

class II there are seven category of officers; while in class III  

there are 13 category of officers. So also in class IV there are  

four category of officers.  Rule 3 of the said Rules prescribes  

the  method  of  appointment  and  specifies  the  appointing  

authority  for  different  category  of  posts.  Since  we  are  

3

concerned only with promotions to class II category I posts, we  

may extract Rule 3 to the extent the same regulates promotion  

for that class and category:

“3.  Method  of  Appointment  and  Appointing  Authority:- The Method of appointment and appointing  authority for different categories of posts of service shall  be as follows:

   Class Category Method of Appointment Appointing  

Authority 1. xxxx xxx

I 1(a) xxxx xxx 2. xxxx xxx 3. xxxx xxx

II 1 By  promotion  from  Categories1,2,3,4,5,8,10 , 11 and 12 of Class III

Government

xx xxx xxxx xxx”

4. Under  Rule  3  are  placed  Notes  1  to  9  which  govern  

several aspects relating to preparation of seniority lists and the  

method of recruitment to be adopted for different posts as also  

the academic qualifications required for such promotions.  

5. The High Court has, as noticed earlier, declared Note 1 to  

be intra vires to which finding there is no challenge before us.  

It is the validity of Note 6 to Rule 3 which prescribes a roster  

4

for promotion to the post of District Educational Officer and  

Deputy  Director  comprising  category  1  of  Class  II,  that  is  

under attack before us. The Note reads:

“NOTE 6 : for the purpose of promotion to category  1 of class II, the following 12 point cycle shall be  followed from the feeder categories:

1. A.D., G.A.O, and A.P.O.

2. Direct  recruit  Dy.E.O./Gazetted  Head Master  Grade-I,  Lecturer  IASE/CTE/SCERT,  Senior  Lecturer DIET and Special Officer (OS)

3. Promotee Dy.E.O./Gazetted Head Master Gr.I  and P.E.O.

4. Promotee  Lecture  IASE/CTE/SCERT,  Senior  Lecturer DIET and A.D. (NFE)

5. Direct Recruit Dy.E.O./Gazetted Head Master  Gr.I,  Lecturer  IASE/CTE/SCERT,  Senior  Lecturer DIET and Special Officer (O.S.)

6. Promotee  Lecture  IASE/CTE/SCERT,  Senior  Lecturer DIET and A.D. (NFE)

7. A.D., G.A.O, and A.P.O.

8. Direct  recruit  Dy.E.O./Gazetted  Head Master  Grade-I,  Lecturer  IASE/CTE/SCERT,  Senior  Lecturer DIET and Special Officer (OS)

9. Promotee Dy.E.O./Gazetted Head Master Gr.I  and P.E.O.

5

10. Promotee  Lecturer  IASE/CTE/SCERT,  Senior  Lecturer DIET and A.D. (NFE)

11. Direct Recruit Dy.E.O./Gazetted Head Master  Gr.I,  Lecturer  IASE/CTE/SCERT,  Senior  Lecturer DIET and Special Officer (O.S.)

12. Promotee  Lecturer  IASE/CTE/SCERT,  Senior  Lecturer DIET and A.D. (NFE)”

6. A careful reading of Rule 3 (supra) would show that for  

posts in Class II category (1) comprising District Educational  

Officer and Deputy Director, officers comprising categories 1 to  

5, 8, 10, 11 and 12 of class III are eligible for appointment.  

This implies that vacancies in category 1 of class II shall be  

filled up in terms of the 12 point cycle stipulated in Note 6  

(supra).  A  closer  reading  of  Note  6  and  the  roster  for  

appointment  prescribed  therein  would  indicate  that  

appointments against vacancies in class II category 1 would,  

inter alia, depend upon whether the eligible officer is a direct  

recruit or a promotee. For instance, a vacancy at roster Point 2  

would go to a direct recruit Deputy Educational Officer or a  

direct  recruit  Gazetted  Head  Master  Grade  I  or  Lecturer  

IASE/CTE/SCERT or a direct recruit Senior Lecturer DIET or  

6

a Special  Officer  (OS).  In  contradiction,  a  promotee  Deputy  

Educational Officer or a promotee gazetted Head Master Grade  

I will not be eligible for consideration against a vacancy falling  

at  roster  Point  2.  Similarly,  a  promotee  Lecturer  

IASE/CTE/SCERT  or  promotee  senior  Lecturer  DIET  even  

when he or she is a member of the same class as their direct  

recruit counterparts in that category shall have to wait for a  

vacancy to occur at roster Point 4. Suffice it to say that while  

roster  Points  2,  5,  8  and  11  have  been  allotted  to  direct  

recruits, the promotees have been treated differently and can  

be considered for vacancies at roster points 4, 6, 10 and 12  

only.  This  classification  of  persons  drawn  from  different  

sources who stand integrated into one class for the purpose of  

promotion  is  what  was  assailed  on  behalf  of  the  promotee  

officers before the Tribunal primarily on the ground that direct  

recruits  and  the  promotees  may  have  come  from  different  

sources but once they are integrated into one class, there can  

be no classification as between them on the basis of their birth  

marks. The integration of promotees and direct recruits into  

one class would wipe out their birth marks with the result that  

7

the same can not be made a basis for a valid classification.  

Any such classification would amount to classifying equals in  

the  matter  of  further  promotion based solely  on the  source  

from which they were drawn. Relying upon the decisions of  

this Court, the Tribunal and the High Court have held that  

inasmuch as Note 6 to Rule 3 classifies the promotees and  

direct recruits for the purpose of future promotion, even after  

their integration into one cadre the same was discriminatory  

hence ultra vires of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.  

7. Appearing for the appellants Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned  

senior  counsel  argued  that  in  The  State  of  Jammu  and  

Kashmir Vs. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa and Ors. 1974 (1) SCC  

19, this Court has recognised that a classification based on  

higher educational qualifications was permissible even when  

those for whom the classification was made were integrated  

into  one class.  He urged that  the  decision of  this  Court  in  

Roshan Lal Tandon Vs. Union of India 1968 (1) SCR 185,  

reliance whereupon was placed by the Tribunal as also by the  

High Court in support of the view taken by them stood diluted  

8

to  that  extent  implying  thereby  that  the  law  declared  in  

Roshan Lal Tandon’s case (supra) could admit of exceptions,  

one of which based on higher qualifications was recognised in  

Triloki Nath’s case (supra).  Dr. Dhavan strenuously argued  

that  this  Court  could  recognise  the  need  for  correcting  

imbalance, if any, in the filling up of posts by persons drawn  

from different categories as yet another exception to the Rule  

stated in  Roshan Lal Tandon’s case (supra).  He contended  

that the Government had reserved to itself the power to review  

the roster  from time to time,  which power of  review would,  

according to Dr. Dhawan, enable the Government to ensure a  

fair  distribution  of  vacancies  among  all  those  eligible  for  

appointment against the same, but who came from difference  

sources.  

8. Mr. A. Mariarputham, learned senior counsel appearing  

for the contesting respondents, on the other hand, submitted  

that the view taken by the Tribunal  and the High Court  of  

Andhra  Pradesh  declaring  Note  6  to  Rule  3  was  legally  

unexceptionable inasmuch as the said note was on the face of  

9

it  discriminatory  in  so  far  as  the  same  classified  those  

integrated  into  a  particular  category  based  not  on  their  

educational  or  other  qualification  but  whether  they  were  

promotees  or  direct  recruits.  The  legal  position,  argued  the  

learned counsel, was much too well settled by the decisions of  

this  Court  to  admit  of  any  doubt  or  call  for  any  

reconsideration.  It  was  also  not,  according  to  the  learned  

counsel, possible to carve out an exception to the well settled  

legal  position governing permissible  classifications based on  

an assumed imbalance in the filling up of vacancies from out  

of officers drawn from different sources.  

9. In  Roshan  Lal  Tandon’s case  (supra),  one  of  the  

questions  that  fell  for  consideration  was  whether  the  

promotees and direct recruits who formed one class in Grade  

‘D’  could  thereafter  be  classified  again  depending  upon the  

source  from  which  they  were  drawn  for  the  purpose  of  

promotion to the next higher Grade ‘C’. This Court observed:

“In  our  opinion,  the  constitutional  objection  taken  by  the  petitioner  to  this  part  of  the  notification  is  well-founded  and  must  be  accepted  as  correct.  At  the  time  when  the  

10

petitioner  and  the  direct  recruits  were  appointed to Grade ‘D’, there was one class in  Grade  ‘D’  formed  of  direct  recruits  and  the  promotees  from  the  grade  of  artisans.  The  recruits  from  both  the  sources  to  Grade  ‘D’  were  integrated  into  one  class  and  no  discrimination  could  thereafter  be  made  in  favour of recruits from one source as against  the  recruits  from  the  other  source  in  the  matter  of  promotion  to  Grade  ‘C’.  To  put  it  differently,  once  the  direct  recruits  and  promotees  are  absorbed  in  one  cadre,  they  form  one  class  and  they  cannot  be  discriminated  for  the  purpose  of  further  promotion to the higher Grade ‘C’.”  

10. The  above  decision  was  noticed  by  the  Constitution  

Bench of  this Court  in  Triloki Nath’s  case (supra).  In that  

case diploma holder engineers had challenged the validity of  

certain service rules, inter alia, on the ground that inasmuch  

as the said Rules made a distinction between Degree Holder  

members of the Engineering service and Diploma Holders for  

purposes of promotion to the post of Executive Engineers the  

same was unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14 and  

16 of  the  Constitution.  The Rules  in that case provided for  

promotion  of  only  such  of  the  Assistant  Engineers  as  

possessed a bachelor’s degree in engineering or qualification of  

A.M.I.E. and as had put in seven years of service in the J & K  

Engineering Service. The High Court had allowed the petitions  

11

of  Diploma  Holders  and  struck  down  the  Rule  as  

unconstitutional,  holding that  the  Diploma Holders and the  

Degree Holders having been integrated into one category, no  

distinction or classification based on educational qualification  

could thereafter be made between them. In an appeal to this  

Court  that  view  was  reversed.  This  Court  held  that  a  

classification must be truly founded on substantial differences  

that distinguish persons grouped together from those left out  

of the group and such differential attributes must bear a just  

and  rational  relation  to  the  object  sought  to  be  achieved.  

Having said so, this Court observed:

“33. Judged from this point of view, it seems to  us  impossible  to  accept  the  respondents’  submission that the classification of Assistant  Engineers  into  degree-holders  and  diploma- holders rests on any unreal  or unreasonable  basis.  The  classification,  according  to  the  appellants, was made with a view to achieving  administrative  efficiency  in  the  Engineering  services. If this be the object, the classification  is  clearly  co-related  to  it,  for  higher  educational  qualifications  are  at  least  presumptive  evidence  of  a  higher  mental  equipment.  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  administrative efficiency can be achieved only  through  the  medium  of  those  possessing  comparatively  higher  educational  qualifications  but  that  is  beside  the  point.  What  is  relevant  is  that  the  object  to  be  achieved here  is  not  a mere pretence  for  an  

12

indiscriminate  imposition  of  inequalities  and  the  classification  cannot  be  characterized  as  arbitrary or absurd. That is the farthest that  judicial scrutiny can extend.”

11. The Court also observed that the classification made on  

the basis of educational qualifications with a view to achieving  

administrative  efficiency  can  not  be  said  to  rest  on  any  

fortuitous circumstance and that one has always to bear in  

mind  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  in  order  to  

judge the validity of a classification. The ratio of the decision  

in  Roshan Lal Tandon’s  case (supra) was reiterated by their  

Lordship in the following words:

“44. The key words of the judgment are: “The  recruits  from  both  the  sources to  Grade  ‘D’  were  integrated  into  one  class  and  no  discrimination  could  thereafter  be  made  in  favour of recruits from one  source  as against  the  recruits  from  the  other  source in  the  matter  of  promotion  to  Grade  ‘C’,  (emphasis  supplied).  By  this  was  meant  that  in  the  matter of promotional  opportunities to Grade  ‘C’, no discrimination could be made between  promotees and direct recruits by reference to  the source from which they were drawn. That  is  to  say,  if  apprentice  train  examiners  who  were  recruited  directly  to  Grade  ‘D’  as  train  examiners  formed  one  common  class  with  skilled artisans who were promoted to Grade  ‘D’ as train examiners, no favoured treatment  could be given to the former merely because  they were directly recruited as train examiners  and  no  discrimination  could  be  made  as  

13

against  the  latter  merely  because  they  were  promotees.  This  is  the  true  meaning  of  the  observation extracted above and no more than  this  can  be  read  into  the  sentence  next  following: “To put it differently, once the direct  recruits and promotees are absorbed into one  cadre, they form one class and they cannot be  discriminated  for  the  purpose  of  further  promotion to the higher Grade ‘C’.” In terms,  this was just a different way of putting what  had preceded.”

12. In the light of the above pronouncements, the Tribunal  

and the High Court were, in our view, justified in holding that  

Note 6 to Rule 3 was unconstitutional inasmuch as the same  

classified  officers  eligible  for  appointment  against  class  II  

category  1  posts  depending  upon  whether  they  were  direct  

recruits or promotees. Such a classification based on the birth  

mark that stood obliterated after integration of officers coming  

from different source into a common cadre/category would be  

wholly unjustified and discriminatory.  

13. That leaves us with the question whether any imbalance  

among those eligible for appointment against class II category  

1 posts coming from different sources and categories would  

itself justify a classification like the one made in Note 6. Our  

answer  is  in  the  negative.  There  is  no  gainsaying  that  

14

classification must rest on a reasonable and intelligible basis  

and the same must bear a nexus to the object sought to be  

achieved by the statute. By its very nature classification can  

and is often fraught with the danger of resulting in artificial  

inequalities which make it necessary to subject the power to  

classify  to restraints  lest  the guarantee of  equality becomes  

illusory on account of classifications being fanciful instead of  

fair,  intelligible  or  reasonable.  We may gainfully  extract  the  

note of caution sounded by Krishna Iyer J. in his Lordship’s  

separate  but  concurring  judgment  in  Triloki  Nath’s  case  

(supra) :

“……..The dilemma of democracy is as to how  to  avoid  validating  the  abolition  of  the  difference between the good and the bad in the  name  of  equality  and  putting  to  sleep  the  constitutional  command  for  expanding  the  areas of equal treatment for the weaker ones  with  the  dope  of  “special  qualifications”  measured  by  expensive  and  exotic  degrees.  These are perhaps meta-judicial matters left to  the  other  branches  of  Government,  but  the  Court  must  hold  the  Executive  within  the  leading strings of egalitarian constitutionalism  and  correct,  by  judicial  review,  episodes  of  subtle  and  shady  classification  grossly  violative of equal justice. That is the heart of  the matter. That is the note that rings through  the first  three fundamental  rights the people  have given to themselves.”

15

14. In the result we find no merit in these appeals which fail  

and are hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs.  

……………………………J. (MARKANDEY KATJU)

……………………………J. (T.S. THAKUR)

New Delhi February17, 2010

16